Showing posts with label revision to session court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label revision to session court. Show all posts

Friday, 20 June 2025

Karnataka HC: Revision Petition Before Sessions Court Against Order Passed By Magistrate U/S 143A NI Act Maintainable U/S.397 CrPC

All these judgments considered the purport of an application under Section 143A of the Act and its closure and would hold that revision before the Court of Sessions under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. would be maintainable as an order on the application filed under Section 143A of the Act is not an interlocutory order but an intermediate order. Therefore, I answer the issue that has arisen for consideration holding that an order passed on an application filed under Section 143A of the Act, is not interlocutory order, but an intermediate order, as the application is filed, and the application is closed, under the said provision, determining the rights and liabilities of parties qua the application and revision petition before the Court of Sessions on the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 143A either allowing the application, or rejecting it, would be maintainable for the aggrieved party, be it the complainant or the accused to approach.{Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 5944 of 2023

Decided On: 28.07.2023

Sanjay P.S. Vs. Abhishek M.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation:  MANU/KA/1977/2023.

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Sunday, 2 April 2023

What is the duty of the session court while deciding a revision against an order passed by a magistrate in the Domestic Violence Act?


The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, in 
the impugned judgment and order, has observed that the learned Magistrate failed to consider the evidence, material placed on record and facts elicited on record in proper perspective. While exercising power under appeal, the appellate Court has to write a judgment as provided under Section 354 of Cr.P.C. as it applies to the judgment by the appellate Court. The judgment shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. The appellate Court has to write a Judgment as if it is a trial before it. It has to record the reasons. Writing a Judgment in appeal is rewriting the judgment. The appellate Courts are also governed under rules including standard of reviewing the Judgment and order of the trial Court. It has to reappreciate the evidence and assign the reason for its conclusions. The appellate Court has to assign reasons if it disagrees with the findings of the trial Court. Merely writing a single line about failing to consider the evidence, material placed on record, and the facts elicited in proper perspective is incorrect in law.{Para 6}

7. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not assign any reason, disagreeing with the reasoned order passed by the learned Magistrate. It has erroneously observed without giving reasons that the Magistrate has not properly appreciated the evidence in proper perspective. Same way, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has recorded a single-line reason that there is sufficient evidence to establish the domestic violence caused to the appellant. Again, such a single-line reason is not expected from senior judges like District judges. He appears to have ignored the rules of writing judgment in appeal. On the contrary, the learned Magistrate has discussed the facts in detail. He has considered each and every piece of evidence. He has also considered the law as regards domestic violence and the entitlement of the aggrieved persons under the D.V. Act.

8. In order to seek relief under D.V. Act, the aggrieved person has to prove or prima facie show that there was domestic violence. That compelled him or her to seek relief under the said Act. Domestic violence is sine-qua-non for considering the application under the D.V. Act. In this case, the wife has been residing separately since 2005 from her husband. She never claimed maintenance under either the law or by her own petition. She is getting the interim maintenance of Rs.1,000/- in the divorce petition filed by the husband. It is yet not concluded.

9. Perusal of the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, this Court is of the view that it is well-reasoned order and with correct findings that the respondent/wife failed to prove the domestic violence. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge appears to have not correctly examined the record, considered the rule of appreciating the evidence, and mechanically passed the impugned order. The impugned order is illegal, improper and incorrect, and therefore, it is liable to be set aside. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.36 OF 2020

Murlidhar Vs  Sangita 

CORAM : S.G. MEHARE, J.

DATED : MARCH 09, 2023.

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 15.

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Friday, 10 September 2021

Supreme Court: Against which orders court can entertain criminal revision?

 There are three categories of orders that a court can pass—final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction—that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.{Para 16}

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind—an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

24. The second reason why Amar Nath [Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 CrPC cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 CrPC to set aside an interlocutory order. This is what this Court held : (SCC p. 140, para 3)

“3. While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Sections 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers.”

