Showing posts with label muslim woman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label muslim woman. Show all posts

Saturday, 18 November 2023

Supreme Court: Divorced Muslim woman is entitled to get maintenance from her husband U/S 125 of CRPC as long as she does not remarry

Cumulative reading of the relevant portions of judgments of this Court in Danial Latifi (supra) and Iqbal Bano (supra) would make it crystal clear that even a divorced Muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenance from her divorced husband, as long as she does not remarry. This being a beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof must accrue to the divorced Muslim women. {Para 29}

30. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned orders are hereby set aside and quashed. It is held that even if a Muslim woman has been divorced, she would be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. after the expiry of period of iddat also, as long as she does not remarry.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2309 of 2009 

Decided On: 04.12.2009

Shabana Bano Vs. Imran Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B. Sudershan Reddy and Deepak Verma, JJ.

Author: Deepak Verma, J.

Citation:2010 ALL MR (cri)278 , MANU/SC/1859/2009

Print Page

Thursday, 28 September 2023

Whether muslim mother can claim maintenance from her children U/S 125 of CRPC?

 Section 4(1) of the Act contains the provision for maintenance to the divorced woman from her children but this does in fact not debar the divorced Muslim woman from invoking the provision of Section 125 of Cr. PC against her children. Even under the Act the application of the provisions of Section 125 of Cr. PC has been contemplated and the Act has not specifically made any ouster of the application of Section 125 Cr.PC Section 5 of the Act has imposed one condition for the application of sections 125 to 128 of Cr. P C against former husband of the divorced Muslim woman but it is conspicuously silent as regards their application against others. The framework of the Act itself and the ratio decided in the case of Danial Latifi (supra) which we have discussed above will show that the Act itself is not a substituted measure of Section 125 of Cr. P C but in addition thereto. This suggests that the proceeding under Section 125 of Cr.PC against children of the respondent mother is quite maintainable despite the pendency of the proceeding under sections 3, 4 of the Act against her husband.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

C.R.R. No. 516 of 2001

Decided On: 10.12.2001

Makiur Rahaman Kha and Ors. Vs.  Mahila Bibi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.C. Sil, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/0390/2001.

Print Page

Whether burden of proof is on the muslim husband to prove that he has given divorce to his wife and how he should prove it?

Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and after perusing the entire record, this Court is of the opinion that in pursuance of definition of divorced woman, it is bounden duty of the husband to prove in Court by adducing cogent and reliable evidence that he had divorced his wife in accordance with Muslim law especially when the wife is not accepting the divorce and denies the factum of giving divorce to her by her husband. Section 2(a) of (The) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is defined as under:--

"2, Definition.-- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires--


(a) "Divorced woman" means a Muslim woman who married according to Muslim Law, and has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law."

In the present case applicant/wife filed an application under Section 125, Cr.PC for grant of maintenance. In reply to this application, non-applicant/husband submitted in Paragraph 2 that in August, 1997, he had given divorce to the applicant/wife according to Muslim Law. Thereafter, he has filed written application on 1-5-1998, in which he has mentioned that he has pronounced oral divorce to his wife and also given divorce in writing before the Trial Court and has no relations with her.  Learned Revisional Court has failed to consider whether the divorce was given in accordance with the Muslim Law. It is pertinent to note that non-applicant/husband neither examined himself in Court as a witness nor given any opportunity to cross-examine to the applicant/wife. He has not examined any other witness in his favour in Court for establishing his case by adducing evidence. As a matter of fact, in the entire case, there is no evidence led by the husband to prove his case. A mere pleading as mentioned in paragraph 2 of his reply or filing an application about pronouncement or declaration of divorce, would not sufficient to establish that non-applicant/husband has given divorce to the applicant/wife in accordance with the Muslim Law as embodied in Section 2(1)(a) of the Muslim Woman Act.


The fact is also very important and noticeable that the wife/applicant served legal notice dated 2-12-1997, Exh. P-1, its acknowledgment is Exh. P-2 by which she demanded maintenance @ Rs. 2,000/- per month. This notice was duly received by the non-applicant/husband and also admitted the receipt of notice in Paragraph 8 of the reply submitted on 2-9-1998. When the non-applicant husband received notice on 2-12-1997, why he had not given intimation of divorce and reply to this notice informing that the applicant/wife was already divorced in the month of August, 97 and as such now she is not entitled for any maintenance except in accordance with the Provisions of Muslim Women Act.

Learned Lower Revisional Court has failed to consider that the non-applicant/husband has failed to establish that applicant/wife has been given divorce by him in accordance with Muslim Law. For this purpose, non-applicant/husband neither examined him in Court nor adduced any evidence. In absence of this, it cannot be said that the applicant/wife acquired status of divorced woman and, therefore, her application under Section 125, Cr.PC was maintainable only from the period of filing the application till the date of giving divorce and for iddat period.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Criminal Revision No. 341/2001

Decided On: 19.07.2002

Khatunbai  Vs. Gani Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.L. Kochar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/0316/2002.

