Whether insurance claim can be recovered if death is due to heart attack?

A plain reading of the cover Clause in the M.O.U. would make it clear that it is intended to impose a twofold limitation. A death in order to qualify for the insurance cover must not only be accidental but the accident causing death must itself result from some external, violent and other visible means. This two fold limitation is based on what is called, in the Law of Insurance, the distinction between 'accidental result' and 'accidental means'. An unexpected and unforeseen consequence or result from a normal or routine activity may constitute an accident but it would not qualify as 'accidental means'. Thus, if a person suffers a fatal heart attack while dancing (considered to be a normal activity) the death may be called 'accidental' but it would fail to attract the insurance cover because it was not due to 'accidental means'. On the other hand, if a person dies due to heart attack suffered as a result of over-exertion on being chased by a ferocious dog (an unintended occurrence, and not a normal activity) the death might attract the insurance cover as it was caused by 'accidental means'.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3413 of 2019 

Decided On: 24.04.2019

Alka Shukla  Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

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When unnatural death of married woman would not amount to dowry death?

 In Pushpender Singh v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 160/2015, (2015) SCC OnLine Del 12748, decided by a division bench (of which I was a member) on 12.10.2015, similar questions were examined. After referring to the provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and various judgments thereupon, it was observed thus:

“102. Broad principles emerging from above noted case law, to the extent germane to the issues raised before us, may be culled out as under:—

(i) The death of a married woman within seven years of the marriage, otherwise than under normal circumstances must result in a serious attempt on the part of the investigating agency, and the court, to inquire if it is a case of culpable homicide;

(ii) If the evidence shows the husband or any of his relatives to be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts resulting in the death, the trial must proceed on the charge of culpable homicide;

(iii) If the evidence is forthcoming to show that the unnatural death of the married woman within seven years of her marriage was preceded “soon before” her death by she being subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry by the husband or any of his relatives, the charge of “dowry death” is to be invoked as an “alternative charge”, or even as a single or main charge against others not implicated by reason of abetment, conspiracy etc.

(iv) The offence of “dowry death” is neither a substitute, nor “minor offence”, nor “included” in the offence of “culpable homicide”;

(v) To bring home the charge of “culpable homicide”, the prosecution must prove the accused to have intentionally committed the act causing death or causing bodily injury resulting in death. In contrast, to bring home the charge of “dowry death”, direct nexus on the part of the accused with the act(s) causing death, or resulting in bodily injury causing death, need not be shown. The prosecution needs to prove only the fact of death being otherwise than under normal circumstances (to put it simply, it being an unnatural death), coupled with the fact that the deceased (necessarily a married woman) had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demands for dowry by the husband, or any of his relatives, the death having occurred within seven years of the marriage. Upon such proof, the Court is bound to presume that the husband, or the relative, who is party to the cruelty or harassment of the specified nature is responsible for the “dowry death”;

(vi) For the charge of “dowry death”, the husband or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the acts leading to the death;

(vii) To bring home a charge of dowry death, there must be “proximity” or a “live link” between the cruelty and harassment based on dowry demands and the consequential death leading to inference that said conduct was indulged in “soon before” the death;

(viii) The past events of cruelty or harassment, they not having become stale, continue to be relevant for raising the presumption, if the evidence shows continuity of the incriminating conduct proximate enough in terms of time to the unnatural death, even if interspersed by tentative efforts at resolution or compromise;

(ix) A case of unnatural death of the married woman would not amount to “dowry death”, if it is shown to have occurred on account of an accident or as a result of acts of commission or omission on the part of a third person, i.e a person other than the husband or any of his relatives, or for reasons not connected with demands for dowry; and,

(x) The accused against whom presumption is raised may dispel its effect by showing that he had no hand at all, in the death, and he may do so either by showing that the death was accidental or brought about by another person unconnected with the cruelty or harassment relating to the demands for dowry.”

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before R.K Gauba, J.)

Shiv Ram & Ors. v. State of Delhi

 Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13127

Crl. A. 496/2002

Decided on December 7, 2018

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Whether court should give benefit of probation of offenders Act in case of death in Road Accident?

  Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents

in India and the devastating consequences visiting the

victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the

nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as

attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the

Probation of Offenders Act. While considering the

quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of

causing death by rash or negligent driving of

automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be

deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator

of the automobile almost throughout his working hours.

