Big Relief for Widows in Maharashtra: Court Fees Slashed - Reduction in maximum court fees from Rs. 75,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-

 2. In view of the requisition raised by the Testamentary Registrar, Ms. Chavan, Learned AGP, on instructions, submits that the State Government has issued a notification dated 9th August, 2024, which reads thus:

“Maharashtra Court Fees Act.

No. Mudrank-2023/C.R.641/M-1(Policy).- In exercise of the powers conferred by section 46 of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act (XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra, hereby reduces the maximum limit of fees from Rs. 75,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-, payable by widows on probate of a will or letters of administration with or without will annexed, specified in Article 10 of the First Schedule appended to the said Act, to be filed in any Civil Court in respect of obtaining Heirship Certificate from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette.”

3. In light of this, it is her submission that it should apply to all

widows in cases for application for probate, letters of administration, succession certificate and legal heirship certificate irrespectively. With this clarification, nothing further remains.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION

MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 108 OF 2025

Subhadra Anant Kesarkar ...Petitioner

Rukmini Vithoba Khedekar ...Deceased

CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.

DATE : 09 th  APRIL, 2025

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'Highly Objectionable': Supreme Court Criticises Patna HC Remark That Widow Has No Use Of Make-up

 Admittedly, another woman namely, Chando Devi (sister of Ram Chabila Singh) was also residing in the same portion of the

house. The High Court did take note of this fact but explained it

away by observing that since Chando Devi was a widow, the

make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no

need for her to put on make-up being a widow. In our opinion,

the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable

but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this

nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality

expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not

made out from any evidence on record.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1031 OF 2015

VIJAY SINGH@VIJAY KR. SHARMA  Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR 

Author: SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 735,

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Whether widow is entitled to get compensation under workman compensation Act if she remarries?

 Section 2(d) of the Employees' (Workmen's) Compensation Act, 1923 (for short referred to as the Act)defines "dependents". The provision reads as under: {Para 11}

2(d). 'Dependant' means any of the following relatives of a deceased employees namely; (i) a widow, a minor legitimate or adopted son, an unmarried legitimate or adopted daughter, or a widowed mother; and

12. A plain reading of the above definition makes it clear that as on the date of death; wife of the deceased who becomes a widow is treated as a dependant and is made eligible to receive compensation. The Act does not make a distinction between a person who remains widow or who re-marries again.

14. Similar question has fallen for consideration before the High Court of Rajasthan in case of R.B. Moondra and Company Vs. Bhanwari and Others Contention that widow is debarred from claiming the compensation on account of re-marriage is rejected. Para 19 reads as under:

The last contention that the widow became debarred from claiming compensation on account of her remarriage has also no force because in the Act there is no such provision that after remarriage widow of the deceased would not be regarded as a dependent. Under Section 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a widow remains a dependant, within the meaning of that section so long as she is not remarried. But the definition of the 'dependant' under the Act is not so restricted and the fact that she has remarried will not disentitle her to claim compensation under the Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3122 of 2002

Decided On: 24.04.2013

Mandadi Adilakshmi Vs. Vallabhaneni Siva Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Naveen Rao, J.

Citation: 2014 ACJ 950 (AP), MANU/AP/0562/2013.

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Whether widow will acquire ownership right over property in her possession recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance?

 It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which belonged to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It was only in the Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that the objections raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour of Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved by her in the said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which could be drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956. {Para 19}

20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that such property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. The word "possessed by" and "acquired" used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.

21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019

Decided On: 18.05.2022

Munni Devi (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Rajendra (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0665/2022.

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Whether Parents-in-law can claim for maintenance from their widowed daughter-in-law under Section 125 of CRPC?

