Supreme Court: Appellate or revisional court has power to set aside a bail order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles

Whether Appellate or Revisional Courts have power to set aside bail orders that are perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles -- Held, appellate or revisional power exists to set aside a bail order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles -- It is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without reference to subsequent conduct

Per R. Mahadevan, J.

This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail 

order that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without reference to subsequent conduct. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and another, a three-Judge Bench held that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the bail order vulnerable and liable to be set aside. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, this Court held that where the High Court grants bail mechanically and without application of mind to material factors such as the gravity of the offence or antecedents of the accused, such an order must be set aside. In Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta and another, this Court distinguished between cancellation of bail by the same court and annulment by an appellate / revisional court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Gauhati HC Extends Benefit Of Probation of offenders Act To Man Convicted U/S 498A IPC, Says Offence Was Not Heinous

 It is by now well settled that Act, 1958 is a milestone in progress of modern liberal trend of reform in the field of Penology. It is the result of recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. It was also held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ved Prakash Vs. State of Haryana reported in 1981 1 SCC 447, that sentencing an accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. The Trial court should collect material necessary to award a just punishment in circumstances. It was further held that the social background and the personal factors of the crime doer are very relevant in this regard. {Para 7}

8. In the case of Sita Ram Paswan Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2005 SC 3534, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down certain principle for exercise of discretionary power under the Act and the consideration required. The Hon’ble Apex Court opined that while exercising the discretionary power under the Act 1958, the courts are to consider the circumstances of the case, the nature of offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. It was concluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the benefit available to the accused under section 4 of the Act, 1958 is subject to the Limitation embodied in the provision and the word ‘may’ clearly indicates that the discretion is vested with the court whether to release the offender in exercise of power under section 3/4 of the Act, 1958, having regard to the nature of the offence, the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case.

9. It was further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that such power can be exercised by the court even at the appellate or revisional stage or also by Apex Court hearing appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

10. Now, in the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, let this court consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties.

11. In the case in hand, the offence was committed on 11.02.2008. The nature of offence cannot also be said to be heinous in the given circumstances of the present case. The victim and the accused have got remarried as recorded hereinabove. The accused has also offered the Mohr, paid the maintenance awarded, the wife had also withdrawn the maintenance case and in view of the aforesaid, in the considered opinion of this Court that this is a fit case where the benefit of provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be given to the accused petitioner by this court in exercise of its revisonal power.

 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : Crl.Rev.P./331/2013

MD. BADRUT ZAMAN Vs  THE STATE OF ASSAM

BEFORE

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

Date of Judgement : 19.12.2024.

Citation:  2024:GAU-AS:12939.

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Important Supreme Court Judgments on bail(Part 3)

 

1) Supreme Court: Participation in protest and expression of strong views is not violation of bail conditions-bail is not liable to be cancelled on that ground

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1994 OF 2024

A.DURAIMURUGAN PANDIYAN SATTAI @ DURAIMURUGAN  VS. STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ANR.

Dated: April 08, 2024.

https://www.lawweb.in/2024/06/supreme-court-participation-in-protest.html

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What is the duty of appellate or revisional court if it is setting aside findings of facts recorded by trial court?

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us, and with justification, that the judgment and order of, the High Court does not disclose application of mind to the evidence on record, or to the findings recorded by the Trial Court, which were sought to be set aside by the impugned judgment and order. The finding of the High Court is as vague as it can be and it is not possible to cull out the reasons which persuaded the learned Judge to set aside the findings recorded by the Trial Court. We have earlier quoted the relevant part of the judgment which justifies the criticism of the learned counsel. It is well settled that the Appellate or Revisional Court while setting aside the findings recorded by the Court below must notice those findings, and if the Appellate or Revisional Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are untenable, record its reasons for coming to the said conclusion. Where the findings are findings of fact it must discuss the evidence on record which justify the reversal of the findings recorded by the Court below. This is particularly so when findings recorded by the Trial Court are sought to be set aside by an Appellate or Revisional Court. One cannot take exception to a judgment merely on the ground of its brevity, but if the judgment appears to be cryptic and conclusions are reached without even referring to the evidence on record or noticing the findings of the Trial Court, the party aggrieved is entitled to ask for setting aside of such a judgment.