Print Page

Important provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

 

[Act 25 of 1986 as amended by Act 34 of 2019]

[19th May, 1986]

An Act to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from, their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
(2) It extends to the whole of India.

2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) “divorced woman” means a Muslim woman who was married according to Muslim law, and has been divorced by, or has obtained divorce from, her husband in accordance with Muslim law;

Print Page

Important provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019

 [Act 20 of 2019 ]   

[31st July, 2019]


An Act to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
(2) It shall extend to the whole of India.
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th day of September, 2018.
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(b) “Magistrate” means a Judicial Magistrate of the first class exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in the area where the married Muslim woman resides; and

(c) “talaq” means talaq-e-biddat or any other similar form of talaq having the effect of instantaneous and irrevocable divorce pronounced by a Muslim husband.

Print Page

Saturday, 24 June 2023

Can a Muslim Woman Seek Maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act Even After Divorce?


In this case, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "aggrieved person" postulates a woman "who is", or "has been" in a domestic relationship with the respondent. It is held that such words are used in the definition to cover past relationship as well. It would be profitable to extract the relevant paragraphs:-


"8. In my view, the definition of the "aggrieved person'" and the "Respondent" are the defining definitions in so far as the issue that arises for consideration in the present Petitions is concerned. The definition of "aggrieved person" postulates a woman who is, or "has been" in a domestic relationship with the Respondent and the Respondent means any adult male person who is, or "has been", in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. Since a domestic relationship is a sine qua non for invoking the provisions of the said Act, Section 2(f) also becomes material. Section 2(f) as can be seen from a reading of the said provision means a domestic relationship between two persons who live or "have", at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity , marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. Therefore, the aforesaid three definitions take in their sweep even a past relationship as the words "has been" or "have lived' have been used in the said definitions. The said words therefore, have been used purposefully as the said Act has been enacted to protect a woman from domestic violence and, therefore, there cannot be any fetter which can come in the way by interpreting the provisions in a manner to mean that unless the domestic relationship continues on the date of the application, the provisions of the said Act cannot be invoked. The words "has been" and the words "have lived" have been used for the purpose of showing the past relationship or experience between the concerned parties. To interpret the said provisions so as to mean that only subsisting domestic relationship are covered would result in turning the provisions of the said Act otiose. As is well settled by the judgments of the Apex court in cases of beneficent legislations, an interpretation which furthers its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Reference could be made to the judgment of the Apex Court reported in MANU/SC/1167/2009 : (2009) 14 SCC 546 : (AIR 2010 SC 1253 ; 2010 Lab IC 1104) the matter of Union of India v. De-vendra Kumar Pant and others. Apart from that a literal construction of the provisions would show that even if the woman was in the past in a relationship she would be entitled to invoke the provisions of the said Act. The words "has been" or "have lived" appearing in the definitions are plain and clear and therefore effect would have to be given to them. In the instant case, the Petitioner who is the aggrieved person and the Respondent No. 1 had lived together in the shared household when they were related by marriage. The Petitioner through divorced continued to stay in the shared house hold till she was allegedly forcefully evicted by the Respondent No. 1, she would therefore be entitled to invoke the provisions of the said Act, as the Petitioner and the respondent No. 1 are squarely covered by the provisions of the said Act."


16. In view of this settled legal position, the applicant would be squarely covered by definition of 'aggrieved person' as well as by the definition of 'domestic relationship'. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the non-applicant that she would not be entitled to get any relief under the D.V. Act cannot be sustained.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 2022

Decided On: 09.06.2023

Ahsanullah   Vs.  Shahana Parvin

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.A. Sanap, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2036/2023.

Print Page

Sunday, 3 January 2021

Whether relatives of husband can be prosecuted for offences Under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act?

 The provisions of Section 7(c) apply to the Muslim husband. The offence which is created by Section 3 is on the pronouncement of a talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife. Section 3 renders the pronouncement of talaq void and illegal. Section 4 makes the Act of the Muslim husband punishable with imprisonment. Thus, on a preliminary analysis, it is clear that the appellant as the mother-in-law of the second respondent cannot be accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq under the Act as the offence can only be committed by a Muslim man.

Reportable

Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Rahna Jalal vs The State Of Kerala on 17 December, 2020

Criminal Appeal No 883 of 2020  
Read full Judgment here: Click here       
Print Page

Saturday, 2 January 2021

Supreme Court: Triple Talaq-No Complete Bar On Anticipatory Bail For Offence Under 2019 Act, Provided Court Hear Complainant Woman

For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that on a true and harmonious construction of Section 438 of CrPC and Section 7(c) of the Act, there is no bar on granting anticipatory bail for an offence committed under the Act, provided that the competent court must hear the married Muslim woman who has made the complaint before granting the anticipatory bail. It would be at the discretion of the court to grant ad-interim relief to the accused during the pendency of the anticipatory bail application, having issued notice to the married Muslim woman.

