Supreme Court Acquits Husband in Dowry Death Case: Holds Prosecution Failed to Prove Cruelty or Harassment “Soon Before Death,” Presumption Under Section 113-B Evidence Act Not Applicable Due to Contradictory Testimonies

In the cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had recorded his statements on 3rd April 1998 and 7th April 1998, which were marked as exhibits DG and DH, respectively. He accepted that the allegation that the Accused used to maltreat his sister on account of insufficient dowry given in the marriage and having brought broken furniture is not found in both the police statements. He also stated that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi does not find place in both statements. Therefore, the version of PW-7 in his examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry is a significant and relevant omission. Hence, this amounts to a contradiction. The public prosecutor claimed that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi was mentioned in his third statement, which was recorded on 23rd June 1998. The third statement, recorded belatedly, obviously appears to be an afterthought. As regards his statement that the Accused used to give a beating to his sister, it seems that he got this information when he visited the matrimonial home of his sister three months after the marriage. It is a very vague allegation. Moreover, the witness has not stated that this was disclosed to him by his deceased sister. Assuming that what he has said is correct, this incident of beating must have taken place between 25th June 1996 till end of September 1996. Therefore, this incident did not happen soon before the death. It is not his case that when the deceased allegedly visited his house nine to ten days before the incident, she complained about any cruelty or any harassment. Thus, none of the three statements of the witnesses contain any specific instances of cruelty or harassment.

{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014

Decided On: 31.01.2025

Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka,  and Ujjal Bhuyan, , JJ.

Author:Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 133,MANU/SC/0132/2025.

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Whether Daughter will Lose Right In Joint Family Property if Dowry Was Paid At Her Marriage?

 The evidence on record shows that the joint family property was purported to be exclusively usurped by the brothers to exclude the sisters. Merely because one of the sisters deposed in favour of the brothers does not mean that the issue of family arrangement or oral partition was duly proved. There is no evidence about providing a sufficient dowry to the daughters of the house. However, even if it is assumed that some dowry was provided to the daughters, that does not mean that the daughters cease to have any right in the family property. The rights of the daughters could not have been extinguished in the manner in which they have been attempted to be extinguished by the brothers, post the father's demise.{Para 86}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Second Appeal No. 89 of 2005

Decided On: 16.03.2023

Terezinha Martins David Vs. Miguel Guarda Rosario Martins and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1005/2023.

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Important Provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961

 2. Definition of “dowry”.—In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person,

at or before 4[or any time after the marriage] 5[in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

Explanation I.—6[* * *]

Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

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Can brothers exclude their sisters from joint family property on the ground that dowry was paid at the time of their sisters' marriage?

The evidence on record shows that the joint family property was purported to be exclusively usurped by the brothers to exclude the sisters. Merely because one of the sisters deposed in favour of the brothers does not mean that the issue of family arrangement or oral partition was duly proved. There is no evidence about providing a sufficient dowry to the daughters of the house. However, even if it is assumed that some dowry was provided to the daughters, that does not mean that the daughters cease to have any right in the family property. The rights of the daughters could not have been extinguished in the manner in which they have been attempted to be extinguished by the brothers, post the father's demise. 

{Para 86}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Second Appeal No. 89 of 2005

Decided On: 16.03.2023

Terezinha Martins David Vs. Miguel Guarda Rosario Martins and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1005/2023,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 20.

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Can the daughter claim partition of joint family property without bringing property given to her towards dowry in hotchpotch?

 Such being the case, I am of the considered opinion

that a beneficiary of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession

Act cannot claim a benefit by way of partition as regard

to joint family properties without reference to the

properties already received by her at the time of

marriage as dowry/gift or otherwise. The said properties

at an undisputed point of time forming part of the joint

family property and the plaintiff having received it, the

same would also have to be made part of the partition

suit in order for the partition to be equitable hence,

those properties would also be amenable to partition.