This Court has considered the submission and the judgment in the case of Saroj W/o. Govind Mukkawar (supra). In the case of Saroj W/o. Govind Mukkawar (supra), the distinguishing factor was that the widow of the deceased son was appointed by the department, where the deceased was serving, on a compassionate ground, wherein she was required to give an undertaking that she will maintain the members of the family who were dependent on the deceased. In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the job secured by the petitioner is on a compassionate ground. Even by looking at the application, it is clear that deceased husband was working in MSRTC, whereas now the petitioner is appointed in health department of the State Government. Thus it is clear that the appointment is not on a compassionate ground. The submission that the petitioner would succeed the property of deceased need not be considered in the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. The categories of persons entitle to claim maintenance are already mentioned in Clause (a) to (d) of Sub-Section 1 of Section 125. This Court has already held in Criminal Revision Application No. 139/2017 that maintenance under the said section can be claimed only by the persons falling in the category mentioned in the Section. {Para 8}

9. Thus considering this legal position and the facts of the case it is clear that the respondents are not entitled to receive maintenance from the petitioner on the counts firstly that they are not coming under the relation mentioned in Section 125. Secondly the appointment of the petitioner was not on a compassionate ground in place of her husband. Thirdly on the count that the respondent no. 2 has also received an amount of Rs. 1,88,000/- after the death of deceased son. The fact that the couple have a land and have their own house, is also not disputed. So even on facts this Court finds that no case is made out by the respondents to claim maintenance from the petitioner. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the continuance of the proceeding of Criminal M.A. No. 25/2019 pending in the Court of Learned Nyayadhikari Gram Nyayalaya, Jalkot, Dist. Latur would be an abuse of process law and therefore the same is quashed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1092 of 2022

Decided On: 12.04.2023

Shobha Vs. Kishanrao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kishore C. Sant, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1469/2023.

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Is a Child Adopted By Widow After the Death Of a Government Employee Entitled To Family Pension?

It is necessary that the scope of the benefit of family pension be restricted only to sons or daughters legally adopted by the government servant, during his/her lifetime. The definition of 'family' is narrowly worded under the CCS (Pension) Rules, in the specific context of the entitlement to 'family pension' and in relation to the government servant. Therefore, the word "adoption" in Rule 54(14)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, in the context of grant of family pension, must be restricted to an adoption made by a government servant during his/her lifetime and must not be extended to a case of adoption made by a surviving spouse of the government servant after his/her death. This is because the object of the provision is to lend succour to a son till he attains the age of twenty-five years and unmarried or widowed or divorced daughter; similarly to the adopted son or unmarried adopted daughter when such an adoption had been made by the government servant during his/her lifetime.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 386 of 2023 

Ram Shridhar Chimurkar Vs.  Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Decided On: 17.01.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0041/2023

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Whether widow is entitled to get relief against her In-laws under the domestic violence Act?

 (iii) That is why, the expression 'domestic relationship' has been defined in an expansive manner to mean a relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household when they are related by marriage. We have also interpreted the word 'live' or 'lived' in the context of right to reside in Sub-section (1) of Section 17. The right to live in the shared household, even when the domestic relationship may have been severed for instance when a woman has been widowed owing to the death of her husband, entitles her to have remedies under the D.V. Act.

(c) Even in the case of relationship in the nature of marriage, during which period the woman suffered domestic violence and is thus an aggrieved person can seek remedies subsequent to the cessation of the relationship, the only pre-condition is that the allegation of domestic violence must relate to the period of the subsistence of relationship in the nature of marriage.

In our view, the question raised about a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed must be interpreted in a broad and expansive way, so as to encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in presentia but also a past domestic relationship. Therefore, the Parliament has intentionally used the expression 'domestic relationship' to mean a relationship between two persons who not only live together in the shared household but also between two persons who 'have at any point of time lived together' in a shared household.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs.  Kamlesh Devi

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Supreme court: Hindu Widow is absolute owner of property owned by her husband which is in her possession

Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife and that right in the case of a widow is "a pre-existing right", which existed under the Shastric Hindu law long before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely recognised the position as was existing under the Shastric Hindu law and gave it a "statutory" backing. Where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she has a right to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance. {Para 24}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019

Decided On: 18.05.2022 

 Munni Devi (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Rajendra (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0665/2022

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Whether Child Adopted By A Widow is Entitled To Inherit Her Deceased Husband's Property?

