Showing posts with label hindu woman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hindu woman. Show all posts

Saturday, 4 October 2025

Supreme court: Hindu Woman Can Claim Full Ownership Of Property Under S.14(1) of Hindu Succession Act Only If She Possesses It

 Seen in the light of the ratio of the above judgments, it is clear that for establishing full ownership on the undivided joint family estate Under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act the Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property and such acquisition must be either by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or "in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance" or by gift or be her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription.{Para 24}


25. Even on going through the pleadings in the Revenue suit for partition filed by Plaintiff Kailash Chand, it is clear that there is not even a whisper in the plaint that Smt. Nandkanwarbai or the Plaintiff Kailash Chand himself were ever in possession of the suit property. As a matter of fact, the suit was filed by pleading that the suit property was a joint Hindu family property and Defendant-Mukat Lal(Appellant herein) had consented to give half share of the suit property to the Plaintiff Kailash Chand on his demand. This assertion was denied by Defendant-Mukat Lal.


26. In this context, when we consider the effect of the earlier civil suit instituted by Smt. Nadkanwarbai(deceased widow), it becomes clear that she was never in possession of the suit property because the civil suit was filed by her claiming the relief of title as well as possession and the same was dismissed. This finding of the civil Court was never challenged. Since, Smt. Nadkanwarbai was never in possession of the suit property, as a necessary corollary the Revenue suit for partition claiming absolute ownership Under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act could not be maintained by her adopted son, Plaintiff Kailash Chand by virtue of inheritance.

Ratio Decidendi:

For establishing full ownership on the undivided joint family estate under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act the Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6460 of 2024.

Decided On: 16.05.2024

Mukatlal Vs. Kailash Chand (D) through L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

 Citation: 2024 INSC 428, MANU/SC/0447/2024.

Print Page

Wednesday, 30 August 2023

Whether hindu woman can claim right in immovable property U/S 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act if she was not in possession of that property?

 Section 14 subSection (1) had no application in this case. The essential ingredient of Section 14 sub Section(1) is possession over the property. Admittedly the plaintiff was never in possession of the property. The possession was always that of the defendant and therefore Section 14 subSection (1) would not be applicable. In Ram Vishal (dead) by lrs. and Ors. v.Jagan Nath & Another. reported in (2004) 9 SCC 302 the position of possession being a prerequisite to sustain a claim under subsection (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act was confirmed in Para 16 which is quoted below:

 ‘16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case [(1998)

6 SCC 314] can be of no assistance to the respondent.

As has been held by this Court, a preexisting right is a sine

qua non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of

the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be

possessed of the property but she must have acquired the

property. Such acquisition must be either by way of

inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or by

her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription…’

[Emphasis Supplied]

5. As per the law as it existed at their relevant time the

property which was an agricultural property would devolve

upon the male child and daughters would get only a

limited right to maintenance till, they were married and the

widow would be entitled to maintenance from the income

from the property till her death or remarriage. As per the

family Settlement Deed dated 12.03.1938 which was relied

upon by both the parties, the property in dispute was

specifically allotted to Sami Vaidyar and his only son

Sukumaran. Therefore, the widow of Sami Vaidyar i.e.,

Choyichi will not have any right over the property. The

findings of all the courts below were that Choyichi was

never in possession of the property and therefore she

would not get the right, as claimed by her under Section

14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

2023INSC774

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.254 OF 2010

M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS Vs A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS.

Dated: AUGUST 28, 2023.

Print Page

Sunday, 20 May 2018

When right in property acquired by Hindu female by compromise decree will not enlarge into full right?