{Para 11}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1059 of 2003 

Decided On: 26.08.2003

Deb Narayan Halder Vs. Anushree Halder

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Santosh Hegde and B.P. Singh, JJ.

Author: B.P. Singh, J.

Citation:  AIR 2003 SC 3174,MANU/SC/0629/2003.

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Whether the court can mould relief in revision proceeding considering the subsequent event?

What is urged is that only an appeal is a continuation of a suit while revision is not. There cannot be any demur to the legal proposition as such. However, I am of the view that where the right to sustain the application is no longer available to Murugan Bus Service, different considerations will arise irrespective of the fact that the jurisdiction that is exercised is appellate jurisdiction or revisional. In other words, if the lis is kept pending, that would enough for the court to interfere. If it were some other matter perhaps, one may not very much worry in exercising revisional jurisdiction. But here as I have stated above, the right to sustain the application on certain stated qualifications having disappeared, can it be said that because of this High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction and because it concerns itself under S. 115 C.P.C. with the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal or lower authority, it should shut its eves? I do not think so. The power of revision is a limited one, in comparison to the appellate power. Barring that there is no point in saying that under revisional powers, the subsequent events cannot be taken note of. Such an extreme argument will render the revisional power absolutely nugatory. In shankar v. Krishnaji MANU/SC/0456/1969 : [1970]1SCR322 , it has been categorically held that the power under S. 115 C.P.C is a valuable power which is exercised by the High Court as a superior Court. Therefore the right to sustain the application must survive at any stage of the order. In fact, Alagirirswami J. (as he then was) in a ruling reported in Abdul Rahiman v. Abdulla (1967) 80 MLW 54, which comes under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, took note of an even that took place during the revisional stage and granted the relief. this exactly is the purport of the ruling in P.Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, MANU/SC/0415/1975 : [1975]3SCR958 . that case also related to A.P.Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act. Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the court, said as follows ( at p.1410) -

"We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and prosperity vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the hand-maid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inapt the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation ponds, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the fight or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. the later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into S. 10(3)(iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact.

Therefore, if a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the court, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inapt the decretal remdey. I should think that equity and justice demand my taking note of these events especially when by reason of these events, the original grantee Murugan Bus Service loses all the qualification to the a transport operator.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.R.P. No. 1535 of 1980

Decided On: 17.09.1982

 A.M.V. Jayaraman Vs.  Murugan Bus Service and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Mohan, J.

Citations: AIR 1983 Mad 210,MANU/TN/0377/1983,1982SCCONLINE Mad 138

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When revisional court can take note of subsequent event?

 It is true that the Court can take notice of subsequent events. These cases are where the court finds that because of altered circumstances like devolution of interest it is necessary to shorten litigation. Where the original relief has become inappropriate by subsequent events, the Court can take notice of such changes. If the court finds that the judgment of the Court cannot be carried into effect because of change of circumstances the Court takes notice of the same. If the Court finds that the matter is no longer in controversy the court also takes notice of such event. If the property which is the subject matter of suit is no longer available the Court will take notice of such event. The court takes notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1036 of 1967

Decided On: 12.09.1972

Laxmi & Co. Vs. Anant R. Deshpande and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.N. Ray and I.D. Dua, JJ.

Citations: 1973 AIR 171, 1973 SCR (2) 172,MANU/SC/0513/1972,(1973) 1SCC 37

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Whether revisional court can take additional evidence in suitable cases?

  Learned counsel for the petitioners Sri H.S. Nigam argued with vehemence that the view of the lower revisional court that in law no additional evidence could be admitted in a revision filed under Section 18 of the Act. is patently erroneous and in support of his argument, learned counsel has relied upon a number of decisions of this Court. Reliance has been placed on the decisions in (1) Lallu Lal Gupta v. IVth Additional District Judge and others, 1979 (UP) RCC 372 ; (2) Bihari Lal v. IInd Additional District Judge, Mathura and others, 1983 (2) ARC 146 ; (3) Smt. Shanti Devi v. District Judge, Farrukhabad and others, 1982 ARC 92 and (4) Radhey Shyam and another v. Additional District Judge, Unnao and others, 1984 (2) ARC 404. In all these decisions, the view taken was that a revisional court in suitable cases is entitled to take additional evidence and while exercising the power of taking additional evidence, the revisonal court has to act on the principles contained in Order XLI. Rule 27, C.P.C.

