Supreme Court: Spying in Matrimony: When Privacy Gives Way to Fair Trial Rights Under Section 122 of Evidence Act

 In matrimonial disputes under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 122, the court held that the provision comprises two parts: “compellability” and “permissibility” of spousal communications. A spouse cannot be compelled to disclose confidential communication made by the other, and consent for disclosure lies with the spouse who made the communication. The provision aims to protect the sanctity of marriage, not individual fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes. Secretly recorded telephonic conversations between spouses are admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings under the exception carved out within Section 122, which must be balanced with the right to a fair trial, also guaranteed by Article 21. Section 122 does not apply horizontally and recognizes the rights to a fair trial, to produce relevant evidence, and to prove one’s case against the spouse. The court rejected the argument that such evidence would disturb domestic harmony, noting that snooping between spouses indicates a broken relationship. The court clarified that while the content of a common law right may resemble a fundamental right, they are differentiated by the duties’ incidence—on private entities versus the State. Admissibility of secretly obtained evidence requires satisfying a three-fold test of relevance, identification, and accuracy. Recording conversations without the speaker’s consent or knowledge does not per se bar admissibility. Appeal allowed. (Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37; R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCR 417).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9489 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.07.2025

Vibhor Garg Vs. Neha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0902/2025,2025 INSC 829

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The Great Divide: Decoding the Distinction Between Common Law and Fundamental Privacy Rights in India's Constitutional Framework

The Conceptual Dichotomy: Understanding the Fundamental Distinction

The right to privacy in India exists in a fascinating dual form—simultaneously operating as both a common law right and a fundamental right. This distinction, articulated most clearly in the landmark K.S. Puttaswamy case and later refined in Kaushal Kishor, represents one of the most significant conceptual developments in Indian constitutional jurisprudence.

Justice Bobde's seminal observation in Puttaswamy provides the foundational framework for understanding this dichotomy: "The only material distinctions between [common law rights and fundamental rights] lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a failure to do so can be redressed". This distinction fundamentally reshapes how privacy rights are conceptualized and enforced in the Indian legal system.

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Supreme Court: What is difference between a horizontal approach and vertical approach of fundamental rights?

 The distinction between the horizontal and vertical application of fundamental rights is a key concept in constitutional law, particularly in interpreting rights under the Indian Constitution. This distinction was discussed in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha (2025) and earlier cases such as K.S. Puttaswamy and Kaushal Kishore.

Vertical Application of Fundamental Rights

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Delhi HC: Balancing Substantive Justice with Proportionality and Privacy Protections in Spousal Financial Disclosure

 

 A balanced scale symbolizing justice weighing financial documents against privacy protection

 The judgment from the High Court of Delhi concerns a matrimonial dispute where the Wife sought dissolution of marriage on grounds including adultery and cruelty. One key aspect of the judgment relates to the production of the Husband’s financial documents during the litigation process.

Context

·       The Wife applied under Order XI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), seeking production of various financial documents of the Husband.

·       These documents included credit card statements, UPI transaction records, demat account statements, paytm transactions, Amazon purchase records, ESOP details, and statements from multiple years.

·       The Wife argued these documents were necessary not only to substantiate adultery but also to assess the Husband’s financial capacity for determining permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA), 1955.

Family Court’s Approach

·       The Family Court partially allowed the application, permitting production of financial documents at Serial Nos. (i) to (viii), (x), (xii), and (xiii), essentially covering relevant bank and credit card statements, investment records, and documents evidencing income and assets.

·       It rejected other requests, including WhatsApp, Microsoft Teams, Facebook Messenger chats, FASTag records, leave records, hotel bookings, and travel details, on the ground that they amounted to fishing and roving inquiries beyond the scope of pleadings.

Husband’s Contentions

·       The Husband contended that the application for financial documents was premature since alimony claims arise only after the divorce decree.

·       He also argued the documents sought were irrelevant to the current stage, overly broad, and an invasion of privacy.

·       He claimed compliance with disclosure rules as per Rajneesh v. Neha (2021) and emphasized professional confidentiality concerns.

·       He further asserted some documents were not under his control and that the Wife’s requests were a fishing expedition unsupported by specific pleadings.

The High Court’s Findings on Financial Documents

·       The Court recognized the wide but not unlimited scope of discovery under Order XI Rule 14, emphasizing that documents sought must be relevant to the matters in dispute.

·       It stressed the need for a practical and flexible approach rather than a blanket rejection of discovery applications on grounds of speculation.

·       The Court held that the Wife is entitled to documents specifically related to her legally wedded Husband and the allegations—documents tied to a particular person, period, and issue.