Supreme Court of India
Girish Kumar Suneja vs Cbi on 13 July, 2017
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Saturday, 20 June 2020

Supreme Court: Session Court should hear accused in revision petition against the dismissal of the protest petition

 The restoration of the complaint by the Additional Sessions
Judge was undoubtedly to the prejudice of the appellant. The right
of the appellant to be heard at this stage need not detain us any
further in view of Manharibhai (supra) observing as follows:
“53.. . . We hold, as it must be, that in a revision
petition preferred by the complainant before the
High Court or the Sessions Judge challenging an
order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint
under Section 203 of the Code at the stage under
Section. 200 or after following the process
contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the
accused or a person who is suspected to have
committed the crime is entitled to hearing by the
Revisional Court. In other words, where the
complaint has been dismissed by the Magistrate
under Section 203 of the Code, upon challenge to
the legality of the said order being laid by the
complainant in a revision petition before the High
Court or the Sessions Judge, the persons who are
arraigned as accused in the complaint have a right
to be heard in such revision petition. This is a
plain requirement of Section 401(2) of the Code. If
the Revisional Court overturns the order of the
Magistrate dismissing the complaint and the
complaint is restored to the file of the Magistrate
and it is sent back for fresh consideration, the
persons who are alleged in the complaint to have
committed the crime have, however, no right to

participate in the proceedings nor are they entitled
to any hearing of any sort whatsoever by the
Magistrate until the consideration of the matter by
the Magistrate for issuance of process. We answer
the question accordingly. The judgments of the
High Courts to the contrary are overruled.”
8. The impugned orders dated 6.03.2009 and 08.10.2007 are
held to be unsustainable in their present form. They are therefore
set aside. The matter is remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge,
Greater Mumbai to hear the revision application afresh after notice
to the appellant also and then pass a fresh reasoned and speaking
order to his satisfaction.

NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2183 OF 2011

SUBHASH SAHEBRAO DESHMUKH Vs  SATISH ATMARAM TALEKAR

NAVIN SINHA, J.
Dated:June 18, 2020
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Friday, 1 May 2020

Whether it is improper for the appellate court to dismiss revision petition on the technical plea of limitation?

I am of the opinion that the Revisional Court took rather dogmatic view while dismissing the Revision Application on technical plea of limitation.
8. What appears from the record is that when the criminal prosecution was stopped u/s 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant was not heard, as regards the question of disposal of the property. The learned Judicial Magistrate (F.C.) ordered confiscation of the cash amount without giving opportunity to the applicant to make any submission.
So his immediate conduct was to request the learned Magistrate to recall such order. Considering these aspects, dismissal of the Revisional Application, on technical pleas, was improper.
Bombay High Court
Dwarkadas Bandulal Agrawal vs The State Of Maharashtra on 11 September, 2008
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Sunday, 24 March 2019

Whether it is mandatory to pay entire maintenance amount granted by trial court prior to filing of revision or appeal?

Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal-as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance.
In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Before Vipin Sanghi and P.S Teji, JJ.)

Sabina Sahdev v. Vidur Sahdev .

CRL.M.C 878/2018 & Crl.M.A No. 3240/2018
Decided on July 9, 2018,
Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747 : (2018) 251 DLT 245 (DB) : (2018) 3 HLR 413 : 2019 Cri LJ 218
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Wednesday, 12 October 2016

Whether revision is maintainable against order of magistrate passed under Domestic violence Act?

 In so far as problems between spouses, the D.V. Act has been enacted to provide various reliefs to the wives, children, etc.  as against committing domestic violence.  As against any order passed  under the D.V.Act, appeal is provided under Section 29 of the said Act which we have already noticed.  A combined reading of Section 29 of the D.V. Act and Section 372 Cr.P.C. would clearly show that as against any order passed under D.V. Act, an appeal shall lies to the Court of Sessions.


 As per the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 a Judicial I Class Magistrate becomes Chief Judicial Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Additional Metropolitan Magistrate.  Though Chief Judicial Magistrate is having supervisory power over the Judicial Magistrates, he is also a Magistrate.  Thus, an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under D.V.Act will be an order passed by a Magistrate within the meaning of Section 29 of the said Act and it is subject to the appeal remedy provided in Section 29 of the D.V. Act.

In the result, this Criminal revision is not maintainable in this Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS


DATED :  26-02-2016



CORAM



THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE P.DEVADASS



Crl.R.C.No.271 of 2016 and

 Crl.M.P.No.1873 of 2016


P.Kalpana Vs.  R.Saravanan @ Arumugam


Citation:2016 CRLJ(NOC)266 Mad
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