Supreme Court: What are parameters for grant of bail in the cases of dowry death?

 The impugned order has led to travesty of justice. It was expected of the High Court to consider the bail application keeping in mind:-

(i) The nature of the alleged crime;

(ii) The punishment provided by the BNS 2023 for the alleged crime; (iii) The relations between the accused and the deceased, i.e., being husband and wife;

(iv) The place where the incident occurred;

(v) The postmortem report indicating that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and most importantly, the statutory presumption of commission of offence as envisaged under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872. {Para 19}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 770/2026

Date of Order: 09.02.2026

Chetram Verma Vs. State Of U.P.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/2834/2026.

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What is basic concept of Dowry death as per provisions of IPC?

 Dowry death is defined in Section 304B IPC. It applies when a woman dies by burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives for, or in connection with, demand for dowry; in such a case, the law treats it as dowry death.

Essentials

For Section 304B IPC, these ingredients must be proved:

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Supreme Court Acquits Husband in Dowry Death Case: Holds Prosecution Failed to Prove Cruelty or Harassment “Soon Before Death,” Presumption Under Section 113-B Evidence Act Not Applicable Due to Contradictory Testimonies

In the cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had recorded his statements on 3rd April 1998 and 7th April 1998, which were marked as exhibits DG and DH, respectively. He accepted that the allegation that the Accused used to maltreat his sister on account of insufficient dowry given in the marriage and having brought broken furniture is not found in both the police statements. He also stated that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi does not find place in both statements. Therefore, the version of PW-7 in his examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry is a significant and relevant omission. Hence, this amounts to a contradiction. The public prosecutor claimed that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi was mentioned in his third statement, which was recorded on 23rd June 1998. The third statement, recorded belatedly, obviously appears to be an afterthought. As regards his statement that the Accused used to give a beating to his sister, it seems that he got this information when he visited the matrimonial home of his sister three months after the marriage. It is a very vague allegation. Moreover, the witness has not stated that this was disclosed to him by his deceased sister. Assuming that what he has said is correct, this incident of beating must have taken place between 25th June 1996 till end of September 1996. Therefore, this incident did not happen soon before the death. It is not his case that when the deceased allegedly visited his house nine to ten days before the incident, she complained about any cruelty or any harassment. Thus, none of the three statements of the witnesses contain any specific instances of cruelty or harassment.

{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014

Decided On: 31.01.2025

Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka,  and Ujjal Bhuyan, , JJ.

Author:Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 133,MANU/SC/0132/2025.

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What are essential ingredients of offence of dowry death?

 The essential ingredients of dowry death under Indian criminal law remain consistent between the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), with Section 304B of IPC now replaced by Section 80 of BNS.

Essential Ingredients of Dowry Death

The following four essential ingredients must be established to prove dowry death under both legal frameworks:

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What is distinction between Section 113A and Section 113B of Evidence Act?

It is relevant to note that Under Section 113B, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the Accused abetted the commission of suicide. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015

Decided On: 09.01.2025

Ram Pyarey Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 71,MANU/SC/0074/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Whether the court must draw presumption under S 113A of Evidence Act if there is no cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment

The law as regards the abetment of suicide punishable Under Sections 306 of the Indian Penal Code is now well settled. It appears that the Courts below laid much emphasis on Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, "the Evidence Act"). Sections 113A {S 117 of BSA} & 113B of the Evidence Act {S 118 of BSA} talks about presumption. Sections 113A {S 117 of BSA} and 113B {S 118 of BSA}respectively read thus:{Para 12}

113A. {S 117 of BSA} Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

113B.{S 118 of BSA} Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

13. It is relevant to note that Under Section 113B {S 118 of BSA}, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A {S 117 of BSA} where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the Accused abetted the commission of suicide.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015

Decided On: 09.01.2025

Ram Pyarey Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 71,MANU/SC/0074/2025.

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Whether court can convict accused of an offence U/S 304B of IPC if he was charged only under S 302 of IPC?