He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford

to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when

his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He

cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash

driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even

if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the

death of any human being; or even if such death ensues

he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that

even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by

the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear

psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing

death of a human being due to his callous driving of the

vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the

role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of

trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents

due to callous driving of automobiles.’(Dalbir Singh

vs.State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82, SCC pp.84-85 &

87, paras 1 & 13)”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 85 of 2009.

Date of decision: 24th March, 2018.

Santosh Kumar  V State of Himachal Pradesh. 

Coram

 Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.

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How to determine compensation for accidental death of government servant?

The claimants are legitimately entitled to claim for the loss of
“pay and wages” of the deceased Government employee against the
tortfeasor or Insurance Company, as the case may be, covered by the
first part of Rule 5 under the Act of 1988. The claimants or
dependents of the deceased Government employee (employed by State
of Haryana), however, cannot set up a claim for the same subject
falling under the first part of Rule 5 - “pay and allowances”, which are
receivable by them from employer (State) under Rule 5 (1) of the Rules
of 2006. In that, if the deceased employee was to survive the motor
accident injury, would have remained in employment and earned his
regular pay and allowances. Any other interpretation of the said Rules
would inevitably result in double payment towards the same head of
loss of “pay and wages” of the deceased Government employee
entailing in grant of bonanza, largesse or source of profit to the
dependants / claimants. Somewhat similar situation has been spelt
out in Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which reads thus:
“167. Option regarding claims for compensation in
certain cases.--- Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the
death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim
for compensation under this Act and also under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to
compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of
Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those
Acts but not under both.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Indeed, similar statutory exclusion of claim receivable under the
Rules of 2006 is absent. That, however, does not mean that the Claims
Tribunal should remain oblivious to the fact that the claim towards
loss of Pay and wages of the deceased has already been or will be
compensated by the employer in the form of ex-gratia financial
assistance on compassionate grounds under Rule 5 (1). The Claims
Tribunal has to adjudicate the claim and determine the amount of
compensation which appears to it to be just. The amount receivable by
the dependants / claimants towards the head of pay and allowances
in the form of ex-gratia financial assistance, therefore, cannot be paid
for the second time to the claimants. True it is, that the Rules of 2006
would come into play if the Government employee dies in harness even
due to natural death. At the same time, the Rules of 2006 do not
expressly enable the dependents of the deceased Government
employee to claim similar amount from the tortfeasor or Insurance
Company because of the accidental death of the deceased Government
employee. The harmonious approach for determining a just
compensation payable under the Act of 1988, therefore, is to exclude
the amount received or receivable by the dependents of the deceased
Government employee under the Rules of 2006 towards the head
financial assistance equivalent to “pay and other allowances” that was
last drawn by the deceased Government employee in the normal
course. This is not to say that the amount or payment receivable by
the dependents of the deceased Government employee under Rule 5
(1) of the Rules, is the total entitlement under the head of “loss of
income”. So far as the claim towards loss of future escalation of
income and other benefits, if the deceased Government employee had
survived the accident can still be pursued by them in their claim
under the Act of 1988. For, it is not covered by the Rules of 2006.
Similarly, other benefits extended to the dependents of the deceased
Government employee in terms of sub-rule (2) to sub-rule (5) of Rule 5
including family pension, Life Insurance, Provident Fund etc., that
must remain unaffected and cannot be allowed to be deducted, which,
any way would be paid to the dependents of the deceased Government
employee, applying the principle expounded in Helen C.Rebello and
Patricia Jean Mahajan’s cases (supra).
(REPORTABLE)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 9654 /2016
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 14312/2013)
Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd.
Vs.
Shashi Sharma & Ors.
Citation:(2016) 9 SCC627

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When husband should not convicted for offence of abetment of suicide of wife?

