Authorization Lapse in Cheque Bounce Cases: Dismiss or Decide Later?

Understanding the Law on Maintainability and Judicial Approach under Section 138 NI Act

The filing of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) requires that the complainant — whether an individual or a company — be duly entitled or authorized to initiate legal proceedings. But what happens when a complaint is filed by a person on behalf of a company without proper authorization? Should the court dismiss the complaint at the outset, or can this issue wait until the final hearing? And if an accused challenges this at the preliminary stage, is a criminal revision against rejection of such a plea maintainable?

This article examines these issues through the lens of Supreme Court and Bombay High Court precedents.

1. Is the Magistrate’s Order Rejecting Accused’s Objection Interlocutory?

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, order of disposal of property during pendency of criminal trial will be final order or interlocutory order?

Three types of orders under Section 457(1) can be passed in various eventualities. Occasion to pass an order for disposal of property can arise in various circumstances. It can be in a situation where the property is subject to decay or may be of such a nature that it cannot be retained in the same form or condition beyond certain time or that the retention thereof is either harmful to the public or the disposal thereof is in the public interest. The second type of orders can be in the circumstances when somebody approaches the concerned Criminal Court claiming to be entitled to possess such property. If the claimant in that regard is able to satisfy the Court about his claim regarding possession to the property, certainly the Court is empowered to pass appropriate order in that regard subject to conditions regarding production thereof in the Court whenever required. The third eventuality can also arise when the property is required to be kept in custody of somebody to enable him to produce it in the course of trial or inventory or whenever required by the Court and at the same time, the person entitled to possess such property cannot be ascertained. In such circumstances also the Court can pass appropriate order for delivery of property to a person ready and willing to produce the same as and when required by the Court and subject to conditions to be specified by the Court. {Para 6}

7. Considering the ingredient of Section 457(1) of the Code, it may appear to be the power invariably to be exercised at the interim stage and, therefore, any order passed in exercise of such power has to be an interlocutory order. Undoubtedly, the term "interlocutory" will have to be understood with reference to the expression used in that regard in Section 397 of the Code. The Sub-section (2) of Section 397 clearly debars the exercise of revisional power in case of any interlocutory order passed by the Criminal Court. Considering the same, can it be said that merely because the power under Section 457(1) can be invoked even before the disposal of inquiry or trial, every such order passed thereunder would be an interlocutory order? Can it be said that because the order to be passed under Section 457(1) would relate to delivery of property in the course of inquiry or trial, it would amount to an interlocutory order? As seen above, the exercise of power under Section 457(1) can be in three different circumstances. Will such exercise of power irrespective of the eventuality in which such power is exercised, would result in an interlocutory order?

8. As seen above, there are three eventualities visualised for exercise of power under Section 457(1), and one eventuality clearly refers to disposal of property, while the other to delivery of the property and the third one for custody. Once the property is disposed of during the pendency of the trial or before the conclusion of the trial, in our considered opinion, any order resulting in disposal of property can hardly be said to be an interlocutory order. Such an order would automatically result in final adjudication in relation to the property ordered to be disposed of. The disposal may also include destruction of the property. In case the property is destroyed, nothing further remains to be considered in relation to the property. Obviously, therefore, any such order can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be an interlocutory order. Such an order will put an end to all the rights or interest in the property.

9. As regards the delivery of property to any person entitled for possession thereof, it will stand on the same footing as that of disposal of the property. In case of such delivery of property, it would be only after ascertaining the right of the person claiming to be entitled to have possession of such property. Obviously, therefore, the Court will have to decide the issue relating to the right to possess and accordingly deliver the property to the person who is entitled to possess the same. Being so, such an order deciding the issue regarding right to possess the property cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. For that purpose, such an order would be amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code.

10. As regards the third eventuality under Section 457 of the Code, the order in such an eventuality would be only for custody of the property during the trial, subject to condition that the same should be produced at any time required by the Court. Such an order would certainly fall within the category of interlocutory order as one cannot attach any finality to such an order since it does not decide any right to the property nor it implies any adjudication of any issue as such.

11. It is also to be clarified that while passing the order in relation to the second eventuality i.e. to say delivery of property to a person entitled to possess the same, the Court is not forbidden from imposing conditions in respect of production of such property whenever required by the Court during the trial. However, such a condition by itself would not amount to nullify the effect of adjudication in relation to the issue pertaining to right to possess the property. Being so, irrespective of any condition laid down for production of the property while delivering the property to the person entitled to possess, nevertheless the order would be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1531 of 2006 in Case No. 685/N of 2005 in C.R. No. 264 of 2005

Decided On: 15.07.2008

D'damas Jewellery India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M.S. Khandeparkar and V.K. Tahilramani, JJ.