Reportable

Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Rahna Jalal vs The State Of Kerala on 17 December, 2020

Criminal Appeal No 883 of 2020  
Read full Judgment here: Click here     
Citation:(2021)1 SCC 733,2020 SCCONLINESC 1061                                                                                     
Print Page

Saturday, 26 December 2020

Whether application for anticipatory bail is maintainable in offences under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019?

 When there are specific provision and specific

procedure contemplated for consideration of bail by the

Magistrate Court under Section 7(c) of the Act, 2019, whether

an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is to be entertained is

the question in this case. There is indeed no prohibition of the

applicability of Section 438 Cr.P.C. in the Act, 2019. Section

18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 clearly says that nothing in Section 438 of

the Cr.P.C. shall apply in relation to any case involving the

arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an

offence under that Act. But, there is no such prohibitory

Section in the Act, 2019 restraining the court in entertaining an

application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. Therefore, it cannot be

said that there is a total bar to entertain an application under

Section 438 Cr.P.C. if an offence under the Act, 2019 is alleged

against an accused.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

Bail Appl..No.9163 OF 2019


NAHAS Vs THE STATE OF KERALA,

Print Page

Friday, 25 December 2020

Guidelines of Kerala high court for the procedure to be followed for grant of bail to accused for an offence under Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019

  Therefore, from the above discussions, the

following conclusions are emerged :

(i) An application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is not

barred in a case in which an offence under the

provisions of Act, 2019 is alleged. But, if an

accused wants to avail the right under Section 438

Cr.P.C., he should specifically plead in an

application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. about the

reasons for not approaching the Magistrate under

Section 7(c) of the Act, 2019.

(ii) If an accused in a case registered under the

provisions of the Act, 2019 filed a Bail Application

before the Magistrate under Section 7(c), his

personal presence before the Magistrate is not

necessary till final orders are passed in the Bail

Application. The personal presence of the victim is

also not needed. The accused can file the Bail

Application through a lawyer if he intends to do so.

The victim also can contest the bail application

through a lawyer if she decides so.

(iii) If a Bail Application is filed under Section 7(c) of the

Act, 2019, the Magistrate should hear the married

Muslim woman upon whom talaq is pronounced.

(iv) The order passed in a Bail Application filed under

Section 7(c) should be a speaking order.

(v) If a Bail Application filed by an accused under

section 7(c) of the Act, 2019 is allowed, the

Magistrate can direct the accused to appear before

the court within a short period to comply the bail

conditions including the execution of bond, etc.

(vi) If a Bail Application is dismissed by the learned

Magistrate under Section 7(c) of the Act, 2019, the

Investigating Officer can take up follow up action

and arrest the accused, if necessary.

(vii) If a Bail Application is dismissed by the learned

Magistrate under Section 7(c) of the Act, 2019, the

accused can challenge that order, if he intends to do

so, in accordance with law. At that stage, the

accused can even file an application under Section

438 Cr.P.C., if there is an apprehension of arrest.

(viii) If an application under Section 7(c) is allowed, the

married Muslim woman upon whom a talaq is

pronounced can challenge that order in accordance

with law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

Bail Appl..No.9163 OF 2019


NAHAS Vs THE STATE OF KERALA,


Dated this the 3rd day of August 2020

Print Page

Tuesday, 8 December 2020

Whether former husband of Muslim wife can refuse to pay permanent alimony to her if she remarries after divorce?

 We may conclude observing that when the Court makes an award of permanent alimony or for one time payment, it is not founded on any stipulation that any part of the sum would be either actually refunded in whole or in part. Such sum is not granted on the condition against remarriage for all times to come or for any particular period. In fact, it is something different from the obligation of her husband to maintain his divorced wife for his life or until remarried. The permanent alimony in a way is an estimated sum in lump sum to discharge the judgment debtor from his future liabilities unconditionally. On the other hand, the grant of periodical payment by way of maintenance to a divorced wife is in recognition/obligation to the spouse to maintain her so long as she enjoys the continued status of a divorcee. On such remarriage, that status of divorcee comes to an end and she acquires another marital status as someone's spouse. Under the Act, 1986 as well as under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the wife includes a divorcee. Therefore, when the wife remarries, her claim of maintenance primarily comes to stand against her new husband coming into existence in new relationship. The obligation of maintaining the divorced wife is shifted to the husband, whom she subsequently marries. The future obligation to maintain her by her previous husband comes to an end. That makes a case of permanent alimony different from a case of grant of periodical maintenance. The former is to discharge the husband from his obligation for all times in lieu of a settled reason, in the later, he is required to continuously discharge his obligations at interval of every period. This proposition of law laid down by us should be looked into keeping in mind Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986. A divorced woman is entitled to 'a reasonable and fair provision" and "maintenance" to be made and paid to her within and post the Iddat period by her former husband. The Supreme Court in Danial Latifi (supra) interpreted this as two separate obligations. The Court found "reasonable and fair provision' to mean a provision in advance for the future needs of the ex-wife including her residence, food, clothes and other necessities. The Supreme Court found that the Act, 1986 requires a Muslim husband to provide maintenance of a reasonable and fair amount needed to maintain his wife for the rest of her life but that he must pay this amount in total during the iddat Period. At the cost of repetition, we state that the provision for permanent alimony is incidental to the granting of a decree or judicial separation, divorce or annulment of marriage. In other words, the relief of permanent alimony is a relief incidental to the granting of the substantive relief by the Court in the main proceeding.{Para 79}


