Showing posts with label representation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label representation. Show all posts

Sunday, 19 August 2018

Whether fresh cause of action will accrue to petitioner on making of repeated representation?

The petitioner has offered an explanation for delay in filing the writ petition. However, the explanation, according to us, is unsatisfactory. The petitioner has referred to various representations and attempted to explain the delay by stating that he persuaded the respondent authorities to redress his grievance. However, according to us, the repeated representation did not give a fresh cause of action to the petitioner and mere making of representation cannot justify his belated approach. According to us, the petitioner is a person who is not vigilant of his rights and has acquiesced with the situation from 2002 to 2014 i.e. almost for a period of 12 years and we do not feel that we should exercise our extraordinary and discretionary writ jurisdiction to help the tardy and indolent/lethargic litigant like the petitioner. The petition filed by the petitioner is grossly belated with no satisfactory explanation for delay. We would not like to extend our discretion to the petitioner who has reflected completely negligent attitude to assert his right and approached us at a belated stage and put the blame on the respondent by attributing that his repeated representations were not replied to by the respondents and therefore there is no delay in filing the present petition. We are not able to persuade ourselves to the submissions made by the learned Counsel and we do not intend to condone the delay when we are of the clear opinion that the present writ petition is hopelessly barred by limitation.

Further the petitioner cannot take benefit of the repeated representations as the said representation will not give him fresh cause of action and would not revive the cause which has become stale.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2058 of 2014

Decided On: 13.10.2017

Debi Prasad Satapathy Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Dharmadhikari and Bharati H. Dangre, JJ.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 285
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Saturday, 14 October 2017

Whether court can presume that prejudice was caused to minor child if she was not properly represented in suit?

The correct view, I think, is that no irregularity by way of an omission to send a notice as required by Order 32, Rule 3 shall operate to render void the presumed representation of the minors in a suit, unless such an omission has in fact prejudiced their defence, and such prejudice is not a matter of assumption or presumption but of proof see Suresh Chunder Waru Choudhry v. Jugut Chunder Pal [1887] 14 Cal. 204, Bhagwan Dayal v. Param Sukh Das [1915] 37 All. 179, and in this Court the case reported in Nachiappa Chetti v. Chinniah Ambalan MANU/TN/0534/1916 : [1916] 4 L.W. 362 and particularly in Ramaswami Chetti v. Doraiswami 1923 Mad. 465. The ratio decidendi in Maruthamalai v. Palani [1913] 37 Mad. 235 is to the same effect. It is clear then that the lower Courts were not justified in setting aside the decree in O.S. No. 274 of 1917 without first considering the question whether in fact the minors had been prejudiced in their defence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 06.02.1924

 K. Tirumalacharyulu alias Ramanujacharyulu and Ors.
Vs.
Ammisetti Venkiah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Wallace, J.

Citation:AIR 1924 Madras 763
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Friday, 21 July 2017

Whether Arbitral Tribunal Can Make Representation To HC For Contempt If Parties Violate Its Orders?

In Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd ., (1999) 2 SCC 479, the Supreme Court observed that though section 17 gives the arbitral tribunal the power to pass orders, the same cannot be enforced as orders of a court and it is for this reason only that section 9 gives the court power to pass interim orders during the arbitration proceedings. Subsequently, in M.D. Army Welfare Housing 9 Organisation v. Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd. , (2004) 9 SCC 619 the Court had held that under section 17 of the Act no power is conferred on the arbitral tribunal to enforce its order nor does it provide for judicial enforcement thereof.
48. In the face of such categorical judicial opinion, the Delhi High Court attempted to find a suitable legislative basis for enforcing the orders of the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 in the case of Sri Krishan v. Anand , (2009) 3 Arb LR 447 (Del) (followed in Indiabulls Financial Services v. Jubilee Plots , OMP Nos.452-453/2009 Order dated 18.08.2009). The Delhi High Court held that any person failing to comply with the order of the arbitral tribunal under section 17 would be deemed to be "making any other default" or "guilty" of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct of the proceedings" under section 27(5) of Act.
The remedy of the aggrieved party would then be to apply to the arbitral tribunal for making a representation to the Court to mete out appropriate punishment. Once such a representation is received by the Court from the arbitral tribunal, the Court would be competent to deal with such party in default as if it is in contempt of an order of the Court, i.e., either under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2A Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
49. The Commission believes that while it is important to provide teeth to the interim orders of the arbitral tribunal as well as to provide for their enforcement, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Sri Krishan v. Anand is not a complete solution. The Commission has, therefore, recommended amendments to section 17 of the Act which would give teeth to the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal and the same would be statutorily enforceable in the same manner as the Orders of a Court. In this respect, the views of the Commission are consistent with (though do not go as far as) the 2006 amendments to Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Pursuant to this report, sub-section(2) to Section 17 was added by the Amendment Act 2015, so that the cumbersome procedure of an Arbitral Tribunal having to apply every time to the High Court for contempt of its orders would no 10 longer be necessary. Such orders would now be deemed to be orders of the Court for all purposes and would be enforced under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in the same manner as if they were orders of the Court.
Thus we do not find Shri Rana Mukherjee's submission to be of any substance in view of the fact that Section 17(2) was enacted for the purpose of providing a "complete solution" to the problem. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court. The matter is remanded to decide the alleged contempt on facts.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Alka Chandewar Vs. Shamshul Ishrar Khan
[Civil Appeal No.8720 of 2017 arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No.3576 of 2016]
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
Dated:6 JULY 2017
Citation:(2017) 16 SCC 119
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Monday, 17 July 2017