·       It found the Family Court’s partial allowance appropriate and reasoned, permitting production of documents directly pertinent to the Wife’s claims and rejecting those beyond the pleadings or unrelated to financial standing or maintenance claims.

·       The judgment emphasized balancing the Wife’s right to evidence with the need to protect the Husband from undue fishing, harassment, or intrusion into unrelated private matters.

·       The Court allowed production of the financial documents at Serial Nos. (i) to (viii), (x), (xii), and (xiii) in a manner proportional to the issues in dispute.

·       It concluded that allowing these financial disclosures does not constitute an abuse of the discovery process and is justified for a fair adjudication of claims.

Conclusion

The judgment confirms that in matrimonial disputes:

·       Courts can order production of financial documents relevant to alimony, maintenance, and proving adultery.

·       Discovery must be specific, relevant, and proportionate to the pleaded issues.

·       Courts will reject irrelevant, speculative, or overly intrusive disclosure applications to protect privacy.

·       The court exercises a balanced discretion to ensure fair access to necessary evidence while preventing fishing expeditions.

·       The Husband was directed to produce the specified financial records to facilitate effective legal proceedings, subject to confidentiality safeguards.

This decision affirms the principle that evidence production in matrimonial cases must support substantive justice without violating proportionality and privacy protections.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 251/2025 and CM APPL. 50033/2025

MS. TANVI CHATURVEDI Vs MS. SMITA SHRIVASTAVA & ANR.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

Author: ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

Judgment pronounced on: 29.08.2025.

Citation: 2025 DHC 7474 DB.

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Delhi HC: Court Can Seek Mobile Location of Spouse to Ascertain Adultery in Matrimonial Disputes: A Detailed Analysis

 

 Introduction

The intersection of digital privacy rights and matrimonial law has become a critical area of jurisprudence in contemporary India. The recent Delhi High Court judgment in Ms. Tanvi Chaturvedi v. Ms. Smita Shrivastava & Anr.Citation: 2025 DHC 7474 DB.  marks a significant milestone in establishing the legal framework for courts to seek mobile location data and Call Detail Records (CDRs) to ascertain adultery in matrimonial disputes. This comprehensive analysis examines the evolving legal position on courts' authority to collect digital evidence in matrimonial proceedings while balancing fundamental privacy rights with the imperative of fair trial.

Legal Framework for Mobile Location Data Collection

Constitutional Foundation

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Delhi HC: Under which circumstances, police papers can not treated as gospel truth in motor accident claim petition

It is well settled law that while deciding MACT cases statement in FIR is not a gospel truth and onus of proving the defence is upon the person who takes the defence and not upon the others. No evidence has been led on this point by the insurance company. It is suggested in the positive manner that they were travelling with their belongings and tools. {Para 26}.

27 Ld counsel for insurance company Sh. Sujit Jaiswal, Adv. said that they were relying on the DAR report, however, they have not settled the matter on this count and evidence has been led and they have been allowed to cross examine even the eye witness on the point of negligence on the point of avoidance of liability. Hence insurance company is only to substantiate its defence either through cross examination of eye witness or by leading its own evidence. The insurance company has taken premium in unnamed passenger also in the cover note, it is no where mentioned that these un-named person are driver or cleaner, however it is clarified subsequently after 60 days it is after the money has been received and the vehicle has been insured, that this term has been altered to read as un-named passenger, two drivers and two cleaners. However, it is a case of third party liability.

28 Orissa High Court specifically mentioning that in compensation case under Motor Vehicles Act. FIR charge sheet or other police papers are not substantive evidence and same not to be accepted in view of oral evidence adduced by claimants, which is contrary to what has been stated in police papers. As per the above cited judgments, the FIR is not a gospel truth and once the petition go for trial and is put in cross examination, it is more important than that what is stated in the FIR. Hence, as the vehicle was duly insured and insurance company has failed to prove its defence that they are not liable to make the payment of the amount as both the passengers are unauthorised passengers. Onus of proving was on them. Neither they have examined any witness on their behalf on this point or cross examination, in my considered view specifically on this point infact a vague suggestion has been put which has been replied in affirmative by the witness that labourers were travelling with their belongings and tools. Nowhere a question was put to the witness that he was not travelling in the cabin when witness was specifically put on record that he was travelling in the cabin. Hence the insurance company is liable to make the payment of the compensation amount to the petitioners."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Mac. App. 610/2013

Decided On: 21.04.2023

Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mangal Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Gaurang Kanth, J.