 There is decision of this Court on the subject and the said issue is covered by the decision in case of Banabai and others Vs. Wasudeo, reported in AIR 1979 Bom. 881 (At Nagpur). When there is direct Judgment of this Court, it needs to be followed in the said decision. In para No. 18, it is held as under :-

18. Thus it would be seen that the adoption takes effect only

from the date of adoption and not prior to the adoption. Under

the former law the adoption had the effect of relating the

adoption back to the date of death of the father. The adopted

son was deemed to be in existence at the time when the father

died. That fiction of relation back as a result of the adoption has

been done away with by S. 12. Further the provisions also limit

the rights of the provisions also limit the rights of the adopted

son in the new family and proviso (c) which is material and

which deals with the rights in the property as well the right of

management to which Mr Kherdekar wants me to extend the

principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court is that “the

adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which

vested in him or her before the adoption.” In other words,

though the adopted son from the date of adoption becomes a

member of the adoptive family and acquires all the rights and

status which that person would acquire in the adopting family

with regard to the property, his right was controlled and is

subject to his incapacity to divest any person of an estate

which has already vested in him. Though, therefore, an

adopted son may have rights in future in the property which the

family may acquire after his adoption, with regard to the

property which has vested in any particular person before his

adoption, the adoption does not vest in him any rights with

regard to that property. The plain terms of S. 12 and in

particular proviso (c) clearly make it quite clear that the

adopted son, short of acquiring the right of management and

right to the property of his adoptive parents acquires all the

other rights and status of a natural born son in the family.

26. In case of Banabai (supra), the principle of relation back as a

result of the adoption has been done away with by section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Under the old Hindu law the adoption had the effect of relating the adoption back to the date of death of the father. The adopted son was deemed to be in existence at the time when the father died. That fiction of relation back as a result of adoption is no more available in view of Section 12 of said Act. Having regard to this

legal position, I am unable to accept the argument advanced by Mr Pakashsing Patil, learned counsel for the appellants. After coming into force of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the child adopted by the widow of the co-parcener, does not get the status of the child of deceased co-parcener from the date of death of co-parcener. As such, adopted son/original defendant No.1 cannot claim share in the suit property, by stepping into the shoes of his late father who died long before in the year 1965. Therefore, I have recorded my finding against question No.1 in the negative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO. 515 OF 2021

 Rajesh S/o. Panditrao Pawar,  Vs Parwatibai W/o. Bhimrao Bende

CORAM : SHRIKANT D. KULKARNI, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 07.04.2022

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Whether Hindu widow can inherit husband's property if she has not remarried on the day succession opens?

 It is very well true that if we have to deal with rights of a

particular party, we have to consider the provisions of relevant law in

its entirety. Section 14 of the Act of 1956 makes the female Hindu

being absolute owner if she possessed the property. Whereas Section 24 of the said Act disinherits the widow if she re-marries. Here this Court wants to note the difference in between the wordings of Section 2 of the Act of 1856 on one hand and the wordings of Section 24 of the Act of 1956. There is emphasis ‘on the date when succession opens’ as per Section 24 of the Act of 1956. The status of the widow being remarried continuing to be widow must be on the date when succession opens. The wordings “if on the date the succession opens” does not find place in Section 2 of the Act of 1856. So, we have to respect the intention of the legislators while incorporating these provisions in

Section 24 of the Act of 1956. {Para 14}

15] In other words, if the widow has not re-married when the

succession opens, the disqualification under Section 24 of the Act of

1956 will not be applicable. Admittedly, defendant-Sunanda re-married

in May, 1991 (i.e. after opening of succession on 19th April, 1991). For

the above discussion, contention of the appellant so as to disqualify the

defendant-Sunanda cannot be accepted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

SECOND APPEAL NO.144 OF 2007

Smt. Jaiwantabai Shenuji Wankhade Vs  Sunanda w/o Ganesh Dode,

CORAM : S.M. MODAK, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 23 rd AUGUST, 2021

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Whether widow can become the absolute owner of property inherited from her husband even if she is not in actual possession of it?