Whether high court can reject representation of Judicial officer/Judge without sending it to government?

Claiming that petitioner was having 2 years of service as on the date on which she submitted application for leave, she submitted a representation produced as Ext. P9 dated 16.01.2014 in W.P.(C) No. 13556 of 2014, through proper channel requesting to convert the same as an application under Rule 91 of Part I KSR, as she had availed it for higher studies in law which is beneficial for the Judicial Service. By Ext. P10 representation dated 16.1.2014, she requested the District Judge to forward it to Government, through proper channel. It was followed by another representation dated 16.1.2014 (Ext. P11) stating that there was some mistake in the number of days to be converted as leave under Rule 91. By Ext. P12 letter from the High Court she was informed that the administrative committee of the High Court had already rejected her request in representation for protection of seniority and that request for commutation of leave as one under Rule 91 of Part I KSR, as per Rule 89 was also rejected, as the High Court was not in a position to forward the request to Government without offering remarks, as it will affect the settled seniority in respect of other officers.

32. When the authority which granted leave to petitioner was the Government, the request for commutation of that leave was to be considered by Government. The 2nd respondent was not therefore right in rejecting her representation, without forwarding it under the guise of the circular issued in 1986 or on the reasons stated in Ext. P12. When petitioner's request was one made in terms of the statutory provisions in KSR, even if the High Court is of the view that it is not liable to be granted or converted as requested, the 2nd respondent ought to have forwarded the representation, for consideration by the competent authority. Therefore the order Ext. P12 to the extent it rejected the representation of petitioner without forwarding it to the Government is unsustainable and hence it is quashed accordingly. The 2nd respondent shall forward the same to Government without any further delay; at any rate within a period of 3 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

W.P.(C) Nos. 9440 of 2012 (R) and 13556 of 2014

Decided On: 28.04.2017

 V.G. Anupama Vs.  State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.V. Asha, J.

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Monday, 15 August 2016

When high court should not issue direction to passport authority to consider representation?

