Supreme court: When Joint Hindu Family Property Is Partitioned, Shares Of Parties Become Their Self-Acquired Properties

It cannot be disputed that the properties divided among Defendant No. 1 and his brothers through partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are joint family properties. However, as per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers. {Para 17}

19. As reiterated above, after the joint family property has been distributed in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family properties and the shares of the respective parties become their self-acquired properties. Hence, the suit property acquired by Defendant No. 1 became his self-acquired property, on being sold by his brother Thippeswamy to him, vide sale deed dated 16.10.1989. 

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.)

Angadi Chandranna Vs  Shankar and Others 

Civil Appeal No. 5401 of 2025

Decided on April 22, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 877,2025 INSC 532.

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Whether the rule of Estoppel will prevent sons from claiming rights in the self acquired property of their grand father, if their father has relinquished his rights in that property?

What estoppel brings about, however, is preventing a party from setting up the right, which, but for the estoppel, he would have in the property. In this regard, we may notice the following discussion under the caption 'Death or disability of the representor' (pages 125-126) in the work Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner:

Death or disability of the representor

128. In case of the death, or the total or partial disability (whether by reason of insolvency, infancy, lunacy, coverture, or otherwise), of the representor at the time of the proceedings in which the question of estoppel is raised, the liability to the estoppel, speaking generally, devolves upon, or is transmitted to, the same persons, in accordance with the same rules, and subject to the same conditions, as the liability of such a representor to proceedings for the avoidance of a contract procured by the representation.

Where the representor has died between the date of the representation and the date of the raising of the estoppel, the executor or administrator, or (in case of title to, and estates in, land) the heir or devise, of the deceased representor is bound by the representation to the same extent as the representor would have been, and succeeds to all the burdens of estoppel in respect thereof to which, at the date of his decease, such representor was subject...

23. It will be noticed that the father of the Appellants, by his conduct, being estopped, as found by us, is the fountainhead or the source of the title declared in Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. It is, in other words, only based on the relationship between Shri Chandran and the Appellants, that the right Under Section 8(a) of the Hindus Succession Act, purports to vest the right in the Appellants. We would think, therefore, that Appellants would also not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. If the principle in Gulam Abbas (supra) applies, then, despite the fact that what was purported to be released by Shri Chandran, was a mere spec successionis or expectation his conduct in transferring/releasing his rights for valuable consideration, would give rise to an estoppel. The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel. We also find no merit at all in the attempt at drawing a distinction based on religion. The principle of estoppel applies without such distinction.

24.  Having received valuable consideration and allowed his father Shri Sengalani Chettair to proceed on the basis that he was free to deal with the property without the prospect of being haunted by any claim whatsoever as regards the property by Shri Chandran, a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by Shri Chandran. Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by Shri Chandran or his children, viz., the Appellants.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 521-522 of 2023.

Decided On: 25.01.2023

Elumalai and Ors. Vs. M. Kamala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: K.M. Joseph, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0077/2023, 2023/INSC/83

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Supreme Court: When A Person Has Relinquished Rights In Father's Self Acquired Property, His Sons Are Estopped From Claiming Share

  In the facts of this case, the case of the appellants may be noted. It is their case, that Shri Chandran, their father, himself did not have any right in the plaint schedule property. This is for the reason that being the separate property of Shri Sengalani Chettair, Shri Chandran did not have any right by birth. He himself had only, what is described a spec successionis within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not even the case of the appellants that they had any independent right in the plaint schedule property either at the time of their birth or at the time when their father died or even when their grandfather Shri Sengalani Chettair died in 1988. The right, which they claim, at the earliest point, can arise only by treating the property as the separate property of Shri Sengalani Chettair on his death within the meaning of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, we are unable to discard the deed of release executed by their father Shri Chandran in the year 1975 as a covenant within the meaning of Section 8 of the ‘1956 Act.’

