Important Judgments and articles on rights of woman

 

1) When Justice Takes Pause: The Shifting Landscape of Bail for Women, the Pregnant, and the Infirm Under India’s Criminal Laws

Part 2: Pregnant Women and Nursing Mothers—When Two Lives Are One

The Invisible Category

Neither Section 437 of the CrPC nor Section 480 of the BNSS explicitly mentions pregnant women or nursing mothers. Yet pregnancy may fall under two categories: “woman” and “sick or infirm.” This ambiguity has forced courts to venture beyond the statutory text and into constitutional territory.

The judicial approach has been transformative. Courts now treat pregnancy as a “super-category”—a condition that engages the rights of two distinct entities: the mother and the unborn child. Both are constitutionally protected; neither is justiciable as a criminal actor.

https://www.lawweb.in/2025/12/when-justice-takes-pause-shifting.html

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From Possession to Precedent: Unraveling Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act

 The landscape of Hindu women’s inheritance rights has witnessed seismic judicial shifts in the past two years. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956—once hailed as a watershed for converting limited estates into absolute ownership—now stands at the crossroads of conflicting interpretations. Recent Supreme Court and Bombay High Court pronouncements have both expanded and constrained its ambit, compelling the apex Court to refer the matter to a larger bench for definitive resolution.

Introduction

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The Crucible of Confusion: Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and the Supreme Court's Clarion Call for Legal Certainty

 The Current Legal Landscape: Where Courts Stand Today

As of October 2024, the legal position regarding Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 remains in a state of interpretative flux following the Supreme Court's landmark order dated December 9, 2024, in Tej Bhan (D) Through LRs v. Ram Kishan (D) Through LRs. This judicial acknowledgment has profound implications for how courts across India must navigate the conflicting precedents while awaiting the larger bench's definitive pronouncement.

The Binding Nature of Tulasamma: Not Overruled but Under Review

Is Tulasamma Still Valid Law?

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Supreme Court Refers To Larger Bench Conflicting Opinions On Female Hindu's Rights Under S.14 of Hindu Succession Act

 We have noticed that while following Tulsamma, the subsequent decisions in Thota Sesharathamma, Masilamani Mudaliar and Shakuntala Devi (supra) have made passing observations about the discordant note in the case of Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha (supra) but they have not been clearly and categorically overruled. Perhaps this is the reason why the subsequent decisions consistently followed the idea in Karmi and enunciated different principles in the subsequent decisions of Gumpha, Sadhu Singh (supra) and that perspective continued on its own strength. {Para 23}

24. We heard the present appeal in detail and have also taken a view in the matter, but having realised that there are a large number of decisions which are not only inconsistent with one another on principle but have tried to negotiate a contrary view by distinguishing them on facts or by simply ignoring the binding decision, we are of the view that there must be clarity and certainty in the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act.

25. In view of the above, we direct the Registry to place our order along with the appeal paper book before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022

Decided On: 09.12.2024

Tej Bhan (D) through L.R. and Ors. Vs. Ram Kishan (D) through L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Citation: 2024 INSC 945,MANU/SC/1301/2024

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Bombay HC: Unmarried daughters, widows or destitute daughters have absolute right of residence in the immovable property of joint family as per S 14 of Hindu Succession Act

 Thus, the legal principles applicable to the facts of the present case, on the daughter's rights under the Hindu law in the father's property can be summarised as follows:

(a) The uncodified Hindu law provided that a Hindu father is bound to maintain his unmarried daughters, and on the death of the father, they are entitled to be maintained out of his estate and if the married daughter is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband, or, after his death, from his family, her father, if he has got separate property of his own, is under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain her. A moral obligation, even though not enforceable under the law, would, by acknowledgement, bring it to the level of a legal obligation, for it would be perfectly legitimate for the father to treat himself obliged out of love and affection to maintain his destitute daughter. This obligation would also apply to the heirs of the father who inherited the father's property.

(b) Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 has improved the right of a Hindu woman, which was acquired before or after the 1956 Act.

(c) In view of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as the full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

(d) The words "any property" in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act would include both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, and also in lieu of maintenance.

(e) After the 1956 Act, in the property of a male Hindu dying intestate, the daughter classified as a Class I heir has a share.

