Showing posts with label legitimate expectation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label legitimate expectation. Show all posts

Sunday, 6 December 2020

Supreme court: Inter-relation between Promissory Estoppel, Legitimate Expectations and article 14 of Constitution of India


Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations


289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that basis the party concerned must have acted to its prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used against a statutory provision or notification.


290.....In any case, in the absence of any promise, the Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public interest.


(emphasis supplied)


41. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary MANU/SC/0169/2016 : (2016) 4 SCC 236, speaking through Chief Justice T S Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327 : (1990) 170 CLR 1. It then observed:


This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.


Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.


42. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries MANU/SC/0257/1993 : (1993) 1 SCC 71, speaking through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus:


7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law: A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review.


8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the Rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the Rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Civil Appeal Nos. 3860-3862 of 2020 

Decided On: 01.12.2020


The State of Jharkhand Vs. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. and Ors.


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0906/2020

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Sunday, 8 April 2018

Whether a person is entitled to get appointment if his name is in select list?


In Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India : AIR 1991

SC 1612, the issue was considered by the Constitution Bench and it

was held as follows:
“It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted”.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                                                                                   [C.R.]
                                                 PRESENT:

                               MR.JUSTICE P.N.RAVINDRAN
                                                       &
                            MR.JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

                        27TH DAY OF MARCH 2018

                                     WA.No. 342 of 2016 IN WPC. 8905/2012
                                


           G.RADHAKRISHNAN,
Vs
KERALA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
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Sunday, 19 March 2017

Whether encroachment on E class land can be regularized relying on doctrine of legitimate expectation?

  
Madras City Wine Merchants' Association and another  Vs.  State of
T. N. and another (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases 509:
“Legitimate expectation may arise­
(a) if there is an express promise given by a public
authority; or 
(b)   because   of   the   existence   of   a   regular   practice
which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue;
(c) Such   an   expectation   must   be   reasonable.
However, if there is a change in policy or in public
interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation,
no question of legitimate expectation would arise.”

                                                    (emphasis supplied)
10] In the light of aforesaid legal position, it is crystal clear that the
petitioners have no legal right whatsoever to insist for consideration of their
applications for regularization on the basis of Government Resolution dated
28­11­1991. Though it is a fact that the applications moved by the petitioners
were pursuant to the said Government Resolution, these applications were
pending when the State Government came up with a fresh policy by issuing
Government Resolution dated 12­7­2011. The mere fact that the petitioners
had applied for regularization in terms of the earlier policy and the said
applications were pending when the new policy came into force cannot be a
ground to hold that the said applications ought to have been considered as

per the earlier policy. The said applications, therefore, have been rightly
decided in the light of Government  resolution dated 12­7­2011 which is
holding the field. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
WRIT   PETITION    NO.   6466     OF     2015
Bhagwan Kisan Wagh
V
 State of Maharashtra,
CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.
 DATED: 21­-07-­2016.
Citation: 2017(2) MHLJ 425
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When doctrine of legitimate expectation is not applicable?

  Madras City Wine Merchants' Association and another  Vs.  State of
T. N. and another (1994) 5 Supreme Court Cases 509:
“Legitimate expectation may arise­
(a) if there is an express promise given by a public
authority; or 
(b)   because   of   the   existence   of   a   regular   practice
which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue;
(c) Such   an   expectation   must   be   reasonable.
However, if there is a change in policy or in public
interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation,
no question of legitimate expectation would arise.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
10] In the light of aforesaid legal position, it is crystal clear that the
petitioners have no legal right whatsoever to insist for consideration of their
applications for regularization on the basis of Government Resolution dated
28­11­1991. Though it is a fact that the applications moved by the petitioners
were pursuant to the said Government Resolution, these applications were
pending when the State Government came up with a fresh policy by issuing
Government Resolution dated 12­7­2011. The mere fact that the petitioners
had applied for regularization in terms of the earlier policy and the said
applications were pending when the new policy came into force cannot be a
ground to hold that the said applications ought to have been considered as

per the earlier policy. The said applications, therefore, have been rightly
decided in the light of Government  resolution dated 12­7­2011 which is
holding the field. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
WRIT   PETITION    NO.   6466     OF     2015
Bhagwan Kisan Wagh

V
 State of Maharashtra,


CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

 DATED: 21­-07-­2016.
Citation: 2017(2) MHLJ 425
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Monday, 12 December 2016

What is doctrine of settled expectation in respect of regularization of encroachment?

