Shared for Service, Not for Personal Use: Why Misusing a Phone Number Can Raise Legal Concerns Under India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

 A mobile number is often shared casually in daily life — to book a cab, receive a delivery, complete a digital payment, or obtain a service update. Yet the fact that a number is visible in a transaction does not make it freely available for personal use. Under India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, a mobile number can constitute personal data when it relates to an identifiable individual, and its use must remain tied to a lawful purpose.

This means that if a number is shared for a limited purpose, such as ride coordination, billing, delivery, or customer support, it should not ordinarily be reused for personal messaging, unrelated marketing, or informal follow-up without a valid legal basis. The law is gradually reinforcing a simple principle: access to personal data is not the same as permission to use it however one wishes.

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Supreme Court Acquits Husband in Dowry Death Case: Holds Prosecution Failed to Prove Cruelty or Harassment “Soon Before Death,” Presumption Under Section 113-B Evidence Act Not Applicable Due to Contradictory Testimonies

In the cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had recorded his statements on 3rd April 1998 and 7th April 1998, which were marked as exhibits DG and DH, respectively. He accepted that the allegation that the Accused used to maltreat his sister on account of insufficient dowry given in the marriage and having brought broken furniture is not found in both the police statements. He also stated that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi does not find place in both statements. Therefore, the version of PW-7 in his examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry is a significant and relevant omission. Hence, this amounts to a contradiction. The public prosecutor claimed that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi was mentioned in his third statement, which was recorded on 23rd June 1998. The third statement, recorded belatedly, obviously appears to be an afterthought. As regards his statement that the Accused used to give a beating to his sister, it seems that he got this information when he visited the matrimonial home of his sister three months after the marriage. It is a very vague allegation. Moreover, the witness has not stated that this was disclosed to him by his deceased sister. Assuming that what he has said is correct, this incident of beating must have taken place between 25th June 1996 till end of September 1996. Therefore, this incident did not happen soon before the death. It is not his case that when the deceased allegedly visited his house nine to ten days before the incident, she complained about any cruelty or any harassment. Thus, none of the three statements of the witnesses contain any specific instances of cruelty or harassment.

{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014

Decided On: 31.01.2025

Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka,  and Ujjal Bhuyan, , JJ.

Author:Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 133,MANU/SC/0132/2025.

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Bombay HC: How to appreciate evidence in offence Under S 498A of IPC if there was demand of money without harassment for getting that money?

  Informant has thereafter stated that her husband and

parents-in-law were asking her to bring amount of Rs.5,00,000/-

for getting permanency in employment of husband with Nagar

Parishad. She told them that her parents are poor and unable to

give the amount. Then applicant Nos.1 to 3 responded that if she

is unable to bring the amount, then she should not come for

cohabitation and on that count, she was harassed mentally and

physically time and again. Again the acts amounting to “physical

and mental cruelty” are not given. Statement that unless she

brings the amount she should not come for cohabitation without

any action will not amount to mental and physical harassment.

When the alleged demand is made has also not approximately

stated and for how much period the said demand persisted has

not been stated. She then states that she gave information about

the treatment given to her and her father who had in turn given

that information to their relative. All of them had come and tried

to persuade accused persons, but there was no settlement.

According to the informant since that date the accused persons

intensified harassment. Again the details are lacking. Then she

directly states that when she was in her parental house,

applicant No.1 went there and abused her. Thereafter, the other

accused persons i.e. applicant Nos.4 to 7 instigated applicant

Nos.1 to 3 for not to allow cohabitation of the informant with

applicant No.1. Threat was given that if she is unable to bring

the money then she will not be allowed to stay with them and she

would be killed. All these allegations are vague. When that

statement was made has also not been stated. As earlier stated it

is to be noted that she got married on 24.06.2022 and FIR has

been lodged on 24.07.2023. That means the married life of which

narration has been given is of just more than one year. Out of

that three months she was treated properly and when she

returned to the parental home has not been stated. Statements

of the witnesses are on the same line. All the witnesses have also

kept those facts vague as they are. Neither the details about the

alleged cruelty have been given, nor the date on which there was

a meeting and when the informant came to the parental home

has been stated. The statements of the witnesses are copy paste

and it appears that the investigating officer has made maximum

use of the computer, of course which is not for good reasons.

