Showing posts with label Pecuniary jurisdiction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pecuniary jurisdiction. Show all posts

Friday, 2 August 2024

Whether plaintiff should value his appeal on the basis of combined valuation of the plaint and counterclaim where both suit and counter-claim are dismissed?

 Where both suit and counter-claim are dismissed, the subject-matter of the appeal would be the plaint. Hence valuation would be as per the valuation of the plaint and Court fee as payable on the plaint; would be as due and payable thereon. The plaintiff cannot be made to value his appeal on the basis of the combined valuation of the plaint and counterclaim, in respect of which he makes no claim. {Para 48}.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Writ Petition No. 283 of 2006

Decided On: 05.03.2007

Teofilo Barreto Vs. Sadashiva G. Nasnodkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: V.C. Daga, J.

Citations: 2007 (4) BomCR 830, 2007 (6) MhLj 1, MANU/MH/0637/2007.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the District Court (Appellate Court) lacks jurisdiction to entertain appeal when valuation of cross-objection exceeds pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court?

 Having noticed the change in old Code and new unamended Code of Civil Procedure, let me now turn to the further legislative change brought about in new Code by virtue of amendment of the year 1976; whereby provisions with respect to counter-claim under Order 8, Rule 6-A to 6-G came to be inserted. Consequent to this insertion provisions of Order 20, Rule 19(1), (2) also came to be amended and the words "counter-claim" were inserted immediately after the words "set off". Thus, by virtue of this amendment, set off and counter-claim are treated at par; and both were brought on the same platform with equal status. Therefore, while interpreting clause, Order 20, Rule 19(2), the same treatment which is given to a decree of set off, will have to be given to a decree in suit in which counter-claim was claimed. The legislative object which led to deletion of Section 216 and enactment of Order 20, Rule 19 in respect of decree of set off shall also hold good in respect of decree from counterclaim. As such decree passed in a suit where counter-claim was preferred has to be treated subject to the same provisions in respect of appeal to which it would have been subject, if no counter-claim had been preferred. If the legislative view is that the decree wherein the set off is claimed should go before the same Appellate Forum to which it would have been subject in normal course in absence of claim for set-off; then so far as the counter-claim is concerned; the same treatment will have to be accorded to a decree passed in a suit where counter-claim was preferred. As an extension of the same principle, the cross objection arising from the decree of set-off and/or counter-claim will have to be given similar treatment in the matter of determination of Appellate Forum. {Para 56}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Writ Petition No. 283 of 2006

Decided On: 05.03.2007

Teofilo Barreto Vs. Sadashiva G. Nasnodkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: V.C. Daga, J.

Citations: 2007 (4) BomCR 830, 2007 (6) MhLj 1, MANU/MH/0637/2007.

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Saturday, 29 December 2018

Whether objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction of court can be taken at appellate stage?

 In the light of the above, it is clear
that no objection to the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the court which tried OS No.
61 of 1971 could be raised successfully even
in an appeal against that very decree unless
it had been raised at the earliest
opportunity and a failure of justice or
prejudice was shown. Obviously therefore, it
could not be collaterally challenged. That
too not by the plaintiffs therein, but by a
defendant whose alienation was unsuccessfully
challenged by the plaintiffs in that suit.”
56. Now, reverting back to facts of this case it is
apparent from the judgment dated 22.10.2016 of
Additional District Judge, that no objection to the
competence of Additional District Judge to decide the
case was taken by any of the parties. No objection
having been taken to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the
Additional District Judge, Section 21 of the Civil
Procedure Code comes into play. Subsection
(2) of
Section 21 provides that no objection as to the
competence of the Court with reference to the pecuniary

limits of the jurisdiction shall be allowed by any
Appellate or Revisional Court unless conditions
mentioned therein are fulfilled. No objection having
been raised by respondent tenant regarding competence of
the Court. Subsection
(2) precludes the revisionist to
raise any objection regarding competence of the court
and further revisional court ought not to have allowed
such objection regarding competence of Court of
Additional District Judge to decide the suit. The
respondent tenant did not raise any objection regarding
competence of the Court and took a chance to obtain
judgments in his favour on merits, he cannot be allowed
to turnround
and contend that the court of Additional
District Judge had no jurisdiction to try the Small
Cause Suit and the judgment is without jurisdiction and
nullity. Section 21 has been enacted to thwart any such
objection by unsuccessful party who did not raise any
objection regarding competence of court and allowed the
matter to be heard on merits. Further, in deciding the
small cause suit by Additional District Judge, the