80. From the aforesaid discussion the following conclusions emerge;


(A) Before the enactment of the Act, 1939, a woman, under pure Muslim Law, had no right to get a decree for divorce from the husband if the husband refuse to divorce her. The Act, 1939, for the first time, conferred a legal right to move the Civil Court for a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds specified in Section 2 of the Act, 1939. After the Act of 1939, a wife thus had a statutory right to obtain a divorce from her husband through the Court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.


(B) A decree for dissolution of marriage obtained by the wife under the provisions of the Act, 1939 is a legal divorce under the Muslim Law by virtue of the statute. The ex-wife, having obtained divorce from her erstwhile husband under the provisions of the Act, 1939 is entitled to reasonable and fair provision under Section 3 of the Act, 1986.


(C) Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over all other enactments. The Family Courts Act has in its comprehension all community including the Muslims. All disputes between the Muslim community within the purview of the Family Courts Act are to be settled by the Family Courts.


(D) The dispute contemplated by Section 3 of the Act, 1986 is within the purview and four corners of the Family Courts Act as the dispute under Section 3 of the Act, 1986 also relates to matrimonial relations between the parties.


(E) The right of maintenance and right in the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its dissolution. Those reliefs are incidental to the main relief of 'dissolution of marriage' and therefore, these reliefs are very much an integral part of the decree of 'dissolution of marriage'. The Law contemplates that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations; (I) to make "reasonable and fair provision" for his divorcee wife and (ii) to provide "maintenance" for her. The obligation to make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife is not restricted until the divorced wife remarries. It is within the jurisdiction of the Family Court to pass an order for a lump sum amount to be paid to the wife in discharge of the obligation of the husband under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986 and such order cannot be modified upon remarriage of the divorced Muslim wife.


(F) The provision for permanent alimony is incidental to the granting of a decree or judicial separation, divorce or annulment of marriage.


(G) When the Family Court makes an order of permanent alimony or for one time payment in the proceedings instituted by the wife for divorce, it is not founded on any stipulation that any part of the sum would be refunded either in whole or in part. Such sum is not granted on the condition against remarriage for all times to come or for any particular period. It is something different from the obligation to her husband to maintain his divorced wife for his life or until remarried. The permanent alimony in a way is an estimated sum in lump sum to discharge the husband from her future liabilities unconditionally.


(H) The grant of periodical payment by way of maintenance to a divorced wife is in recognition/obligation of the spouse to maintain her so long as she enjoys the continued the status of divorcee. If the wife gets remarried, her status of divorcee is come to an end and the liability of the husband to pay periodical maintenance would also come to an end.


81. It is brought to our notice by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties that the appellant herein remarried way back in the year 2014. This is suggestive of the fact that much before the respondent herein instituted the proceedings in the Family Court for divorce, the husband had already remarried and raised a family. The appellant could do so because polygamy is permissible amongst the Muslim Community. It does not constitute an offence of bigamy punishable under 494 of the Penal Code. The materials on record further indicates that the husband hardly paid anything towards maintenance. The respondent had to leave her matrimonial home soon after the marriage, i.e., sometime in 2010. Ultimately, she was constrained to institute the proceedings of divorce in the Family Court. It appears that even during the pendency of such proceedings before the Family Court, nothing was paid to the wife. The wife, ultimately, succeeded before the Family Court in getting the marriage dissolved and was also successful in getting an order of permanent alimony. The husband now cannot turn around and say that he is not liable to pay the lump sum amount because the respondent is remarried.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/First Appeal No. 2012 of 2019 and Civil Application No. 1 of 2019 in R/First Appeal No. 2012 of 2019

Decided On: 19.03.2020

 Tarif Rashidbhai Qureshi Vs.  Asmabanu

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and V.B. Mayani, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/GJ/0734/2020

Print Page

Sunday, 23 June 2019

Triple Talaq Judgment

Applying the test of manifest arbitrariness to the case at hand, it is clear that Triple Talaq is a form of Talaq which is itself considered to be something innovative, namely, that it is not in the Sunna, being an irregular or heretical form of Talaq. We have noticed how in Fyzee's book (supra), the Hanafi school of Shariat law, which itself recognizes this form of Talaq, specifically states that though lawful it is sinful in that it incurs the wrath of God. Indeed, in Shamim Ara v. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0850/2002 : (2002) 7 SCC 518, this Court after referring to a number of authorities including certain recent High Court judgments held as under:

13...The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters -- one from the wife's family and the other from the husband's; if the attempts fail, talaq may be effected (para 13). In Rukia Khatun case [MANU/GH/0031/1979 : (1981) 1 Gau LR 375] the Division Bench stated that the correct law of talaq, as ordained by the Holy Quran, is: (i) that "talaq" must be for a reasonable cause; and (ii) that it must be preceded by an attempt of reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife from her family and the other by the husband from his. If their attempts fail, "talaq" may be effected. The Division Bench expressly recorded its dissent from the Calcutta and Bombay views which, in their opinion, did not lay down the correct law.

