Showing posts with label second wife. Show all posts
Showing posts with label second wife. Show all posts

Sunday, 1 June 2025

Should the Second Wife Be Impleaded in Domestic Violence Cases? A Legal Analysis

 The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has been a crucial legislation in safeguarding women's rights. However, questions often arise regarding the scope of parties who can be impleaded in proceedings under this Act, particularly when allegations involve a second marriage. This article examines the legal position on whether a second wife should be made a party to domestic violence proceedings initiated by the first wife.

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Thursday, 23 May 2024

Under which circumstances Motor accident tribunal can give compensation to second wife of deceased?

 The second marriage is not legally recognised by law. However, in this case, with the consent of the respondent No. 1-first wife, the deceased married the respondent No. 2-second wife and they were living under the same roof and, therefore, though the respondent No. 2-second wife is not entitled to any amount towards loss of consortium, she is entitled to a sum of Rs. 50,000 as she only gave birth to the respondent Nos. 3 to 6. If at all there was any grievance against the second marriage, it is only the respondent No. 1-first wife alone to object the same. In this case, as stated above, the respondent No. 1-first wife has not objected to it and in fact, the claim petition has been filed making them as claimants as the respondent Nos. 1 and 2-claimant Nos. 1 and 2. Therefore, the respondent No. 2-second wife is entitled to a sum of Rs. 50,000 for loss of love and affection. Merely because she was married as a second wife, she should not be condemned for 'no fault of her'. In this case, as explained supra, she only gave birth to the respondent Nos. 3 to 6-claimant Nos. 3 to 6 as the respondent No. 1-first wife did not have any issue. It is not only the respondent No. 1-the first wife, but the respondent No. 2-second wife should be undergoing psychological, emotional and physical suffering and sorrows, which cannot be estimated in terms of money.

{Para 17}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

CMA (MD) Nos. 987 and 988 of 2014

Decided On: 13.02.2017

Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Indirani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Kirubakaran, J.

Citation: 2018 ACJ 110 (Mad), MANU/TN/4588/2017.

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Friday, 17 April 2020

Whether the second wife can prove the first marriage of husband by producing a photocopy of his passport before Family court?

The burden of proof to establish that there subsisted a marriage, is on the appellant. The appellant not being the holder of the document, she could only have produced photocopies of the passports. The rigor of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not to be applied in a proceeding before the Family Court in view of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. In the judgment in Sithara v. Harikrishnan Nair [MANU/KE/1677/2011 : 2011 (4) KLT 492], a Division Bench of this Court held that when a wife filed petition for declaration of marriage as null and void and produces a photocopy of prior marriage certificate, propriety required that Family Court declare the marriage null and void based on undisputed averments in the affidavit. Under Section 14, the Family Court may receive as evidence any document, information or matter that may in its opinion assist it to deal with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the present case, the appellant has discharged her burden of proof by filing affidavit in proof and producing photocopies of the passports of the respondent.

12. The respondent has not cared to appear in the Family Court proceedings and to controvert the evidence adduced by the appellant. Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 requires Family Courts to follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 subject to the other provisions of the Act. Order VIII Rule 10 of CPC provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same, the court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. The counsel for the appellant relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Arti Jaiswal v. Pawan Chaudhary and others [MANU/BH/1208/2016 : AIR 2016 Pat. 200] wherein it was held that in a proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage on ground of subsistence of earlier marriage, when evidence on record by way of affidavit and pleadings remain unchallenged, subsistence of earlier marriage can be presumed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Mat. Appeal No. 1132 of 2017

Decided On: 20.08.2019

 Namitha S. Nair  Vs.  V. Ravikanth

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.T. Ravi Kumar and N. Nagaresh, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2020 Kerala 19
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Wednesday, 30 October 2019

Supreme Court: It is mandatory to hear second wife in appeal filed by first wife if husband has performed second marriage after divorce decree

 The Appellant herein is the second wife of Respondent No. 1 (husband). It is the case of the Appellant that after passing of the ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage of Respondent No. 1 with Respondent No. 2 and expiry of period of limitation for filing appeal, Respondent No. 1(husband) entered into matrimony with her (appellant). On the other hand, Respondent No. 2 (first wife of Respondent No. 1) filed the aforesaid appeal of which the Appellant had no knowledge, but the fact of Respondent No. 1 having married the Appellant was indeed stated before the High Court. However, when Respondent No. 1 stated that she was having no problem with the appellant, the High Court set aside the ex parte decree passed on 23.08.2003 in C.S. No. 09-A of 2002 and directed that, the parties shall live together as husband and wife. The Appellant herein (second wife of Respondent No. 1), on coming to know of the aforesaid order dated 09.08.2011 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court in M.A. No. 709/2005, filed review petition (R.P. No. 48 of 2014) before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, by order dated 17.10.2014, dismissed the said review petition. Challenging both the orders, the Appellant has filed the present appeals by way of special leave in this Court.