 A perusal of the impugned order would indicate that petitioners' application for admitting additional evidence on record has been rejected on a number of grounds and it is not correct to say that the said application has been rejected solely on the ground that the revisional court does not possess any power to admit additional evidence while exercising jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act. It would appear that the revisional court has also held that the petitioners have no right in law to contest the release application or to challenge the order releasing the accommodation in favour of the landlord. In all those cases on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners, it was held that the additional evidence in revision can be admitted in suitable cases on the principles contained in Order LXI, Rule 27, C.P.C., but before that power could be exercised, it has to be seen by the court that a right vests in the party seeking to bring additional evidence on record.

Allahabad High Court

Suraj Bhan Jain And Another vs Ist Additional District Judge, on 4 September, 1997

Equivalent citations: 1998 (1) AWC 266

Bench: J Gupta

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Whether Appellate Court and the Revisional Court may pass a direction, that sentence granted to accused to run concurrently?

 It is settled position of the law that the direction to run the sentence concurrently may be passed by the Trial Court, Appellate Court and the Revisional Court.

13. Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Mani & Anr. vs. State of Kerala, has held that "when no direction is given by the trial court that the sentences were to run concurrently, direction can be issued by the High Court under inherent powers even if the stage of exercising discretion under section 427(1) of the Code is over, in circumstances which would serve the purposes mentioned in Section 482".

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. A. 611/2018, Crl. M.A. 40714/2019 and Crl. M.B. 5926/2020

Decided On: 12.06.2020

 Pankaj Verma  Vs.   State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Suresh Kait, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1232/2020

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Leading Supreme Court judgment on Suspension of conviction if it was on Corruption Charges against a public servant

 The legal position, therefore, is this : Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convictional person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at tall aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.

No doubt when the appellate Court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior Court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal.

But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is different matter.

 If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level.

The legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate Court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment of suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (crl.) 770 of 2001

Decided On: 02.08.2001

K.C. Sareen Vs  C.B.I., Chandigarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas and S.N. Variava, JJ.

 Citation : AIR 2001 SC 3320

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Whether appellate or revisional authority can allow production of additional evidence?

 The expression "pass such order as it thinks fit" is not restricted to the passing of orders which are final in character. If for the purposes of doing complete justice between the parties, the authority who hears the revision petition is satisfied that it is necessary to call for additional evidence, he may call for such evidence. There is no bar in the Act or the rules against an appellate or the revising authority taking into consideration additional evidence brought on the record, if the authority requires additional evidence to be brought on the record or allows it to be brought on the record to do complete justice between the parties. The evidence must undoubtedly be disclosed to the parties and they must be given an opportunity to meet an inference that may arise from such additional evidence. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1943 of 1967

Decided On: 26.02.1968

Arbind Kumar Singh Vs. Nand Kishore Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.K. Mitter, J.C. Shah and V. Ramaswami, JJ.

Citations: AIR 1968 SC 1227, 1968 SCR (3) 322

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Whether objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of court can be taken at appellate stage?

 In the light of the above, it is clear
that no objection to the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the court which tried OS No.
61 of 1971 could be raised successfully even
in an appeal against that very decree unless
it had been raised at the earliest
opportunity and a failure of justice or
prejudice was shown. Obviously therefore, it
could not be collaterally challenged. That
too not by the plaintiffs therein, but by a
defendant whose alienation was unsuccessfully
challenged by the plaintiffs in that suit.”
56. Now, reverting back to facts of this case it is
apparent from the judgment dated 22.10.2016 of
Additional District Judge, that no objection to the
competence of Additional District Judge to decide the
case was taken by any of the parties. No objection
having been taken to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the
Additional District Judge, Section 21 of the Civil
Procedure Code comes into play. Subsection
(2) of
Section 21 provides that no objection as to the
competence of the Court with reference to the pecuniary