tenant has not proved that there has been a consequent
failure of justice.
57. The High Court in the impugned judgment has not
adverted to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In judgment of Shobhit Nigam(Supra) also, affect of
Section 21 was neither considered nor raised. Section 21
contains a legislative policy which policy has an object
and purpose. The object is also to avoid retrial of
cases on merit on basis of technical objections.

62. We thus hold that even when the court of Additional
District Judge was not competent to decide the Small
Causes Suit in question on the ground that the pecuniary
jurisdiction is vested in Court of Small Causes i.e.
Civil Judge, Senior Division w.e.f. 07.12.2015, no
interference was called in the judgment of Additional
District Judge in the exercise of Revisional
Jurisdiction by High Court in view of the provisions of
Section 21 of Civil Procedure Code.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.90519052
OF 2018

OM PRAKASH AGARWAL SINCE DECEASED
THR. LRS.  Vs  VISHAN DAYAL RAJPOOT & ANR. 
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Sunday, 11 March 2018

Whether appellate forum under rent law depends on pecuniary jurisdiction of court?

From the perusal of the plaint as well as the reliefs sought in the same it was certainly a suit instituted under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act before the learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalgaon and for deciding the jurisdiction for appeal, valuation made in the appeal memo and the remittance of court-fees cannot be the sole ground in a suit which was instituted under a special statute. Section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act provides, inter alia, that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, an appeal shall lie from a decree or order made by the Civil Judge, to the District Court.
"If a suit falls within the purview of Section 28, the rules with regard to the jurisdiction laid down in the Civil Procedure Code have no application. It is not permissible to ask the further question whether the special Court set up under the section has the necessary pecuniary jurisdiction or even the necessary territorial jurisdiction. The special Courts have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to a particular subject-matter and their jurisdiction arises, not by reason of any pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction, but their jurisdiction arises by reason of the subject-matter being of the nature mentioned in the section. In order to determine the jurisdiction of the special Court, the only thing has to be looked at is the subject-matter of the suit; and if the subject-matter of the suit is that which is described in the section, the special Court has jurisdiction and no further question as to its pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction can arise."
10. We are, therefore, satisfied that the view taken by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Jalgaon, in returning the appeal on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction is unsustainable and the appeal against the order passed by the learned 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalgaon, in Special Civil Suit No. 441 of 1998 would lie before the District Court only.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

First Appeal No. 900 of 2002

Decided On: 17.02.2003

Ramesh s/o Bhikamchand Jain Vs.  Corporation Bank

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.H. Marlapalle and V.G. Munshi, JJ.
Citation: 2003(3) MHLJ 30,2004(2) Bom CR874
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Monday, 19 June 2017

When court should decide issue of undervaluation of suit as preliminary issue?