10. The need to remand the case has occasioned because we find that the Appellant was not made a party to the appeal and nor she was heard by the High Court.

11. On perusal of the impugned order dated 09.08.2011, we find that the High Court, even after taking note of the factum of the marriage of the Appellant with Respondent No. 1, has not adverted to the consequences thereof and has given such directions, which may not be capable of due performance.

12. In such a situation, where the impugned order was passed without hearing the Appellant and not issuing any notice of the appeal to her and yet giving such directions, which may not be capable of being carried out, the impugned order, in our view, is wholly without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable and it has to be set aside on this short ground alone.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 4847-4848 of 2019 

Decided On: 09.05.2019

 Karuna Kansal Vs. Hemant Kansal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Abhay Manohar Sapre and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

Citation: (2019) 6 SCC 581
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Sunday, 29 September 2019

Bombay High court(FB) : Second wife not entitled to get pension

 The matter is placed before this Full Bench upon the directions of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The reference was made by the Division Bench of this Court referring the following issue to the full bench, "In cases to which, Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, apply whether the second wife is entitled to claim family pension?"

Kamalbai and Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (31.01.2019 - BOMHC) : MANU/MH/0776/2019 The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in a case of Chanda Hinglas Bharti Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) and Ramabai Gulabrao Jamnik Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) so also the view of the learned Single in a case of Indubai Jaydeo Pawar and another Vs. Draupada @ Draupadi Jaydeo Pawar and others (supra) appears to be correct view. 

 The Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in a case of Raj Kumari and another Vs. Krishna and others reported in MANU/SC/0397/2015 : (2015) 14 SCC 511 has also observed that normally pension is given to the legally wedded wife of a deceased employee. Same view is taken by the Apex Court in a case of Rameshwari Devi Vs. State of Bihar (supra) and it is held that the second wife is not entitled for family pension.

26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the reference as under:

"In cases to which Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 apply, the family pension can be claimed by a widow, who was legally wedded wife of the deceased employee. Second wife, if not a legally wedded wife would not be entitled for family pension and if the second wife is legally wedded wife, then should be entitled for the family pension."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition Nos. 9933, 11256 and 12308 of 2016

Decided On: 31.01.2019

 Kamalbai  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.V. Gangapurwala, R.V. Ghuge and S.M. Gavhane, JJ.
Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 921



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Saturday, 31 August 2019

Whether second wife is entitled to get family pension?

That from the aforesaid discussion, I hold and conclude:

(i) marriages covered by Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act are void i.e. void from inception and have to be ignored as not existing in law at all when such a question arises.

(ii) a woman performing the marriage with a Hindu Government servant during the lifetime of his wife cannot be said to be his "widow".

(iii) definition of "Family" under sub-rule 16 of Rule 116 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 includes only wife and a judicially separated wife with a rider that judicial separation is not granted on the ground of adultery.

(iv) expression "Family pension is payable to more widows than one" in terms of sub-rule (6) clause (a) of Rule 116 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 cannot be read in isolation but has to be read and understood in context of definition of "Family" defined under Rule 116(16) (b) of the Maharashtra civil Services Pension Rules, 1982, in as much as, pension is payable to the "Family of deceased",

(emphasis supplied).

Thus, taking into consideration the provisions of the scheme of "Family pension" under Rule 116 and the definition of "Family", I hold that a Hindu woman who marries a Hindu man during the subsistence of his first marriage is excluded from the scheme of Rule 116 of the Maharashtra Civil Services Pension Rules and thus not entitled to the family pension. I therefore answer Question no. 1 in negative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 463 of 2014 and Civil Application No. 1067 of 2014

Decided On: 28.02.2019

 Kamal Mahaling Patil Vs.  Indubai Mahaling Patil and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sandeep K. Shinde, J.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 594
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Saturday, 27 January 2018

Whether children born out of physical relationship between man and woman will get benefit of deeming legitimacy?