14. We are in respectful agreement with the abovesaid observations made by the learned Judges of the High Courts.

(at page 526)

284. Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instant and irrevocable, it is obvious that any attempt at reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters from their families, which is essential to save the marital tie, cannot ever take place. Also, as understood by the Privy Council in Rashid Ahmad (supra), such Triple Talaq is valid even if it is not for any reasonable cause, which view of the law no longer holds good after Shamim Ara (supra). This being the case, it is clear that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be violative of the fundamental right contained Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, therefore, the 1937 Act, insofar as it seeks to recognize and enforce Triple Talaq, is within the meaning of the expression "laws in force" in Article 13(1) and must be struck down as being void to the extent that it recognizes and enforces Triple Talaq. Since we have declared Section 2 of the 1937 Act to be void to the extent indicated above on the narrower ground of it being manifestly arbitrary, we do not find the need to go into the ground of discrimination in these cases, as was argued by the learned Attorney General and those supporting him.

ORDER of THE COURT

In view of the different opinions recorded, by a majority of 3:2 the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat'-triple talaq is set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (C) Nos. 118, 288, 327, 665 of 2016, 43 of 2017 and Suo Motu Writ (C) No. 2 of 2015 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

Decided On: 22.08.2017

 Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
Print Page

Saturday, 24 November 2018

Whether civil court can grant reliefs incidental to main relief of dissolution of marriage under muslim law?

 Third and the most important factor which is required to be considered is that the law always expect that all the disputes between the parties should be decided in one forum and in one proceeding, so as to avoid the multiplicity of proceedings and the waste of time, energy and money of the parties in prosecuting the remedies in different forums. The right of maintenance and right in the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its dissolution. Those reliefs are incidental to the main relief of 'dissolution of marriage' and therefore, these reliefs are very much integral part of decree of 'dissolution of marriage'. Hence, they are required to be considered in the same proceeding, even if at times such reliefs are not asked for also. It is well recognized that the award of maintenance is the fall out of the decree of 'dissolution of marriage', hence even if at times, the Respondent has not asked for the maintenance, she is awarded that maintenance for herself and her children while passing the decree for 'dissolution of marriage'. It may be stated that, even when the decree is of 'Restitution of Conjugal Rights' under Section 9 of 'The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955' there is provision for award of maintenance under Order 21, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, till the decree is complied with. The point to be stressed is that the relief of maintenance whether to the wife or the children is incidental to the relief of 'dissolution of marriage'. Merely because 'The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939', does not mention that the Court is also having the jurisdiction or power to grant such relief, it cannot be said that the Court is not having jurisdiction to grant it, if it is incidental, claimed and the Court finds it necessary to grant the same. Moreover, the right of maintenance given to wife and the minor children under the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is in addition to the right, which the minor children are having under Muslim Law to get maintenance from the father. The law expects that the parties should not be driven to approach the different forums but in one forum itself they should be granted whatever reliefs to which they are entitled.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal (ST.) No. 11650 of 2017 and Civil Application No. 1570 of 2017 in Second Appeal (ST.) No. 11650 of 2017

Decided On: 02.08.2018

 Adnan Chara Vs.  Farhat Adnan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation:AIR 2018 Bom 282
Print Page

Saturday, 4 August 2018

Whether Civil Court can grant Maintenance, Mehr & a Share in Matrimonial property to Muslim Woman?

It is also not a case where the Civil Court cannot and does
not have the jurisdiction to grant these reliefs of maintenance and
share in the matrimonial property. Under the provisions of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Section 26
confers concurrent jurisdiction on all the three forums, including the
Family Court, the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class and also the
Civil Court, as regards the relief like the maintenance. So far as the

relief in respect of the matrimonial property or the property standing
in the joint name of both the spouses which is a fact in this case also,
the Civil Court is having the jurisdiction to entertain such suit. As a
matter of fact, according to learned counsel for the Appellant also,
Section 22 of 'The Specific Relief Act, 1963', clearly provides for
partition of such jointly owned property and under the provisions of
'The Specific Relief Act, 1963', it is the Civil Court, which is having the
jurisdiction to grant such decree. Therefore, it is not a case, where the
Civil Court was not having the jurisdiction to grant the reliefs which
the Respondent had claimed in the suit. Hence, it also cannot be said
that the trial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction.
31] As regards the reliance placed by learned counsel for the
Appellant on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Chandrika Singh (supra), there the issue framed was relating to the
tenancy, for which a separate competent authority is established and
the Civil Court's jurisdiction to decide such issue is excluded.
Therefore, it was held that such issue was required to be referred to
the tenancy authorities. Here, in the case, the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court is not excluded in any way to decide both these issues relating to
maintenance of the children and the right and share of the
Respondent in the jointly owned flat. The Civil Court was having very