(f) Under Section 23 of the 1956 Act, a female heir had no right to claim partition in a dwelling house till the male heirs chose to divide the respective shares, but it gave the right of residence to a female heir in the dwelling house. Section 23 is omitted with effect from 9th September 2005. {Para 17}

18. Thus, it is a well-established legal principle that, pre-1956, unmarried daughters, widows or destitute daughters were entitled to be maintained by their father and reside in the father's property. Hence, in the present case, the right of the defendants to residence prior to 1956 would become an absolute right after the Act of 1956 came into force. So far as defendant nos. 1 and 3 are concerned, even if it is held that they came to reside in the suit property after Rama's death, they would be entitled to the right to residence in view of the moral obligation to be maintained by the heirs of the father who inherited the property.

19. Thus, irrespective of whether Rama died before or after 1956, the appellants, being daughters of Rama, had a right to his property. Before 1956, Rama or his heirs who inherited his property were bound to maintain the appellants, and on the death of Rama, they were entitled to be maintained out of his estate under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain them. After the 1956 Act, Section 14 has improved their right of maintenance acquired before the 1956 Act, which has culminated in an absolute right. In view of Section 23 of the 1956 Act, the appellants had the right of residence in the dwelling house. If Rama died after 1956, the appellants, being Class I heirs, were entitled to a share in Rama's property. Hence, under any contingency, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek possession from the appellants on the ground that they were gratuitous licensees and she terminated it. Hence, all the questions of law are answered accordingly in favour of the appellants.

20. Considering the well-established legal principles as discussed above, the appellants' right of residence needs to be protected. Thus, in view of the well-settled legal position as discussed in the above paragraphs, the impugned decrees would not be sustainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 296 of 1993

Decided On: 13.08.2025

Anusaya Baburao Kale and Ors. Vs. Babai Laxman Chorge

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Gauri Godse, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:35026, MANU/MH/5038/2025.

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Under which circumstances life interest in property given to wife will not convert into ownership rights as per S 14 of Hindu Succession Act?

In our view the relevant aspect of the aforesaid conclusion is para 4 which opines where Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere.{Para 30}

31. We may add here that the objective of Section 14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. If we were to hold so it would imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be the objective, in our view.

32. The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. We are, thus, of the view that it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life interest in her favour. The natural sequitur is that the Respondents cannot inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale deeds in favour of the Respondents cannot be sustained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1543-1544 of 2019

Decided On: 01.02.2022

Jogi Ram Vs. Suresh Kumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0119/2022.

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Whether widow will acquire ownership right over property in her possession recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance?

 It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which belonged to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It was only in the Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that the objections raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour of Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved by her in the said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which could be drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956. {Para 19}

20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that such property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. The word "possessed by" and "acquired" used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.

21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019

Decided On: 18.05.2022

Munni Devi (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Rajendra (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0665/2022.

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Whether hindu woman can claim right in immovable property U/S 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act if she was not in possession of that property?

 Section 14 subSection (1) had no application in this case. The essential ingredient of Section 14 sub Section(1) is possession over the property. Admittedly the plaintiff was never in possession of the property. The possession was always that of the defendant and therefore Section 14 subSection (1) would not be applicable. In Ram Vishal (dead) by lrs. and Ors. v.Jagan Nath & Another. reported in (2004) 9 SCC 302 the position of possession being a prerequisite to sustain a claim under subsection (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act was confirmed in Para 16 which is quoted below:

 ‘16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case [(1998)

6 SCC 314] can be of no assistance to the respondent.

As has been held by this Court, a preexisting right is a sine

qua non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of

the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be

possessed of the property but she must have acquired the

property. Such acquisition must be either by way of

inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or by

her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription…’

[Emphasis Supplied]

5. As per the law as it existed at their relevant time the

property which was an agricultural property would devolve

upon the male child and daughters would get only a

limited right to maintenance till, they were married and the

widow would be entitled to maintenance from the income

from the property till her death or remarriage. As per the

family Settlement Deed dated 12.03.1938 which was relied

upon by both the parties, the property in dispute was

specifically allotted to Sami Vaidyar and his only son

Sukumaran. Therefore, the widow of Sami Vaidyar i.e.,

Choyichi will not have any right over the property. The

findings of all the courts below were that Choyichi was

never in possession of the property and therefore she

would not get the right, as claimed by her under Section

14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

2023INSC774

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.254 OF 2010

M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS Vs A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS.

Dated: AUGUST 28, 2023.