I rely on the decision in Revanasiddappa & anr. v. Mallikarjun & Ors. (supra), where it is held that "however one thing must be made clear that benefit given under the amended section 16 is available only in cases where there is a marriage may such marriage is void or voidable in view of the provisions of the act". In converse, if there is no marriage may be void or voidable, then, this benefit of 'deeming legitimacy' is not available for the children, who are begotten out of any physical relationship of a man and a woman. Thus, the meaning of marriage and the benefit of legitimacy as contemplated under section 16 is not wide but is restricted to and controlled by the word 'marriage'. Any physical relationship between a man and a woman is not contemplated as a marriage under section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Review Petition No. 19 of 2016 in First Appeal No. 577 of 2015

Decided On: 07.06.2017

Indubai Jaydeo Pawar and Ors. Vs. Draupada and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mridula Bhatkar, J.
Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 816
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Wednesday, 24 May 2017

Whether complaint for offence of bigamy can be filed by second wife?

Having noticed the agony, trauma etc. which would be suffered by the woman with whom second marriage is performed, if the marriage is declared to be void, let us make an attempt to ascertain the purpose of enacting Section 494 IPC. This Section introduces monogamy which is essentially voluntary union of life of one man with one woman to the exclusion of all others. It enacts that neither party must have a spouse living at the time of marriage. Polygamy was practiced in many sections of Hindu society in ancient times. It is not a matter of long past that in India, hyper gamy brought forth wholesale polygamy and along with it misery, plight and ignominy to woman having no parallel in the world. In post vedic India a King could take and generally used to have more than one wife. Section 4, of Hindu Marriage Act nullifies and supersedes such practice all over India among the Hindus. Section 494 is intended to achieve laudable object of monogamy. This object can be achieved only by expanding the meaning of the phrase "aggrieved person". For variety of reasons the first wife may not choose to file complaint against her husband e.g. when she is assured of re-union by her husband, when husband assures to snap the tie of second marriage etc. Non-filing of the complaint under Section 494 IPC by first wife does not mean that the offence is wiped out and monogamy sought to be achieved by means of Section 494 IPC merely remains in statute book. Having regard to the scope, purpose, context and object of enacting Section 494 IPC and also the prevailing practices in the society sought to be curbed by Section 494 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the complainant should be an aggrieved person. Section 198(1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, amongst other things, provides that where the person aggrieved by an offence under Section 494 or Section 495 IPC is the wife, complaint on her behalf may also be filed by her father, mother, sister, son, daughter etc. or with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption. In Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0109/1979 : (1979) 2 SCC 170 this Court has ruled that in order to attract the provisions of Section 494 IPC both the marriages of the accused must be valid in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by the personal law governing the parties must have been duly performed. Though Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that any marriage solemnized, if it contravenes the conditions specified in Clause (i) of Section 5 of the said Act, shall be null and void, it also provides that such marriage may on a petition presented by either party thereto, be so declared. Though the law specifically does not cast obligation on either party to seek declaration of nullity of marriage and it may be open to the parties even without recourse to the Court to treat the marriage as a nullity, such a course is neither prudent nor intended and a declaration in terms of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act will have to be asked for, for the purpose of precaution and/or record. Therefore, until the declaration contemplated by Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act is made by a competent Court, the woman with whom second marriage is solemnized continues to be the wife within the meaning of Section 494 IPC and would be entitled to maintain a complaint against her husband.
Even otherwise, as explained earlier, she suffers several legal wrongs and/or legal injuries when second marriage is treated as a nullity by the husband arbitrarily, without recourse to the Court or where declaration sought is granted by a competent Court. The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant. Section 494 does not restrict right of filing complaint to the first wife and there is no reason to read the said Section in a restricted manner as is suggested by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Section 494 does not say that the complaint for commission of offence under the said section can be filed only by wife living and not by the woman with whom subsequent marriage takes place during the life time of the wife living and which marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such wife. The complaint can also be filed by the person with whom second marriage takes place which is void by reason of its taking place during the life of first wife.
A bare reading of the complaint together with statutory provisions makes it abundantly clear that the Appellant having a wife living, married with the Respondent No. 2 herein by concealing from her the fact of former marriage and therefore her complaint against the Appellant for commission of offence punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC is, maintainable and cannot be quashed on this ground.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 1428 of 2011.
Decided On: 21.07.2011
 A. Subash Babu

Vs.
 State of A.P. and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.M. Panchal and H.L. Gokhale, JJ.