 Citation: 2023:DHC:2763, MANU/DE/2697/2023.

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Himachal Pradesh HC: Claimant of Motor accident must examine Doctor to prove permanent disability certificate

The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give "ready to use' disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily giving liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the Doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or Discharge Certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the Doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of claimant, is tendered for cross-examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local Hospitals/Medical Colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability. {Para 12}

10. Thus, it is obvious that mere production of a disability certificate is no proof of the extent of disability till the Doctor who issued the certificate or treated the patient is tendered for cross examination in Court. The Apex Court also held that the same injury can lead to different loss of earning capacity and summarized the principles in the following terms:

Fourthly, in cases where the certificates are not contested by the Respondents, they may be marked by consent, thereby dispensing with the oral evidence. These small measures as also any other suitable steps taken to ensure the availability of expert evidence, will ensure assessment of just compensation and will go a long way in demonstrating that Courts/Tribunals show concern for litigants and witnesses.

13. Consequently, the award is set-aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal shall decide the application filed by the Insurance Company under Section 170 of the Act at the first instance. Thereafter, it shall give only one opportunity to the claimant to produce the Doctor since in this case the claimant had already taken a number of opportunities and had also taken dasti summons to produce the doctor. No application for examination of the doctor on commission shall be entertained and it shall be the responsibility of the claimant to serve and produce the doctor who issued the disability certificate. Only one opportunity in this behalf shall be given and in case the claimant fails to produce the doctor, the evidence of the claimant shall be closed. In case the doctor is examined, an opportunity to rebut the evidence shall be given to the Respondents and to the Insurance Company if it is permitted to contest the claim on all grounds.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

CMPMO No. 227 of 2009

Decided On: 09.03.2011

Oriental Insurance Company Vs. Parveen and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Deepak Gupta, J.

Citation: MANU/HP/0662/2011,2012 ACC 2 3192011 SCC ONLINE HP 7432011 ACJ 2692.

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SC Rules Insurer Liable in Motor Accident Case Involving Goods Vehicle Passengers

 Insofar as the contention regarding the passengers in the goods vehicle being gratuitous, we have to notice the evidence as produced by the second Respondent along with I.A. No. 190303/2022 in C.A. Nos. 6338-6339/2024. The deposition of the claimant injured in the said appeal clearly indicates that he was a fish monger and the basket with fish for sale, was being carried in the goods vehicle, in which the claimant was also accompanying the goods. Likewise in C.A. No. 6340/2024, the deceased passenger was a vegetable hawker, who too accompanied the goods carried in the vehicle. We see from the cross-examination by the learned Counsel for the insurer that the said fact was challenged by way of a suggestion. In the examination-in-chief of the witness for the insurer produced as Annexure- R/13, the Administrative Officer asserted that the passengers were gratuitous. But, in cross-examination he categorically stated that he did not have any knowledge regarding the status of the deceased/injured in the accident and he does not have any information as to whether they were accompanying the goods in the vehicle or not. The suggestion made to the claimant hence has to be ignored. It is pertinent that in the reply to the claim filed, produced as Annexure-R/11, the insurer had raised a contention that if there were goods in the vehicle then the seizure of such goods would have been recorded in the mahazar prepared in the criminal case. However, the insurance company did not take any effort to produce any such mahazar. The claimant while being cross-examined was also not confronted with the records of the criminal case which were produced and marked by the claimants in their evidence. {Para 7}

8. We hence find that the contention raised by the insurer that the deceased/injured in the accident were gratuitous passengers in the vehicle remains in the realm of mere assertion without substantiation. Section 147 which has the nominal heading "Requirements of policies and limits of liability" by Sub-section (1)(b)(i) enables indemnification by the insurer, any liability with respect to the death or bodily injury to third parties and any person including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the motor vehicle.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6338-6339 of 2024, 6341 of 2024, 6340 of 2024 and 6342 of 2024

Decided On: 08.08.2025

Brij Bihari Gupta Vs. Manmet and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 948, MANU/SC/1053/2025.

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When Clean Hands Meet Dirty Claims: Judicial Vigilance Against Insurance Fraud in Motor Accident Compensation Cases

 

"Visualizing judicial authority and AI-driven fraud detection technologies in motor insurance claims."

Abstract

Motor vehicle accident compensation claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, while serving as a beneficial social security mechanism, have increasingly become vulnerable to fraudulent exploitation. This article analyzes a landmark judgment from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal that demonstrates judicial vigilance in detecting and preventing insurance fraud, establishing crucial precedents for burden of proof, evidentiary standards, and the application of the clean hands doctrine in motor accident claims.