Be that as it may. The question raised before us is whether in a case where prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 302 IPC, but on the facts the ingredients of section 304B have winched to the fore, can the court convict him of that offence in the absence of the said offence being included in the charge.{Para 14}

15. Sections 221 and 222 of the Code are the two provisions dealing with the power of a criminal court to convict the accused of an offence which is not included in the charge. The primary condition for application of section 221 of the Code is that the court should have felt doubt, at the time of framing the charge, as to which of the several acts (which may be proved) will constitute the offence on account of the nature of the acts or series of acts alleged against the accused. In such a case the section permits "to convict the accused" of the offence of which he is shown to have committed though he was not charged with it." But in the nature of the acts alleged by the prosecution in this case there was absolutely no scope for any doubt regarding the offence under Section 302 IPC, at least at the time of framing the charge.

16. Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case "when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars". The Section permits the court to convict the accused "of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it." Sub-section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different, situation. "When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence although he is not charged with it."

17. What is meant by "a minor offence" for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis-a-vis the other offence.

18. The composition of the offence under Section 304B IPC is vastly different from the formation of the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC and hence the former cannot be regarded as minor offence vis-a-vis the latter. However, the position would be different when the charge also contains the offence under Section 498A IPC (Husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty). As the word "cruelty" is explained as including, inter alia, "harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

19. So when a person is charged with an offence under Sections 302 and 498A IPC on the allegation that he caused the death of a bride after subjecting her to harassment with a demand for dowry, within a period of 7 years of marriage, a situation may arise, as in this case, that the offence of murder is not established as against the accused. Nonetheless all other ingredients necessary for the offence under Section 304B IPC would stand established. Can the accused be convicted in such a case for the offence under Section 304B IPC without the said offence forming part of the charge?

22. The crux of the matter is this: Would there be occasion for a failure of justice by adopting such a course as to convict an accused of the offence under Section 304B IPC when all the ingredients necessary for the said offence have come out in evidence, although he was not charged with the said offence? In this context a reference to Section 464(1) of the Code is apposite:

"No finding, sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby." (emphasis supplied)

23. In other words, a conviction would be valid even if there is any omission or irregularity in the charge, provided it did not occasion a failure of justice.

24. We often hear about "failure of justice" and quite often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or facile an expression which could be fitted in any situation of a case. The expression "failure of justice" would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon (The simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd. vs. Department of the Environment 1977(1) A E R 813. The criminal court, particularly the superior court should make a close examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage.

25. One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is that no man should be condemned without being heard, ("Audi alteram partem"). But the law reports are replete with instances of courts hesitating to approve the contention that failure of justice had occasioned merely because a person was not heard on a particular aspect. However, if the aspect is of such a nature that non-explanation of it has contributed to penalising an individual, the court should say that since he was not given the opportunity to explain that aspect there was failure of justice on account of non-compliance with the principle of natural justice.

26. We have now to examine whether, on the evidence now on record the appellant can be convicted under Section 304B IPC without the same being included as a count in the charge Section 304B has been brought on the statute book on 9-11-1986 as a package along with Section 113B of the Evidence Act. Section 304B(1) IPC reads thus:

"304-B. Dowry death.- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death."

27. In the Explanation to the Section it is said that the word "dowry" shall be understood as defined in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

28. The postulates needed to establish the said offence are: (1) Death of a wife should have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage; (2) soon before her death she should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection with any demand for dowry. Now reading section 113B of the Evidence Act, as a part of the said offence, the position is this: If the prosecution succeeds in showing that soon before her death she was subjected by him to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry and that her death had occurred (within seven years of her marriage) otherwise than under normal circumstances "the court shall presume that such person had caused dowry death."

29. Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act "whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved." So the court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.

30. Section 113A of the Evidence Act says that under certain conditions, almost similar to the conditions for dowry death "the court may presume having regard to the circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband etc." When the law says that the court may presume the fact, it is discretionary on the part of the court either to regard such fact as proved or not to do so, which depends upon all the other circumstances of the case. As there is no compulsion on the court to act on the presumption the accused can persuade the court against drawing a presumption adverse to him.

31. But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.

32. Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.

33. The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration:- If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304B IPC read with Section 113B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a decoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304B, IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal.

34. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by law.

35. In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section 302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a conviction under Section 304B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such count was included in the charge, when the count affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption.