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Monday, 17 April 2017

When second wife is not entitled to get family pension?

 In Sirazun Nessa (supra), a short but an important
question of law involved in the Writ Appeal was whether the
second wife of a Mohammedan employee was entitled to any
share in the family pension of her late husband. The issue being
answered in the negative by the learned Single Judge, the
petitioner had challenged the judgment and order in the Writ
Petition. In the brief facts, the appellant had married Tapadar
during the subsistence of his marriage with the respondent no.8.
He had eight children through the first wife and three through the
second wife. The appellant started living separately from her
husband since 1985 due to matrimonial discord and sought
maintenance and ultimately the case culminated in a compromise
when he agreed to pay maintenance to her as well their children.
It was pleaded in the petition that after the retirement from the
service he had submitted an application before the concerned
Department requesting the inclusion of her name as a nominee to
receive 50% pensionary benefits after his death.
22] In Smt. Sirazun Nessa (supra), he retired from the
service on 31.12.2003 and died on 1.10.2006 and thereafter the
appellant and the respondent no.8 had staked their claim for the
retiral benefits. It was contended on her behalf that as the
deceased was a Mohammedan by faith, he was permitted under
his Personal Law to marry the appellant even during the
subsistence of his marriage with the first wife and therefore she
was legally entitled to inherit the proportionate family pension.
Their Lordships considered Rule 143 (iii) vis-a-vis Rule 26(i) of
the Conduct Rules and found that under Rule 143 (i) there was no
indication of entitlement of the family pension by more than one
wife and in the Note appended to the Rule 143(ii) definitely
pointed out the consideration of the claim for the family pension
by two or more widows. At the same time, the Rule had not ruled
out taking into the consideration the valid marriage of two or
more wives by a Mohammedan employee. Their Lordships also
found that though the Conduct Rules had put certain preconditions
for contracting a second marriage, they did not totally
prohibit a second marriage provided it was permitted under the
personal law and custom of the concerned Government employee
and the only rider was to obtain permission from the19
Government. In the ultimate it was held that the petitioner was
entitled to a proportionate family pension. The judgment in Smt.
Sirazun Nessa (supra), is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as
unlike the petitioner therein, the petitioner in our case is
governed under the Family Laws applicable in the State where
there is a bar to the second marriage during the subsistence of
the first marriage. Hence, considering the law on the point vis-avis
the Pension Rules and the Family Laws applicable to the State,
the petitioner alone is entitled to the pension and accordingly she
is held entitled to a direction to quash and set aside the decision
of the respondent-authorities holding the respondent no.4 entitled
to a half share in the family pension. It goes without saying that
the petitioner alone is entitled to a writ to the respondents to pay
the petitioner each month the entire amount of the family
pension that is due and payable upon the demise of her late
husband.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA.
 WRIT PETITION NO. 767/2014

Mrs.Banu Shaikh V The State of Goa,

CORAM : F.M.REIS & NUTAN D.SARDESSAI, JJ

PRONOUNCED ON :24/08/2016
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR875
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Saturday, 11 March 2017

Whether minor children from second marriage are entitled to get family pension?

Now, when first order was cancelled by the State Government and second passed depriving Yogmaya Devi and her children of any right in the pensionary benefits of Narain Lal, she filed writ petition in the High Court, which as noted above, was allowed by the learned single Judge and later appeal filed by Rameshwari Devi against that was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court which is impugned. Learned single Judge referred to Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Article 1955 holding that even though the marriage of Narain Lal with Yogmaya Devi was void (heir children would be legitimate and thus would be entitled to claim share in the family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity of Narain Lal but only till they attained majority. Learned single Judge accordingly issued direction to the State Government, to issue fresh sanction order for payment of arrears of family pension and death cum-retirement gratuity to the minor children born from the wedlock between Yogmaya Devi and Narain Lal till they attain majority but nothing would be payable to Yogmaya Devi.
It cannot be disputed that the marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi was in contravention of Clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act and was a void marriage. Under Section 16 of this Act, children of void marriage are legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolve firstly on heirs in Clause (1) which include widow and son. Among the widow and son, they all get shares (see Sections 8, 10 and the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956). Yogmaya Devi cannot be described a widow of Narain Lal, her marriage with Narain Lal being void. Sons of the marriage between Narain Lal and Yogmaya Devi being the legitimate sons of Narain Lal would be entitled to the property of Narain Lal in equal shares along with that of Rameshwari Devi and the son born from the marriage of Rameshwari Devi with Narain Lal. That is, however, legal position when Hindu male dies intestate. Here, however, we are concerned with the family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity payments which is governed by the relevant rules, It is not disputed before us that if the legal position as aforesaid is correct, there is no error with the directions issued by the learned single Judge in the judgment which is upheld by the Division Bench in LPA by the impugned judgment.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. No. 605 of 2000 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 17636 of 1998)
Decided On: 27.01.2000
 Rameshwari Devi Vs. State of Bihar and others


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
D.P. Wadhwa and S.N. Phukan, JJ.