There cannot be statement in the form of copy paste paragraph to paragraph without difference in punctuations and fonts also.

Unnecessarily energy has been wasted in drawing panchanama of the house of applicant No.1 and even photographs have been

taken on the mobile and then certificate under Section 65-B of

Indian Evidence Act has been given. {Para 4}.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.3263 OF 2023

Mohammad Muddassar Vs The State of Maharashtra

 CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI &

 ROHIT W. JOSHI, JJ.

 PRONOUNCED ON : 10 JANUARY 2025

ORDER (Per Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.) :-

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:594-DB.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the court can grant permanent injunction to husband restraining his wife from harassing him in any manner whatsoever?

 Then comes the challenge by the wife to that part of the decree by which the learned Judge of the Family Court has granted a permanent injunction restraining the wife from harassing the husband in any manner whatsoever. The word harassment is a subjective term. The judgment is silent on the scope and meaning of the word harassment. On plain reading of the said part of the decree, apart from the fact that there is a serious doubt whether such a decree could have been passed, the said decree is incapable of being enforced. The law on this aspect is very well settled. No Court or Tribunal can grant relief which is incapable of being enforced. One such decision in which the law is reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of MRF Ltd. Goa v. Goa MRF Employees Union, Goa and another, MANU/MH/0969/2003 : 2003 (4) LLN 1182. Relevant paragraph is paragraph 10 which reads thus:

"10...No Court or Tribunal will grant a relief if it is incapable of enforcing it either by execution or otherwise. We have earlier noted that the expression "incidental" would not include an interim relief by way of preventive injunction. No judgment of the Apex Court has been cited to show that the matter has been concluded by any judgment. On the contrary in Delhi Cloth and General Mills (MANU/SC/0188/1966 : AIR 1967 SC 469) (vide supra), the Apex Court has noted that the judgment of Management, Hotel Imperial the question was posed but not answered. Therefore, even if it was held that there was such a power to grant relief there is no power or mechanism for the relief to be enforced. If there be a power to grant relief there must also be power to enforce the relief. In that context it must be held that no power is conferred on the Tribunal or the other authorities under Chp. II to grant relief of injunction."

Therefore, the said part of the decree cannot be sustained.

{Para 35}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Family Court Appeal No. 95 of 2009

Decided On: 16.03.2017

 Wife  Vs. Husband

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Anuja Prabhudessai, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: Citation : AIR 2017 Bom 186,MANU/MH/2336/2017

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Whether husband and his relatives can be convicted for abetment of suicide of wife if they are acquitted in offence U/S 498A of IPC?

This Court in an illuminating judgment in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh MANU/SC/0654/2001 : (2001) 9 SCC 618 has stated the law as follows:

This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the Accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to "all the other circumstances of the case". A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression-"the other circumstances of the case" used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says-"Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.

8. We find that having absolved the Appellants of the charge of cruelty, which is the most basic ingredient for the offence made out Under Section 498A, the third ingredient for application of Section 113A is missing, namely, that the relatives i.e., the mother-in-law and father-in-law who are charged Under Section 306 had subjected the victim to cruelty. No doubt, in the facts of this case, it has been concurrently found that the in-laws did harass her, but harassment is something of a lesser degree than cruelty. Also, we find on the facts, taken as a whole, that assuming the presumption Under Section 113A would apply, it has been fully rebutted, for the reason that there is no link or intention on the part of the in-laws to assist the victim to commit suicide.

9. In the absence of this vital link, the mere fact that there is a finding of harassment would not lead to the conclusion that there is "abetment of suicide".

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 790/2017 

Decided On: 24.04.2017

 Heera Lal  Vs.  State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

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When unnatural death of married woman would not amount to dowry death?