Hence, the contention of Sri.A.Nagarajappa, learned

counsel for the petitioner that these properties were

independently purchased (Item no. 9 from Defendant

no. 9 and Item No. 10 from third parties) and would not

be amenable for partition is an issue that would have to

be decided after trial and cannot be adjudicated upon at

this stage. The assertions clearly and categorically made

is that the 1st defendant had executed nominal sale

deeds in respect of item Nos.9 and 10 properties. {Para 16}

17. It is for the parties to establish during the course of trial

as to whether the properties belonged to the joint family

or not. If the properties belong to the joint family, then

the same would be amenable for partition. If the

plaintiffs were able to establish that the properties had

been independently purchased out of their own funds

and the said properties are not joint family properties,

then the same would not be amenable for partition.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU 

WRIT PETITION NO.39982 OF 2018 (GM-CPC)

SMT.HEMALATHA Vs SRI.VENKATESH

BEFORE

 MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

Dated: 16TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022

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Whether demand of money for construction of a house can be treated as a demand for dowry?

 In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

[emphasis added] {Para 12}

Supreme Court

CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA N. V. RAMANA JUSTICE A. S. BOPANNA JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. JOGENDRA & ANR.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012

11th January 2022

Author: Hima Kohli, J.

Citation:  2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 29

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Can allegations of demand of dowry and alcohol consumption made by wife amount to ‘cruelty’?

 The allegations made by the respondent wife with regard to the petitioner demanding dowry and indulging in alcohol consumption, in our view, do not tantamount to making serious allegations impinging on the character of the petitioner, to such an extent, that they would be the cause of immense mental agony and cruelty to the petitioner such that it would make it impossible for the petitioner to live with the Respondent wife. Moreover, the past conduct of the Appellant shows that the allegation of the Appellant indulging in drinking of liquor is not false.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Vipin Sanghi and Jasmeet Singh, JJ.)

Harish Kumar  Vs Sarita 

MAT. APP.(F.C) 146/2020 and CM APPL. 30682/2020

Decided on October 6, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4937

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Whether there is the limitation for claiming property by wife entrusted to husband?

 The question involved in the above reference is that,

when there is a change in circumstances between the spouses,

especially when there is a dissolution of marriage and substantial

time had elapsed, whether the trust created between them would

be extinguished.

6. It is settled law when the wife entrusts with the husband any property belonging to her, a trust is created and the husband is bound to return the same to his wife. If the same is not returned, the wife has a right to demand the same by filing a suit or as in the present case, file an application before the Family Court or take other necessary steps under the relevant statutes in force. When S.10 of the Limitation Act indicates that there is no limitation for initiating any such action, in the absence of any other statute providing for a limitation, the trustee cannot take a contention that he shall not return the trust property on account of any period of limitation. The question posed is, when the relationship between the parties gets deranged and results in divorce, whether the trust gets extinguished and the divorced wife would be entitled to invoke S.10 of the Limitation Act and file a suit at her will and pleasure at any point in time. 

9. As per S.6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, when a

statutory trust is created in respect of dowry, the principle

aforestated shall apply.

10. In the case of ornaments which are given in the form of

dowry, definitely, a statutory trust is created. Even otherwise, if

the ornaments owned by the wife do not form part of the dowry

and if there is an entrustment of gold ornaments by the wife to

the husband or his parents, a trust gets created, in which event,

the trustee or trustees, as the case may be, are liable to return

the same and there is no limitation for claiming the same by the

wife/divorced wife.

In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are in full

agreement with the law laid down in Chacko's case (supra) and

we uphold the view expressed in Bindu K.P.'s case (supra). 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE

 MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS

and

 MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.

Mat.Appeal.No.358 OF 2019

SHEELA.K.K., Vs  N.G.SURESH,

Author: Shaffique, J.

Dated:  24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2020

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What is difference between stridhan and dowry?

 Although ‘Stridhan’ and ‘Dowry’ are entirely different, they are generally misconceived to mean the same. Under Indian law, dowry means any property or valuable security that is given or agreed to be given by the bride’s side to the bridegroom’s family before, after or during the time of marriage. The main difference between ‘dowry’ and ‘Stridhan’ is the element of “demand, undue influence or coercion” that is present in the former but absent in the latter. Stridhan is a gift that is voluntarily given to the women and it is not the result of demand, undue influence or coercion.