limits of the jurisdiction shall be allowed by any
Appellate or Revisional Court unless conditions
mentioned therein are fulfilled. No objection having
been raised by respondent tenant regarding competence of
the Court. Subsection
(2) precludes the revisionist to
raise any objection regarding competence of the court
and further revisional court ought not to have allowed
such objection regarding competence of Court of
Additional District Judge to decide the suit. The
respondent tenant did not raise any objection regarding
competence of the Court and took a chance to obtain
judgments in his favour on merits, he cannot be allowed
to turnround
and contend that the court of Additional
District Judge had no jurisdiction to try the Small
Cause Suit and the judgment is without jurisdiction and
nullity. Section 21 has been enacted to thwart any such
objection by unsuccessful party who did not raise any
objection regarding competence of court and allowed the
matter to be heard on merits. Further, in deciding the
small cause suit by Additional District Judge, the

tenant has not proved that there has been a consequent
failure of justice.
57. The High Court in the impugned judgment has not
adverted to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In judgment of Shobhit Nigam(Supra) also, affect of
Section 21 was neither considered nor raised. Section 21
contains a legislative policy which policy has an object
and purpose. The object is also to avoid retrial of
cases on merit on basis of technical objections.

62. We thus hold that even when the court of Additional
District Judge was not competent to decide the Small
Causes Suit in question on the ground that the pecuniary
jurisdiction is vested in Court of Small Causes i.e.
Civil Judge, Senior Division w.e.f. 07.12.2015, no
interference was called in the judgment of Additional
District Judge in the exercise of Revisional
Jurisdiction by High Court in view of the provisions of
Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.90519052
OF 2018

OM PRAKASH AGARWAL SINCE DECEASED
THR. LRS.  Vs  VISHAN DAYAL RAJPOOT & ANR. 

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When revision is tenable against orders passed under Maharashtra rent control Act?

For an order to be revisable under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the order must affect the very existence of the suit or the foundation of the party's case in their pleadings and not merely a procedural order, not affecting the substantive rights of parties, though such procedural order may ultimately affect the strength or weakness of the case of the aggrieved litigant which is to be finally determined at the trial while passing the decree in the suit or final order in the proceeding.

85. Following are instances of revisable orders.

(i) an order refusing leave to amend the plaint or written statement, where the proposed amendment is for assertion of rights or liabilities under the Rent Act or any other substantive law

(ii) an order rejecting an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of the CPC

(iii) an order allowing or rejecting an application for a declaration that the suit has abated

(iv) an order refusing to extend the time for filing a written statement

(v) an order for deleting an issue pertaining to rights or liabilities under the Rent Act, or any other substantive law

This list is illustrative and not exhaustive.

86. Following are instances of orders which would not be revisable orders:-

(i) an order granting leave to amend plaint or written statement

(ii) an order granting extension of time to file written statement

(iii) an order raising additional issue

(iv) an order made for production of documents or discovery or inspection.

(v) an order directing a plaintiff/defendant to furnish better and further particulars

(vi) an order issuing or refusing to issue a commission for examination of witnesses

(vii) an order issuing or refusing to issue summons for additional witness or document

(viii) an order condoning delay in filing documents, after the first date of hearing.

(ix) an order of costs to one of the parties for its default

(x) an order granting or refusing an adjournment

(xi) an order allowing an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of CPC

This list is also illustrative and not exhaustive.