 In Pushpender Singh v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 160/2015, (2015) SCC OnLine Del 12748, decided by a division bench (of which I was a member) on 12.10.2015, similar questions were examined. After referring to the provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and various judgments thereupon, it was observed thus:

“102. Broad principles emerging from above noted case law, to the extent germane to the issues raised before us, may be culled out as under:—

(i) The death of a married woman within seven years of the marriage, otherwise than under normal circumstances must result in a serious attempt on the part of the investigating agency, and the court, to inquire if it is a case of culpable homicide;

(ii) If the evidence shows the husband or any of his relatives to be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts resulting in the death, the trial must proceed on the charge of culpable homicide;

(iii) If the evidence is forthcoming to show that the unnatural death of the married woman within seven years of her marriage was preceded “soon before” her death by she being subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry by the husband or any of his relatives, the charge of “dowry death” is to be invoked as an “alternative charge”, or even as a single or main charge against others not implicated by reason of abetment, conspiracy etc.

(iv) The offence of “dowry death” is neither a substitute, nor “minor offence”, nor “included” in the offence of “culpable homicide”;

(v) To bring home the charge of “culpable homicide”, the prosecution must prove the accused to have intentionally committed the act causing death or causing bodily injury resulting in death. In contrast, to bring home the charge of “dowry death”, direct nexus on the part of the accused with the act(s) causing death, or resulting in bodily injury causing death, need not be shown. The prosecution needs to prove only the fact of death being otherwise than under normal circumstances (to put it simply, it being an unnatural death), coupled with the fact that the deceased (necessarily a married woman) had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demands for dowry by the husband, or any of his relatives, the death having occurred within seven years of the marriage. Upon such proof, the Court is bound to presume that the husband, or the relative, who is party to the cruelty or harassment of the specified nature is responsible for the “dowry death”;

(vi) For the charge of “dowry death”, the husband or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts leading to the death;

(vii) To bring home a charge of dowry death, there must be “proximity” or a “live link” between the cruelty and harassment based on dowry demands and the consequential death leading to inference that said conduct was indulged in “soon before” the death;

(viii) The past events of cruelty or harassment, they not having become stale, continue to be relevant for raising the presumption, if the evidence shows continuity of the incriminating conduct proximate enough in terms of time to the unnatural death, even if interspersed by tentative efforts at resolution or compromise;

(ix) A case of unnatural death of the married woman would not amount to “dowry death”, if it is shown to have occurred on account of an accident or as a result of acts of commission or omission on the part of a third person, i.e a person other than the husband or any of his relatives, or for reasons not connected with demands for dowry; and,

(x) The accused against whom presumption is raised may dispel its effect by showing that he had no hand at all, in the death, and he may do so either by showing that the death was accidental or brought about by another person unconnected with the cruelty or harassment relating to the demands for dowry.”

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before R.K Gauba, J.)

Shiv Ram & Ors. v. State of Delhi

 Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13127

Crl. A. 496/2002

Decided on December 7, 2018

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Whether inordinate delay in providing information under right to information Act amounts to harassment?

 Further, Commission is convinced with the averment of the Appellant for having suffered gross detriment due to the delay of over 2 years in providing the information to him. Appellant deserves to be compensated on this account. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers vested in the CIC under section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act, Commission directs the public authority through its Chief Executive Officer to compensate the Appellant by an amount of Rs. 5000/- for the inconvenience and detriment caused to him. The CPIO should ensure that this amount is remitted to the Appellant by demand draft/pay order within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.

Central Information Commission

(Before Divya Prakash Sinha, IC)

Relevant facts emerging from the Appeal:

Aabid Hussain Vs  CPIO, O/o CEO, Cantonment Board, Jabalpur (MP) … 

File No. CIC/DCABO/A/2016/271739/IARMY/SD

Decided on October 16, 2017, [Hearing on: 16/10/2017]

RTI application filed on	:	31/08/2015
PIO replied on	:	No reply
First appeal filed on	:	05/10/2015
First Appellate Authority order	:	No order
Second Appeal dated	:	24/11/2015

Citation:2017SCC ONLINE CIC  1506

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Whether single incident of beating to wife amounts to offence U/S 498A of IPC?