{Para 21}

22. As far as the argument of the appellants that the appellants would have an independent right, when succession open to the estate of Shri Sengalani Chettair, when he died in 1988, in view of the fact that the appellants are the children of the predeceased son, viz., Shri Chandran, who died on 09.12.1978, we are of the view that there is no merit in the said contention. It is true that under Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property of a male Hindu, dying intestate, will devolve, firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule. The son of a predeceased son, it is true, is a Class I heir. Therefore, it could be argued that since Shri Sengalani Chettair died intestate, a right was created in the property in favour of the appellants, being the children of the predeceased son. What estoppel brings about, however, is preventing a party from setting up the right, which, but for the estoppel, he would have in the property. In this regard, we may notice the following discussion under the caption ‘Death or disability of the representor’ (pages 125-126) in the work Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner:

“Death or disability of the representor

128. In case of the death, or the total or partial disability (whether by reason of insolvency, infancy, lunacy, coverture, or otherwise), of the representor at the time of the proceedings in which the question of estoppel is raised, the liability to the estoppel, speaking generally, devolves upon, or is transmitted to, the same persons, in accordance with the same rules, and subject to the same conditions, as the liability of such a representor to proceedings for the avoidance of a contract procured by the representation.

Where the representor has died between the date of the representation and the date of the raising of the estoppel, the executor or administrator, or (in case of title to, and estates in, land) the heir or devise, of the deceased representor is bound by the representation to the same extent as the representor would have been, and succeeds to all the burdens of estoppel in respect thereof to which, at the date of his decease, such representor was subject…”

23. It will be noticed that the father of the appellants, by his conduct, being estopped, as found by us, is the fountainhead or the source of the title declared in Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. It is, in other words, only based on the relationship between Shri Chandran and the appellants, that the right under Section 8(a) of the Hindus Succession Act, purports to vest the right in the appellants. We would think, therefore, that appellants would also not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. If the principle in Gulam Abbas (supra) applies, then, despite the fact that what

was purported to be released by Shri Chandran, was a mere spec successonis or expectation his conduct in transferring/releasing his rights for valuable consideration, would give rise to an estoppel. The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel. We also find no merit at all in the attempt at drawing a distinction based on religion. The principle of estoppel applies without such distinction.

24.  Having received valuable consideration and allowed his father Shri Sengalani Chettair to proceed on the basis that he was free to deal with the property without the prospect of being haunted by any claim whatsoever as regards the property by Shri Chandran, a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by Shri Chandran. Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by Shri Chandran or his children, viz., the appellants.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.521-522 OF 2023

ELUMALAI @ VENKATESAN & ANR  Vs M. KAMALA AND ORS. & ETC

Author: K.M. JOSEPH, J.

DATED: JANUARY 25, 2023.

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Supreme Court: Daughter's Right To Inherit Self-Acquired Property Of Father Dying Intestate Recognized Under Customary Hindu Law

 Our Analysis

66. Right of a widow or daughter to inherit the self-acquired property or share received in partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate is well recognized not only under the old customary Hindu Law but also by various judicial pronouncements and thus, our answer to the question Nos. 1 and 2 are as under :-

“If a property of a male Hindu dying intestate is a self-acquired property or obtained in partition of a co-parcenery or a family property, the same would devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship, and a daughter of such a male Hindu would be entitled to inherit such property in preference to other collaterals.”

67. In the case at hands, since the property in question was admittedly the self-acquired property of Marappa Gounder despite the family being in state of jointness upon his death intestate, his sole surviving daughter Kupayee Ammal, will inherit the same by inheritance and the property shall not devolve by survivorship.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI

ARUNACHALA GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LRS. Vs. PONNUSAMY AND ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6659 OF 2011

20th January 2022

Author: KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Citation:  2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 59.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the court can rely on the plea of a coparcener that property is a self-acquired property in the absence of a specific pleading and independent nucleus for acquiring property?

  It is an admitted fact that, plaintiff No.1 is the

legally wedded wife of defendant No.1 and out of the said

wedlock, plaintiff No.2 is born. The plaintiffs are claiming

share in the share of defendant No.1. According to the

plaintiffs, all the suit schedule properties are joint family

properties. Now by filing I.A.1/2020 under Order XLI Rule

27 of CPC, the defendants/appellants are attempting to

make out a case that, some of the suit schedule properties

are purchased by defendant Nos.2 to 4 and they are their

self acquired properties. However, on perusal of the

written statement of the defendants, no such plea was

raised before the trial Court. Further, there is no pleading

that, apart from the joint family nucleus, the defendants

had any independent nucleus so as to acquire any separate

property in the name of the respective defendants. In the

absence of specific pleadings, the documents which are

now sought to be produced have no relevancy.