Author: R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

Citation: 2008 ALL MR (Cri) 2127, MANU/MH/0611/2008.

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Bombay HC: Order passed under sec. 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. being an interlocutory order in view of bar under sec. 397(2) revision against it is not maintainable

 Learned single Judge held that the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of interim nature subject to final order and it was interlocutory order which did not decide rights of the parties in any manner. The learned single Judge held that the order passed by the Magistrate did not fall in the category of intermediate order and is covered in the category of interlocutory order and, therefore, not amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, Cr.P.C. This case is akin to the case under consideration and I have no reason to take a different view of the matter. In addition, it may be pointed out that in Ghafoor Bhai v. Motiram Bongirwar MANU/MH/0320/1977 while construing Section 457, Cr.P.C. it was held that the provisions of Section 457, Cr.P.C. were sufficiently wide so as to cover the case where the Magistrate is called upon to pass an order about disposal of custody of property even during the investigation stage of the matter. This position was approved in Virendra Kumar v. Dilawar Khan (supra) and for this purpose, reference may be made to paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the said Judgment which read as under :-

10. This Court, in Ghafoor Bhai Nabbu Bhai Tawar v. Motiram Keshaorao Bongirwar MANU/MH/0320/1977 : 1977 Mh LJ 548, while construing the provisions of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, held that by the words 'and such property is not produced before the Criminal Court during the inquiry or trial' used in the section, all that the Legislature intended to convey is that the property has not been produced before the Magistrate. Such non-production could be on account of (1) the absence of any inquiry or trial, or (2) though the enquiry or trial is pending, the investigation agency had not yet: produced it in the Court. The Court then held that the provisions of Section 457 of the Code were sufficiently wide so as to cover the case where the Magistrate is called upon to pass an order about disposal or custody of a property even during the investigation stage of the matter.

12. In my view, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has merit and has to be accepted. As pointed out by Gadgil, J. in Ghafoor Bhai's case MANU/MH/0320/1977 (supra), an order may be passed under Section 457 of the Code purely at the stage of investigation or even after the charge-sheet had been filed, but before the property was actually produced before the Court during the trial. In the latter case, any order passed by the Magistrate must necessarily be an interlocutory order subject to the final orders to be passed after the trial has concluded.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Crl. Appln. No. 1249 of 1997

Decided On: 10.03.2001

Prakash Tarachand Sakhre Vs. Ashok Pundloikrao Wajge and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Batta, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1293/2001,2001 CRLJ 3024.

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Bombay HC: Order granting anticipatory bail to accused persons - It is interlocutory order and no revision lies against that order

In the case of Amar Nath and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, the Apex Court has clearly held that "passing order for bail" is an interlocutory order and, therefore, there can hardly be any controversy in this regard. The impugned order dated 13-8-1998 is undoubtedly an order of grant of bail and, therefore, falls within the ambit and category of interlocutory order and in view of bar created by Section 397(2) of the Code, the High Court is precluded from exercising its revisional powers in this regard, which ultimately results in rendering revision against such interlocutory order not maintainable. I must, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection raised by Shri Pendsey, learned Counsel for the non-applicants and further hold that all the above referred four revisions filed by the State as well as complainant are not maintainable against the impugned order of grant of bail, dated 13-8-1998. {Para 11}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

D.D. SINHA, J.

The State Of Maharashtra Vs. Sanjay S/O Moreshwar Damle & Ors.,

Cri. Rev. Appln. No. 182 of 1998

4th March, 1999

Citation:  1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1127

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Bombay HC: Revision Petition Not Maintainable Against Order Granting Bail

 From the above referred observations, it is evident that theterm ‘interlocutory order’ used in sub section 2 of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. covers the challenge made to the orders for bail. {Para 17}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.678 OF 2024

Raju Anna Chaughule  V/s. The State Of Maharashtra 

CORAM : ANIL S. KILOR, J.

DATE : 22ND OCTOBER, 2024.

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J & K HC: Magistrate issuing notice in Domestic violence Act is interlocutory order and Revision is not maintainable against said order

 An order issuing notice on an application does not decide the rights of the parties, therefore, such an order is interlocutory in nature. Such orders are passed by a Court to manage the proceedings without finally determining the rights of the parties. An interlocutory order is used to address procedural matters and it does not decide the rights of the parties conclusively. Therefore, such an order is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the superior court. In fact sub section (2) of Section 438 of BNSS creates a statutory bar for exercising revisional powers in relation to any interlocutory order. Thus the revisional court has rightly refused to entertain the revision petition filed by the petitioners. {Para 7}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR

CRM (M) No. 261/2025

Decided On: 21.05.2025

Aamina and Ors. Vs. Aamir Ahmad Mir and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dhar, J.

