What are the scope and differences between Slum Rehabilitation Act (SRA), and Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999?

 In Maharashtra, two key legislative frameworks govern different aspects of urban development and housing: the Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, commonly known as the Slum Rehabilitation Act (SRA), and the Rent Control Act (Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999).

1. Slum Rehabilitation Act (SRA):

Scope: The Slum Rehabilitation Act primarily focuses on the improvement, clearance, and redevelopment of slum areas within urban regions of Maharashtra. Its objective is to provide better housing and living conditions for slum dwellers by rehabilitating them in situ (on the same site) or by rehousing them in alternative accommodation.

Key Features:

• Identification of Slums: The Act provides a framework for identifying slum areas based on specified criteria such as inadequate infrastructure, lack of basic amenities, and poor living conditions.

• Rehabilitation: It mandates the redevelopment of slum areas either by constructing new dwellings for slum dwellers on the same land (in situ rehabilitation) or by providing alternative accommodation in other locations (resettlement).

• Development Rights: Developers are granted development rights over the slum land for commercial or residential use in exchange for rehabilitating slum dwellers. This incentivizes private participation in slum redevelopment projects.

• Regulatory Authority: The Act establishes a regulatory authority to oversee and facilitate the implementation of slum rehabilitation projects.

2. Rent Control Act (Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999):

Scope: The Rent Control Act regulates the rent and tenancy of residential and non-residential premises in Maharashtra. Its primary aim is to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction and ensure fair rental practices.

Print Page

Whether private agreement between builder and some of the slum dwellers is binding over Slum Rehabilitation Authority?

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1359 of 2023

Decided On: 15.12.2023

Sayunkta Sangarsh Samiti and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aniruddha Bose and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.

Author: Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1346/2023.

Print Page

Whether it is permissible to club private land and Municipal Corporation land for declaring it as a slum area to approve a slum rehabilitation scheme?

 It is the appellants’ case that a total of 124 families
occupied dwellings in the slums existing over said plots. According
to Mr. Parikh the respondent authorities committed error of law in
treating the slum area over municipal plots and those over private
plots as one slum area. This, according to Mr. Parikh, deprived the
slum residents over private plots of having their own redevelopment
activity limited to private plots as per the wishes of 70% of its
occupants. As per his submission, by illegally declaring a common
slum area over two different kinds of lands, one owned by municipal
authority and the other by private persons, the rights of the
petitioners to have their own say has been diluted and adversely
affected. In other words, the major grievance of the appellants is
that the respondents have wrongly treated that there exists a
consent for redevelopment from 70% of the occupants. Such claim,
according to appellants, must be rejected and the appellants should
be allowed to have the redevelopment through a cooperative of occupants of private plots exclusively. 

 26. In view of discussions made above and on finding merit in the

submissions advanced on behalf of respondents we record our
agreement with the views expressed by the High Court that there is no illegality in clubbing of private land and Municipal Corporation land for declaring a contiguous area as a slum area for the purposes of approving a slum rehabilitation scheme for such area.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9363 OF 2011

Balasaheb Arjun Torbole  Vs The Administrator & Divisional Commissioner


SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.
Citation; (2015)6SCC534, 

Print Page

Whether civil court can decide issue of eligible slum dweller as per Maharashtra Slum Areas Act?

The perusal of the plaint would also reveal that the entire tenor of the case of the Plaintiff is that after the death of Anandibai, it is the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1, who were jointly entitled to the benefits of the hutment which was occupied by their mother Anandibai. It can thus be seen that the basic prayer of the Plaintiff is for a declaration that he along with the Defendant No. 1 is entitled to the rights flowing from the said hutment. By now, it is the settled position of law that the averments in the plaint cannot be read in isolation and for finding out what is the main relief claimed in the plaint, the plaint has to be read as a whole. The perusal of the plaint would reveal that the basic claim of the Plaintiff is on the basis of being the legal heir of Anandibai who was the original occupant of the suit hut. As such, it would be clear that the main claim in the plaint is against the Defendant No. 1, contending that the Plaintiff and the Defendant No. 1 are entitled to the joint use of the rights flowing from the said hut being legal heirs of the deceased Anandibai.