Even without adverting to her cross-examination, evidence of PW2 Chanda makes it crystal clear that accused had not subjected her to any ill-treatment for demanding money or amount of Rs.10,000/-. Her version shows that when she ultimately disclosed him that she is unable to bring the amount of Rs.10,000/-, her husband i.e. the accused had beaten her. The requirement of definition of cruelty found in explanation (b) to section 498A is harassment of a women with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet the unlawful demand of any property or valuable security. It is thus clear that there should be harassment or ill-

treatment of a married women in order to coercing her to apeal99-99 meet the unlawful demand by the husband or in-laws. In the case in hand, evidence of PW2 Chanda shows that her husband demanded an amount of Rs.10,000/- to her. She does not state that she was either coerced or harassed by her husband while demanding amount. On the contrary, she stated that when she disclosed to her husband that she is not in a position to bring that amount, her husband had beaten her. Except this, there is no material in chief-examination of PW2 Chanda to show that she was coerced, harassed ill-

treated or tortured by her husband while making demand of money from her. Alleged beating given by her husband, PW2 Chand, as seen from the from her evidence, is only once which has resulted in lodging report by her. Cruelty as envisaged in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code requires constant harassment and torture with some persistence, causing reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife that living with her husband will be harmful or injurious to her.

This element is missing from the evidence of PW2 Chanda. As such, her evidence is not sufficient to infer the act of legal cruelty by the respondent / accused.

Bombay High Court

The State Of Maharashtra vs Chhagan Kanhu Bankar on 25 April, 2016

Bench: A.M. Badar

Citation:2016 ALLMR(cri) 5042

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When offence of dowry death is not made out?

PW-1, Laxmi Prasad Lonia, uncle of the deceased acknowledged that
at the time of marriage, the Respondents had agreed that whatever would
be given would be acceptable to them. Silver ornaments, sofa, bed, TV,
Godrej Almirah, watch and utensils were given voluntarily. Thereafter,
general allegations have been made that dowry was being demanded
without any mention of the nature of demand much less any singular act of
cruelty or harassment described motivated by the desire for extraction of
dowry. Rs.5,000/- was demanded to ensure employment for the deceased
as an Anganbadi Worker, which cannot be construed as a dowry demand.
There is no evidence of any specific dowry demand. Likewise, PW-2,
Shriram Lonia, father of the deceased also deposed in general terms that
dowry was being demanded without mentioning any specific items or much
less the nature of cruelty or harassment let alone any specific instance with
regard to the same. He also acknowledged that at the time of marriage, no
dowry was demanded and he gave gifts voluntarily. Likewise, PW-3,
Godavaribai, mother of the deceased also deposed in very general terms
not citing any instance of harassment or cruelty much less any nature of the
same or that in proximity to death. Other witnesses also have talked of
Rs.5,000/- having been demanded to ensure employment for the deceased
as an Anganbadi Worker. Even other witnesses on which reliance has been
placed have not spoken of any specific nature of cruelty or harassment
much less the nature of the dowry demand and have not cited a single
instance of harassment or cruelty for dowry.
8. We therefore do not find any reason to differ with the conclusions of
the Additional Sessions Judge that there was complete want of evidence
with regard to any cruelty or harassment for purposes of dowry, much less
any specific instance cited or the nature of such cruelty or harassment
mentioned let alone any specific demand for dowry made. There is
complete want of evidence with regard to any occurrence related to a
demand for dowry in proximity to death. The ingredients of Section 304B
IPC having not been fulfilled, we find no reason to interfere with the
acquittal.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No.185 of 2001
State of Chhattisgarh

v
 Mahendra Kumar Lonia, 
Dated:12/4/2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ(NOC)237 CHH

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Whether accused can be convicted U/S 498A of IPC even if there is no material showing harassment or cruelty?