On a careful perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that under Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, to get attracted, the property must be possessed by the female Hindu on coming into force of the Act of 1956. The object of this provision is firstly, to remove the disability of a female to acquire and hold property as an absolute owner and secondly, to convert any estate already held by woman on the date of commencement of the Act as a limited owner, into an absolute estate. {Para 17}

19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva and others (1970) 1 SCC 786 while considering the meaning of “any property possessed by a female Hindu” quoted with approval the following words of Justice P.N. Mookherjee in the matter of Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta  AIR 1957 Cal 557 (at page 559):

“The opening words in “property possessed by a female

Hindu” obviously mean that to come within the purview of

the section the property must be in possession of the

female concerned at the date of the commencement of the

Act. They clearly contemplate the female's possession

when the Act came into force. That possession might have

been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised

by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate

in the disputed property is claimed to have been

transformed into absolute estate under this particular

section, was at least in such possession, taking the word

“possession” in its widest connotation, when the Act came

into force, the section would not apply.”

and Their Lordships held :

“In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct

view as to how the words “any property possessed by a

female Hindu” should be interpreted.”

20. In Eramma (supra), the Supreme Court held that the property possessed by a female Hindu as contemplated in the Section is clearly the property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act and negatived a claim under Section 14(1) of the Act in view of the fact that the female Hindu possessed the property on the date of the Act by way of a trespass after she had validly gifted away the property, and further held that the need for possession with a semblance of right as on the date of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act was thus emphasized.

21. In the matter of Dindayal and another v. Rajaram AIR 1970 SC 1019 it was held that before any property can be said to be “possessed” by a Hindu woman as provided in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, two things are necessary (a) she must have a right to the possession of that property, and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively.

22. Thereafter, in the matter of V. Tulasamma and others v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. (1977) 3 SCC 99, their Lordships considered the real nature of incidence of Hindu widow's right of maintenance and scope and ambit of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956 and held as under: -

“The words “possessed by” used by the Legislature in

Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and

include the State of owning a property even though the

owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.

Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a

preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act

had been passed but had not been given actual possession

under a final decree the property would be deemed to be

possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would

get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well

settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be

under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the

section does not contemplate the possession of any rank

trespasser without any right or title.”

23. In the matter of Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others9, the Supreme Court pointed out the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 would come into play and held that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 would come into play. It was further held that if she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Second Appeal No.356 of 2001

Judgment delivered on: 28-6-2021

Loknath Vs  Sindhu, W/o Akhil Kolta,

Coram:

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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Whether the concubine of a government servant can get a family pension if she continues to reside with him after the death of his wife?

 When there is a specific enactment of the Domestic Violence

Act, 2005, Rule 49 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 will take a

backseat, as Domestic Violence Act, 2005, will come to the driver’s seat and

the woman will have to be given protection and the Rule cannot supersede

the Statute mentioned supra. In the light of the Domestic Violence Act,

2005, if the live-in-relationship is established, then the woman attains the

status of a wife. The march of law happens only while considering the cohabitation

that, continues after the death of the first wife.{Para 13}

14. In a similar circumstance, a learned Single Judge of this Court in

the case of C.Sarojini Devi vs. The Director of Local Fund Audits,

Chennai, has held that, the second wife is entitled to payment of family

pension after the death of the first wife. For better appreciation, relevant

portion of the said judgment is extracted below:

“12. Even in the above judgment, the petitioner

therein had married the Government Employee during

the subsistence of the first marriage. The only difference

is that in that case, the first marriage got dissolved in the

year 2003 and the first wife died in the year 2005. This

Court took into consideration the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhannulal's case. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court, in the said case has held that Law

presumes in favour of marriageand against concubinage,

when a man and woman have co-habitated continuously

for a long time. By relying upon this judgment, this

Court held that after the dissolution of marriage with the

first wife and after her death, the petitioner therein was

living with the deceased Government servant till his

death. This was taken into consideration by this Court

and this Court held that the petitioner therein must be

considered to be the wife of the deceased Government

servant atleast after the dissolution of the first marriage

and the subsequent death of the first wife.