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Supreme Court: Seeking Financial Assistance Can Constitute Demand For Dowry

 Mr. Raval relied on decision of this Court in the case of Appasaheb &

Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721, in this judgment it was

observed:

“11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the

word “dowry” any property or valuable security

should be given or agreed to be given either directly

or indirectly at or before or any time after the

marriage and in connection with the marriage of the

said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of

property or valuable security must have some

connection with the marriage of the parties and a

correlation between the giving or taking of property

or valuable security with the marriage of the parties

is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be

strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known

social custom or practice in India. It is well-settled

principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is

passed with reference to a particular trade, business

or transaction and words are used which everybody

conversant with that trade, business or transaction

knows or understands to have a particular meaning

in it, then the words are to be construed as having

that particular meaning.(See Union of India v.

Garware Nylons Ltd. (1996) 10 SCC 413 and

Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India

(1997) 2 SCC 664.) A demand for money on account

of some financial stringency or for meeting some

urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure

cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said

word is normally understood. The evidence adduced

by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any

demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants

as what was allegedly asked for was some money

for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing

manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section

304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established,

the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained.”

7. But the view of the Court reflected in that judgment that seeking

financial assistance would not per se constitute demand for dowry has been

rejected by a later judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the

case of Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477. Upon

considering the case of Appasaheb (supra) and certain other authorities, it

was held in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra):-

“20. Given that the statute with which we are

dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and commonsense

interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to

be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment

in Appasaheb case followed by the judgment of Vipin

Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore,

declare that any money or property or valuable

security demanded by any of the persons mentioned

in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or

before or at any time after the marriage which is

reasonably connected to the death of a married

woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in

relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given

case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

(Non-Reportable)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1850 OF 2010

Jatinder Kumar  Vs.  State of Haryana 

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Dated:Dated: December 17, 2019

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Leading Judgment on dowry death

 In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [MANU/SC/0296/2000 : (2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 SCC (Cri.) 935] where this Court considered the term "soon before". The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)

15. ... 'Soon before' is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term 'soon before' is not synonymous with the term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the expression 'soon after' as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be 'soon before death' if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.

22. In another recent judgment in Sher Singh v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0022/2015 : 2015 (1) SCALE 250, this Court said:

We are aware that the word 'soon' finds place in Section 304B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death Under Section 304B or the suicide Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. Once the presence of these concomitants are established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt. (at page 262)

23. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman Under Section 304B.

24. At this stage, it is important to notice a recent judgment of this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0364/2014 : 2014 (5) SCALE 641 in which the law was stated thus:

The expression "soon before" is a relative term as held by this Court, which is required to be considered under the specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time of allotment. It can be said that the term "soon before" is synonyms with the term "immediately before". The determination of the period which can come within term "soon before" is left to be determined by courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (at page 646)

25. We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. "Soon before" is not synonymous with "immediately before".

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2321 of 2009

Decided On: 26.02.2015

 Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.S. Thakur, Rohinton Fali Nariman and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2015 SC 1359

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Whether a person can be added as an accused U/S 319 of CRPC for any offence?

Under Section 319 Cr.P.C., a person can be added as an
accused invoking the provisions not only for the same offence for
which the accused is tried but for “any offence”; but that offence
shall be such that in respect of which all the accused could be
tried together. It is to be seen whether the appellants could be
summoned for the offence under Section 498A IPC and under
Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The statement of PW-
1 both in the complaint and in his evidence before the court is
very general stating that he had given sufficient dowry to Shilpa
according to his status and that the groom side were not satisfied
with the dowry and that they used to demand dowry each and
every time. Insofar as the demand of dowry and the dowry

harassment, there are no particulars given as to the time of
demand and what was the nature of demand. The averments in
the complaint and the evidence is vague and no specific demand
is attributed to any of the appellants. In such circumstances,
there is no justification for summoning the appellants even under
Section 498A IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act. It is also pertinent to point out that upon
completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer felt that no
offence under Sections 498A, 304-B IPC and under Sections 3
and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is made out. Charge sheet
was filed for the offence punishable only under Section 302 IPC
against Chanchal @ Babita. As held in the Constitution Bench
judgment in Hardeep Singh, for summoning an accused under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. it requires much stronger evidence than
mere probability of his complicity which is lacking in the present
case. The trial court and the High Court, in our considered view,
has not examined the matter in the light of the well-settled
principles and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 395 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 4626 of 2017)

SUNIL KUMAR GUPTA Vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:February 27, 2019

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Whether civil suit is maintainable for recovery of dowry and gold ornaments?