much jurisdiction and therefore, there is no question of the trial Court
exceeding its jurisdiction or acting beyond its jurisdiction or
exercising the jurisdiction, which was not vested in it. Hence, on this
score also, the contention raised by learned counsel for the Appellant
cannot be accepted.
32] Third and the most important factor which is required to
be considered is that the law always expect that all the disputes
between the parties should be decided in one forum and in one
proceeding, so as to avoid the multiplicity of proceedings and the
waste of time, energy and money of the parties in prosecuting the
remedies in different forums. The right of maintenance and right in
the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its
dissolution. Those reliefs are incidental to the main relief of
'dissolution of marriage' and therefore, these reliefs are very much
integral part of decree of 'dissolution of marriage'. Hence, they are
required to be considered in the same proceeding, even if at times
such reliefs are not asked for also. It is well recognized that the award
of maintenance is the fall out of the decree of 'dissolution of marriage',
hence even if at times, the Respondent has not asked for the
maintenance, she is awarded that maintenance for herself and her
children while passing the decree for 'dissolution of marriage'. It may

be stated that, even when the decree is of 'Restitution of Conjugal
Rights' under Section 9 of 'The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955' there is
provision for award of maintenance under Order 21, Rule 33 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, till the decree is complied with. The point to
be stressed is that the relief of maintenance whether to the wife or the
children is incidental to the relief of 'dissolution of marriage'. Merely
because 'The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939', does not
mention that the Court is also having the jurisdiction or power to
grant such relief, it cannot be said that the Court is not having
jurisdiction to grant it, if it is incidental, claimed and the Court finds it
necessary to grant the same. Moreover, the right of maintenance
given to wife and the minor children under the provisions of the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is in
addition to the right, which the minor children are having under
Muslim Law to get maintenance from the father. The law expects that
the parties should not be driven to approach the different forums but
in one forum itself they should be granted whatever reliefs to which
they are entitled.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL (ST.) NO. 11650 OF 2017
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1570 OF 2017
IN
SECOND APPEAL (ST.) NO. 11650 OF 2017

Adnan Chara Vs Farhat Adnan


CORAM : DR.SHALINI PHANSALKAR-JOSHI, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 2nd AUGUST, 2018.
Citation:AIR 2018 Bom 282

Print Page

Tuesday, 15 May 2018

Whether muslim woman is entitled to get rights conferred under domestic violence Act?


As   till   the   time   the   Talaq   is   not   proved,   the
respondent continues to be legally weeded wife of the petitioner and
in   that  contingency   the   question   is  whether  the   wife   who  is  in
domestic relationship with the petitioner is entitled to seek the relief
under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act.   Though the

learned counsel for the petitioner had vehemently argued that the
parties are governed by Muslim Personal Laws and therefore the
provisions  of   the   Domestic   Violence  Act   cannot   be  invoked,  per
contra  Mrs.Irani  would   submit  that  there   is  no  intention  of   the
legislature to restrict the provisions of Protection from Womens of
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to a particular category of women and
to specifically exclude the women belonging to the Muslim religion.
8. Perusal of the provisions of the Protection of Women
from   Domestic   Violence   Act,   2005   would   reveal   that   it   is   an
enactment   to   provide   for   more  effective  protection   for   rights   of
women   guaranteed   under   the   Indian   Constitution   who   are   the
victims of the violence.  The enactment no way intends to restrict its
application to any particular category of women but it intends to
protect the women aggrieved, who are victims of Domestic Violence.
The   definition   and   connotation   of   “Domestic   Violence”   under
Section­3  of   the  enactment   do  not  indicate   any  intention   either
express or implied to exclude Muslim women.   Section­36 of the
said enactment provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law
for the time any force.  Thus, the scheme of the enactment do not
restrict the applicability of the provisions of the Act to a particular

category   of   women,   nevertheless   to   a     woman   belonging   to   a
particular religion.  No doubt the Muslim women are also governed
by   several   other   enactments   in   the   form   of   Muslim   Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, Dissolution of Muslim
Marriage Act, 1939 etc., however, the rights conferred under the
said enactments can in no way curtail the operation or Protection
granted under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act.  In these circumstances the contention advanced by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the respondent­wife could not avail
the   provisions   of   the   Domestic   Violence   Act   is   not   sustainable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 114 OF 2018
WITH 
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.518 OF 2018

Mr.Ali Abbas Daruwala  V/s. Mrs.Shehnaz Daruwala.

­­­­
CORAM : SMT.BHARATI H. DANGRE, J

PROUNCENED ON : 04th MAY 2018.
Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 596

Print Page

Sunday, 11 June 2017

Whether it can be presumed that Muslim man had no wife other than whose name is mentioned in service book?