13. This Court is in complete agreement with the

proposition of law that has been enunciated in the above

judgment. It is very easy to brand the petitioner as a

concubine and deprive her of her livelihood. However,

the fact remains that the petitioner lived with the

deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy from the year 1975 up to his

death in the year 2009. This means that she lived with

him for nearly 34 years. The petitioner also gave birth to

three children. If the petitioner had made this claim

when the first wife is alive, then obviously the petitioner

will not be entitled for Family Pension, since her

relationship is not recognized by law.

14. The march of law happens only while

considering the co-habitation that continues after the

death of the first wife. That is the most crucial factor that

was taken into consideration by this Court while

granting the Family Pension to the petitioner in the case

cited supra. Even in the present case, the first wife died

on 02.04.1997. Thereafter, the petitioner lived with the

deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy till his death on 20.01.2009.

During this period, it can always be construed that the

petitioner and the deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy were

living as husband and wife and their long co-habitation

itself raises that presumption of marriage. Added to that

the deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy had also nominated the

petitioner on 11.05.1999 to receive the Family Pension

after his death.

15. In the considered view of this Court, this

Court has to necessarily lean towards the presumption of

marriage rather than branding the petitioner as a

concubine. This will be the most appropriate way to deal

with the facts of the present case, if justice has to be

done to the petitioner.

16. In view of the above discussion, this Court

has no hesitation to quash the impugned order passed by

the first respondent on 01.02.2016 and accordingly, the

same is quashed. The first respondent is directed to pass

necessary orders and sanction Family Pension to the

petitioner with effect from the date of death of

Dr.A.Chinnasamy i.e., from 20.01.2009 and disburse the

arrears of pension to the petitioner, within a period of

twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of

this order. The petitioner shall be continued to be paid

with the Family Pension till her life time.”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CORAM :

 MR.JUSTICE S.VAIDYANATHAN

W.P.No.5706 of 2021

Malarkodi @ Malar Vs. The Chief Internal Audit Officer,

Board Office Audit Branch,

DATED : 09.03.2021

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Whether Married Hindu Woman can give property that she has inherited from her husband in Family Settlement to her brothers' children?

Reverting to the facts of the present case,

admittedly, the defendants-respondents were nephews,

i.e., brother’s sons of Smt. Jagno. We need to look

into the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Section 15,

which deals with the general rules of succession in

the case of female Hindus for properties inherited by

female Hindus, which are devolved in according to

Sections 15 and 16. Section 15(1), which is relevant

is as follows:-

“15. General rules of succession in the

case of female Hindus.—(1)The property of

a female Hindu dying intestate shall

devolve according to the rules set out in

section 16,—

(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters

(including the children of any predeceased

son or daughter) and the husband;

(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the

husband;

(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the

father; and

(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.”

27. A perusal of Section 15(1)(d) indicates that

heirs of the father are covered in the heirs, who

could succeed. When heirs of father of a female are

included as person who can possibly succeed, it

cannot be held that they are strangers and not the

members of the family qua the female.

28. In the present case, Smt. Jagno, who as a widow

of Sher Singh, who had died in 1953, had succeeded to

half share in the agricultural land and she was the

absolute owner when she entered into settlement. We,

thus, do not find any merit in the submission of

learned counsel for the appellants that the

defendants-respondents were strangers to the family.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5167 of 2010

KHUSHI RAM Vs NAWAL SINGH 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Dated: February 22, 2021.

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Whether the widow of one brother can claim Benami joint ownership of the property if it is in the name of another brother?

Furthermore, it is essential to observe that the present appellant's claim also does not fall within the exception (iii) to Section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 which reads to the effect as under:-

"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--

(8) "benami property" means any property which is the subject matter of a benami transaction and also includes the proceeds from such property;

(9) "benami transaction" means,--

(A) a transaction or an arrangement--

(a) where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by, another person; and

(b) the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of the person who has provided the consideration,

except when the property is held by--

(i) .