In this context, it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (M. Ingaci vs. The Commissioner, Devakottai Municipality, Sivagangai District) 2010 2 Law Weekly 785, wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that there are several instances where unscrupulous petitioners have misused the direction issued to "consider".  It was further held that  there are large-scale misuse of the orders "to consider".  The Division Bench also relied on para Nos. 18 to 210 of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in the case of A.P. SRTC vs. G. Srinivas Reddy (2006) 3 SCC 674 = 2006, 3 Law Weekly 170, wherein in Para Nos. 18 to 20, it was held as under:-
"18.  We may also note that sometimes the High Court dispose of the matter merely with a direction to the authority to 'consider' the matter without examining the issue raised even though the facts necessary to decide the correctness of the order are available.  Neither pressure of work nor the complexity of the issue can be a reason for the court to avoid deciding the issue which requires to be decided, and disposing of the matter with a direction to 'consider' the matter afresh.  Be that as it may.
19. There are also several instances where unscrupulous petitioners with the connivance of 'pliable' authorities have misused the direction 'to consider' issued by Court.  We may illustrate by an example.  A claim, which is stale, time-barred or untenable, is put forth in the form of a representation.  On the ground that the authority has not disposed of the representation within a reasonable time, the person making the representation approaches the High Court with an innocuous prayer to direct the authority to 'consider' and dispose of the representation.  When the court disposes of the petition with a direction to 'consider', the authority grants the relief, taking shelter under the order of the court directing him to 'consider' the grant of relief.  Instances are also not wanting where authorities unfamiliar with the process and practice relating to writ proceedings and the nuances of judicial review, have interpreted or understood the order 'to consider' as directing grant of relief sought in the representation and consequently granting reliefs which otherwise could not have been granted.  Thus, action of the authorities granting undeserving relief, in pursuance of orders to 'consider' may be on account of ignorance, or on account of bona fide belief that they should grant relief in view of the court's direction 'to consider' the claim, or on account of collusion/connivance between the person making the representation and the authority deciding it. Representations of daily-wagers seeking regularisation/absorption in to regular service is a species of cases, where there has been large-scale misuse of the orders 'to consider'.
20. Therefore, while disposing of the writ petition with a direction 'to consider', there is a need for the High Court to make the direction clear and specific.  The order should clearly indicate whether the High Court is recording any finding about the entitlement of the petitioner to the relief or whether the petition is being disposed of without examining the claim on merits.  The court should also normally fix a time-frame for consideration and decision.  If no time frame is fixed and if the authority does not decide the matter, the direction of the court becomes virtually infructuous as the aggrieved petitioner will have to come again to court with a fresh writ petition or file an application for fixing time for deciding the matter."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS


Pronounced on : 07-03-2016

Coram

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. SUBBIAH

Writ Petition No. 7376 of 2015

K. Maiyyan .. Petitioner 

Versus

 The Regional Passport Officer
   Citation:AIR 2016(NOC)525 Mad
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Saturday, 3 May 2014

Whether Theory of representation is applicable to muslim law?

The Madras High Court adopted the above view of the Bombay High Court in the earlier decisions. But in the full bench case of Abdul Majeeth v. Krishnamachariar (1915) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 243 that Court followed the Allahabad High Court in holding that a sale effected, to pay off a debt due from his estate by some of the heirs of a deceased Mahomedan who may be in possession of the whole or part of the estate was binding on them to the extent of their share only and did not bind the other heirs. The reasoning of that decision proceeds on the ground that under Mahomedan law each heir inherits a separate and distinct share and that the theory of representation is unknown to the Mahomedan law, or in other words one heir does not represent the other heirs-(see Dallu Mal v. Hari Das (1901) I.L.R. 23 All. 263 and Manni Gir v. Amar Jati (1935) I.L.R. 58 All. 594. It is obvious ' that if the estate vested immediately on the death of a Mahomedan in each of his heirs in proportion to his share according to the Mahomedan law on account of several inheritance, the theory of representation can have no place. 


Madras High Court
M.Alagiri vs Philomina on 22 December, 2010




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Sunday, 9 February 2014

Whether it is permissible to entertain representation against annual confidential report after lapse of several years?



In the Government's Instructions dated 28.8.1962, it was
emphasized that in the absence of specified procedure for entertaining the
representations against ACR, the authorities had noted that whenever any
officer in a key position is transferred, certain government servants think that
it is a good opportunity to re-open finally settled cases connected with their
conditions of service or disciplinary matters, which may be even several
years old. There was also a tendency of sending advance copies of
representations to all the higher authorities which was leading to unnecessary
work at all levels. At the same time, it was also necessary to ensure a fair

chance of representation to the government employee. Going by these
considerations the detailed procedure was laid down in those Instructions
dated 28.8.1962.
 It reiterated the tendency to entertain
belated representations qua seniority or seeking ante-dated promotion or
expunction of adverse remarks in ACR or appeals against punishments after
lapse of number of years that too whenever any officer in key position is
transferred. It condemned and deprecated this practice in strong words. It also
highlighted that entertainment of such representations after long lapse of time is
not only in contravention of Rules and settled legal position on the subject but it
also creates unnecessary complications/ litigations and unsettles the settled inter
se relativities. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 392 OF 2008

VINOD KUMAR Vs STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

Citation; AIR 2014 SC 33
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