Citation:  MANU/JK/0358/2025.

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Bombay HC: Order of stay of criminal proceeding is final order and hence revision is maintainable against said order

 These cardinal principles will have to be taken into consideration while deciding the controversy raised before us, as well as the nature of the order. It cannot be forgotten that in a given case, such a stay of criminal case, can be granted even at the instance of complainant. When criminal prosecution is stayed for an indefinite period, i.e. pending the decision of a civil suit, it affects substantive rights of the parties i.e. complainant as well as accused. It is common knowledge that the civil suit often drags on for years together. Thus stay of criminal prosecution till the decision of the civil suit practically amounts to suspension of the proceedings for an indefinite period. It is not merely an order of adjournment. Such an order clearly disturbs normal procedure of trial and affects substantive rights of the parties. The order of the Judicial Magistrate staying the criminal prosecution for an indefinite period was undoubtedly a matter of moment, and affects the valuable right of the complainant to proceed with the criminal case. Therefore we have no hesitation in holding that it cannot be treated as an interlocutory order and hence the bar under section 397(2) of the Code will not apply to such an order. Therefore we agree with the view taken by Shimpi J. in Criminal Application No. 452 of 1975 dated 9th December 1977 and overrule the view taken by Khatri J. in M/s. Bush India Ltd. & anr's case.

Bombay High Court

C. S. DHARMADHIKARI AND V. V. VAZE, JJ.

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, BOMBAY vs. SURESH U. GUPTA

Cri. Writ Petns. Nos. 530 of 1984

5th September, 1985.

Citation: 1985 ALLMR ONLINE 435

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Supreme court: Order framing a charge is an interlocutory order

128. In view of the conclusion that the order framing a charge is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 11(1), the appeal against such an order is incompetent in view of the provision contained in Section 11(2), and therefore the preliminary objection must be upheld and the appeal 'is dismissed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 562 of 1979

Decided On: 07.12.1979

V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.P. Sen, D.A. Desai, P.N. Shinghal and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.

Authored By : S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P.N. Shinghal, D.A. Desai

Citations: 1980 AIR 962, 1980 SCR (2) 380,MANU/SC/0284/1979.

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Important Supreme Court Judgments on bail(Part 3)

 

1) Supreme Court: Participation in protest and expression of strong views is not violation of bail conditions-bail is not liable to be cancelled on that ground

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1994 OF 2024

A.DURAIMURUGAN PANDIYAN SATTAI @ DURAIMURUGAN  VS. STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ANR.

Dated: April 08, 2024.

https://www.lawweb.in/2024/06/supreme-court-participation-in-protest.html

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Bombay HC: Order rejecting police custody remand is not interlocutory and revision is maintainable against said order

The learned Judge of this Court in R. Shakuntala, finally came to conclusion that an order rejecting application for remand of the accused to judicial custody is a final order and not an interlocutory order. This will be applicable with equal force to the refusal of request for police custody also. As such, the order passed by the Magistrate rejecting request for police custody cannot be treated as interlocutory order because the police cannot repeat and make applications again and again for police custody after the application for police custody had been rejected once and particularly in view of the limitation under Section 167 Cr.P.C. that the police custody may be granted only during first 15 days after the arrest or detention and not thereafter. If such application for police custody is rejected, that order becomes final and the Investigating Officer is permanently deprived of seeking police custody of that accused for the purpose o further investigation, discovery, etc. even though the offence may be very serious.

By granting bail and refusing police custody of the accused, who were not in police custody even for a day, the learned Magistrate practically prohibited the investigating agency from making proper investigation to the case which, in fact, required in-depth investigation and which could not be possible without the police custody. Therefore, while the order refusing the police custody could be challenged under revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, the order granting bail could be cancelled by the superior courts, including the Sessions Court, by virtue of the powers under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 2785 of 2009 and Criminal Application No. 425 of 2010

Decided On: 22.07.2010

Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2011 Cri L J 515, MANU/MH/0806/2010.

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Supreme Court: Grant or refusal of a bail application is an interlocutory order

It cannot be doubted that the grant or refusal of a bail application is essentially an interlocutory order. There is no finality to such an order for an application for bail can always be renewed from time to time.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 313 of 1987 

Decided On: 14.03.1988

Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.P. Sen and L.M. Sharma, JJ.