36. As the appellant was convicted by the High Court under Section 304B IPC, without such opportunity being granted to him, we deem it necessary in the interest of justice to afford him that opportunity. The case in the trial court should proceed against the appellant (not against the other two accused whose acquittal remains unchallenged now) from the stage of defence evidence. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (crl.) 907 of 1998

Decided On: 24.01.2001

Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs  State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas, R.P. Sethi and B.N. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: Citation : AIR 2001 SC 921,(2001) 2 SCC 577, MANU/SC/0047/2001

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Delhi HC: Parameters for grant of bail to accused prosecuted for Dowry death

The facts show that the deceased passed away just under two years of marriage. The presumption in law under Section 113B of the IEA would apply if it is shown that there was either cruelty or harassment, coupled with a demand for dowry, soon before the death of the deceased. Insofar as violence or physical harassment is concerned, there appears to be no allegation against the Petitioner, as is clear from the statement of the father, mother and sisters of the deceased. Insofar as the demand for dowry and other forms of harassment are concerned, the charge sheet has already been filed. The prosecution has also arrayed the witnesses whom it intends to examine and trial is yet to commence. At this stage, the Court is not to analyze the statements of the father, mother and sisters of the deceased in great detail.

11. After broadly perusing the bank statements of the Petitioner and the deceased, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner is financially well-settled. The conduct of the Petitioner, to the extent that he immediately rushed back from the railway station upon receiving a phone call, called the Police, took the deceased to the hospital and contacted the in-laws, goes to show that he does not pose any flight risk. The documents filed on record also show that he indeed booked an Ola cab on the fateful day and was not at home. The bank account statements show that he had been regularly depositing money in his wife’s account and there were withdrawals from the same as well. The death of the deceased is quite unfortunate, however, the circumstances that may have led to the same are not clear at this stage. The same would have to be considered at the stage of trial.

12. The presumption in law of a `dowry death’ is meant to act as a deterrent to the demand of dowry and to ensure that women are not harassed for the same. However, currently, the question is whether the Petitioner ought to be released on bail. In Savita v. State of Delhi, (2019) 10 SCC 29, which was a case under Sections 498-A and 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”), since the accused had already been in jail for 27 months out of a total sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment, the Supreme Court thought it fit to grant bail. In the case of Thangela Narendra alias Chinnu v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 14 SCC 709 as well, the Supreme Court, considering the fact that investigation had already been completed and the accused had been in jail for around a year, granted interim bail on admission. In Kamal v. State [Bail Application No.4211/2016, decided on 1st December, 2006], a ld. Single Judge of this Court had observed that despite the presumption under Section 113B of the IEA, the relationship between the accused and the deceased, which were reflected in letters written by the accused, persuaded the Court to grant bail. Recently, in Yashpal v. State (Govt. NCT of Delhi) [Bail Application No.1340/2019, decided on 29th May, 2019], a ld. Single Judge of this Court, considering that the details of dowry were not given to the investigating officer and the fact that the trial was likely to take some time, granted regular bail to the accused.

13. In the present case, the application for bail has been moved during the COVID-19 lockdown. The Petitioner is educated and appears to be well-settled. The charges against the Petitioner have to be thrashed out at trial. The investigation is already completed. Protection against any coercive action has been granted to the niece, however, it is not disputed that the niece is regularly appearing before the Trial Court. The Petitioner has already undergone imprisonment for around one year and seven months. This Court is thus of the opinion that the Petitioner is entitled to be released on bail, subject to on the following terms and conditions:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision: 21st May 2020

 BAIL APPL No. 875/2020

SHYAM KISHOR  Vs  THE STATE.

CORAM:

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Crl. M.A. Nos. 6226-27/2020

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When unnatural death of married woman would not amount to dowry death?