11. Perusal of the provisions of the said Act referred to hereinabove would reveal that by no stretch of imagination a dispute of nature which is sought to be raised in the plaint can be gone into by the Competent Authority, Appellate Court or Grievance Redressal Committee. In any case, the issue as to rights flowing to the Plaintiff and Defendant as legal heirs of Anandibai could be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Court and not any other forum.

12. In this regard, it will be relevant to refer to para nos. 12,13 and 14 of the Apex Court, in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v/s. Bal Mukund Bairwa reported in MANU/SC/0181/2009 : (2009) 4 SCC 299.

12. Section 9 of the Code is in enforcement of the fundamental principles of law laid down in the maxim Ubi jus Ibi remedium. A litigant, thus, having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a competent civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute. Ex facie, in terms of Section 9 of the Code, civil courts can try all suits, unless barred by statute, either expressly or by necessary implication.

13. The civil court, furthermore, being a court of plenary jurisdiction has the jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction upon considering the averments made in the plaint but that would not mean that the plaintiff can circumvent the provisions of law in order to invest jurisdiction on the civil court although it otherwise may not possess. For the said purpose, the court in given cases would be entitled to decide the question of its own jurisdiction upon arriving at a finding in regard to the existence of the jurisdictional fact.

14. It is also well settled that there is a presumption that a civil court will have jurisdiction and the ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a civil court is sought to be barred under a statute, the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction.

13. It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court in clear terms has held that a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a competent civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute. It has been further held that there is a presumption that a civil court will have jurisdiction and the ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. It has been further held that a person taking a plea contra must establish the same.

14. In the present case, as has been discussed herein-above, the dispute interse between the two claimants claiming to be legal heirs of deceased Anandibai, by no stretch of imagination, falls within the scope of powers of the Competent Authority or the Appellate Authority or Grievance Redressal Committee, which falls under Sections 35 and 42 of the said Act.

15. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge has erred in rejecting the plaint.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 137 of 2012

Decided On: 09.04.2013

 Ashok B. Nigudkar Vs.  Sudhadra P. Nirgudkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation:2013(4) ALLMR 753

Print Page

Whether is it mandatory for the landlord to secure fresh permission U/S 22 of Maharashtra slum Act after death of the original tenant?

Is there any defect in the permission under Section 22 of the 1971 Act the landlords secured?

20. Now, let us address the third issue: the alleged defect in the landlords' securing permission under Section 22 of the 1971 Act. The tenants have rightly contended that if there were an adverse finding on this question, the entire suit would fail; then the findings on the first two issues would be of no consequence. But I need to examine whether there is any defect in the landlords' securing permission from the Competent Authority under Section 22 of the 1971 Act. To illustrate on this point, I may first extract Section 22, which reads:

"22. Proceedings for eviction of occupiers or for issue of distress warrants not to be taken without permission of competent Authority:

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority,-

(a) institute, after commencement of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of any occupier from any building or land [in a slum area or for recovery of any arrears of rent or compensation from any such occupier, or for both; or]

. ..

(2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) [or (1-A)] shall make an application in writing to the Competent Authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.

(3) On receipt of such application, the Competent Authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall, by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such permission.

(4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under clause (a) or (b) of sub section (1) or clause (a) of subsection (1-A) the Competent Authority shall take into account the following factors, namely:-

(a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him, if he were evicted;

(b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area;

(b-1) whether, having regard to the relevant circumstances of each case, the total-amount of arrears of rent or compensation and the period for which it is due and the capacity of the occupier to pay the same, the occupier is ready and willing to pay the whole of the amount of arrears of rent or compensation by reasonable installments within a stipulated time;]

(c) any other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.

. ..

(5) Where the Competent Authority refuses to grant the permission under any of the clauses of sub-section (1) or (1A), it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to applicant."