 The substantial question of law that arises for

consideration in this Regular Second Appeal is, whether a

legal or reasonable presumption can be drawn to the effect

that a Muhammedan Government Servant had no wife

other than the wife whose name is shown in the Service

Book maintained under Rule 93 of the Government

Servants Conduct Rules, 1960.

      8. Coming to Rule 93 of the Government Servants

Conduct Rules, it is apposite to extract the same for a

proper understanding and better appreciation.            Rule 93

reads as follows:

           "Bigamous Marriages.--(i) No Government servant

           who has a wife living shall contract another

           marriage without first obtaining the permission of

           the  Government,     notwithstanding   that   such

           subsequent marriage is permissible under the

           personal law for the time being applicable to him."

The conduct of a Government servant is governed by the

Government      Servant      Conduct    Rules.   The     statutory

mandate under Rule 93 is that the Government servant,


who has a wife living, shall not contract another wife

without first obtaining the permission of the Government,

though      his personal    law   permits  him   subsequent

marriages.      It is true that the Conduct Rules are issued

under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and therefore

they have the same force as that of a statute, and any

infraction would amount to violation of law. But, in view of

Rule 93, it can never be presumed that a Muhammedan

Government Servant has no wife other than the wife whose

name is shown in the service book or pension book,

particularly when his personal law permits him to marry

more than one wife, upto four. Such a presumption is far

fetched and stretched and it goes beyond the intention of

the said Rule.

      9.     Coming to the instant case, it is true that


Aboobackerkutty had not obtained permission to marry the


first defendant under Rule 93 of the said Rules. Certainly,


the said disobedience or violation of that Rule would


warrant disciplinary action against him for misconduct



under the Rule. But, it cannot be presumed that he has no

wife other than the first defendant in view of Rule 93,


particularly when his personal law permits him to marry


and maintain more than one wife, upto four. Therefore,

this Court is not inclined to countenance the arguments

advanced by the the learned counsel for the appellant on

the basis of Rule 93 and it stands rejected.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                           PRESENT:

           MR.JUSTICE K.HARILAL

  11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2017
                  RSA.No. 1187 of 2015 (G)
                 

  UMMAYUMMA, Vs  KIZHAKKINIYAKATH THITHACHUTTY UMMA, 

                     
Print Page

Sunday, 9 April 2017

Whether magistrate can grant maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC to muslim wife if there is no legal divorce?

If we consider the submissions put forth by the Counsel for the parties and a perusal of the record what clearly appears is that fact that the Petitioner in the instant case has not been able to establish the fact that there was a customary Talak (except claiming Talak to have been made by sending a Registered letter) between the parties, coupled with the fact that there was an allegation made by the Respondent wife that she was subjected to physical and mental harassment and torture at the hands of the Petitioner and therefore she was forced to leave the matrimonial house and live separately. Further so far as agreement between the parties is concerned there is also an averment specifically made by Respondent No. 1 that the said agreement has been got executed by playing mischief by her father and uncle and she was not aware of the said proceeding, therefore the same would not be binding upon her. These pleadings have also come on record where it is the finding of fact that there was no customary ritual Talak which is said to have been executed by the Petitioner by sending the same by registered post to the house of the Respondent-wife. Further it also reflects from the Ikrarnama that the payment of Rs. 3.5 lakhs was by way of payment made as Mehar as well as amount payable during Iddat, therefore the same cannot be said to be an amount paid to the Respondents as one time settlement towards the maintenance of the Respondents for the life time. Further even if there was an agreement between the parties which the Respondent No. 1 has denied clearly would be contrary to the legal provisions of law. Mere agreement entered at between the parties would not disentitle wife and their children from claiming maintenance for their sustenance. Thus, till his wife is remarried it would be the responsibility of the Petitioner husband alone to maintain the wife and children born from them. An agreement in another words cannot be construed that the amount which have been paid as "Mehar" and during "Iddat" would be liable of being also considered for payment of maintenance of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3.
5. So far as law in respect of maintainability of the provisions of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. is concerned much water has since flown. Until and unless there is a proper legal divorce between the parties under the Provisions of the Act, 1986 the wife under normal circumstance can move claim for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH
Criminal Misc. Petition No. 599 of 2016
Decided On: 23.08.2016
 Shakil Usman Ansari

Vs.

 Afsana Bano and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sam Koshy, J.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 834
Print Page

Sunday, 1 January 2017

Whether muslim wife can inherit property of her husband who has embraced hindu religion?

(ii) Whether off-springs born out of a Mohameddan marriage would
inherit property of their father on death if he became a Hindu before death?