The IV Additional District Court, Kadapa, dismissed the petition in I.A. No. 606/2017 relying on Smt. G. Renuka's case MANU/AP/0021/1995 : AIR 1995 AP 130 (supra), wherein this Court in view of Section 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, held that plaint is maintainable to recover the amount of dowry. It was observed thus:

"Para 13: I may also point out that the Dowry Prohibition Act contemplates two stages. The first stage is taking or giving or abetting of giving or taking of dowry. The second stage is, after taking dowry and pending transfer of the same to the beneficiary, the person holds it in trust for the benefit of the woman. Though under the first stage, namely, taking or giving or abetting of giving or taking of dowry is punishable and therefore such act is a void transaction; under second stage i.e. after taking the dowry, the Legislature itself has provided that the person who took the dowry shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman pending transfer in her favour. Therefore, during the second stage, it is open to a woman to file a suit to recover the amount from the person who held the dowry in trust, if that person has not transferred the trust property in favour of the woman for her benefit. It follows from the above, that the suit by the plaintiff, in this case, is maintainable, as admittedly, the 2nd defendant, who admitted to have received the amount of dowry from the father of the plaintiff by way of a cheque on 19-4-1974, had not transferred it for the benefit of the plaintiff. The observations made by this Court in G. Ramasubbaiah v. G. Rajamma (1975 (1) APLJ 168) also categorically say that giving or receiving of dowry will come within the mischief of Sec. 3 of the Act, subject to the provisions of Sec. 6. Subject to the provisions of Section 6 mean that the person taking the dowry holds the property for the benefit of the woman as a trustee. It does not mean to say that during the said period, the woman cannot file a suit for recovery of the same. Section 6 of the Act enables the wife to file a suit for recovery of the dowry paid, if the person who received the dowry has failed to transfer the property for the benefit of the woman within the prescribed period.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD 

C.R.P. No. 4329 of 2017

Decided On: 24.01.2018

Vadhiboyana Venkata Krishna Reddy Vs.  C. Venkata Ramama Reddy

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U. Durga Prasad Rao, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Hyder 3

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Whether claim of wife for return of gifts items can be rejected if she has failed to produce bills of those items?

Third issue was whether appellant is entitled for items mentioned in the list. Appellant in her statement has categorically mentioned the items given in marriage. Learned Judge Family Court believed the version of respondent/husband that he had returned the items of appellant, however, disbelieved the version of appellant without any reason. He further observed that there was no bill of any item and no gift item was given in the marriage. Appellant in her statement categorically mentioned the list of items given in the marriage. In our opinion, nobody keeps bill of purchased item unless item is so expensive and it cannot be believed that in the marriage, nobody would not give any gift.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

First Appeal No. 105 of 2011

Decided On: 23.07.2018

 Sonia Vs. Sanjay Mehta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajiv Sharma and Alok Singh, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 882 UTR

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Short notes on Dowry Death And S 498A of IPC

In 1986, a new section,S 304B was inserted into IPC to provide for stringent punishment in respect of dowry death.

Ingredients of S 304B

It is clear that before this offence is said to have been committed, the following conditions must be satisfied:

1) The wife should have died because of burns or any bodily injury;

2) Her death should have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances.

3)Such death should have taken place within seven years from the date of her marriage.

4)Soon before her death, she should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relatives.

5) Such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with any demand for dowry.

Read important judgments on Dowry death:

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What is dowry?

For the purpose of S 304B, the word dowry has the same meaning as S 2 of Dowry prohibition Act,which defines the word as follows:

Dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-

a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage,or

b) by parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person,to either party to the marriage or to any other person-

at, before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of said parties.