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Thursday, 2 March 2017

Whether second wife can claim family pension after death of husband?

The reasoning given by the Division Bench is consistent with the
other   provisions   of   law   as   mentioned   above   wherein   the   second
marriage   is   held   void.     The   Indian   legal   system   has   adopted
monogamy   as   a   legal   structure   of     the   marriage   institution   and,
therefore, occasional fractures of second marriage in subsistence of
first marriage are held void in law.   The second woman cannot be
given a status of  a legally wedded wife and, as rightly observed by
the Division bench, she is not a widow in true and legal sense.   A
wrong may exist in the Society on a large scale, however it cannot be
justified as a righteous custom because of its magnitude.  In order to

buttress this point, it will not be out of place to give example of give
and take of dowry which throws light on the wide gap between the
legality and the reality.  To take lenient view towards the wrong doers
is contrary to law laid down by the legislature.  Thus, gap should not
be widened by the decision of the Court but it is to be bridged. It is
mandatory for the Court to interpret a law which gives true effect to
the legislative intent.   The Division Bench in the case of  Chanda
Hinglas   Bharati  has   referred   to   the   relevant   provisions   under
different acts regarding the consequences of second marriage and the
status of second woman.  
38. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that a
second wife was deceived by deceased husband and she begotten a
daughter from the deceased and therefore, it is necessary for the
Court to take a gender protectionist view and grant her pension. This
argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is one sided and
may appear convincing superficially, but it does not stand to reason
after close scrutiny.   The Courts have empathy for a woman who is
deceived by a man, however, she may take recourse under the other
enactments for redressal.  So far as husband is a Government servant

and matter is covered under the rules, then the Court cannot take
other view than permissible in law. The Division Bench in the case of
Chanda Hinglas Bharati has made a reference to similar argument
and has rightly observed that “showing sympathy to a woman like the
petitioner would result in depriving a legitimate wife of her right to
receive full family pension.  This is the gender positive view towards
the legally wedded wife.  The case of second wife may be unfortunate
but I am of the view that Court cannot pass verdict in her favour.
While doing justice, injustice should not be caused to a person having
a rightful claim. 
39. Thus, I fully rely on the ratio laid down in the case of Chanda
Hinglas Bharati and hold that marriage contracted with second lady
in subsistence of first marriage or spouse is living, then second lady
from   the   Hindu/Christians   cannot   claim   as   a   widow   entitled   to
pension   subject   to   personal   law   or   as   stated   in   Rule   26   of
Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO.577 OF 2015
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1770 OF 2015

Draupada @ Draupadi Jaydeo Pawar  vs.  Indubai d/o. Kashinath Shivram Chavan

CORAM : MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.

 Dated  : 10th FEBRUARY, 2016
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR197
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Friday, 3 February 2017

When second wife is not entitled to get service on compassionate ground?

Since inception the contention of the appellant had been that her marriage with Sh. Hari Ram on 2nd June, 1990 was performed by way of execution of a marriage deed and an affidavit. It is not disputed by her that late Sh. Hari Ram had a living spouse Smt. Phoolmati Devi on 02nd June, 1990 and she expired on 11th May, 1994.
14. Under Hindu Law, marriage is a sacrament and not a contract which can be entered into by execution of a marriage deed. On 02nd June, 1990 Sh. Hari Ram was having a living spouse.
15. For the first time while filing Civil Suit No. 364/2013, just to improve her case, the appellant claimed to have got married to Sh. Hari Ram as per Hindu rites and ceremonies on 2nd June, 1994 at Delhi and again on 10th December, 1994 at the village of Sh. Hari Ram after the death of his first wife Smt. Phoowati Devi. When she applied for succession certificate or sought appointment on compassionate ground, she did not plead that marriage ceremonies were performed twice in the year 1994 i.e. on 2nd June, 1994 at Delhi and on 10th December, 1994 at the village of Sh. Hari Ram. Even in the year 2002 while filing Civil Writ petition No. 8360/2002 no such claim was made.
19. The Courts below have rightly held that the appellant/plaintiff cannot claim the status of a legally wedded wife of Sh. Hari Ram on the strength of alleged marriage dated 02nd June, 1990. The solemnisation of marriage thereafter on 02ndJune, 1994 at Delhi and on 10th December, 1994 at the village of Sh. Hari Ram was also not proved by leading satisfactory evidence to this effect. Even the certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat and submitted to M.S., Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital contained the date of marriage to be 02nd June, 1990 with no reference to remarriage on 02nd June, 1994 or 10th December, 1994.
In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Before Pratibha Rani, J.)
Champa Devi 
v.
Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
RSA 403/2015
Decided on January 17, 2017
Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6562
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Thursday, 15 September 2016