It is an admitted position that on 23.12.1932 a compromise decree was passed in a suit filed by predecessors of the defendants against the predecessors of the plaintiffs. In terms of the compromise decree, the sons of Har Narain who were predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs agreed to give limited possessory rights to the predecessor of the defendant, namely, Sheo Lal.
In terms of the compromise, the consent decree was passed holding that "during the lifetime of Sheo Lal, he will not be entitled to sell or mortgage his property in any case", thereby meaning that Sheo Lal merely got restrictive possessory rights in terms of the decree dated 23.12.1932 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Hissar.
Further, it categorically provided that the suit property was to revert to the predecessors of the plaintiffs in case the widow predeceased Sheo Lal and in case Sheo Lal predeceases the widow, the widow shall be entitled to use the same during her life time. Thereafter, the suit property will revert to the predecessors of the plaintiff. It is thus clear that Sheo Lal was given a limited right in respect of the suit property. Sheo Lal died in the year 1961. Chimmli, wife of Sheo Lal died in 1976.
12. The suit was filed primarily on the ground that neither Sheo Lal nor his widow had any pre-existing right in the suit land since their rights flow from the compromise decree. After the death of Smt. Chimmli, the plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the land. It is clear that Sheo Lal was granted limited right not in recognition of his pre-existing right. Section 14(1) of the Act does not recognize the pre-existing right of a male Hindu. The suit property never became the self acquired property of Sheo Lal. Even his widow Chimmli did not hold the land in lieu of maintenance which can be enlarged into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The estate was conferred on Chimmli by virtue of the decree which created a new right. There were no pre-existing rights of either Sheo Lal or his widow Chimmli. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Smt. Chimmli would not have acquired a better right than Sheo Lal in the suit property. The rights of Sheo Lal as well as Smt. Chimmli flow from the consent decree.
13. In Tulasamma (supra), this Court has held that Hindu women's right to maintenance is the personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is the duty to maintain her even if he has no property. The right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. It was further held that the claim for the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu family is legally a substitute of a share which she would have got in the property of her husband.
14. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in the hands of Chimmli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of maintenance. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Sheo Lal did not possess any property. He had only life interest in the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male. Smt. Chimmli could not have acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute. Right of Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chimmli, flows from the decree. Therefore, her right would not mature into full-fledged ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). She has acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time. Therefore, Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Basanti Devi (D) by LRS. & Ors Vs. Rati Ram & Ors.
[Civil Appeal No.7919 of 2011]
S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.
DATED: 8 MAY 2018
Citation: (2018) 16 SCC 608
Print Page

Tuesday, 26 December 2017

Leading Supreme Court judgment on distinction between S 14(1) and S 14(2) of Hindu succession Act relating to property rights of woman

 In the case of V. Tulasamma(supra), the learned Judge, Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, speaking for the Bench, succinctly and in a lucid manner while analyzing the true scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act held as under:

Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that 'property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act. The language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the Act and promote the socio-economic ends, namely, to enlarge her limited interest to absolute ownership in consonance with the changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation.

Section 14(2) provides that nothing contained in Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate in such property. It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

Section 14(2) applies only to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing rights. In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in that sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognizes a pre-existing right such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, Section 14(2) has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at a partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

The use of terms like 'property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance', or 'arrears of maintenance' etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes Sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of Sub-section (2).

The words 'restricted estate' in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.

40. Similarly, while explaining the ratio of V. Tulasamma (supra) and how one has to read the ratio for being applied to the facts of a particular case, this Court in the case of Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike and Ors., MANU/SC/8475/2006 : (2006) 8 SCC 75 again succinctly discussed the applicability of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act and on facts involved therein held that the facts involved would attract Section 14(2) of the Act. Justice Balasubramanyan speaking for two Judge Bench held in paras 13 and 14 and 15 as under:

13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 21784 of 2017 

Decided On: 12.12.2017

Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna and Ors.

Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 1
Print Page

Whether it is permissible to create life interest in property in favour of Hindu woman?


 An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.

42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case of Plaintiff No. 2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall Under Section 14(1) of the Act but it squarely falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act. In other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case (supra) would apply.

43. A fortiori, Plaintiff No. 2-late Mrs. Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death Under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we say for following factual reasons arising in the case.

44. First, the testator-Mr. Dewan being the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property.

45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could make by virtue of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act.

46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act which remained a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" Under Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.

47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here.

48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however, never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was, therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from her husband.

49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.

50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wife's death would go to testator's nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wife's right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties by Will and such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest Under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest" i.e. "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singh's case (supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 21784 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 32044/2016)

Decided On: 12.12.2017

Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 1
Print Page

Sunday, 12 November 2017

When suit for possession by heir of deceased hindu woman having absolute right in property will not be barred by limitation?