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Notes on Hindu succession Act 1956 as amended in the year 2005

S 3.Definitions:-

a) Agnate :One person is said to agnate of another if two are related by blood or adoption wholly through male.

c) Cognate:One person is said to Cognate of another if two are related by blood or adoption not wholly through male.

d)The expressions custom and usage signify any rule which having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area,tribe,community,group or family:

Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy;and

provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family,it has not been discontinued by the family;

e) 1)Full blood: Same father, Same mother.

        Half blood: Same father,different mother.

2)Uterine blood :Same mother,different father.

f) heir: person entitled to inherit property of deceased.

g) intestate: person died without making will.

S 4. Overriding effect of Act: Any law or custom contrary to this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus.

S 5.Act not to apply to certain properties:-

1)This Act shall not apply to any property succession to which is regulated by Indian succession Act,by reason of S 21 of Special marriage Act.

Read IMP Judgments on HSA: Click here

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When right in property acquired by Hindu female by compromise decree will not enlarge into full right?

It is an admitted position that on 23.12.1932 a compromise decree was passed in a suit filed by predecessors of the defendants against the predecessors of the plaintiffs. In terms of the compromise decree, the sons of Har Narain who were predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs agreed to give limited possessory rights to the predecessor of the defendant, namely, Sheo Lal.

In terms of the compromise, the consent decree was passed holding that "during the lifetime of Sheo Lal, he will not be entitled to sell or mortgage his property in any case", thereby meaning that Sheo Lal merely got restrictive possessory rights in terms of the decree dated 23.12.1932 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Hissar.

Further, it categorically provided that the suit property was to revert to the predecessors of the plaintiffs in case the widow predeceased Sheo Lal and in case Sheo Lal predeceases the widow, the widow shall be entitled to use the same during her life time. Thereafter, the suit property will revert to the predecessors of the plaintiff. It is thus clear that Sheo Lal was given a limited right in respect of the suit property. Sheo Lal died in the year 1961. Chimmli, wife of Sheo Lal died in 1976.

12. The suit was filed primarily on the ground that neither Sheo Lal nor his widow had any pre-existing right in the suit land since their rights flow from the compromise decree. After the death of Smt. Chimmli, the plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the land. It is clear that Sheo Lal was granted limited right not in recognition of his pre-existing right. Section 14(1) of the Act does not recognize the pre-existing right of a male Hindu. The suit property never became the self acquired property of Sheo Lal. Even his widow Chimmli did not hold the land in lieu of maintenance which can be enlarged into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The estate was conferred on Chimmli by virtue of the decree which created a new right. There were no pre-existing rights of either Sheo Lal or his widow Chimmli. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Smt. Chimmli would not have acquired a better right than Sheo Lal in the suit property. The rights of Sheo Lal as well as Smt. Chimmli flow from the consent decree.

13. In Tulasamma (supra), this Court has held that Hindu women's right to maintenance is the personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is the duty to maintain her even if he has no property. The right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. It was further held that the claim for the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu family is legally a substitute of a share which she would have got in the property of her husband.

14. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in the hands of Chimmli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of maintenance. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Sheo Lal did not possess any property. He had only life interest in the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male. Smt. Chimmli could not have acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute. Right of Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chimmli, flows from the decree. Therefore, her right would not mature into full-fledged ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). She has acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time. Therefore, Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Basanti Devi (D) by LRS. & Ors Vs. Rati Ram & Ors.

[Civil Appeal No.7919 of 2011]

S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.

DATED: 8 MAY 2018
Citation: (2018) 16 SCC 608

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Leading Supreme Court judgment on distinction between S 14(1) and S 14(2) of Hindu succession Act relating to property rights of woman

 In the case of V. Tulasamma(supra), the learned Judge, Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, speaking for the Bench, succinctly and in a lucid manner while analyzing the true scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act held as under:

Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that 'property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act. The language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the Act and promote the socio-economic ends, namely, to enlarge her limited interest to absolute ownership in consonance with the changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation.

Section 14(2) provides that nothing contained in Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate in such property. It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

Section 14(2) applies only to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing rights. In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in that sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognizes a pre-existing right such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, Section 14(2) has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at a partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

The use of terms like 'property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance', or 'arrears of maintenance' etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes Sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of Sub-section (2).

The words 'restricted estate' in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.