Author: A.P. Sen, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0560/1988 : 1988 (2) SCC 271.

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Questions and answers on law(Part 46)

 

Q 1:-Whether criminal revision is maintainable against the order of Judge taking voluntary statement given by the witness on record during recording of his evidence?

Ans:- This is pure interlocutory order. Hence revision is not maintainable against said order as per  Section 397(2) of CRPC.

Q 2:- Is Criminal revision is maintainable against order of issue of warrant by Magistrate?

Ans:- Warrant can be cancelled by Magistrate. It is interlocutory order. Hence revision is not maintainable as per 

Section 397(2) of CRPC.

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Supreme Court: Against which orders court can entertain criminal revision?

 There are three categories of orders that a court can pass—final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction—that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.{Para 16}

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind—an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

24. The second reason why Amar Nath [Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 CrPC cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 CrPC to set aside an interlocutory order. This is what this Court held : (SCC p. 140, para 3)

“3. While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Sections 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers.”

Supreme Court of India

Girish Kumar Suneja vs Cbi on 13 July, 2017

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Whether revision is maintainable against the order of framing of charge or discharge of accused?

 The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye

(supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing

discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are

therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. That

apart, this Court in the above cited cases has unequivocally

acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent

jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of

justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual

cases. As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while

exercising its aforestated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect.

The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully

and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For

example, when the contents of a complaint or the other

purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an

innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to

prevent the abuse of process of law. {Para 15}

16. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering

the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The

Court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out

whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court

has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence

and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in

the case and so on. [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar

Samal(1979) 3 SCC 4]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order

further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.

17. This brings us to the present case wherein the High Court has

not gone into the merits of the case and did not analyze the

case in light of the settled law referred to above.

18. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not

entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the

fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused.

In line with the fact that the High Court and the court below

have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this

case and other related aspects concerning improvement of

witness statements, it is necessary for the High Court to

reconsider the entire matter and decide the revision petition

afresh. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order dated

28.11.2018 and remand the case back to the High Court for its

reconsideration in accordance with law.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.472 OF 2021

Sanjay Kumar Rai  Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 

Author: Surya Kant, J:

DATED : 07.05.2021

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Whether Order Of Commercial Court U/Sec 9 Of Arbitration & Conciliation Act is Appealable?

Is an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Arbitration

Act') by a Commercial Court appealable under Section 13(1) of

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the

Commercial Courts Act')? This question essentially falls for

consideration in the instant case.

In

the instant case, the impugned order is an order of injunction. It

is appealable under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908. It is an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration

Act. It is also appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act states that an appeal shall

lie from an order granting or refusing to grant any measure

under Section 9 of the said Act. Right of appeal is the creature of

a statute. It is well settled that right of appeal is a substantive

right. Nothing contained in Section 13(1) or Section 13(2) of the

Commercial Courts Act curtails this right of appeal.

21. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the heading of

the unamended Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act also

read as “Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and

Commercial Divisions”. There was a proviso to unamended

Section 13(1) of the Act which now stands as the proviso to

Section 13(1A) of the Act. This proviso restricts the right of

appeal from orders that are specifically enumerated under Order

XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 37 of the

Arbitration Act. If the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioners is accepted, the proviso to Section 13(1A) of the

Commercial Courts Act would be meaningless.

22. The scope of the proviso to the unamended Section

13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, which now stands as the

proviso to Section 13(1A) of the Act, was considered by the

Supreme Court in Kandla Export Corporation v. M/s OCI

Corporation : (2018) 14 SCC 715 and it was held as follows:

“Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act,

with which we are immediately concerned in

these appeals, is in two parts. The main provision

is, as has been correctly submitted by Shri Giri, a

provision which provides for appeals from

judgments, orders and decrees of the

Commercial Division of the High Court. To this

main provision, an exception is carved out by the

proviso. ..... The proviso goes on to state that an

appeal shall lie from such orders passed by the

Commercial Division of the High Court that are

specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the

Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and Section

37 of the Arbitration Act. It will at once be

noticed that orders that are not specifically

enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC would,

therefore, not be appealable, and appeals that

are mentioned in Section 37 of the Arbitration

Act alone are appeals that can be made to the

Commercial Appellate Division of a High Court”.

23. Moreover, in order to find out whether an appeal

against an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is

maintainable or not, the provisions of the said Act have to be

looked into. There is no independent right of appeal provided

under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. It merely

provides the forum of filing appeals. Section 37(1) (b) of the

Arbitration Act creates the right to file an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 of the said Act. It is the parameters of Section 37(1) of the Arbitration Act alone which have to be looked at in order to determine whether an appeal against an order under Section 9 of the said Act is maintainable or not (See BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC  Limited : (2020) 4 SCC 234).