The question whether an applicant would have a vested right to
seek consideration of his request on the basis of the date when he had so
applied   has   been   considered   by   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in  Howrah
Municipal Corpn. v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 663.  In said case, an
application for sanction for construction was made by a Company. As the
sanction was neither granted nor refused within the prescribed period, the
Company had approached the High Court in that regard. The High Court had
directed the Municipal Corporation to consider grant of sanction subject to
fulfillment of requirements.  When the application for sanction was pending,
the Building Rules were amended due to which the sanction as sought was

not   granted.     In   that   background   while   considering   the   question   as   to
whether any vested right had been created in favour of the Company despite
subsequent amendment to the Building Rules, it was observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that with long usage the word “vest” has also acquired a
meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right.”  What the Company had was
only a “legitimate” or “settled expectation” to obtain the sanction. The same
did not create any vested right to obtained the sanction.   The following
observations in para 37 of the aforesaid judgment clarify the position.
“37.............................................................................What   we
can understand from the claim of a “vested right” set up by
the respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building
Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an
application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the
Court for its consideration, it had a “legitimate” or “settled
expectation”   to   obtain   the   sanction.     In   our   considered
opinion, such “settled expectation”, if any, did not create any
vested right to obtain sanction.  True it is, that the respondent
Company   which   can   have   no   control   over   the   manner   of
processing   of   application   for   sanction   by   the   Corporation
cannot   be   blamed   for   delay   but   during   pendency   of   its
application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise
of its rule­making power, amended the Building Rules and
imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G.T. Road
and other wards, such “settled expectation” has been rendered
impossible of fulfilment due to change in law. The claim based
on the alleged “vested right” or “settled expectation” cannot
be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into
force   by   the   State   Government   by   amending   the   Building
Rules and not by the Corporation against whom such “vested
right” or “settled expectation” is being sought to be enforced.
The “vested right' or settled expectation has been nullified not
only by the Corporation but also by the State by amending the
Building Rules, Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or
the so­called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against
public interest and convenience which are sought to be served
by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the
Corporation issued thereupon.”

From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the petitioners
merely had a   “settled expectation” in the matter of regularization of their
encroachment under Government Resolution dated 28­11­1991 and not any
vested right.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
WRIT   PETITION    NO.   6466     OF     2015

Bhagwan Kisan Wagh V  State of Maharashtra,

CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

 DATED : 21­-07­-2016.
Citation: 2016 (5) ALLMR847
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Whether application for regularisation of encroachment can be decided as per provisions applicable on date of their disposal?

I have given due consideration to the respective submissions and
I have gone through the documents filed on record.   As per Government
Resolution   dated   28.11.1991   a   policy   decision   was   taken   by   the   State
Government   to   regularise   encroachments   made   between   01.04.1978   and
14.04.1990.   The manner in which such encroachments could be regularised
was stipulated therein.  In Jagpal Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court
noticed   that   various   lands   that   vested   in   the   grampanchayats   had   been

encroached.   It was noticed that various State Governments had permitted
allotment of such lands to private persons and commercial enterprises on
payment of some money.  It was observed that such Government orders were
illegal.  In that background directions were issued to all State Governments to
prepare schemes for eviction of illegal/unauthorised occupants of such land.
It was observed that such schemes should provide for speedy eviction of
illegal occupants after giving show cause notice and brief hearing. 
Pursuant to this judgment, the State Government brought into
effect  Government  Resolution  dated  12.07.2011.    The  same   was  for   the
purpose of removal of encroachments on E­class lands.  A policy decision was
taken that in future   such lands should be utilised only for implementing
public   utility   services   and   for   implementing   the   policies   of   the   Central
Government and the State Government.  It was also resolved not to allot such
lands to any individual or any private institution.   
7] In R. V. Bhuskute (supra) the Division Bench of this Court while
entertaining   a   public   interest   litigation   in   the   matter   of   removal   of
encroachments issued directions to the State Government to publish a list of
persons who were entitled to take   benefit of Clause 10 of Government
Resolution dated 28.11.1991.  This order passed by the Division Bench was
considered subsequently by another Division Bench in  Bhaskar Bhagwant
Dikkar (supra).   It was observed that the order passed in  R. V. Bhuskute
(supra)  did not  refer  to  the  judgment  of the  Hon'ble  Supreme  Court  in
Jagpal   Singh (supra)  as   well   as   the   Government   Resolution   dated