Introduction

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J & K HC: Doctor who is not Neurologist can not give opinion if permanent disability of claimant relates to Neuro problem.

 From the above, it is clear that the disability certificate EXTP-RK is based upon the certificate dated 15.04.2014 issued by the Standing Medical Board which, in turn, has been issued on the basis of opinions of three Doctors from the fields of Psychiatry, Neuro-Surgery and Neurology. The witness Dr. Raj Kumar Bhagat examined by the claimant before the Tribunal has stated that he is only a consultant Surgeon and not a Neuro expert/Surgeon. He has also stated that the other two Members of the Medical Board are Physician Specialists and there was no Neuro expert/surgeon to assess the disability of the claimant. The said witness has gone on to state that the certificate of disability of the claimant is with respect to Neuro problems, as such, he cannot comment upon the Neuro related problem or disability. He has confirmed the fact that he has never examined the claimant. {Para 11}

12. It is an admitted fact that the disability of the claimant relates to Neuro problem. It is also an admitted case that Dr. Raj Kumar Bhagat, who was examined as a witness by the claimant, has neither treated, nor examined the claimant and he is not even associated with the field of Neurology. The question that arises for determination is, as to whether, on the basis of the statement made by a Doctor, who has neither examined the claimant, nor he is an expert in the relevant field, it can be stated that the claimant has suffered a particular type of disability simply on the basis of a certificate issued by the Medical Board.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

Mac App. Nos. 96/2022 and 128/2022

Decided On: 11.05.2023

National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Subash Chander and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dhar, J.

Citation: MANU/JK/0412/2023.

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When Vagueness Breeds Litigation: The Imperative for Judicial Clarity in Educational Expense Orders Under the PWDV Act

 Abstract

Recent judicial developments have highlighted a critical gap in domestic violence jurisprudence: the enforcement challenges arising from vague court orders regarding educational expenses. This article examines a landmark appellate decision that established stringent documentation requirements and specificity standards for educational expense claims under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDV Act), 2005. The judgment reinforces the principle that judicial orders must be "clear, specific and enforceable" to prevent abuse of process and unnecessary litigation.

Introduction

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The Constitutional Dialectic: Reconciling Privacy, Fairness, and Marital Sanctity in India's Digital Age

 Abstract

The Supreme Court of India's recent landmark judgment in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha (2025) represents a pivotal constitutional moment that redefines the delicate equilibrium between fundamental rights within the matrimonial domain. This decision transcends traditional evidence law principles, offering profound insights into the evolving jurisprudence of privacy rights, fair trial guarantees, and the constitutional architecture governing private relationships in contemporary India. This article examines the Court's nuanced approach to balancing competing constitutional imperatives while addressing the complex interplay between vertical and horizontal application of fundamental rights.

Introduction: The Constitutional Crossroads

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Secretly Recorded Spousal Conversations in Matrimonial Proceedings: Supreme Court’s Landmark Judgment Balances Privacy and Fair Trial Rights

 

The Supreme Court of India, in a landmark judgment dated July 14, 2025, in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha, has decisively addressed the contentious issue of the admissibility of secretly recorded conversations between spouses in matrimonial disputes. This ruling marks a significant turning point at the crossroads of privacy rights, evidence law, and matrimonial justice, offering much-needed clarity for courts, advocates, and litigants navigating these sensitive terrains.

Background: Privacy vs. Evidence in Matrimonial Litigation

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LLM Notes: Discuss the tortious liability of a public utility corporation with relevant caselaws

1. Introduction – Law of Torts

Tort: A civil wrong, other than breach of contract or breach of trust, whereby a person’s legal right is violated and he suffers harm.

The purpose of tort law is to provide compensation for wrongful loss.

Public Utility Corporations, though government-owned or controlled, can also be subject to tortious liability like private individuals or companies.

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LLM Notes: Discuss the aims and objects of consumer protection Act 1986 and also write rights of consumers as per indian law.

 Aims and Objects of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was a landmark legislation enacted by the Parliament of India to address consumer grievances and provide comprehensive protection to consumers in the marketplace. The Act has since been replaced by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, but its foundational principles remain crucial.

Primary Aims and Objects:

1. Protection Against Exploitation

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LLM Notes: The Salient Provisions of the Indian Post and Telegraph Act in an Era of Globalization of Communication

Historical Context and Legislative Evolution

The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 served as the foundational legal framework for telecommunications in India for over 138 years. Originally conceived during the British colonial period, the Act was designed to give the government control over telegraph infrastructure to facilitate administrative control and suppress rebellions. This colonial-era legislation has now been replaced by the Telecommunications Act, 2023, which came into effect in June 2024.

