Showing posts with label S 14(2) of Hindu succession Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 14(2) of Hindu succession Act. Show all posts

Wednesday, 25 June 2025

What is the difference between section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

 Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is a pivotal provision that transformed women's property rights under Hindu law. The two subsections work together but serve distinct purposes in defining a Hindu woman's ownership rights.

Section 14(1): General Rule of Absolute Ownership

Section 14(1) establishes the fundamental principle that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner". This provision converts what was previously limited ownership into absolute ownership.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Distinction Between Section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act : Antecedent Rights as the Determining Criterion

 The question raised in this appeal has been considered in detail and is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh [  MANU/SC/0514/1987 : 1987:INSC:177 : (1987) 3 SCC 674] wherein it is observed: (SCC p. 679, para 4)


It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership Under Section 14(1) in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of Court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right." {Para 2}


3. After this decision there are number of other decisions taking the same view and it is now settled law that if a female Hindu acquires property under a written instrument or a decree of the Court and where such acquisition is not traceable to any antecedent right then sub-section (2) of Section 14 alone would be attracted and where an antecedent right is traceable, a document in the nature of will is of no consequence and the case will be covered by provisions contained in Section 14 Sub-section (1)..."

There have been no averments suggesting that the maintenance given to Smt. Veerabhadramma was insufficient to warrant interference in line with Punni Devi (supra), which states that it has to be sufficient to grant the lady so awarded maintenance to be able to continue a lifestyle, which she has been used to thus far.


12. The law, as laid down by Gulwant Kaur (supra) and confirmed by Jaswant Kaur (supra), is clear. Property given in lieu of maintenance would solidify into absolute ownership by action of Section 14(1) of HSA, 1956. In other words, the right of maintenance on its own is apposite for such property to transfer into her sole, unquestionable, and absolute right. The partition deed of 1933, it has been held, is clear that 3.55 Cents of land would be enjoyed by Smt. Veerabhadramma as a life interest and thereafter would devolve upon the two lines of succession, i.e., the sons of late Kallakuri Swami through his first wife and also his second wife.


13. In that view of the matter, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5389 of 2012

Decided On: 21.11.2024

Kallakuri Pattabhiramaswamy (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Kallakuri Kamaraju and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

 Citation: 2024 INSC 883, MANU/SC/1231/2024
Print Page

Thursday, 3 February 2022

When limited estate in the immovable property given to the wife in the will of her husband will not become her absolute property?

  In our view the relevant aspect of the aforesaid conclusion is para 4 which opines where sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere. {Para 30}

31. We may add here that the objective of Section 14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. If we were to hold so it would imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be the objective, in our view.

32. The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. We are, thus, of the view that it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life interest in her favour. The natural sequittur is that the respondents cannot inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1543-1544 OF 2019

JOGI RAM  Vs SURESH KUMAR 

Author: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

Dated: February 01, 2022.

Print Page

Saturday, 23 March 2019

Whether wife will get absolute right in property if his husband was having only life interest in said property?

In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in the hands of Chhimli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of maintenance. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Sheo Lal did not possess any property. He had only life interest in the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male. Smt. Chhimli could not have acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute. Right of Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chhimli, flows from the decree. Therefore, her right would not mature into full-fledged ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). She has acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time. Therefore, Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7919 of 2011

Decided On: 08.05.2018

 Basanti Devi (dead)  Vs. Rati Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 16 SCC 608
Print Page

Sunday, 20 May 2018

When right in property acquired by Hindu female by compromise decree will not enlarge into full right?

It is an admitted position that on 23.12.1932 a compromise decree was passed in a suit filed by predecessors of the defendants against the predecessors of the plaintiffs. In terms of the compromise decree, the sons of Har Narain who were predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs agreed to give limited possessory rights to the predecessor of the defendant, namely, Sheo Lal.
In terms of the compromise, the consent decree was passed holding that "during the lifetime of Sheo Lal, he will not be entitled to sell or mortgage his property in any case", thereby meaning that Sheo Lal merely got restrictive possessory rights in terms of the decree dated 23.12.1932 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Hissar.
Further, it categorically provided that the suit property was to revert to the predecessors of the plaintiffs in case the widow predeceased Sheo Lal and in case Sheo Lal predeceases the widow, the widow shall be entitled to use the same during her life time. Thereafter, the suit property will revert to the predecessors of the plaintiff. It is thus clear that Sheo Lal was given a limited right in respect of the suit property. Sheo Lal died in the year 1961. Chimmli, wife of Sheo Lal died in 1976.
12. The suit was filed primarily on the ground that neither Sheo Lal nor his widow had any pre-existing right in the suit land since their rights flow from the compromise decree. After the death of Smt. Chimmli, the plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the land. It is clear that Sheo Lal was granted limited right not in recognition of his pre-existing right. Section 14(1) of the Act does not recognize the pre-existing right of a male Hindu. The suit property never became the self acquired property of Sheo Lal. Even his widow Chimmli did not hold the land in lieu of maintenance which can be enlarged into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The estate was conferred on Chimmli by virtue of the decree which created a new right. There were no pre-existing rights of either Sheo Lal or his widow Chimmli. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Smt. Chimmli would not have acquired a better right than Sheo Lal in the suit property. The rights of Sheo Lal as well as Smt. Chimmli flow from the consent decree.
13. In Tulasamma (supra), this Court has held that Hindu women's right to maintenance is the personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is the duty to maintain her even if he has no property. The right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. It was further held that the claim for the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu family is legally a substitute of a share which she would have got in the property of her husband.
14. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in the hands of Chimmli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of maintenance. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Sheo Lal did not possess any property. He had only life interest in the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male. Smt. Chimmli could not have acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute. Right of Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chimmli, flows from the decree. Therefore, her right would not mature into full-fledged ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). She has acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time. Therefore, Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Basanti Devi (D) by LRS. & Ors Vs. Rati Ram & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No.7919 of 2011]
S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.
DATED: 8 MAY 2018
Citation: (2018) 16 SCC 608
Print Page

Tuesday, 26 December 2017

Whether it is permissible to create life interest in property in favour of Hindu woman?


 An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.

42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case of Plaintiff No. 2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall Under Section 14(1) of the Act but it squarely falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act. In other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case (supra) would apply.

43. A fortiori, Plaintiff No. 2-late Mrs. Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death Under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we say for following factual reasons arising in the case.

44. First, the testator-Mr. Dewan being the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property.

45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could make by virtue of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act.

46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act which remained a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" Under Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.

47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here.

48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however, never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was, therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from her husband.

49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.

50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wife's death would go to testator's nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wife's right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties by Will and such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest Under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest" i.e. "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singh's case (supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 21784 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 32044/2016)

Decided On: 12.12.2017

Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 1
Print Page