 In Pushpender Singh v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 160/2015, (2015) SCC OnLine Del 12748, decided by a division bench (of which I was a member) on 12.10.2015, similar questions were examined. After referring to the provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and various judgments thereupon, it was observed thus:

“102. Broad principles emerging from above noted case law, to the extent germane to the issues raised before us, may be culled out as under:—

(i) The death of a married woman within seven years of the marriage, otherwise than under normal circumstances must result in a serious attempt on the part of the investigating agency, and the court, to inquire if it is a case of culpable homicide;

(ii) If the evidence shows the husband or any of his relatives to be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts resulting in the death, the trial must proceed on the charge of culpable homicide;

(iii) If the evidence is forthcoming to show that the unnatural death of the married woman within seven years of her marriage was preceded “soon before” her death by she being subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry by the husband or any of his relatives, the charge of “dowry death” is to be invoked as an “alternative charge”, or even as a single or main charge against others not implicated by reason of abetment, conspiracy etc.

(iv) The offence of “dowry death” is neither a substitute, nor “minor offence”, nor “included” in the offence of “culpable homicide”;

(v) To bring home the charge of “culpable homicide”, the prosecution must prove the accused to have intentionally committed the act causing death or causing bodily injury resulting in death. In contrast, to bring home the charge of “dowry death”, direct nexus on the part of the accused with the act(s) causing death, or resulting in bodily injury causing death, need not be shown. The prosecution needs to prove only the fact of death being otherwise than under normal circumstances (to put it simply, it being an unnatural death), coupled with the fact that the deceased (necessarily a married woman) had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demands for dowry by the husband, or any of his relatives, the death having occurred within seven years of the marriage. Upon such proof, the Court is bound to presume that the husband, or the relative, who is party to the cruelty or harassment of the specified nature is responsible for the “dowry death”;

(vi) For the charge of “dowry death”, the husband or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts leading to the death;

(vii) To bring home a charge of dowry death, there must be “proximity” or a “live link” between the cruelty and harassment based on dowry demands and the consequential death leading to inference that said conduct was indulged in “soon before” the death;

(viii) The past events of cruelty or harassment, they not having become stale, continue to be relevant for raising the presumption, if the evidence shows continuity of the incriminating conduct proximate enough in terms of time to the unnatural death, even if interspersed by tentative efforts at resolution or compromise;

(ix) A case of unnatural death of the married woman would not amount to “dowry death”, if it is shown to have occurred on account of an accident or as a result of acts of commission or omission on the part of a third person, i.e a person other than the husband or any of his relatives, or for reasons not connected with demands for dowry; and,

(x) The accused against whom presumption is raised may dispel its effect by showing that he had no hand at all, in the death, and he may do so either by showing that the death was accidental or brought about by another person unconnected with the cruelty or harassment relating to the demands for dowry.”

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before R.K Gauba, J.)

Shiv Ram & Ors. v. State of Delhi

 Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13127

Crl. A. 496/2002

Decided on December 7, 2018

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Whether offence of dowry death is made out if offence U/S 498A of IPC is not made out?

The last ingredient is based upon the commission of offence under Section 498A IPC and while committing the offence under Section 498A IPC, if it connects with the death, then it would be an offence punishable under Section 304B IPC. The prosecution has failed miserably to establish beyond reasonable doubt that any cruelty or harassment was meted out to the deceased by the appellant, let alone soon before her death. The testimony of above mentioned prosecution witnesses to the effect that TV or fridge was demanded per se does not establish the cruelty and harassment towards the deceased. Evidently, the death of the deceased had taken place on 02.08.1987 i.e. within one year of marriage. The prosecution has failed to establish that after the marriage of the deceased, there were circumstances of harassment or cruelty that took place on account of demand of dowry which could connect with the death of the deceased.

21. The argument advanced by the learned APP for the State is that Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act leads to the presumption of the guilt of the appellant. Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:

“113B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.”

22. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be drawn only where the ingredients of Section 304B IPC are fulfilled. The prosecution has failed to establish the necessary ingredient of dowry death i.e. cruelty or harassment meted out to the deceased by the appellant what to say soon before her death. As mentioned above, the prosecution has failed to prove the chain of necessary ingredients to raise the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.

23. From no stretch of imagination, the evidence led by the prosecution in the present case could culminate into conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B read with 34 IPC.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before P.S. Teji, J.)

Ramesh Chander  v.  State of Delhi 

Crl. A. No. 526/2002

Decided on December 21, 2016

Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6473

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