12.07.2011.   The Division Bench thereafter proceeded to direct the State
Government to implement the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Jagpal   Singh (supra)   as   well   as   the   Government   Resolution   dated
12.07.2011.  A further direction was issued to all Collectors in the State to
recall any order of regularising any encroachment if made under Clause 9(1)
and 9(2) of Government Resolution dated 12.07.2011 and to take possession
of such lands for grazing purpose. 
8] It would be first necessary to consider whether the petitioners can
claim   a   vested   right   for   seeking   consideration   of   their   applications   for
regularization of encroachments in terms of Government Resolution dated
28­11­1991. This would have to be considered in the light of the fact that
when the applications for regularisation were pending, another Government
Resolution dated 12­7­2011 indicating a change in policy came into effect.
The question whether an applicant would have a vested right to
seek consideration of his request on the basis of the date when he had so
applied   has   been   considered   by   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in  Howrah
Municipal Corpn. v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 663.  In said case, an
application for sanction for construction was made by a Company. As the
sanction was neither granted nor refused within the prescribed period, the
Company had approached the High Court in that regard. The High Court had
directed the Municipal Corporation to consider grant of sanction subject to
fulfillment of requirements.  When the application for sanction was pending,
the Building Rules were amended due to which the sanction as sought was

not   granted.     In   that   background   while   considering   the   question   as   to
whether any vested right had been created in favour of the Company despite
subsequent amendment to the Building Rules, it was observed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that with long usage the word “vest” has also acquired a
meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right.”  What the Company had was
only a “legitimate” or “settled expectation” to obtain the sanction. The same
did not create any vested right to obtained the sanction.   The following
observations in para 37 of the aforesaid judgment clarify the position.
“37.............................................................................What   we
can understand from the claim of a “vested right” set up by
the respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building
Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an
application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the
Court for its consideration, it had a “legitimate” or “settled
expectation”   to   obtain   the   sanction.     In   our   considered
opinion, such “settled expectation”, if any, did not crate any
vested right to obtain sanction.  True it is, that the respondent
Company   which   can   have   no   control   over   the   manner   of
processing   of   application   for   sanction   by   the   Corporation
cannot   be   blamed   for   delay   but   during   pendency   of   its
application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise
of its rule­making power, amended the Building Rules and
imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G.T. Road
and other wards, such “settled expectation” has been rendered
impossible of fulfilment due to change in law. The claim based
on the alleged “vested right” or “settled expectation” cannot
be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into
force   by   the   State   Government   by   amending   the   Building
Rules and not by the Corporation against whom such “vested
right” or “settled expectation” is being sought to be enforced.
The “vested right' or settled expectation has been nullified not
only by the Corporation but also by the State by amending the
Building Rules, Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or
the so­called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against
public interest and convenience which are sought to be served
by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the
Corporation issued thereupon.”

From the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the petitioners
merely had a   “settled expectation” in the matter of regularization of their
encroachment under Government Resolution dated 28­11­1991 and not any
vested right.
9. It is also equally well settled that consideration of an application
of the present nature would depend upon the provisions as are applicable on
the date of disposal of the application.   In case of a change in policy, the
application would be liable to be dealt with in the manner and procedure that
is prevailing on the date when such application is considered and decided.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
WRIT   PETITION    NO.   6466     OF     2015

Bhagwan Kisan Wagh V State of Maharashtra,

CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

 DATED : 21­-07­-2016.
Citation: 2016 (5) ALLMR847
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