When children from second wife should not be granted succession certificate?

Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants, forcefully submitted that both the appellants being the sons of late Kumar Sahu through his second wife, are entitled to be declared as legal heirs and successors of deceased Kumar Sahu. In alternative it was submitted that even if the second marriage is declared void, their status is that of illegitimate sons and they are entitled to share in the property left behind by the deceased Kumar Sahu. The learned counsel for the appellants to substantiate his arguments relied on Ext. A, the legal heir certificate, issued by the Tahasildar and Ext. B, Admit Card, issued by Bihar Vidyalaya Parikshya Samiti. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the statements made by P.W. 1.
6. On perusal of the deposition of P.W. 1 I find that she has categorically stated in her examination-in-chief that she was the only legally married wife of Kumar Sahu. In view of the aforesaid statement, her statements in cross-examination that "I do not know the second wife of late Kumar Sahu. The Opp. parties are born through Kumar Sahu from the side of his second wife. I cannot say if Binod Sahu and Jitendra Sahu are his sons." Cannot be accepted to be an admission and rightly the trial Court did not accept the said statement. Ext. A is the legal heir certificate granted by the Tahasildar which was issued after issuance of the certificate in favour of the petitioners vide Ext. 2. By way of clarification, the Tahasildar by his letter No. 1702 dated 16.4.1999 informed that the legal heir certificate issued in Misc. Case No. 3947/98 was correct. Admittedly, in the said Misc. case Ext. 2 was issued.
It appears, the Opp. parties have not come up with clean hands in as much as they have not filed any objection or written statement. They have neither disclosed the name of their mother nor disclosed her whereabouts, which throws a cloud of suspicion. The evidence adduced by them is also very shaky.

 I feel the ends of justice and equity would be better served if this Appeal is dismissed giving liberty to the appellants who claim to be the sons of late Kumar Sahu to establish their rights in properly constituted Civil Suit.

Orissa High Court

Binod Sahu And Anr. vs Smt. Chandrama Sahu And Ors. on 3 May, 2002

Equivalent citations: AIR 2003 Ori 11, 2002 II OLR 62

Bench: A Naidu
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Saturday, 30 July 2016

Whether second wife is entitled to get pension with consent of first wife?

 For the reasons and law stated, hereinabove, the second wife cannot claim pension on the consent of the first wife, even if the second wife is eligible under the Rules to receive family pension, as long as, the first wife is alive or does not remarry.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 57990 of 2014
Decided On: 26.02.2015
Ram Mohini Devi Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Suneet Kumar, J.
Citation: 2015 LAB I C2395 ALL
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Whether nomination for retiral benefits made by husband in favour of second wife is valid?

