We are therefore unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court. The High Court proceeded on the premise that the
mechanism contemplated under Sections 13, 14, 17 and 18 of
the 1993 Act constitutes the exclusive route through which an
alleged violation of human rights must travel before
prosecution can be initiated. In doing so, it read into the
statute a limitation which the text does not contain and failed
to give independent operation to Section 30 of the 1993 Act.
The High Court also treated Rule 6 as creating a parallel
substantive regime, whereas, as noted above, the Rule merely
provides the procedural machinery for a Human Rights Court
already contemplated by Parliament. Its further apprehension
that simultaneous recourse to the Commission and the
Human Rights Court may result in double jeopardy is equally
misplaced, since an inquiry or recommendation by the
Commission does not amount to a prior prosecution or
punishment so as to attract the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. {Para 18}
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that Rule 6 of the
2006 Rules is not inconsistent with the 1993 Act and does not
travel beyond the rule-making power conferred upon the State
Government under Section 41 thereof. Rule 6 of the 2006
Rules is therefore intra vires the 1993 Act and is valid.
20. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated
17.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Writ
CRL. A. NO.4075 OF 2026 WITH CONNECTED 13
Petition No. 200873 of 2024 is set aside.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4075 OF 2026
[@SLP(CRL.) NO.16453 OF 2025]
SAYAD ASIFULLA Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.
Author: VIKRAM NATH,J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 964
Dated: AUGUST 25, 2026
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