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Whether demand of property in connection with marriage amounts to dowry demand?

Learned counsel for the appellants heavily relied upon the following observations made by this Court in the case of Appasaheb1:

A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood.

The above observations of this Court must be understood in the context of the case. That was a case wherein the prosecution evidence did not show 'any demand for dowry' as defined in Section 2 of the 1961 Act. The allegation to the effect that the deceased was asked to bring money for domestic expenses and for purchasing manure in the facts of the case was not found sufficient to be covered by the 'demand for dowry'. Appasaheb1 cannot be read to be laying down an absolute proposition that a demand for money or some property or valuable security on account of some business or financial requirement could not be termed as 'demand for dowry'. It was in the facts of the case that it was held so. If a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, has a nexus with marriage, in our opinion, such demand would constitute 'demand for dowry'; the cause or reason for such demand being immaterial.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 831 of 2006

Decided On: 08.02.2011

 Bachni Devi  Vs. State of Haryana through Secretary, 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aftab Alam and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

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Whether offence U/S 498A of IPC is made out even if there is no dowry demand?

 In Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0576/2013 : (2013) 7 SCC 108, while dwelling upon the concept of 'cruelty' enshrined Under Section 498-A the Court has opined thus:

Clause (a) of the Explanation to the aforesaid provision defines "cruelty" to mean "any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide". Clause (b) of the Explanation pertains to unlawful demand. Clause (a) can take in its ambit mental cruelty.

13. The aforesaid analysis of the provision clearly spells how coercive harassment can have the attributes of cruelty that would meet the criterion as conceived of Under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, the emphasis is on any wilful conduct which is of such a nature that is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The mental cruelty which is engraved in the first limb of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code has nothing to do with the demand of dowry. It is associated with mental cruelty that can drive a woman to commit suicide and dependent upon the conduct of the person concerned.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1138-1139 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 5928-5929 of 2016)

Decided On: 22.11.2016

K.V. Prakash Babu Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and Amitava Roy, JJ.

Citation:2017(11) SCC176.

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How to ascertain jurisdiction of court in case of misappropriation of streedhan property?

When the legislature in its wisdom has given such

a right by amending Section 181 (4) of the Code in the year 1978 the

judicial authority cannot deprive a citizen of India such advantage

acquired by law on the ground that it may be misused.

Section 181(4) of the Code runs thus:

“Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of

trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local

jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is

the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be

returned or accounted for, by the accused person.” (emphasis supplied

by me)

This Court wants to emphasize on the word ‘or was required to be

returned or accounted for, by the accused person’. It is true that as per

claim of the de facto complainant the dowry was paid at Siliguri and as perFIR when the victim opposite party was driven out from her matrimonial

abode she claimed her ‘Stridhan’ articles including her certificates but

those were not given to her and as such this Court is satisfied that there is

prima facie case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code.

It is the admitted position that at present this opposite party wife is

residing at her father’s house at Lilua, Howrah. Thus, if the articles are to

be returned after the conclusion of the trial the venue of such return must

be either the court at Howrah or the residence of the de facto complainant,

the victim of this case. Thus, this Court is satisfied that interest of justice

demands that in this scenario the protection must be given to the deserted

lady by applying Section 181 (4) of the Code. The legislature in its wisdom

amended that sub-section and if such advantage has been given to the wife

or the de facto complainant why should the court will take out that

advantage from her mouth. Her entitlement as per law should not be taken

out in the disguise that such sub-section may be used just to oppress her

counterpart.

Thus, in view of the discussion so long made this court is satisfied

that there is enough of material to go for trial even against the petitioners.

This court is also satisfied that in view of Section 181 (4) of the Cr.P.C, the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah has perfect jurisdiction over the case.Thus, this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 is answered in the negative and dismissed accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

Present :  Justice Indrajit Chatterjee

C.R.R. 1529 of 2014

Ashok Kumar Marda & Ors.

V

State of West Bengal & Anr.

Judgment on : 06.10.2016.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 73

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Whether offence of dowry death is made out if offence U/S 498A of IPC is not made out?