15. The status of the plaintiffs is admitted in the

written statement itself. It is also an admitted fact that the

joint family is having sufficient properties and it has got

nucleus to acquire the properties. Under such

circumstances, when there is no specific plea in the written

statement, presumption is that, the properties acquired

subsequently are with the aid of the joint family properties

and as such, they acquire the character of joint family

itself. Hence, I.A.1/2020 does not survive for consideration.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

DHARWAD BENCH

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE H.T.NARENDRA PRASAD

AND

 MR. JUSTICE RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR

REGULAR FIRST APPEAL No.100256/2015

TANAJI S/O NAYAKU NIKAM, Vs  BHARATI W/O TANAJI NIKAM,

Author: RAJENDRA BADAMIKAR, J.,

DATED:  15th DAY OF MARCH 2022

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Whether relinquishment of self-acquired properties of a deceased by legal heirs will enure to benefit of all other legal heirs?

This Court in case of Kishore Tulshiram Mantrim (supra)

after adverting to the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Thamma

Venkata Subbamma (supra) has held that if the properties are self- acquired and not the ancestral coparcenary properties, would acquire on the death of such person in self-acquired property, they will devolve equally on all his legal heirs and therefore some of the legal heirs can definitely relinquish their share in favour of another legal heir and it should not be necessarily in favour of whole body. In my view, the

principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the said judgment would squarely apply to the facts of this case. Since, the suit properties were self-acquired properties of the deceased Shripad Pandit, all the legal heirs of the said deceased were entitled to equal share including the four daughters of the said deceased who were sisters of the appellants. The

daughters of the said deceased thus were free to relinquish their

undivided share in the suit property in favour of the other legal heirs of the said deceased exclusively.

27. In my view, such relinquishment of properties inherited by

the legal heirs of the person whose properties were self-acquired

properties would not enure for the benefit of all the legal heirs of the said deceased but would enure only for those persons in whose favour such deed of relinquishment/release was executed. The principles applicable to the relinquishment of undivided share by coparceners in favour of another coparcener in respect of ancestral property which relinquishment would

enure for the benefit of all the coparceners would not apply in case of the

properties inherited by legal heirs which were self-acquired properties of

the deceased. In my view, the learned Trial Judge erroneously applied the

principles applicable to relinquishment of undivided share by a

coparcener in favour of another coparcener to the properties inherited by

the legal heirs of a deceased whose properties were self-acquired.

28. In my view, since the suit properties were not inherited by

the four generations of male lineage from father, father’s father or father’s

father’s father i.e. father, grand father, the properties even otherwise

could not have been termed as ancestral property. The finding of the Trial

Court that though deed of relinquishment was executed by the four

daughters of the said deceased though in favour of the appellants, same

would act for the benefit of all the coparceners is ex-facie perverse and

contrary to the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court and this

Court. Supreme Court in case of Arshnoor Singh (supra) has quoted a

passage from Mulla in his commentary on Hindu Law (22nd Edition) at

page 129 with approval stating the position with respect to succession

under Mitakshara and has held that after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

came into force, if a person inherits a self-acquired property from his

paternal ancestral, the said property becomes self-acquired property and

does not remain coparcenary property. Principles laid down by the

Supreme Court in the said judgment would apply to the facts of this case.

Bombay High Court

Shri. Shashikant Shripad Pandit ... vs Shri. Kaustubh Subhash Pandit And ... on 25 February, 2020

FIRST APPEAL NO.1773 OF 2019
      ALONG WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.1 OF 2019

CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

2020 SCC OnLine Bom 309 : (2020) 3 Mah LJ 302 : (2020) 2 Bom CR 678 : AIR 2020 (NOC 668) 225 : (2020) 3 AIR Bom R 384

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Whether the Court can treat the partition of self-acquired property by a father as a family arrangement or gift to sons?

It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing' all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.

 But in our opinion, the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the Courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, that we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sale and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present.