30. So far as inheritance of the properties of a Muslim dying intestate is clear.
It has been held in the Holy Book, Al Quran itself as follows:
“Allah commands you regarding your children. For the male a share equivalent
to that of two females.” (Al Quran 4:11)
This ayat shows that the command is to a believer. What will happen if
the believer turns to be nonbeliever, is the question in the present case. An
apostate from Islam and an original non-Muslim are equally viewed from the
stand point of Islam so that if a deceased Muslim leaves behind him 3 heirs, one
of whom is a non-Muslim, the second an apostate and the third a Muslim, in that
event, according to Mohameddan Law, the first two would be excluded from
succession and the inheritance would entirely go to the Muslim heir even if he is 
the remotest in terms of the degree of proximity of the deceased. This shows
that an apostate is excluded from inheritance of properties from his Muslim
ancestors. Coming to the question of the converse case, Jurist Ameer Ali quoted
from Fatwa-e-Alamgiri (Vol. VI, P. 631) and commented that under Sunni Law, a
Muslim does not inherit from a non-Muslim nor does a non-Muslim inherit from a
Muslim. Similarly, Dr. Abid Hasan observed in his ‘Islamic Laws of Inheritance’ by
quoting from Sahih Al-Bukheri that according to Prophet (SAWS), a Muslim
cannot be the heir of a disbeliever, nor can a disbeliever be the heir of a Muslim.
According to him, generally speaking, this is also the majority view that a Muslim
cannot inherit from a non-Muslim.
31. Then what would happen to the properties of an apostate if his Muslim
heirs cannot inherit? It is pointed out that in a Dar-ul-Islam (that is the country
which is governed by law of Islam), such properties would vest in Bait-Ul-Mal and
it would lapse accordingly. But in a country like India which is not a Dar-ul Islam
escheat or lapse cannot take place upon apostasy. This is because the law of
escheat, lapse or Bona vacantia can take place in India only by operation of
Article 296 of the Constitution. The pre conditions of Article 296, obviously do not
include apostasy. Thus, it is clear that from the stand point of Mohamedan law, a
Muslim cannot be heir of a non-believer.
32. Looking the incident from a different perspective it would appear that
when the apostate dies after embracing Hinduism he was being governed by the
tenets of Hindu Law at the time of his death. In the case in hand, learned trial
court also followed the same principle to hold that as a Hindu, Samir Ranjan
Choudhury could not have contacted a second marriage with Krishna Das when 
he had a spouse living. Obviously, the learned court examined the incident from
the light of section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 thus applying the
doctrines of Hindu Law. Had he applied Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for the
purpose of deciding inheritance of the properties left behind by the deceased, in
that event the question would have arisen as to whether a non Hindu would be
entitled to inherit property of a Hindu. This can be tested by examining a
hypothetical case where son of a Hindu renounces Hinduism and becomes a
Muslim and thereafter his Hindu father dies. Obviously, in such case the son who
embraced Islam renouncing Hinduism, perhaps would not have been held a legal
heir of the deceased Hindu and his properties would have been shared only by
his Hindu legal heirs. Inheritance under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law is
governed by the principle of giving oblation. Obviously, once converted to other
religion, a son cannot give oblation following Hindu rituals and so even on such
historical view point a converted son of a Hindu looses his right to inherit
properties of his father. Same is the case in case of renunciation.
33. Secton 26 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 casts some light in matter
involving conversion from Hinduism to another religion. It provides that children
born to a Hindu converted to any other religion after his conversion shall be
disqualified from inheriting properties of any Hindu relative unless such children
or descendants are Hindus at the time succession opens. The indication is clear
that to inherit properties of a Hindu, one must be a Hindu when succession
opens. The example of a Hindu son embracing Islam during life time of his father
is only taken to test as to whether a Muslim son of a Hindu on apostasy from
Islam can inherit share from his deceased Hindu father. 

34. While Hadith like Sahih Al-Bukheri as well as Fatwa-e-Alamgiri prescribes
that a Muslim cannot be heir of a disbeliever or non Muslim, even the Hindu Law
does not permit inheritance to a son who renounces Hinduism during life time of
his father. The sum total is that both from the stand point of Mohameddan Law
as well as the Hindu Law of succession, inheritance does not take place beyond
the periphery of religion. A Muslim inherits properties of his Muslim ancestor and
a Hindu can inherit properties of his Hindu ancestor. In the case in hand, the two
off-springs of Saydur Rahman Hazarika alias Samir Ranjan Choudhury from his
Muslim wife, Musstt. Parbin Rahman Hazarika admittedly continue pursuing
Islamic faith after their father renounced Islam. So, whether doctrine of
representation would apply to make them entitled to inherit properties of their
grand-father does not arise in the present case but what is clear is that the
properties apparently acquired by their father after his conversion to Hinduism
would remain beyond their reach to them as they cannot be heir of a disbeliever
(Fatwa-e-Alamgiri, Vol VI, P. 631 and Sahih Al-Bukheri). The second point for
determination accordingly stands answered holding that the respondents No. 2
and 3 being not legal heirs of Late Samir Ranjan Choudhury shall not be entitled
to succession certificate as prayed for.
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Case No: Intest.Cas. 4/2009

 Smti Krishna Das Choudhury,
V  Musstt. Parbin Rahman Hazarika,

Dated : 23.12.2015
Citation:2016 (5) ALLMR(JOURNAL) 71
Print Page