The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 show that they spoke about the dowry to be the basis for suicide. The High Court came to the conclusion that because the deceased had given birth to a child there was no reason for her to commit suicide. The evidence of the parents of the deceased PWs 1 and 2 was only relatable to dowry. The High Court held that there was no question of demand of dowry, and in fact, appellant was financing the father of the deceased PW1. There being no other material to show as to how the deceased was being harassed or subjected to cruelty, the conclusion of the High Court that because the deceased committed suicide there must be some harassment and cruelty is insupportable and indefensible. There was no material to substantiate this conclusion. Merely on surmises and conjectures the conviction could not have recorded. There is a vast difference between "could have been", "must have been" and "has been". In the absence of any material, the case falls to the first category. In such a case conviction is impermissible.

Supreme Court of India

Hazarilal vs State Of M.P on 20 June, 2007

Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, D.K. Jain

           CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.)  585 of 2001

Citation:(2009)13 SCC 783

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Whether husband is liable for abetment of suicide if wife commits suicide due to harassment given by him?

 The intention of the Legislature
and the ratio of the cases decided
by this Court are clear that in order
to convict a person under Section
306, IPC there has to be a clear
mens rea to commit the offence. It
also requires an active act or direct
act which led the deceased to
commit suicide seeing no option
and this act must have been
intended to push the deceased into
such a position that he/she
committed suicide.
 However in my opinion mere harassment of wife by husband
due to differences perse does not attract Section 306 read with
section 107 of the Code, if the wife commit suicide. 
 In the present case also evidence collected by the
prosecution indicates that there is no overt act fall within the
purview of Sections 107 and 109 of the Code and therefore,
prima facie no offence punishable under Section 306 of the Code
is made out against the petitioner. For the forgoing reasons, I am
of the opinion that the impugned order framing charge under
Section 306 of the Code of the petitioner/accused deserves to be
set aside.
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
SINGLE BENCH:
HON. SHRI JUSTICE SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA
 CRIMINALREVISION NO.457/2012

 Pappu Khare Vs State of M.P.

Dated:29/01/2015

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When prosecution U/S 498A of IPC is liable to quashed against sister in laws?

 Despite our conclusion recorded hereinabove, in
respect of the first contention advanced by the learned senior
counsel for the appellants, it is important to refer to his
second submission also. It was the pointed contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants, that appellant nos. 4, 5
and 6, namely, Bhavana Vershney, Renu Gupta and Tulika Jaiswal,
are all sisters-in-law of respondent no.2 - Sonia Gupta. In
that view of the matter, they are the sisters of the husband of
respondent no.2 - Mukul Gupta. We were informed, that
appellant nos. 4, 5 and 6 are all married and living
independently. They are not residing with any of the appellant
nos. 1 to 3. Since they are married, and living independently
in different places, they had no concern with the relationship
of respondent no.2 - Sonia Gupta with appellant nos. 1 to 3.
Further more, our attention was also invited to the fact, that
no clear allegations have been levelled by respondent no.2 -
Sonia Gupta against any of the appellant nos. 4, 5 and 6. Even
during the course of hearing, respondent no.2 - Sonia Gupta,
who entered appearance in person, did not contest the aforesaid
factual position. Her only submission, during the course of
hearing was, that her three sisters-in-law had visited the
matrimonial house of respondent no.2, on the occasion of 'Grah
Parvesh', and the 'Naming Ceremony' of her daughter. We are of
the view, that the visit of the three sisters-in-law of
respondent no.2 - Sonia Gupta, on the above two occasions were

for celebration, and cannot be treated as occasions where they
harassed respondent no.2. In any case, in the absence of any
material on the record of this case, relating to harassment on
the above two occasions, we are satisfied, that the proceeding
initiated against appellant nos. 4, 5 and 6, consequent upon
the registration of the first information report by respondent
no.2 - Sonia Gupta on 10.04.2002, was not justified. The same
deserves to be quashed. The same is accordingly hereby
quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 128 OF 2011
Ram Saran Varshney and others 
v
State of Uttar Pradesh and another 
Dated;February 05, 2016.
Citation;(2016)3 SCC724

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.

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Dowry death- there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and dowry related harassment or cruelty soon before her death.

Punjab & Haryana High Court: The Court held that in view of the definition of “dowry” given under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the give or take of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom in India and being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed.

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