(ii) .

(iii) any person being an individual in the name of his spouse or in the name of any child of such individual and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual;

(iv) .",

as observed by this Court in Deepak Aggarwal & Anr. Vs. Shakuntala Devi (Supra), the benefit of the said provision also can only be considered to be in relation between the individual who has paid for the purchase of any property as consideration in the name of his spouse or in the name of the child of any such individual and can certainly not relate back to any other property or joint property or an HUF property or any trust property in relation to which there is only an averment made on behalf of the appellant in the written statement that the property in question was purchased with the funds of her deceased spouse or her father in law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA

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Whether the court can deny compensation in motor accident claim petition to the widow if she remarries or became self-reliant during the pendency of proceeding?

1) A divorced wife or a widow can also maintain a

petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is a

proposition now beyond doubt. Even if a remarried widow is

not a dependent of the deceased, absence of dependency

will not dis-entitle the widow to become a legal

representative. In the judgment in Manjuri Bera v. Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd. [2007 ACJ 1279], the Apex Court held

that compensation constitutes part of the estate of the

deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the

deceased would inherit the estate. Going by the said

judgment, even employed sons and married daughters can

maintain an application under Section 166 of the Act. The

principle underlying the exposition would equally apply to a

remarried widow.

2)  In Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai

[(1987) 3 SCC 234], the Apex Court held that a legal

representative is one who suffers on account of death of a

person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not

necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. Widow of

a deceased victim, even after remarriage, continues to be

the legal representative of her husband. The right of

succession accrues immediately on the death of the

husband and in the absence of any provision, she cannot be

divested from the property vested in her due to remarriage.

The right of the widow is a statutory right and the remarriage

does not affect that right.{Para 18}

3)  It is to be noted that the 1st appellant would not

have thought of a remarriage, but for the untimely death of

her husband. It was not a remarriage on account of divorce.

The Court has to consider the psychological hurdles that the

widow will face on account of remarriage. The society is

changing. The age old concept of a remarried widow cutting

off all relations with the family of her ex-husband, is

becoming a story of the past. Fact remains that the 1st

respondent was dependent on the deceased and would

have remained so, but for the demise of her husband

consequent to the accident. The death has indeed resulted

in loss of dependency. After the death of husband, a widow

may go for employment and become self-dependent or may

opt for remarriage. Either way, the loss of dependency

consequent to the death of the husband does not cease

merely because she has remarried or became self-reliant.

The word dependency and legal representative, therefore,

should receive a pragmatic interpretation. While computing

compensation for dependency of a widow on the death of

her husband under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988, her remarriage shall not be a decisive factor.{Para 22}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE N.NAGARESH

MACA.No.1936 OF 2008

GLANIS,W/O.LATE ANIL ABRAHAM, Vs  LAZAR MANJILA,S/O. JOY MANJILA,

Dated this the 30th day of June, 2020

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Whether the court can reduce compensation granted to a widow in a motor accident claim petition due to her remarriage?

In my view, merely because widow of the said deceased was remarried within one year from the date of death of the deceased or even within the shorter period, that would not make the widow dis-entitled to make claim for compensation on the ground that the said widow was not dependent on the date of filing claim application. Such widow continues to represent the estate of the said deceased and thus was entitled to make claim for compensation irrespective of change of her marital status after demise of the said deceased. The status of the claimant as dependent has to be considered on the date of death of the said deceased and not on the date of date of making an application for seeking compensation arising out of such death of the husband. The Tribunal thus rightly considered the claim of the respondent no. 1 being widow of the said deceased in view of the death of her husband due to the said accident, along with the claim of the respondent no. 2 being also one of the legal heirs and representative of the said deceased.