 In the case of The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society v. M/s. Ponniamman Educational Trust, as reported in MANU/SC/0515/2012 : AIR 2012 SC 3912, after referring to the relevant provision, it has been held that --
"In order to consider an application under Order VII Rule 11, the Court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial Court at any stage of the suit."
5. But in the case of Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar, as reported in MANU/SC/0016/1979 : 1980 (1) SCC 616, it has been held that --
"The plaintiff is entitled to give a tentative valuation if in spite of his genuine efforts, he is unable to make out an exact valuation, but plaint is liable to be rejected in case of deliberate undervaluation."
6. "Similarly, in the case of Sujir Keshav Nayak v. Sujir Ganesh Nayak, as reported in MANU/SC/0284/1992 : 1992 (1) SCC 731, it has been held that --
"In suit filed before Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, defendant has right to raise objection as to undervaluation of the suit which has to be decided as preliminary issue by the Court. It has also been held that if Court, on being prima-facie satisfied that valuation of suit was arbitrary, can direct the suit to be properly valued."
It has been further held that --
"In suits for accounting or for dissolution of partnership and accounting filed in Courts of limited pecuniary jurisdiction the plaintiff must take every care to disclose valuation which is not arbitrary, as the plaint is liable to be rejected on objection of the defendants, but in suits of such nature, filed before Courts of unlimited jurisdiction, the valuation disclosed by the plaintiff can be accepted as correct. This however, does not mean that Court's power to examine the correctness of valuation is taken away. If on perusal of plaint, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the plaintiff has not been fair and valued the suit or relief arbitrarily it is not precluded from directing the plaintiff to value it properly and pay Court-fee on it. Thus, summarizing the law, it has been held as under:
(1) Where the question of Court-fee is linked with jurisdiction, a defendant has a right to raise objection and the Court should decide it as a preliminary issue.
(2) But in those cases where the suit is filed in Court of unlimited jurisdiction, the valuation disclosed by the plaintiff or payment of amount of Court-fee on relief claimed in plaint or memorandum of appeal should be taken as correct.
(3) This does not preclude the Court even in suits filed in Courts of unlimited jurisdiction from examining if the valuation, on averments in plaint, is arbitrary."
7. In the present case, the trial Court with a limited pecuniary jurisdiction, cannot be said to have erred in directing the plaintiff to value the suit as per the guidelines inasmuch as it is very much within the jurisdiction of a Civil Judge even if material would not have been brought to the notice of the Civil Judge, to direct the plaintiff to value the relief as per the market guidelines.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)
W.P. No. 7303 of 2016
Decided On: 26.10.2016
 Manoj Jain and Ors.

Vs.
Pramod Jain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vivek Agarwal, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 Madhya pradesh 39
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Tuesday, 8 November 2016

Whether court can return plaint if it has no jurisdiction to try said case?

At this stage, reference can be made to the decision of the
Supreme Court in  Raizada Topandas and another. vs. M/s Gorakhram
Gokalchand, AIR 1964 SC 1348 wherein it was observed thus:
“(7)  In answering this question it is perhaps necessary
to   refer   to   the   general   principle   which   admittedly
governs the question of jurisdiction at the inception of
suits.  This general principle has been well explained
in   the   Full   Bench   decision   of   the   Allahabad   High
Court, Ananti v. Channu, ILR 52 All 501: (AIR 1930
All 193) (FB) and has not been disputed before us.  It
was observed there:

     “The plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit.
If he establishes the correctness of his facts he will get
his relief from the forum chosen.  If............. he frames
his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts, and
goes for his relief to a court which cannot grant him
relief on the true facts he will have his suit dismissed.
Then there will be no question of returning the plaint
for presentation to the proper Court, for the plaint, as
framed, would not justify the other kind of court to
grant him the relief …............. If it is found, on a trial
on the merits so far as this issue of jurisdiction goes,
that the facts alleged by the plaintiff are not true and
the facts alleged by the defendants are true, and that
the case is not cognisable by the court, there will be
two kinds of orders to be passed. If the jurisdiction is
only   one   relating   to   territorial   limits   or   pecuniary
limits, the plaint will be ordered to be returned for
presentation to the proper court. If, on the other hand,
it is found that, having regard to the nature of the suit,
it is not cognizable by the class of court to which the
court   belongs,   the   plaintiff's   suit   will   have   to   be
dismissed in its entirety.”
Aforesaid principle has been followed by the Division Bench of this Court
in Lt. Col. Anil Bhat and ors. vs. Citi Bank, Mumbai, 2009(3) Mh.L.J. 111.
15. It is, therefore, clear that once the Civil Court comes to the
conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the ground
that the same is barred due to availability of a statutory remedy under a
statute, there would be no occasion whatsoever to direct return of the
plaint for being presented before the proper forum. Under provisions of
Order VII Rule 10(1) of the Code, the plaint can be returned only for
being presented before the Court in which the suit ought to have been
instituted. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.80 OF 2015
APPELLANT: 

Shri   Akola   Gujrati   Samaj   Vs Akola   Municipal   Corporation,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
  CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.
  