40. Similarly, while explaining the ratio of V. Tulasamma (supra) and how one has to read the ratio for being applied to the facts of a particular case, this Court in the case of Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike and Ors., MANU/SC/8475/2006 : (2006) 8 SCC 75 again succinctly discussed the applicability of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act and on facts involved therein held that the facts involved would attract Section 14(2) of the Act. Justice Balasubramanyan speaking for two Judge Bench held in paras 13 and 14 and 15 as under:

13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 21784 of 2017 

Decided On: 12.12.2017

Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna and Ors.

Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 1

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Whether Hindu widow will become absolute owner of property from which she has right to receive maintenance?

 After hearing the learned counsel on either side, the

following question is formulated for decision in the second

appeal :


                 "Whether the right of Kalikutty for maintenance

                 out of the proceeds of the suit property    has

                 become an absolute right in her favour by virtue

                 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act?"

        4. The right of maintenance of a Hindu widow is not a

right to property, but only a right against the property [See

Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi

(AIR 1977 SC 1944)]. In Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal (AIR 1985

Delhi 95), the Delhi High Court         held that the provisions

contained in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would

apply to property possessed by a Hindu female and to which

she had some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her

interest may be. It was clarified by the Delhi High Court in the

said case that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act will not

have any application to a case where a widow had no rights

whatsoever in the properties except a right of maintenance out

of the proceeds of the property. Later, in Ram Vishal v. Jagan

Nath [(2004)9 SCC 302], the Apex Court reiterated the

aforesaid propositions holding that to come within the scope of


the said Section of the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu female

must not only be possessed of the property but she must have

acquired the property either by way of inheritance or devise, or

at a partition or "in lieu of maintenance or arrears of

maintenance" or by gift or her own skill or exertion or by

purchase or by prescription and a mere right of maintenance

without acquisition of some right in the property is not sufficient

to attract the said Section. Paragraph 16 of the said judgment

of the Apex Court reads thus :



          "16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case3 can be of

          no assistance to the respondent. As has been held by this Court, a

          pre-existing right is a sine qua non for conferment of a full

          ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The

          Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she

          must have acquired the property. Such acquisition must be either

          by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or "in lieu of

          maintenance or arrears of maintenance" or by gift or by her own

          skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription. In the present

          matter, it is nobody's case that Manki had got possession of the

          1/4th share in lieu of maintenance or in arrears of maintenance. It

          was also not their case that there was a partition of the property

          and that in such partition, she had been given the property. A


          mere right of maintenance without actual acquisition in any

          manner is not sufficient to attract Section 14."



As far as the present case is concerned, the plaintiff has no

case that Kalikutty had acquired any right in the property by

way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or "in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance" or by gift or her own

skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription. As such, it

cannot be held that Kalikutty had limited interest in the

property within the meaning of Section 14 of the Hindu

Succession Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                                    PRESENT:

                   THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR

           THURSDAY, THE 7TH DAYOF JANUARY 2016

                                              SA.No. 357 of 2003
                                       

            VASUDEVAN,
           Vs
           DEVAKAY,
             Citation: AIR 2016 (NOC) 442 Kerala

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Whether Right of wife to claim maintenance from her husband is lost if husband renounce Hinduism?

 Reliance placed by Mr. Goel on V. Tulasamma and others vs. Sehsa Reddy (Dead) by L.Rrs. : [1977] 3 SCR 261 is wholly misplaced. The question which arose for consideration therein was the nature or the right, a widow acquires in the property in which she had been in possession in lieu of maintenance. Interpreting sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act this Court held that the term "possessed" should receive a wide meaning. It is in this context this Court noticed the authorities from Sastric Hindu Law whereupon our attention has been drawn :-

"Similar observations have been made by the learned author at p. 528 of the book which may be extracted thus: 'According to both the schools, the lawfully wedded wife acquires from the moment of her

marriage a right to the property belonging to the husband at the time and also to any popery that may subsequently be acquired by him. so that she becomes a co-owner of the husband, though her right is not co-equal to that of the husband, but a subordinate one. owing to her disability founded on her status of perpetual or life long tutelage or dependence.

...

This right of the wife to maintenance from

her husband is not lost even if the husband

renounce Hinduism.

This right subsists even after the husband's death although her husband's right as distinguished from hers may pass by survivorship or by

succession to sons or even to collaterals; these simply step into the position of her husband, and she is required by Hindu law to live under their guardianship after her husband's death.' "1

Supreme Court of India

Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel vs Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel And ... on 14 March, 2008

Bench: S Sinha, V Sirpurkar

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