The last ingredient is based upon the commission of offence under Section 498A IPC and while committing the offence under Section 498A IPC, if it connects with the death, then it would be an offence punishable under Section 304B IPC. The prosecution has failed miserably to establish beyond reasonable doubt that any cruelty or harassment was meted out to the deceased by the appellant, let alone soon before her death. The testimony of above mentioned prosecution witnesses to the effect that TV or fridge was demanded per se does not establish the cruelty and harassment towards the deceased. Evidently, the death of the deceased had taken place on 02.08.1987 i.e. within one year of marriage. The prosecution has failed to establish that after the marriage of the deceased, there were circumstances of harassment or cruelty that took place on account of demand of dowry which could connect with the death of the deceased.

21. The argument advanced by the learned APP for the State is that Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act leads to the presumption of the guilt of the appellant. Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:

“113B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.”

22. The presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can be drawn only where the ingredients of Section 304B IPC are fulfilled. The prosecution has failed to establish the necessary ingredient of dowry death i.e. cruelty or harassment meted out to the deceased by the appellant what to say soon before her death. As mentioned above, the prosecution has failed to prove the chain of necessary ingredients to raise the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.

23. From no stretch of imagination, the evidence led by the prosecution in the present case could culminate into conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B read with 34 IPC.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before P.S. Teji, J.)

Ramesh Chander  v.  State of Delhi 

Crl. A. No. 526/2002

Decided on December 21, 2016

Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6473

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Whether cruelty as per S 498A of IPC can be inferred if wife commits suicide?

Considering   evidence   of   material   witnesses   namely   PW­1
Ashish and PW­4 Dr. Yadavrao on the point of cruelty provided by accused
to  deceased  Vandana  and on  demand of  dowry, we  do not  find their
evidence to be sufficient to attract provisions of Sections 498­A and 304­B
of the Indian Penal Code.  As in the evidence of neither of these witnesses,

there are specific allegations of cruelty as required under the law to be
established by the prosecution.  The existence of cruelty cannot be proved
merely because suicide has been committed or deceased died of unnatural
death.     Undoubtedly   to   a   large   extent,   the   concept   of   cruelty   will   be
subjective, but no claim of cruelty can be made  within objective basis.
Thus, merely because victim has taken a drastic step of ending her life, it
cannot be presumed that the treatment that was being given to her was
cruel, so as to attract punishment provided for, in Section 498­A of the
Indian Penal Code.   Explanation to Section 498­A of Indian Penal Code
makes it clear that cruelty means “any willful conduct, which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman”.  The words “willful conduct” and “likely to” used in explanation
clause (a) are significant.   The words “likely to” used in the said clause
show that clause (a) of explanation to Section 498­A of the Indian Penal
Code requires a willful conduct to be of such a nature as would likely to
drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health.   The extent of cruel treatment needs to be objectively
assessed in order to see whether a reasonable or average person would
likely  to be driven  to  commit suicide  or cause grave  injury  to her on
account of treatment.  
Had
the allegations of demand of dowry and harassment to Vandana were
established thereby making an offence under Section 498­A of the Indian
Penal Code, the things would have been different.  However, in the absence
of such evidence and since we do not find dowry demand and harassment
to Vandana to be established, provisions of Section 304­B of Indian Penal
Code cannot put into play so as to attract presumption as to dowry death.
It is necessary to show that soon before the death, deceased had been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for or in connection
with, any demand for dowry.  When this essential ingredient has not been
established in the present case, the question of drawing any presumption
by invoking aforesaid provisions does not arise at all. 
Even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment is not sufficient to
bring in application of Section 304­B of the Indian Penal Code.  It has to be
shown in addition that such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection
with the demand for dowry.   Since the prosecution failed to prove that
aspect, the conviction as recorded cannot be maintained.  

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.08 OF 2005
 Dnyaneshwar @ Nana Kashinath Jumade V State of Maharashtra,

  CORAM  : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI AND
   P.N. DESHMUKH, JJ.

Dated :     AUGUST 19th, 2015.
Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)4783

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