Similarly, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 governed postal services until it was replaced by the Post Office Act, 2023. These legislative transformations reflect India's attempt to modernize its communication laws to meet the demands of globalization and digital transformation.

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How to translate marathi document in English in Google docs?

 Here’s how you can upload a file to Google Docs and use the built-in translate feature:

Step 1: Upload a File to Google Docs

1. Go to Google Drive (drive.google.com) and sign in with your Google account.

2. Click on the “+ New” button on the left sidebar.

3. Select “File upload” from the dropdown menu.

4. Choose the file (e.g., your Marathi notes in Word, PDF, or text format) from your computer.

5. The file will be uploaded to your Google Drive.

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Kerala HC: Wife can claim maintenance after divorce despite prior compromise agreement if she is unable to maintain herself

Apparently, Ext.B2 was executed in the year 2004, and the claim for maintenance was raised only in the year 2012. Thus, without much discussion, it can be held that the consolidated payment of Rs. 30,000/- towards permanent alimony under Ext. B2 compromise will not disentitle the first appellant from raising a claim for maintenance at a later stage if she is actually unable to maintain herself. Therefore, it can be concluded that the first appellant is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent, notwithstanding the terms of Ext.B2 agreement, either under Section 37 of the Act or under Section 125 of Cr. P.C., if she was unable to maintain herself during the relevant time. {Para 20}

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before Sathish Ninan and P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.)

Sheela George and Another V V.M. Alexander 

Mat. Appeal No. 586 of 2017

Decided on June 2, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 3501

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One Rule for All: Non-Occupancy Charges in Housing and Premises Societies

• 
  
  
   Introduction

In Maharashtra, co-operative societies—whether housing societies with residential flats or premises societies with commercial spaces—form the backbone of urban living. An issue that repeatedly causes friction between management committees and members is the levy of non-occupancy charges (fees charged when a member lets out their flat or office on rent/license).

For years, societies exploited this provision, sometimes charging exorbitant sums under the guise of non-occupancy. This created disputes, litigations, and confusion about whether Premises Societies (offices/shops) could impose higher charges than Housing Societies.

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Supreme court: What are differences in principles for grant of bail and cancellation of bail?

 Whether the legal standards and considerations applicable for initial grant of bail are identical to those for cancellation of bail -- Held, considerations for grant of bail and for its cancellation are not identical -- While the grant of bail involves a preventive evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a review of the prior decision, either on account of supervening circumstances or because the original order was legally flawed

Per R. Mahadevan, J.

It is equally well established that the considerations for grant of bail and for its cancellation are not identical. While the grant of bail involves a preventive evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a review of the prior decision - either on account of supervening circumstances or because the original order was legally flawed. As laid down in State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi, “Rejection of bail when bail is applied for, is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another”. This principle reflects a recognition of the sanctity of liberty once granted, and the requirement of compelling justification for its withdrawal.

As per Halsbury's Laws of England, the grant of bail does not set the accused at liberty in the absolute sense but merely shifts custody from the State to the sureties. Consequently, cancellation of bail entails an assessment of whether the accused has abused the liberty so conferred. In Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, this Court delineated broad, though not exhaustive, grounds justifying cancellation of bail, including:

*  Interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice;

*  Evasion of justice;

*  Abuse of the concession of bail;

*  Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice.

In Abdul Basit v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary, this Court elaborated the circumstances in which bail granted under S.439(2) CrPC may be cancelled, including where the accused:

*  engages in similar criminal activity post-bail;

*  interferes with or obstructs the investigation;

*  tampers with evidence or influences witnesses;

*  intimidates or threatens witnesses;

*  attempts to abscond or evade judicial process;

*  becomes unavailable or goes underground;

*  violates the conditions imposed or evades the control of sureties.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Appellate or revisional court has power to set aside a bail order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles

Whether Appellate or Revisional Courts have power to set aside bail orders that are perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles -- Held, appellate or revisional power exists to set aside a bail order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles -- It is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without reference to subsequent conduct

Per R. Mahadevan, J.

This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail 

order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without reference to subsequent conduct. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and another, a three-Judge Bench held that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the bail order vulnerable and liable to be set aside. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, this Court held that where the High Court grants bail mechanically and without application of mind to material factors such as the gravity of the offence or antecedents of the accused, such an order must be set aside. In Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta and another, this Court distinguished between cancellation of bail by the same court and annulment by an appellate / revisional court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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