  DATED :  23-­09­-2015.
Citation: 2016(5) ALLMR 219
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Tuesday, 6 September 2016

Leading Supreme Court Judgment on territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction of court

 In a classic exposition of the law, in Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. MANU/SC/0116/1954 : 1955 SCR 117, after stating that a defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties, the law has been laid down as follows:
"......The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the Legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits".
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. No. 10589 of 2014 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No. 3960 of 2007)
Decided On: 25.11.2014

 K.P. Ranga Rao Vs. K.V. Venkatesham
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Ranjan Gogoi and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Citation:(2015) 13 SCC514
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Monday, 18 May 2015

Supreme Court: Court can entertain counter-claim for possession in suit for injunction


Order 8 Rule 6(A)(1) of the C.P.C., 1908 as amended in 1976 reads thus:
"A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiffs, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not:-
Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court."
It is true that Rule 6A(a) was introduced by Amendment Act of 1976. Preceding the amendment, it was settled law that except in a money claim, counter claim or set off cannot be set up in other suits. The Law Commission of India had recommended, to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings, right to the defendants to raise the plea of set off in addition to a counter claim in Rule 6 in the same suit irrespective of the fact whether the cause of action for counter claim or set off had accrued to defendant either before or after the filing of the suit. The limitation was that the counter claim or set off must be pleaded by way of defence in the written statement before the defendant filed his written statement or before the time limit for delivering the written statement has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. Further limitation was that the counter-claim should not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, by laying the counter claim pecuniary jurisdiction of the court cannot be divested and the power to try the suit already entertained cannot be taken away by accepting the counter claim beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction.. Thus considered, we hold that in a suit for injunction, the counter-claim for possession also could be entertained, by operation of Order 8 Rule 6 (A)(1) of CPC.
Supreme Court of India

Gurbachan Singh vs Bhag Singh & Ors on 24 November, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996 AIR 1087, 1996 SCC (1) 770

Bench: Ramaswamy, K.
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Whether counter claim which oust jurisdiction of court can be allowed?



While passing the order impugned, learned trial
Court has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the
matter of Gurbachan Singh Vs. Bhag Singh reported in AIR
1996 SC 1087, so as to convey that Rule 6A(i) of Order 8 of
Civil Procedure Code debars filing of counter claim of valuation
which divest pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court before whom
the main suit is pending. So far as the above judgment is
concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioner has sought to
distinguish its applicability to the facts of the present case on
the ground that, in the case of Gurbachan Singh (supra) the
trial Court has proceeded with the suit and trial in the suit has
substantially progressed. As such, Supreme Court has taken
view adverse to the interest of petitioners. In my opinion, the
above referred contentions of the petitioner are liable to be
rejected in view of the observations made by Apex Court in
para No. 3 of the said Judgment which reads thus:-
“3.
It is true that Rule 6A(a) was introduced by
Amendment Act of 1976. Preceding the amendment, it
was settled law that except in a money claim, counter
claim or set off cannot be set up in other suits. The Law
Commission of India had recommended, to avoid
multiplicity of the proceedings, right to the defendants to
raise the plea of set off in addition to a counter claim in
Rule 6 in the same suit irrespective of the fact whether

the cause of action for counter claim or set off had
accrued to defendant either before or after the filing of
the suit. The limitation was that the counter claim or set
off must be pleaded by way of defence in the written
statement
before
the
defendant
filed
his
written
statement or before the time limit for delivering the
written statement has expired, whether such counter-
claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not.
Further limitation was that the counter-claim should not
exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. In other words, by laying the counter claim
pecuniary jurisdiction of the court cannot be divested and
the power to try the suit already entertained cannot be
taken away by accepting the counter claim beyond its
pecuniary jurisdiction. Thus considered, we hold that in a
suit for injunction, the counter-claim for possession also
could be entertained, by operation of Order 8 Rule 6 (A)
(1) of CPC.”
The Apex Court in clear terms has observed that in
view of proviso to Rule 6A of Order 8 of Civil Procedure Code,
if by filing counter claim, having valuation which oust the
jurisdiction of the Court from trying suit, then such counter
claim can not be accepted. In other words, a counter claim
beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court can not be
entertained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 8219 OF 2014

Amit  Balasaheb Takte,v Krishna Raosaheb Pawar,

CORAM : N.W. SAMBRE, J.
DATED : 19TH JANUARY, 2015
Citation; 2015(3) ALLMR 82
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Saturday, 21 March 2015

When suit for mandatory injunction is tenable?