24. The question whether the proviso in Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act applies only to Section 13(1A) or whether

it applies to Section 13(1) also, does not arise for consideration

in the instant case. The reason is that, the order impugned in this

original petition, is an order passed under Section 9 of the

Arbitration Act and therefore, appealable under Section 37 of the

said Act, which is specifically mentioned in the proviso.

25. The discussion above leads to the conclusion that an

order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 passed by a Commercial Court below the level of a District

Judge is appealable under Section 13(1) of the Commercial

Courts Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 OP(C).No.1467 OF 2020

 PRANATHMAKA AYURVEDICS PVT LTD. Vs COCOSATH HEALTH PRODUCTS

Coram: MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

Dated this the 24th day of November, 2020

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Supreme Court: Court can entertain interlocutory applications in stayed suit

The learned Counsel for the respondents stated that on account of the stay of the suit, his clients are prevented to take any direction or order by way of interlocutory application. The stay of the trial of the suit does not preclude the respondents to seek such appropriate interlocutory reliefs as may be available and warranted in the facts and circumstances.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 11192 of 1995

Decided On: 16.11.1995

Amita Kaushish Vs. Sanjay Kaushish and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Ramaswamy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ.

Citation: 1996 SCC (7) 19, JT 1995 (8) 507,MANU/SC/1333/1996

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Whether appeal is maintainable against interlocutory order passed by family court under guardian and wards Act?

As discussed above, the coordinate High Courts are of the view

that the plain reading of the provisions of the G & W Act reflect

that an order passed under section 12 of the said act is an

interlocutory order and hence, an appeal is barred by section 47

of the G & W Act.

26. To conclude, the Family Court Act came into force in the year

1984, i.e. 2 years after the pronouncement of Shah Babulal

Khimji (Supra) by the Apex Court. Nowhere was it intended by

the legislature to bring an appeal under Section 19(1) of the

Family Courts against an order passed under Section 12 of the

G & W Act nor does the G & W Act provide for an appeal

against order passed under Section 12 of the G & W Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment pronounced on: 1st October, 2019

 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 211/2017 & CM APPL. 44390/2017

COLONEL RAMESH PAL SINGH Vs SUGHANDHI AGGARWAL

CORAM:

 MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI

 MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

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Whether writ petition is maintainable against interlocutory order of arbitrator?

 In Patel Engineering Ltd. (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that interlocutory orders made by the Arbitrator cannot be subjected to challenge under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such intervention by the High Courts was held to be not permissible as the object of minimizing judicial intervention when the process of arbitration was going on would be defeated by entertaining such challenge at an interlocutory stage. It was further observed that once arbitration proceedings had commenced, the parties would have to wait until the award was pronounced after which the remedy under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could be availed of.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 316/2019

Decided On: 25.03.2019

Space Wood Office Solution Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Anupam Rai Construction

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 356

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Whether observations passed in interlocutory proceedings are binding at final hearing of suit?

In the case of Kamal Babanrao Pasalkar (supra), it is held that "it is settled law that observations passed in interlocutory proceedings are not binding at the final hearing of the suit".

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 104 of 1994 and Civil Revision Application No. 788 of 2011

Decided On: 25.04.2018

 Ramdhiraj Laxman Dhobi Vs Ramdas Behari Dhobi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mridula Bhatkar, J.

Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 444

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Whether writ petition is maintainable against interlocutory order passed by arbitrator during course of proceeding?

 Keeping the object of the Act in view, the Supreme Court has stated the law in the case of Patel Engineering Ltd. (supra) in no uncertain terms that once the matter reaches the Arbitrator, the interlocutory orders made by him cannot be the subject matter of challenge in the writ proceedings. The following observations and dictum in Patel Engineering put it beyond the pale of doubt that the interlocutory orders passed during the course of arbitration proceedings are not to be interfered with under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India:-

 For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of the view that this Court in the writ jurisdiction will not interfere in an interlocutory order passed by the Arbitrator in the pending arbitral proceeding; and that the party aggrieved may reserve its right to lay a challenge to such an interlocutory order, if and when it suffers an adverse award.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Writ Petition Nos. 19822/2018 and 19834/2018 (GM-RES)

Decided On: 27.08.2018

Radiant Infosystems Limited Vs. The Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dinesh Maheshwari, C.J. and Dixit Krishna Shripad, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Karnat 6

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