21. Whatever reasons we applied to Issue No. I--not issuing a fresh quit-notice to the successor-tenants--will apply here, too. Besides that, the third applicant, whom the landlords called a sublessee, was a party to the proceedings under Section 22 before the Competent Authority. And he did contest the landlords' application. The landlords, to begin with, sought and secured permission against the original tenant and the third applicant. Before they could sue, the original tenant died. Then they sued the legal heirs and the third applicant, the sublessee. It was on the same permission the landlords got under Section 22 against the original tenant. I have already noted that there is no privity of contract between the applicants 1 and 2 on the one hand and landlords on the other. Then, as the applicants had traced their rights through the deceased original tenant, the proceedings taken against that original tenant--even under Section 22 of the MRC Act--would survive and affect his legal heirs as well. If the applicants' argument is taken to its logical conclusion, even after the landlords securing a decree if the original tenant died, that decree could not be executed against the legal representatives. The whole issue has to be taken up afresh--de novo. Such a process, I am sure, the law has not contemplated. I, therefore, hold that even against the third issue, the applicants' challenge fails.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 867 of 2012

Decided On: 27.08.2019

 Sunanda Ramkrishna Ayare  Vs.  Harishchandra Gopal Parab

Print Page

What would be the effect of setting aside the declaration of slum during the pendency of suit?

 When a law is enacted by a legislature, though without

competency, it remains on Statute book till a court of competent

jurisdiction declares it invalid and, once it does so, it declared

nonest for all purposes, exception being made in favour of

prospective overruling, where the declaration of invalidating is

directed to take effect from a future date. However on a

declaration of a slum, being set aside, we do not agree with the

view taken in Smt. Teresa that once the declaration of a slum is set

aside, the very effect of it is washed away and, consequently, there

was no prohibition against filing of the suit without permission of

the competent authority. On the contrary, we concur with the

view of the learned Single Judge in case of Smt. Hasira that a suit

instituted without complying with requirement of Section 22 is

not maintainable and the decree therein becomes illegal in

absence of such permission. A decree which has attained finality,

cannot be reopened on a subsequent decision setting aside that

declaration of area as slum.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.2926 OF 2001

WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.741 OF 2018

Satish Shahu Bane Vs  Dattatraya Tanaji Padam 

CORAM : PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, C.J. &

SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON: 18TH NOVEMBER, 2019.

Citation: 2020(5) MHLJ 245

Print Page

Whether it is mandatory to obtain written permission from competent authority under slum Act to evict trespasser?

 Insofar as the definition of 'occupier' in Section 2(e) of the 1971 Act is concerned, it must be immediately stated that the said definition is not exhaustive but inclusive. Clauses (i) to (iv) of Section 2(e) definitely do not embrace within itself a trespasser but Clause (v) that reads, 'occupier' includes 'any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building' would surely take within its fold and sweep a trespasser since such person is not only liable for damages for an act of trespass but also liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building trespassed by him. It is immaterial whether damages for the use and occupation are in fact claimed or not by the owner in an action against the trespasser. By no stretch of imagination, a trespasser could be taken out of the definition of 'occupier' in Section 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act. Clause (v), in our opinion, includes a person who enters the land or building in possession of another with permission or consent but remains upon such land or building after such permission or consent has been revoked since after revocation of permission or consent, he is liable to pay damages for unauthorised use of land or building. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Taj Mohamed Yakub v. Abdul Gani Bhikan MANU/MH/0976/1990 : (1991) Mh L J 263 has taken the view that a trespasser is included in the definition of 'occupier' under Section 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act which, we hold, is the correct view. 

16. Once it is held that a trespasser is included in the definition of 'occupier' in Section 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act, what necessarily follows is that before initiation of any suit or proceeding for eviction of such trespasser, the previous written permission of the Competent Authority is required as mandated by Section 22(1). Section 22(1) starts with non obstante clause and it is clear from the provision contained in Clause (a) thereof that no person shall institute any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for eviction of the occupier from any building or land in a slum area or for recovery of any arrears of rent or compensation from any such occupier or for both without the previous written permission of the Competent Authority. The use of words 'no' and 'shall' in Sub-section (1) of Section 22 makes it abundantly clear that prior written permission of the Competent Authority for an action under Clause (a) thereof is a must. The role of the Competent Authority under the 1971 Act is extremely important as the legislature has conferred power on him to carry out execution of works in improvement of the slum. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 requires the person desiring to obtain the permission to make an application in writing to the Competent Authority. As per Sub-section (3) on receipt of such application, the Competent Authority by an order in writing may either grant or refuse to grant such permission after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary enquiries into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit. Sub-section (4) of Section 22 requires the Competent Authority to take into account the factors set out therein for granting or refusing the permission. These provisions contained in Section 22 are salutary in light of the scheme of 1971 Act and have to be followed. It has to be held, therefore, that for eviction of a trespasser who is 'occupier' within the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of 1971 Act from the land or building or any part thereof in a declared slum area, the written permission of the Competent Authority under Section 22(1)(a) is mandatorily required.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2789 of 2005

Decided On: 01.12.2010

Laxmi Ram Pawar  Vs. Sitabai Balu Dhotre and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aftab Alam and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

Print Page

Whether objection that execution of decree is barred provisions of by Slum Act can be taken in execution proceeding?