In view of our finding that Narayana Pillai dealt with his self-acquired properties under Exhibit A-1, the other parties to the document had no antecedent title. It could not be pretended that there was any bona fide dispute between Narayana Pillai and his children and grandchildren when he divided and gave his properties to them under Exhibit A-1. In Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi MANU/SC/0358/1965 : [1965]3SCR841 , relied on by Sri Vedantachari, it is pointed out that it is not necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangasami Gounden v Nachiappa Gounden (1919) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 523 : L.R. 46 IndAp 72: 36 M.L.J. 493, that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property and that all that is necessary is that the parties must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or even a semblance of a claim on some other ground, as, say, affection. It is no doubt true that the children and grandchildren of Narayana Pillai had a claim to the affection of Narayana Pillai. But it could not on that ground be said that they had a claim or semblance of a claim against his self-acquired property. If the contention of Sri Vedantachari that even a semblance of a claim on some grounds such as affection is sufficient to support Exhibit A-1 as a family arrangement is accepted, it would lead to the result that every deed of gift by a father to his children or near relations could be treated as a family arrangement, though the other requisites of the family arrangement are absent. It is not possible to build an argument that Exhibit A-1 evidences a family arrangement solely on the stray observation in the above Supreme Court decision made in the course of a discussion whether a transaction which was a family settlement amounted to a transfer or creation of trust in the property. It is clear from the Supreme Court decision that the transaction in question in that case is a family arrangement entered into by the parties bona fide for the purpose of putting an end to the dispute among the family members. In the present case, neither the appellant nor the sixth respondent has stated that there were any disputes, or that any dispute was in contemplation which necessitated any family arrangement. In Jatru Pahan v. Ambikajit Prasad MANU/BH/0175/1957 : AIR 1957 Pat 570 , it has been held that the existence of a family dispute is not essential to the validity of a family arrangement, nor is the existence of a doubtful claim based on the allegation of an antecedent title essential for the validity of a family arrangement; such arrangement may bind the parties to it if it is for the benefit of the family, or for the maintenance of peace and harmony and the avoidance of future discord or for the preservation of the property, but there must be some kind of consideration before an agreement in respect to the division of family property can be held to be a valid family arrangement, though in such cases the Court will not scrutinize the quantum of consideration with meticulous nicety. Again in Gangabai v. Punau Rajwa A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 261, it was held that where a family arrangement was merely a cloak for the transfer it could not be upheld. In Natesan v. Commissioner of Income Tax I.L.R. (1964) 1 Mad. 502, it is pointed out that a separate property of a coparcener cannot be fragmented into shares and disposed of by allotment to sharers under the guise of partition without the element of transfer of property. Even if the document Exhibit A-1 is styled as a family arrangement, it is really a gift by Narayana Pillai to the several members of his family. It is true the parties to the document get rights under it. But it is not by virtue of any antecedent title or bona fide claim. For the foregoing reasons, we see no reason to differ from the finding of the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge that, though Exhibit A-1 purports to be a partition deed, it is really a gift deed by Narayana Pillai in favour of the members of his family.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 21.11.1969

 P.L.N. Paramasivam Vs.  P.K. Ramaswami Gounder and Ors.

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Whether a son conducting business with father can claim that it is a joint family business if father has started the said business with his self-acquired property?

In Ramaswami Nayakar v. Raja Padayachi MANU/TN/0247/1925 : AIR1926Mad963 , it has been held that the question whether the self-acquired property of a member of a joint Hindu family has been thrown by him into the common stock or not is a question of fact. In Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand MANU/PR/0008/1948 : (1948) 61 L.W. 437, the Privy Council had to consider a case where a father, who had no ancestral property, started a business and his son claimed that by reason of his association in the business the character of the business became a joint family business. It has been held in that decision that the onus of proving that the separate business of the father became joint family business, especially when there is no-ancestral property, is heavy on the son and that it is for the son to prove that he was associated in the business in such a manner as to raise a reasonable inference that the father intended to make and did make his business a joint family business.  {Para 10}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 21.11.1969

 P.L.N. Paramasivam Vs.  P.K. Ramaswami Gounder and Ors.

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Whether coparcener can throw his self-acquired property into common stock if there is no joint family property?