87. As regards question No. 1 about scope and ambit of power of revision under Section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, our answer is that after the revisional Court is satisfied about maintainability of the revision application, the revisional Court will consider whether the impugned order is according to law. However, "according to law" refers to the order as a whole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall order, which must be according to law, which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to mistake of law. Hence, mere breach of, or non-conformity with, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Act or similar other procedural laws, will not be a ground for interfering with the impugned order of the trial Court. The revisional powers are intended to be exercised with a view to subserve and not to defeat the ends of justice. As a general rule where substantial justice has been done by order of the lower Court, the revisional Court will not interfere with it notwithstanding the fact that the reasons for the order are not correct or the order is improper or irregular. The writ petitions will now go back to the learned Single Judge for hearing and deciding them in light of the principles laid down in this judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 9562, 8029 and 907 of 2010

Decided On: 21.01.2013

 Bhartiben Shah, Vs. Smt. Gracy Thomas and Others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: 
M.S. Shah, C.J., R.V. More & N.M. Jamdar, JJ.
Citation:2013(2) ALLMR 9 FB

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When an objection as to place of suing cannot be allowed by appellate or revisional court?

We find that Pathumma (supra) really Concludes the matter before us. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment, it is stated as under:

"5. In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential:

(1) The objection was taken in the court of first instance,
(2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement,
(3) There has been a consequent failure of justice.

6. All these three conditions must coexist. Now in the present case Conditions 1 and 2 are no doubt fully satisfied; but then before the two appellate courts below could allow the objection to be taken, it was further necessary that a case of failure of justice on account of the place of suing having been wrongly selected was made out. Not only was no attention paid to this aspect of the matter but no material exists on the record from which such failure of justice may be inferred. We called upon Learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents to point out to us even at this stage any reason why we should hold that a failure of justice had occurred by reason of Manjeri having been chosen as the place of suing but he was unable to put forward any. In this view of the matter we must hold that the provisions of the Sub-section above extracted made it imperative for the District Court and the High Court not to entertain the objection whether or not it was otherwise well founded. We, therefore, refrain from going into the question of the correctness of the finding arrived at by the High Court that the Manjeri Court had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application praying for final decree."

10. Obviously Section 21 will apply in the three situations mentioned therein. The first situation refers to the place of suing. The second situation refers to pecuniary limits of the Court's jurisdiction and the third refers to local limits of the Court's jurisdiction. In each of these cases it is stated that an Appellate Court or Revisional Court shall not allow an objection to the place of suing (which refers to Section 16 in the present case) unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement. What follows is important. An objection as to place of suing cannot be allowed unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 10589 of 2014 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No. 3960 of 2007)

Decided On: 25.11.2014

K.P. Ranga Rao Vs. K.V. Venkatesham

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Ranjan Gogoi and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Citation:(2015) 13 SCC514

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When objection as to place of suing can be allowed by appellate or revisional Court ?

Sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 21 of the CPC deal
with powers of appellate or revisional Court to consider the
objections as to the place of suing and pecuniary limits of
jurisdiction of Civil Court. They lay down the conditions for
exercise of power thereunder to allow such objections by the
appellate or revisional Court. These conditions are:-
(I) such objections must be taken in the Court of first
instance at the earliest possible opportunity,
(2) they must be taken in all cases where issues are
settled, at or before settlement of issues.
(3) there has been a consequent failure of justice.
21. In the case of RSDV finance company (supra)
Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the objection as to the place
of suing can be allowed by the appellate or revisional Court only
when above referred three conditions are fulfilled.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH: NAGPUR.
SECOND APPEAL NO. 130 OF 2011.

Sureshkumar S/o. Rochiram Jagyasi, Vs Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd.,

CORAM:-S. B. SHUKRE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON :26TH FEBRUARY, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR748

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Bombay HC: Appellate or revisional Court must hear affected parties before the release of property on Supratnama

 When the appellate or revisional Court wants to vary the order of disposal of the property passed under section 453 or 454 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it can do so after hearing all the parties affected by the proposed order. A third party claimant to the property would in such case entitled to a notice. Though this is not provided by any specific provision in the statute, it will have to be read in Chapter XXXIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 since the basic rule of natural justice would require the Courts to comply with the said requirement. If the property is directed to be delivered to a third party or complainant in a case instituted on Police report, he will have to be issued notice, if the appellate or the revisional Court wants to vary that order and direct the return of the property to some other person. 

Bombay High Court

Bhikaji Tukaram Darade vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 29 September, 1993

Equivalent citations: 1994 (2) BomCR 518

Author: N Chapalgaonker

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