27. This Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mona and others (supra) has held that Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a social legislation and the same must be interpreted to further its objective. Remarriage cannot be an impediment in claiming compensation nor can it be a ground to reduce the compensation to which the widow is otherwise entitled to. In my view, the said judgment of this Court squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal (Stamp) No. 28929 of 2014 and Civil Application No. 991 of 2015

Decided On: 20.12.2019

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs.  Sushama Mahendra Sonawane and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka, J.

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6001

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Whether a widow is entitled to get compensation in motor accident claim petition after her remarriage?

1) The Jammu and Kashmir High Court and the Rajasthan High

Court have held that the re-marriage of widow cannot deprive her

of compensation payable for the death of her husband in the

following cases:-

(i) In Seema Malik vs. Union of India, 2005 ACJ 1389, the

Jammu and Kashmir High Court examined the judgments of various

High Courts on this issue and held as under:-

“5. Another issue which is required to be taken

note of is with regard to the rights of a widow to

claim maintenance even if she re-marries. The

because a widow has remarried, is not to be

made a ground for declining her compensation.

In Hariram v. Commissioner for Workmen's

Compensation, 1994 ACJ 1094 (MP), the view

expressed was that the widow on remarriage

cannot be deprived of her right of getting

compensation. In the above case the argument

put across was that as the widow had re-

married, therefore, the entire amount be given

to the father of the deceased. It was held that

this legal proposition cannot be sustained. The

reasoning given was that the inheritance never

remains in abeyance and, therefore, rights of a

widow are to be taken and recognised on the

date when her husband dies. Therefore, she

cannot be deprived of her right of getting

compensation.

2)  I am in respectful agreement with the view of the Jammu &

Kashmir High Court and the Rajasthan High Court and hold that the remarriage/possibility of the remarriage will not deprive a person from compensation for the death of his/her spouse. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision: 3rd February, 2010

MAC.APP. 512-13/2006

D.T.C. Vs MEENA KUMARI 

CORAM :-

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA

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Leading Supreme court Judgment on share of widow in property of her deceased husband

Before considering the implications of Explanation 1, it is necessary to remember that what Section 6 deals with is devolution of the interest which a male Hindu has in a Mitakshare coparcenary property at the time of his death. Since Explanation 1 is intended to be explanatory of the provisions contained in the section, what the Explanation provides has to be correlated to the subject matter which the section itself deals with. In the instant case the plaintiff's suit, based as it is on the provisions of Section 6, is essentially a claim to obtain a share in the interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the coparcenary property. Two things become necessary to determine for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiff. One, her share in her husband's share and two, her husband's own share in the coparcenary property. The proviso to Section 6 contains the formula for fixing the share of the claimant while Explanation 1 contains a formula for deducing the share of the deceased. The plaintiff's share, by the application of the proviso, has to be determined according to the terms of the testamentary instrument, if any, made by the deceased and since there is none in the instant case, by the application of the rules of intestate succession contained in Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act. The deceased Khandappa died leaving behind him two sons, three daughters and a widow. The son, daughter and a widow are mentioned as heirs in class I of the Schedule and therefore, by reason of the provisions of Section 8(a) read with the 1st clause of Section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs. As between them the two sons, the three daughters and the widow will take equally, each having one share in the deceased's property Under Section 10 read with Rules 1 and 2 of that section. Thus, whatever be the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff's share therein will be 1/6th.

9. The next step, equally important though not equally easy to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the coparcenary property because after all, the plaintiff has a 1/6th interest in that share. Explanation 1 which contains the formula for determining the share of the deceased creates a fiction by providing that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death. One must, therefore, imagine a state of affairs in which a little prior to Khandappa's death, a partition of the coparcenary property was effected between him and other members of the coparcenary. Though the plaintiff, not being a coparcener, was not entitled to demand partition yet, if a partition were to take place between her husband and his two sons, she would be entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son. (see Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, para 315). In a partition between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth being Khandappa's wife, the plaintiff. Khandappa would have therefore got a 1/4th share in the coparcenary property on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and his sons.