We are, therefore, of the considered view that it was necessary for the respondent/tenant to have raised an objection regarding the applicability of the provisions of Section 22 of the Slums Act at the stage of suit and upon raising such an objection the Court could have come to the conclusion as to whether the suit property was in fact situated it the slum area or not. We find that since the objection, which is raised by the respondent/tenant, requires determination of an issue dependent upon the examination of the facts, which can be done only after leading evidence, such an objection cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time, in the Execution Proceedings. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that the decree in question is not passed by a Court lacking inherent jurisdiction or it cannot be said that the objection is such which is apparent on the face of the record.
23. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the objection, which was sought to be raised by the respondent/tenant at the stage of execution proceedings, requires examination of the questions on the basis of the evidence which is required to be led by the parties. We find that the present case is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction or an objection which is apparent on the face of record which does not require examination of any issues. We are of the considered view that the questions which have been raised by the respondent/tenant at the stage of execution proceedings, which he has failed to raise in the suit before the trial Court or in an appeal before the District Judge or in a petition before this Court or in a special leave petition before the Apex Court, cannot be permitted to be raised at the stage of execution proceedings for the first time. In that view of the matter, we find that the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected the objection of the respondent/tenant. We are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has erred in interfering with the order of the Executing Court. In that view of the matter, the appeal succeeds.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Letters Patent Appeal No. 300/2011 in Writ Petition No. 176/2011 (D)

Decided On: 20.08.2013

 Chandrashekhar Vs.  Pandharinath

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and P.N. Deshmukh, JJ.

Citation: 2013(6) MHLJ 377,2013(6) ALLMR 311

Print Page

When suit is maintainable without permission from authorities U/S 22 of Maharashtra slum Act ?

On the other hand, in so far as Smt. Teresa (supra) is concerned, it is clear that the decree has not become final when the notification was set aside. In fact declaration was made on 9-9-1977. That declaration was set aside on 7-12-1979 and suit was decree on 12-4-1979. An application was made to set aside the said decree which was dismissed. Revision which was preferred was allowed. In other words, the decree had not become final. Even otherwise at the highest what section 22 contemplates is bar on the person instituting the suit without permission of the competent authority. It is not ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court. The Civil Court cannot proceed with the matter unless permission of the authority was granted. It is no doubt true that another learned Single Judge in the case of Kalavatibai v. Gopala, MANU/MH/0688/1984 : 1984 Mh.L.J. 261 has taken a view that permission cannot be post facto and has to be before the suit is instituted. At any rate, I am not called upon to answer that issue in the present case. Once the notification is set aside and proceedings are pending, the bar created is lifted. Once the bar is lifted, the bar on the person instituting the suit without permission goes of. The suit can be proceeded with further. In these circumstances, to my mind it is not possible to hold that there is any conflict in the judgment in the case of Smt. Hazira and Smt. Tereza (supra).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1944 of 2002

Decided On: 04.04.2002

 Hari S. Yadav Vs. Hiralal Prabhu Yadav and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

F.I. Rebello, J.

Citation: 2002(6) Bom CR177

Print Page

When non statutory provisions can be treated as mandatory?

In the context of facts of the present case it
is sufficient to observe that non statutory provisions can hardly be
treated as mandatory unless their non observance is shown to have
caused legal injury by affecting some valuable rights of the writ
petitioners. As discussed earlier no such case could be made out by
the appellants so as to require interference on account of alleged
shortcomings in preparation or verification of Annexure II.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9363 OF 2011

Balasaheb Arjun Torbole  Vs The Administrator & Divisional Commissioner


SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J.
Citation; (2015)6SCC534, 

Print Page