 The learned Judge of the trial Court has proceeded to lay 
much   emphasis   on   prayer   clause   (d)   in   the   plaint   to   hold   that   the 
plaintiffs   were   seeking   possession   of   the   suit   property.     The   specific 
averments made in the plaint whereby the plaintiffs have asserted their 
possession even on the date of filing of the suit have been ignored.  It is, 
therefore, clear that the learned Judge of the trial Court committed a 
serious error while holding that the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction 

to entertain the suit.  The impugned order if permitted to operate would 
be corrected in writ jurisdiction.
result in a jurisdictional error                                            
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO.2595 OF 2013
PETITIONERS: 
 Ajay   S/o   Bhalchandra   Nandedkar, 
                                                               
­VERSUS­

 Mrunali   Prabhakar   Gadgil, 
CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.
Citation; 2015(2)ALLMR134, 2014(5)ABR829, 2014(6)MhLj629
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT: 10­-09-­2014 
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Saturday, 26 April 2014

Distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction.

What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in O.S. No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. It may be noted that Section 21 provided that no objection as to place the suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In 1976, the existing Section was numbered as sub- Section (1) and sub-Section (2) was added relating to pecuniary jurisdiction by providing that no objection as to competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection had been taken in the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there had been a consequent failure of justice. Section 21A also was introduced in 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977 creating a bar to the institution of any suit challenging the validity of a decree passed in a former suit between the same parties on any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing.


Supreme Court of India
Subhash Mahadevasa Habib vs Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (D)By ... on 19 March, 2007

Bench: S.B. Sinha, P.K. Balasubramanyan
Citation;(2007)13 SCC 650,2007(4) ALLMR 324 SC, AIR 2007 SC 1828
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Sunday, 24 November 2013

Whether order passed by a court without jurisdiction over subject matter of suit would be nullity?


The core question is as to whether an order passed by a person lacking inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be so. The principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence or even res judicata which are procedural in nature would have no application in a case where an order has been passed by the Tribunal/Court which has no authority in that behalf. Any order passed by a court without jurisdiction would be coram non judice being a nullity, the same ordinarily should not be given effect to. [See Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Another v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu and Others - AIR 1979 SC 193 & MD Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd. (2004) 8 SCC 619].
This aspect of the matter has recently been considered by this Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another [(2005) 7 SCC 791], in the following terms :
"We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity."1

Supreme Court of India
Hasham Abbas Sayyad vs Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors on 12 December, 2006
Citation;2007(3) MhLj 56;(2007)2SCC355
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Wednesday, 23 October 2013

Whether Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division can try suit having pecuniary value below Rs.5 lakhs?

 Mr. Dessai's argument is misconceived when he points out that when a suit is filed even in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division he cannot exercise jurisdiction in a suit if the pecuniary jurisdiction is below Rs. 25,000/-. I am unable to accept the logic behind this argument at any rate as it is open to the Senior Judge to exercise jurisdiction in any suit where the pecuniary value is below Rs. 25,000/- or in excess thereof. However, it is indeed true that similar position is not available to a Junior Judge for he has to confine his jurisdiction in respect of suits where the value does not exceed Rs. 25,000/-. 


Bombay High Court
Dkm Property Investments And Ors. vs Tolentino Pereira And Ors. on 9 November, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1993 (2) BomCR 479

G.D. Kamat, J.
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Saturday, 11 February 2012

Whether objection of pecuniary jurisdiction of court should be decided as per S 9A of CPC?

Objection to pecuniary jurisdiction of the court must be decided as preliminary issue at initial stage as per section 9-A Of CPC


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 567 OF 2011

Shri Rajan Dhansukhlal Vora,V/s. Shri Dinesh Bacchubhai Parekh.

CORAM: R.M.BORDE, J.
DATED : 5th October 2011.

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