It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that Anandibai became entitled to possession of the property on the death of Shakuntalabai in the year 1962. The name of Chimasaheb, original defendant, was mutated and possession of Chimasaheb became adverse w.e.f. the date of death of Shakuntalabai in the year 1962. Thus the suit preferred by the plaintiffs in the year 1979 beyond a period of 12 years, was hopelessly barred by limitation. We are unable to accept the submission as Explanation (b) toArticle 65 of the Act is applicable only in the case where property is not claimed through the female but independently of woman who has died. The word “entitled” contained in Explanation (b) to Article 65 clearly means a person is entitled independently of the right of the Hindu or Mohammedan female. In case she is absolute owner Article 65(b) will have no application. In other words, it is necessary to trace the right to someone else and not to the Hindu or Mohammedan female, as the case may be. In the instant case, Shakuntalabai, daughter of Shankara Rao became absolute owner of the property on 6.2.1958 and on her death on 1.10.1962, the right accrued to Anandibai on the basis of inheritance made from Shakuntalabai who was the owner of the ½ share in question. When the property is claimed from a woman, Hindu or Mohammedan, who was the full owner, it could not be said that Anandibai or the plaintiffs became entitled to the property independently of the rights of female i.e. Shakuntalabai. Thus the suit filed by such heir of female for separate possession/partition would not be governed by Explanation (b) to Article 65. In such a case limitation would not commence as per Explanation (b) toArticle 65 on death of female Hindu. However, the starting point of limitation for computation of 12 years would be the date of start of adverse possession otherwise.
9. In Hashmat Begam & Anr. v. Mazhar Husain & Ors. (1888) ILR 10 All. 343, a Division Bench has opined that the word “entitled” has to be understood in Explanation (b) to Article 65 as meaning “entitled independently of the right of the Hindu or Muhammadan female”. Similar view has been taken in Ghisa Singh & Anr. v. Gajraj Singh AIR 1916 Oudh 50, Mohammad Yaqub v. Bijai Lal AIR 1918 Oudh 32, and Zarif un-nisa & Ors. v. Chaudhri Shafiq-uz-zaman & Ors. AIR 1923 Oudh 185. Explanation (b) to Article 65 is not applicable to a heir of Hindu or Mohammedan female who is full owner of the property as it could not be said that the person became entitled to the property independently of the right of the female but derives right through her. Hence, the suit by such a heir could not be said to be governed by Explanation (b) to Article 65 as held in Hashmat Begam & Anr. (supra), Ghisa Singh (supra), Mohammad Yaqub (supra), Zarif un-nisa & Ors. (supra); and Malkarjun Mahadev Belure v. Amrita Tukaram Dambare & Ors. AIR 1918 Bom. 142 on consideration of provisions of Article 141 of the Limitation Act.

13. In the instant case possession never became adverse to the plaintiffs. There is concurrent finding recorded that the plaintiffs were in joint possession of the disputed land on the date of filing of the suit. The defendants have taken the plea of ouster and the suit has been filed beyond 12 years of death of Shakuntalabai but they have not been able to prove their adverse possession. On the contrary the finding is that Chimasaheb admitted the title of Anandibai. The finding is that till 1976, Chimasaheb never denied the title of Anandibai. Be that as it may. As adverse possession has not been concurrently found by the three courts and in this case the starting point of limitation would not be the date of death of Shakuntalabai in the year 1962 as she was full owner, as such suit could not be said to be barred by limitation.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Bapusaheb Chimasaheb ... vs Mahesh Vijaysinha Rajebhosale & ... on 25 April, 2017

Bench: Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer
Citation:(2017)7 SCC 769
Print Page

Saturday, 28 January 2017

Whether wife will acquire absolute right over property which was given to her in lieu of maintenance?

 Hence, applying the above principles enunciated, to answer the substantial question of law framed in this appeal, it could be safely said that the suit property was given to appellant No. 1 under Exhibit D. 5 in lieu of maintenance and there could be no restriction on the appellants' right over the property and it definitely did not require any registered conveyance in order that she could claim an absolute right over the property on such property being given in lieu of her maintenance.
11. Incidentally, in Tulasamma's case, the instrument, under which the property had been conferred on Tulasamma was circumscribed by certain conditions. The question whether those conditions restricted the right of the Tulasamma was covered under sub-section (2) of Section 14 was answered in the negative and the Court read down the conditions imposed and the property was treated as her absolute property. In the present case on hand, there are not even any such restrictions imposed and it was acted upon, in the mutation entries being effected on an application made by the plaintiff himself and therefore he was estopped from contending otherwise to defeat the right which is absolutely protected under Section 14 of the HS Act.
Consequently, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellants and both the Courts below were wrong in their conclusions that the sale deed in favour of appellant No. 2 was null and void as it was on the basis of the opinion formed that appellant No. 1 did not have absolute right over the property. The substantial question of law stands answered in the vein aforesaid.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (KALABURAGI BENCH)
Regular Second Appeal No. 562/2005
Decided On: 19.07.2016

 Anusuya and Ors. Vs.  Mallayya

Coram:Anand Byrareddy, J.
Citation:AIR 2016 karnataka, 201
Print Page

Saturday, 24 November 2012

Whether wife will become owner of properties acquired by her in lieu of maintenance?


Section 14(2) applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc., which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm. endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely de- clares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as to a claim to maintenance .or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no appli- cation and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub- s. (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any re- strictions placed on the powers of the transferee. 

Supreme Court of India
V. Tulasamma & Ors vs V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) By L. Rs on 17 March, 1977
Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 1944, 1977 SCR (3) 261
Print Page