Sri R. Gopalaswami Iyengar, appearing for the contesting respondents 1 and 2 urged that as there was no joint family property, there could be no question of Narayana Pillai throwing his self-acquired property into common stock. Such a contention has been negatived in several decisions. Thus in Damodar Krishnaji Nirgude v. Commissioner of Income Tax MANU/MH/0103/1961 : [1962] 46 ITR 1252 (Bom) , it was held that it was open to a member of a Hindu undivided family to throw his self acquired property into the family hotchpot even though there was no joint or ancestral property. Again in Natesan v. Commissioner of Income Tax I.L.R. (1964) Mad. 502 , this contention has been negatived in the following passage:

It is now well settled that a separate property of a coparcener under the Hindu Law can acquire the character of a joint family property of the coparcener by his own voluntary act of putting it in the common stock or blending it with joint family properties. The process of blending connotes that there are two sets of properties, separate and joint family, and they are pooled so that the exclusive rights of the coparcener holding the separate property are abandoned; then there emerges only one kind of property, the whole of it becoming joint family property. Where, however, there exists no joint family property and the coparcener owning separate property desires to have it treated as joint family property, it will be open to him to do so and the Hindu Law does not require any formality to achieve this result. The act of the coparcener by which this conversion of separate property into joint family property takes place is described as throwing the property into the common stock or as treating the separate property as joint family property. It is, however, not necessary that there should be pre-existing common stock before it can be said that the separate property is thrown into it. In a case where the family has no joint family property, the common stock is a mere fiction and throwing into the common stock is only a convenient phraseology to describe the process of conversion. A clear, unequivocal and unambiguous declaration by the holder of the separate property that it is joint family property would sufficiently impress that property with the joint family character.

As pointed out in the above passage, the very concept of blending of self acquired property with ancestral or joint family property presupposes the existence of a joint family property. But it is clear from what we have already stated that the conversion of self-acquired property into a joint family property by what is known as throwing into common stock is only an application of the principle of abandonment or waiver of his rights by a coparcener with intention to treat his property as joint family property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 21.11.1969

 P.L.N. Paramasivam Vs.  P.K. Ramaswami Gounder and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Sadasivam, J.

Citations: (1970) 1 MLJ 592

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What are principles for inheritance of self acquired property of female hindu dying intestate?

 The law is silent with regard to self- acquired property of a woman. Sub-section (1) of Section 15, however, apart from the exceptions specified in Sub-section (2) thereof does not make any distinction between a self-acquired property and the property which she had inherited. It refers to a property which has vested in the deceased absolutely or which is her own. The self-acquired property of a female would be her absolute property and not the property which she had inherited from her parents.

10. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act would apply and not the Sub-section (2) thereof.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3241 of 2009 

Decided On: 05.05.2009

 Omprakash  Vs. Radhacharan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.

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Whether property received by son from father by way of gift or will is self acquired property or ancestral property?

The controversy arises, however, on the question as to what kind of interest a son would take in the self-acquired property of his father which he receives by way of gift or testamentary bequest from him, vis-a-vis his own male issue. Does it remain self-acquired property in his hands also, untrammeled by the rights of his sons and grandsons or does it become ancestral property in his hands, though not obtained by descent, in which his male issue become co-owners with him?......

11. In view of the settled law that a Mitakshara father has right of disposition over his self-acquired property to which no exception can be taken by his male descendants, it is in our opinion not possible to hold that such property bequeathed or gifted to a son must necessarily, and under all circumstances, rank as ancestral property in the hands of the donee in which his sons would acquire co-ordinate interest...

16. Still further, it was held that the father's gifts are exempt from partition. The reason for this distinction is that the theory of equal ownership between the father and the son in the ancestral property is not applicable to the father's gifts at all. The Court held as under:

12. ...But when the father obtains the grandfather's property by way of gift, he receives it not because he is a son or has any legal right to such property but because his father chose to bestow a favour on him which he could have bestowed on any other person as well. The interest which he takes in such property must depend upon the will of the grantor. A good deal of confusion, we think, has arisen by not keeping this distinction in mind. To find out whether a property is or is not ancestral in the hands of a particular person, not merely the relationship between the original and the present holder but the mode of transmission also must be looked to; and the property can ordinarily be reckoned as ancestral only if the present holder has got it by virtue of his being a son or descendant of the original owner. The Mitakshara, we think, is fairly clear on this point. It has placed the father's gifts under a separate category altogether and in more places than one has declared them exempt from partition. 