10. Two things are thus clears : One, that in a partition of the coparcenary property Khandappa would have obtained a 1/4th share and two, that the share of the plaintiff in the 1/4th share is 1/6th, that is to say, 1/24th. So far there is no difficulty. The question which poses a somewhat difficult problem is whether the plaintiff's share in the coparcenary property is only 1/24th or whether it is 1/4th plus 1724th, that is to say, 7/24th. The learned trial Judge, relying upon the decision in Shiramabai which was later overruled by the Bombay High Court, accepted the former contention while the High Court accepted the latter. The question is which of these two views is to be preferred.

11. We see no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th by ignoring the 1/4th share which she would have obtained had there been a partition during her husband's life time between him and his two sons. We think that in overlooking that 1/4th share, one unwittingly permits one's imagination to boggle under the oppression of the reality that there was in fact no partition between the plaintiff's husband and his sons. Whether a partition had actually taken place between the plaintiff's husband and his sons is beside the point for the purposes of Explanation 1. That Explanation compels the assumption of a fiction that in fact "a partition of the property had taken place", the point of time of the partition being the one immediately before the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share.

12. The fiction created by Explanation 1 has to be given its due and full effect. Lord Asquith in his famous passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council. [1952] A.C. 109/132. He said if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it; and if the statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it cannot be interpreted to mean that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.

13. In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation 1 to Section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu Mita-kshara coparcener "shall be deemed to be" the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death.

What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages.

To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle.

All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life time of the deceased.

The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. It has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the notional partition.

14. The interpretation which we are placing upon the provisions of Section 6, its proviso and explanation I thereto will further the legislative intent in regard to the enlargement of the share of female heirs, qualitatively and quantitatively. The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 conferred heirship rights on the son's daughter, daughter's daughter and sister in all areas where the Mitakshara law prevailed. Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. 1937, speaking broadly, conferred upon the Hindu widow the right to a share in the joint family property as also a right to demand partition like any male member of the family. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides by Section 14(1) that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. By restricting the operation of the fiction created by Explanation I in the manner suggested by the appellant, we shall be taking a retrograde step, putting back as it were the clock of social reform which has enabled the Hindu Woman to acquire an equal status with males in matters of property. Even assuming that two Interpretations of Explanation I are reasonably possible, we must prefer that interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature and remedy the injustice from which the Hindu women have suffered over the years.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1828 of 1975

Decided On: 27.04.1978

Gurupad Khandappa Magdum  Vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., V.D. Tulzapurkar and P.N. Singhal, JJ.

Equivalent citations: 1978 AIR 1239, 1978 SCR (3) 761

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Whether widowed daughter in law is entitled to get maintenance from father in law if there is no coparcenary property?

19. Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law.

(1) A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law : Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain maintenance

(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or

(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.

(2) Any obligation under Sub-section (1) shall not be enforceable if the father-in-law has not the means to do so from any coparcenary property in his possession out of which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share, and any such obligation shall cease on the remarriage of the daughter-in-law.

10. Shri Deopujari, learned Counsel for the appellants has further contended that provisions of Section 19(2) only bar execution of the obligation by such widowed daughter-in-law against father-in-law if father-in-law has no coparcenary property. In other words, he contends that the obligation of father-in-law which springs from Section 19(1) is independent of its enforceability under Section 19(2). He argues that the obligation cannot be executed or enforced through a Court of law because of bar under Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act if such father-in-law has no coparcenary property, but the obligation exists even against self acquired property under Section 19(1). I am not in a position to accept such distinction. An obligation which cannot be legally enforced cannot be recognized as legal obligation at all. Section 19 is a complete scheme in itself which provides for an obligation and also its enforcement. It creates a right in daughter in law with corresponding liability on father in law. It specifies in what circumstances & to what extent the right accrues and when or how it is enforceable. It is therefore not possible to read Section 19(1) independent of Section 19(2) of Act. I, therefore, find no merit in the argument sought to be raised by the Appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 117 of 1989

Decided On: 18.01.2008

Venubai Wasudeo Rambhad Vs. Laxman Lahanuji Rambhad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges: 

B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.

Citation: AIR 2008 Bom 13,

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