The Supreme Court in Bakulabai and another v. Gangaram and another, 1988 (25) ACC 119, held that the marriage of a Hindu woman with a Hindu male with a living spouse performed after the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is null and void and the woman is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
The Apex Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi and another Versus Smt. Usha Devi, AIR 1984 SC 346, held that a mere nomination made in an insurance policy does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.
This Court in Shakuntala Devi (Smt.) Versus Executive Engineer, Electricity Transmission Ist U.P. Electricity Board, Allahabad and another, [(2001) 1 U.P.L.B.E.C. 8691], while dealing with two wifes wherein the nomination was in favour of the second wife it was held that it cannot defeat the claim of the legally wedded wife, only legally wedded wife is entitled to retiral benefits and provident fund and appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules.
Similarly, view was expressed in Poonam Devi (Smt.) Versus Chief Engineer, Electricity Board and others, [(2004) 3 U.P.L.B.E.C 2292].
In G.L. Bhatia v. Union of India and another, 2000(1) ESC 135 (SC), the Supreme Court held that if a nomination is made contrary to statutory provision, it would be inoperative. In the facts of that case, the husband of the deceased employee claimed family pension while nomination was not in his favour. The authorities rejected the claim of the husband for the reason that he was staying separately from the wife and thus was not entitled to family pension. The Apex Court held that the husband was entitled to family pension, where the rights of the authorities are governed by statutory provisions, the individual nomination contrary to the statute will not operate.
Allahabad High Court
Manno Singh vs State Of U.P. & Others on 11 September, 2014
Bench: Suneet Kumar
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 23388 of 2012
Citation:I(2015)DMC 654 ALL
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Whether nomination for pension in favour of second wife is valid?

 In fact, Bimla Devi respondent, the second wife, legally has no status and cannot claim any share in the estate of deceased Nanak Chand as her marriage is void ab initio in view of Sections 5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
As Smt. Bimla Devi is not the legally wedded wife of deceased Nanak Chand, therefore, there could not be a valid nomination in her favour for the payment of the pension. Please see : Rampyari Bai v. Municipal Corporation and Anr. Even otherwise also the nominee is the trustee for the rightful claimants. Further on examination of the facts on record, we have found that the facts in this case are almost akin to the facts, in Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 431 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that during the subsistence of first marriage, the children born out of second marriage are legitimate as per the provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, though the second marriage itself is void. However, the minor children of the second marriage are entitled to the family pension but not the second widow. While upholding the decision of the Division Bench of Patna High Court which had upheld the view of the Single Judge that first wife and minor children from the second wife, would share the family pension of the deceased to the extent of 50:50. Therefore, taking assistance from the above legal position, settled by the Supreme Court, we hold Premi Devi entitled for 50% of the pensionary benefits and the children from the second wife Smt. Bimla Devi, namely, Santosh and Rajesh Kumar to the extent of 50%.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Decided On: 18.12.2006
Appellants: Smt. Premi Devi
Vs.
Respondent: Director of Directorate General Boarder and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Deepak Gupta and S.S. Thakur, JJ.
Citation:2008(1) CIVILLJ419
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Whether second wife is entitled to inherit pension of her husband?

 Normally, pension is given to the legally wedded wife of a deceased employee. By no stretch of imagination one can say that the plaintiff, Smt. Krishna was the legally wedded wife of late Shri Atam Parkash, especially when he had a wife, who was alive when he married to another woman in Arya Samaj temple, as submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court should not have modified the findings arrived at and the decree passed by the trial court in relation to the pensionery benefits. The pensionery benefits shall be given by the employer of late Shri Atam Parkash to the present appellants in accordance with the rules and regulations governing service conditions of late Shri Atam Prakash.
Supreme Court of India
Raj Kumari & Anr vs Krishna & Ors on 26 February, 2015

Bench: Anil R. Dave, R.K. Agrawal, R. Banumathi
NON-REPORTABLE
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1811 OF 2007

Citation: AIR 2015 SC 2697
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Whether second wife can be treated as legally wedded wife if second marriage was performed with consent of first wife?

In so far as submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that petitioner no.1 solemnized marriage with the said deceased after such writing was received from the first wife giving her no objection in favour of the said deceased in getting married again and petitioner no.1 would be one of the legal heirs of the said deceased is concerned, in my view, this issue is concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 15th March, 2013 in case ofNagendrappaNatikar (supra) when Supreme Court considered similar consent letter addressed by the first wife of the deceased. After considering such writing, Supreme Court held that under section 25 of the Contract Act, any agreement which is opposed to public policy is not enforceable in a court of law and such an agreement is void, since the object is unlawful. In my view, only a competent court can grant decree of divorce and no divorce can be granted to a party governed by Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act, based on such consent letter. In my view divorce can not be granted by parties by such writing unless decree is passed by competent court annulling such marriage. In my view, marriage of the first petitioner with the said deceased is thus void and petitioner no.1 therefore cannot be considered as a legal heir of the said deceased. Petitioner nos.2 and 3 being daughters born out of such wedlock would be entitled to share in the property of the said deceased. Mother of the said deceased is also one of the legal heir of the said deceased and would be one of the legal heir and would be entitled to share in the property of the said deceased.