Our conclusion, therefore, is that a property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the donee simply by reason of the fact that the donee got it from his father or ancestor.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7528 of 2019 

Decided On: 23.09.2019

Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel  Vs. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 4822

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Whether there can be blending of self acquired property with joint family property by making declaration in Income tax return?

B. Jupudi Venkata Vijaya Bhaskar Vs. Jupudi Kesava Rao (died) & Ors., MANU/AP/0032/1994 : AIR 1994 AP 134, where it has been held as under: -

"30......By declaring his status in the Income Tax and Wealth-tax returns as "Hindu Undivided Family", it could not be said that the first defendant had blended his private properties with that of the joint family properties....

31. Declaration of status in the Income Tax returns is not always decisive of the real status of the individual.... "

C. Madan Lal Vs. Controller of Estate Duty, MANU/RH/0069/1968 : [1969] 74 ITR 84(Raj) where it has been held as under:-

20.....In our opinion, in the absence of any other circumstances, the filing of returns and getting his property taxed on the basis of joint family property were not sufficient to show an intention of abandonment of his claim on the part of Sukhdoo. It has been observed in Govind Narain Mathur v. Mohini Devi MANU/RH/0153/1960 : ILR [1960] Raj 1219 that a statement in connection with the assessment of Income Tax that certain property was joint family property may be made for the purpose of getting some advantage under the law relating to Income Tax and that it could not be evidence of any unequivocal intention on the part of the assesses to waive his interest in the self acquired property.... "

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 2223/2013, 

Decided On: 04.02.2019

Aarshiya Gulati  Vs.  Kuldeep Singh Gulati and Ors.

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Whether self acquired property of father given by him to his son becomes ancestral property?

 This Court in three Judge Bench in C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar

considered the question as to whether the properties acquired by

defendant No. 1 under Will are to be regarded as ancestral or selfacquired

property in his hands. It is a case where the plaintiff

claimed partition of the property in a suit filed against his father

and brother. The stand of the father was that the house property

was the self-acquired properties of his father and he got them

under a Will executed in the year 1912. It was held that father of a

Joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has full and

uncontrolled powers of disposition over his self-acquired immovable

property and his male issue could not interfere with these rights in

any way. The Court while examining the question as to what kind

of interest a son would take in the self-acquired property of his

father which he receives by gift or testamentary bequest from him,

it was held that Mitakshara father has absolute right of disposition

over his self-acquired property to which no exception can be taken

by his male descendants. It was held that it was not possible to

hold that such property bequeathed or gifted to a son must

necessarily rank as ancestral property. It was further held that a

property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral

property in the hands of the donee simply by reason of the fact

that the donee got it from his father or ancestor.

21) In view of the undisputed fact, that Ashabhai Patel purchased the

property, therefore, he was competent to execute the Will in favour

of any person. Since the beneficiary of the Will was his son and in

the absence of any intention in the Will, beneficiary would acquire

the property as self-acquired property in terms of C.N.

Arunachala Mudaliar case. The burden of proof that the property

was ancestral was on the plaintiffs alone. It was for them to prove

that the Will of Ashabhai intended to convey the property for the

benefit of the family so as to be treated as ancestral property. In

the absence of any such averment or proof, the property in the

hands of Donor has to be treated as self-acquired property. Once

the property in the hands of Donor is held to be self-acquired

property, he was competent to deal with his property in such a

manner he considers as proper including by executing a gift deed

in favour of a stranger to the family.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7528 OF 2019

GOVINDBHAI CHHOTABHAI PATEL Vs  PATEL RAMANBHAI MATHURBHAI

Dated:SEPTEMBER 23, 2019.