 Now the question is – whether it is proved that
Kalpana committed suicide?   The well in question, from
the   description   given   in   the   scene   of   occurrence
panchanama, appears to be a dangerous place.   There was
no   protective   wall   around   the   well   and   therefore   this
place was quite accident ­prone.  No witness came forward
to suggest that Kalpana had no reason to go near the well
and yet she found drowned in the well.  No one mentioned
that Kalpana's coming towards well was an unusual move
for her.  No one saw Kalpana coming towards the well and

no one explained as to why Kalpana could not have gone to
the well except for the purpose of committing suicide.
On the other hand, it has come on record that well in
question is property of her husband – accused No.1.  Very
close to this well, house of Kalpana's brother­in­law is
situated.   This could, therefore, be a place where she
had   some   reason   to   go.   A   case   of   drowning   cannot   be
further   classified   as   suicidal   drowning   or   accidental
drowning. Therefore, it was for the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Kalpana died due to suicide
and   not   due   to   accident.     As   said   above,   there   is   no
evidence   on   record   to   suggest   that   Kalpana   must   have
committed   suicide.     Therefore,   there   always   remains   a
possibility,   though   remote,   that   Kalpana   could   have
accidentally   fell   into   the   well.   I   am,   therefore,   not
inclined to hold that Kalpana died due to suicide.  When
Kalpana's   dead   body   was   found,   it   was   reported   to   be
accidental death.   Till 03.12.1999, the police did not
register any offence.  It was on 03.02.1999, because the
father of Kalpana alleged that Kalapna committed suicide,
everyone started believing that she died due to suicide.
Unfortunately, P.W.1­Kalpana's father did not reside in
the village. He had no knowledge as to what was Kalpana's
routine and why she could not have gone to the well where
her dead  body was found.   In my view, the prosecution
could not prove that this was a case of suicide.  In view

of this, there is no possibility of convicting accused
No.1   for   the   offence   of   abettment   of   said   suicide.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 474 OF 2002
Sambhaji s/o. Raosaheb Manal 
V
The State of Maharashtra 
CORAM :  A.V.NIRGUDE, J.
DATED : 01.03.2016
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)4614

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Whether family pension which is payable of heirs of deceased can be deducted from compensation granted by MACT?

The learned M.A.C.T. has held that the monthly income

of the deceased was ` 15,058/-. As already stated earlier, If the

income by way of pension was 50% of the last drawn salary

which was ` 22,260/- it had to be ` 11,130/- and not ` 10,058/- as

held by the learned M.A.C.T. Adding further income of ` 5,750/-

earned out of tuition, the total income becomes ` 16,880/-. The

contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents

to the effect that the family of the deceased would be getting

family pension after the death of the deceased and, therefore,

the said family pension amount had to be deducted from the total

income, has no force at all. In the case of “Lal Dei and others”

(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal as well as the High Court could not have

deducted the amount of family pension given to the family while

calculating dependency of the claimants. The Apex Court

referred to the case of “Helan C. Rebello Vs. Maharashtra

S.R.T.C.”, [1998 (3) Mh. L. J. (SC) 674] : [1999(1) SC 90], wherein

the Apex Court had specifically dealt with the said question and

had observed that the family pension is earning of an employee

for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the

service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs

after his death. It was observed that the heirs receive family

pension even otherwise than the accidental death and there is no

co-relation between the two and, therefore, the family pension

amount paid to the family cannot be deducted while claiming the

compensation awarded to the claimants. Therefore, the learned

M.A.C.T. cannot be said to have committed any error by not

deducting the family pension amount.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

FIRST APPEAL NO. 119 of 2009

 Shri Vezic D'Costa alias Vajic D'Costa, Vs Shri Manuelino Fernandes Sales,

CORAM :- U. V. BAKRE, J.

 Pronounced on : 16th December, 2014.

Citation: 2016 (3) ALLMR775

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Whether married sister can claim compensation on account of accidental death of her brother even though she was not dependent on him?

“10. As observed by this Court in Custodian of
Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini
Bai Naique [1989]2SCR810 the definition contained in
Section 2(11) CPC is inclusive in character and its
scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only.
Instead it stipulates that a person who may or may not

be legal heir competent to inherit the property of the
deceased can represent the estate of the deceased
person. It includes heirs as well as persons who
represent the estate even without title either as
executors or administrators in possession of the estate
of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by
the expression 'legal representative'. As observed in
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v.
Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr. [1987]3SCR404 a
legal representative is one who suffers on account of
death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and
need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and
child.
11. There are several factors which have to be noted.
The liability under Section 140 of the Act does not cease
because there is absence of dependency. The right to file
a claim application has to be considered in the
background of right to entitlement.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
FAO No. 4260 of 2008(O&M)
Date of decision : May 08, 2014
Charanjit Kaur ..... Appellant
v.
Suresh Kumar and others ..... Respondents

CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE AJAY TEWARI
Citation; 2016(2) ALLMR (JOURNAL) 17

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When married daughter is entitled to get compensation on account of accidental death of her father?