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Vandana Bhimrao Jadhav and Others Vs. Sagar Bhimrao Jadhav

Citation;2014(2) MHLJ 274 Bom
Court : Mumbai
Judge : R.D. DHANUKA
Decided On : Oct-22-2013
Case Number : Misc. Petition No. 110 of 2011 In Misc. Petition No. 91 of 2009

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Saturday, 11 June 2016

Whether bringing second wife amounts to cruelty on first wife within meaning of S 498A of IPC?

There is one more allegation which, according to prosecution,
is quite serious and which, if proved, would require consideration from
this Court for evaluating its impact on the conduct of the complainant.
This allegation is about bringing a second wife to his house by respondent
No.1.   I must say it here that it is not every type of misconduct that has
been made punishable under section 498­A of I.P.C.   Cruelty has been
defined in section 498­A to mean any willful conduct of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger   to   life,   limb   or   physical   or   mental   health   of   the   woman   or
harassment of the woman made with a view to coercing her or any person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security.  So, it is clear that only those acts committed willfully and which
are in the nature of degrading treatment which qualify to be termed as
cruelty in law.   In other words, cruelty is a conduct designed to produce
definite result in relation to physical or mental condition of a woman.   In
order that the conduct is called willful, it must have been such as could be
said to be indulged in by the accused with an intention to cause or with
the   knowledge   that   it   is   likely   to   cause   degrading   or   humiliating   or
injurious effect on the mind or conduct of the woman.  It involves acts the
result of which causes hurt and often­times agony to the opposite party, be
it mental or physical, which in turn has further damaging consequences,
the most serious of which is an ultimate suicide, as held in the case of

Madhuri Mukund Chitnis  v.  Mukund Martand Chitnis, 1992 CRI.L.J.
111.    Thus, the condemned act called cruelty must be accompanied by
mens rea.   Having said so, it has to be seen whether the allegation that
the accused No.1 had brought one stranger lady to his house at Pune and
announced not only to the complainant but also to her father and uncle
that the stranger was his second wife was reasonably established or not.
Even if this allegation is proved, the matter would not end there, as it
cannot be presumed in every case that such conduct of husband would
create such an adverse  impact on the mind of the wife as is sufficient to
drive her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself and hence a
willful   conduct.     There   are   instances   where   a   second   wife   has   been
accepted by first wife willingly or unwillingly but surely without losing
balance of mind by causing any injury to herself.   So all depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case.    The evidence as regards the said
allegation,   therefore,   needs   to  be  assessed   in   the   light   of   the   law   so
discussed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  571  OF 2001

State of Maharashtra. V/s.  Sanjiv Bhimrao Kamble.

CORAM : S.B. SHUKRE, J.
DATED  : 28th October 2015.
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)2058
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Saturday, 13 February 2016

Whether second wife in bigamous marriage can claim pension in case of death of her husband?

 It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that a
second wife was deceived by deceased husband and she begotten a
daughter from the deceased and therefore, it is necessary for the
Court to take a gender protectionist view and grant her pension. This
argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is one sided and
may appear convincing superficially, but it does not stand to reason
after close scrutiny.   The Courts have empathy for a woman who is
deceived by a man, however, she may take recourse under the other
enactments for redressal.  So far as husband is a Government servant

and matter is covered under the rules, then the Curt cannot take
other view than permissible in law. The Division Bench in the case of
Chanda Hinglas Bharati has made a reference to similar argument
and has rightly observed that “showing sympathy to a woman like the
petitioner would result in depriving a legitimate wife of her right to
receive full family pension.  This is the gender positive view towards
the legally wedded wife.  The case of second wife may be unfortunate
but I am of the view that Court cannot pass verdict in her favour.
While doing justice, injustice should not be caused to a person having
a rightful claim. 
 Thus, I fully rely on the ratio laid down in the case of Chanda
Hinglas Bharati and hold that marriage contracted with second lady
in subsistence of first marriage or spouse is living, then second lady
from   the   Hindu/Christians   cannot   claim   as   a   widow   entitled   to
pension   subject   to   personal   law   or   as   stated   in   Rule   26   of
Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO.577 OF 2015
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1770 OF 2015
Draupada @ Draupadi Jaydeo Pawar
and Others ...  Appellants
vs.
Indubai d/o. Kashinath Shivram Chavan
and Another ...  Respondents

CORAM : MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.

 PRONOUNCED ON  : 10th FEBRUARY, 2016

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