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Supreme Court on Basic concept of blending of self acquired property

 Even the reasons given by the High Court that as the loans
were taken on the suit properties for borewell, crop loan, electric
motor pump set loan, jewel loan by all the three joint family
members, namely Sengoda Gounder, Ramasamy and
Subramanian and, therefore, there was a blending of the suit
properties into joint family properties also, cannot be accepted.
As all the three were residing together and some loans might
have been taken by the family members residing together, by
that itself, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit
properties into joint family properties. The law on the aspect of
blending is well settled that property separate or self acquired
of
a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the

character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by
the owner into the common stock with the intention of
abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such
abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be
established. Clear intention to abandon the separate rights in
the property must be proved. Even abandonment cannot be
inferred from mere allowing other family members also to use
the property or utilisation of income of the separate property out
of generosity to support the family members. 

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 45364537 OF 2019

S.Subramanian .Vs  S. Ramasamy 

M.R. SHAH, J.
Citation: (2019) 6 SCC 46,2019 (7) Scale 254
Dated:May 01, 2019.

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Whether Cogent Evidence is required to Prove Family Property as Self-Acquired?

 In order to prove that the suit properties
described in Schedule ‘B’ and ‘C’ were their
self-acquired properties, the plaintiffs could have
adduced the best evidence in the form of a sale-deed
showing their names as purchasers of the said
properties and also could have adduced evidence of
payment of sale consideration made by them to the
vendee. It was, however, not done.
21) Not only that, the plaintiffs also failed to
adduce any other kind of documentary evidence to
prove their self-acquisition of the Schedule ‘B’ and
‘C’ properties nor they were able to prove the source
of its acquisition.
22) It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there
lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is

joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence
of any proof of division, such legal presumption
continues to operate in the family. The burden,
therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting
the existence of jointness in the family properties
asserts his claim that some properties out of entire
lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired
property. (See-Mulla - Hindu Law, 22nd Edition
Article 23 "Presumption as to co-parcenary and
self acquired property"- pages 346 and 347).

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 11220 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.5664/2012)

Adiveppa & Ors. Vs  Bhimappa & Anr. 

Dated:September 06, 2017

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

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NOTES ON JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY UNDER HINDU LAW

Mitakshara school divides property into two classes,viz:

1) Unobstructed heritage:- Property in which a person acquires an interest by birth is called unobstructed heritage. It is so called because the accrual of the right to such property has no obstruction. Thus property inherited by a hindu from his father,father's father,or father's father's father, is unobstructed heritage. Their right to such property arises from mere fact of their birth in the family and as soon as they are born,they become coparceners of such property along with their paternal ancestor. Ancestral property is therefore is unobstructed heritage.

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How should a member of a joint family prove that some of the joint family properties are his self-acquired property?

 In order to prove that the suit properties described in Schedule 'B' and 'C' were their self-acquired properties, the Plaintiffs could have adduced the best evidence in the form of a sale-deed showing their names as purchasers of the said properties and also could have adduced evidence of payment of sale consideration made by them to the vendee. It was, however, not done.

21. Not only that, the Plaintiffs also failed to adduce any other kind of documentary evidence to prove their self-acquisition of the Schedule 'B' and 'C' properties nor they were able to prove the source of its acquisition.

22. It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property. (See-Mulla-Hindu Law, 22nd Edition Article 23 "Presumption as to co-parcenary and self acquired property"-pages 346 and 347).

23. In our considered opinion, the legal presumption of the suit properties comprising in Schedule 'B' and 'C' to be also the part and parcel of the ancestral one (Schedule 'D') could easily be drawn for want of any evidence of such properties being self-acquired properties of the Plaintiffs. It was also for the reason that the Plaintiffs themselves had based their case by admitting the existence of joint family nucleolus in respect of Schedule 'D' properties and had sought partition by demanding 4/9th share.

24. In our considered opinion, it was, therefore, obligatory upon the Plaintiffs to have proved that despite existence of jointness in the family, properties described in Schedule 'B' and 'C' was not part of ancestral properties but were their self-acquired properties. As held above, the Plaintiffs failed to prove this material fact for want of any evidence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 11220 of 2017 

Decided On: 06.09.2017

Adiveppa and Ors. Vs. Bhimappa and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 4465

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Whether party to deed can challenge recitals of deed?