 In the impugned judgment the High Court has correctly drawn a distinction between "right to apply for compensation" and "entitlement to compensation". The High Court has rightly held that even a married daughter is a legal representative and she is certainly entitled to claim compensation. It was further held, on the facts of the present case, that the married daughter was not dependent on her father. She was living with her husband in her husband's house. Therefore, she was not entitled to claim statutory compensation. According to the High Court, the claimant was not dependent on her father's income. Hence, she was not entitled to claim compensation based on "No Fault Liability".

 In my opinion, "No Fault Liability", envisaged in Section 140 of the said Act, is distinguishable from the rule of "Strict Liability". In the former, the compensation amount is fixed. It is Rs. 50,000/- in cases of death [Section 140(2)]. It is a statutory liability. It is an amount which can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Since, the amount is a fixed amount/crystallized amount, the same has to be considered as part of the estate of the deceased. In the present case, the deceased was an earning member. The statutory compensation could constitute part of his estate. His legal representative, namely, his daughter has inherited his estate. She was entitled to inherit his estate. In the circumstances, she was entitled to receive compensation under "No fault Liability" in terms of Section 140 of the said Act. My opinion is confined only to the "No Fault Liability" under Section 140 of the said Act. That section is a Code by itself within the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Supreme Court of India

Manjuri Bera vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ... on 30 March, 2007

Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, S. H. Kapadia

CASE NO.:Appeal (civil) 1702 of 2007

Citation; AIR2007SC1474, (2007)10SCC643, 

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Whether husband can be denied compensation due to accidental death of his wife if he was not dependent on his wife?

 The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that
respondent no.1 – claimant i.e the husband of the deceased was earning at
the relevant time and as such was not dependent on the income of his wife
cannot be accepted, in view of the evidence that has come on record. No
doubt, the first respondent – claimant was working in the Irrigation
Department and was drawing a monthly salary of Rs.55,000/- per month,
out of which Rs.10,000/- odd was being deducted towards various
deductions including statutory deductions. According to the evidence that

has come on record, the deceased would spend her entire salary on the
family members and was also paying for her children's education. There is
no serious challenge to this part of the evidence that has come on record.
In this day and age, considering the cost of living, the income of both the
husband and wife are equally important for running the house as they
supplement each other's income. It cannot be generally said that as the other
spouse (surviving) is earning, there is no dependency. When a husband and
wife, with separate incomes are living together and sharing their expenses,
and in consequence thereof, their joint living expenses are less than twice
the expenses of each living separately, then each, by the fact of sharing is
conferring a benefit on the other. This results in higher savings. In case, one
spouse loses the benefit of contribution rendered by the other in managing
the household, in such a situation, the surviving spouse would be entitled to
compensation for loss of dependency (for loss of services rendered in
managing households). In the present case, it has come in the evidence that
the deceased was contributing her entire salary for the household needs
including for the education of her two sons, who were studying at the
relevant time. The said evidence as noted earlier has gone unchallenged.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO.1271 OF 2014
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3156 OF 2014
(FOR STAY)
IN
FIRST APPEAL NO.1271 OF 2014
The New India Assurance Company Limited

 Versus
Sunil Parsharam Garud

CORAM : A. S. OKA &
 REVATI MOHITE DERE, JJ.


 PRONOUNCED ON : 29th OCTOBER 2015.
Citation;2016(2) ALLMR354

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Whether parents are entitled to get compensation for accidental death of their daughter from MACT?

It is painful to note that the award has been penned down by a lady
Presiding Officer who has treated the death of an unmarried daughter to be
falling in a category which does not entitle the claimants/parents to seek
compensation for her death.
 The entire approach of the learned Presiding Officer in not even
dealing with the case laws cited on behalf of the claimants observing that
none of them dealt with death of unmarried daughter aged about 19 years,
has to be termed as perverse.
 For seeking compensation, Motor Vehicle Act does not lay down
separate criteria for death of a male or female child. Thus, not considering
the legal position laid down in various pronouncements relied upon by the
claimants/appellants before the learned Tribunal (nineteen reports were
cited) requires the learned Presiding Officer to be sensitized on her approach
on gender issue.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Delivered on: December 23, 2015
 MAC.APP. 339/2006
ARKESH JAIN & ORS. V MOHD. ISHRAR & ORS.
Coram: PRATIBHA RANI, J.

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