 The implications of a statement made in a deed upon the party who made the same has been considered by the privy council in the case of Martin Cashin v. Peter J. Cashin, MANU/PR/0080/1938 : AIR 1938 Privy Council 103 and it has been ruled as follows:-

"..........In a case where the person executing the deed is neither blind nor illiterate, where no fraudulent misrepresentation is made to him, where he has ample opportunity of reading the deed and such knowledge of its purport that the plea of non est factum is not open to him, it is quite immaterial whether he reads the deed or not. He is bound by the deed because it operates as a conclusive bar against him-not because he has read it or understands it, but because he has chosen to execute it........"

(Emphasis supplied)

13. In the case of Lachman Lal v. Munshi Mahton, MANU/BH/0225/1933 : AIR 1933 Pat 708, this Court has also considered the effect of a recital made in a deed in view of Section 115 Evidence Act has held as follows:--

"........There can be no dispute as to what the law is on this point, and it was settled as far back as 1850 when the case of Stroughill v. Buck (5) was decided. Pateson, J., in that case stated the law in these terms:

"When a recital is intended to be a statement which all the parties to the deed have mutually agreed to admit as true, it is an estoppel upon all. But, when it is intended to be the statement of one party only, the estoppel is confined to that party, and the intention is to be gathered from construing the instrument."

14. In this regard, it would also be fruitful to notice the general effect of recital in a deed as mentioned in Halsbury's law of England, IV edition, Vol. 13, para-57 as follows:

"The General Effect:-- By executing a deed in accordance with all the requirements for such execution, the party whose act and deed it is becomes, as a general rule, conclusively bound by what he is stated in the deed to be effecting, undertaking or permitting. He is, in general, so bound even though another party has not executed the deed, or he has himself executed it in a false name. He is, as a rule, estopped from averring and proving by extrinsic evidence that the contents of the deed did not in truth express his intentions or did not correctly express them, or that there are reasons why he should not be obliged to give effect to the duty. This is equally the case whether the deed is expressed to operate as a conveyance of property or as a contract or otherwise....................................

But to all these general principles there are exceptions, cases, where the deed may be a nullity or may be avoided or corrected".

15. The concept of estoppel by deed has also been dealt with in paragraph-954 Volume 16 Halsbury's Law of England IV edition, as follows:

"....Estoppel by deed. Where there is a statement of fact in a deed made between the parties and verified by their seals, an estoppel results, and is called "estoppel by deed". If upon the true construction of the deed the statement is that of both or all the parties, the estoppel is binding on each party; if otherwise, it is only binding on the party making it..."

16. As aforementioned there is no relief by the plaintiff in the suit to avoid the deed (Ext. B) nor there is relief that the recital in the said deed requires correction.

17. The said deed (Ext. B) was admittedly executed by the plaintiff along with other co-sharers accepting the fact of partition of the joint family properties. The said deed did not include the suit property of village-Meharpur. The plaintiff has come out with the case that a fraudulent recital was got in the said deed regarding the suit property being the self-acquired property of Fulchand Rai and Chandramani Rai. But even if the said allegation of the plaintiff is accepted, there is no pleading or evidence alliunde that the plaintiff and the other co-sharers knowingly and purposely left out the suit property from partition and therefore it was not made subject-matter of partition. The conspicuous absence of such a case by the plaintiff substantially dents the case of fraud as endeavored to be made out. As such, in view of the principles in this regard as mentioned above, there cannot be escape for the plaintiff from the binding effect of the recitals including the disputed recital in the deed (Ext. B) in question.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA

Second Appeal No. 197 of 2013

Decided On: 01.07.2017

 Punam Devi and Ors. Vs. Jai Narayan Rai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vijayendra Nath, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 Patna 175

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Whether it is permissible to create life interest in property in favour of Hindu woman?

 An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.

42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case of Plaintiff No. 2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall Under Section 14(1) of the Act but it squarely falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act. In other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case (supra) would apply.

43. A fortiori, Plaintiff No. 2-late Mrs. Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death Under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we say for following factual reasons arising in the case.

44. First, the testator-Mr. Dewan being the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property.

45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could make by virtue of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act.

46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act which remained a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" Under Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.

47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here.

48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however, never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was, therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from her husband.

49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.

50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wife's death would go to testator's nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wife's right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties by Will and such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest Under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest" i.e. "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singh's case (supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 21784 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 32044/2016)

Decided On: 12.12.2017

Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 1

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