What is difference between standard of proof in deciding criminal appeal against acquittal and conviction?

 In criminal law, appellate courts apply distinct standards when deciding appeals against conviction versus appeals against acquittal, primarily because an acquittal reinforces the fundamental presumption of innocence. While both appeals allow for a review of evidence, an appeal against acquittal faces a higher threshold for interference compared to a standard appeal against conviction. 

Here is the detailed difference:

1. Appeal Against Conviction 

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Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on appreciation of evidence in the case of Motor accident claim petition

 In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.

(emphasis supplied) {Para 15}

19. The failure of the Respondents to cross examine the solitary eyewitness or confront him with their version, despite adequate opportunity, must lead to an inference of tacit admission on their part. They did not even suggest the witness that he was siding with the claimants. The High Court has failed to appreciate the legal effect of this absence of cross-examination of a crucial witness.

21. Relying upon Kartar Singh (supra), in a MACT case this Court in Sunita v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation considered the effect of non-examination of the pillion rider as a witness in a claim petition filed by the deceased of the motorcyclist and held as follows:

30. Clearly, the evidence given by Bhagchand withstood the Respondents' scrutiny and the Respondents were unable to shake his evidence. In turn, the High Court has failed to take note of the absence of cross examination of this witness by the Respondents, leave alone the Tribunal's finding on the same, and instead, deliberated on the reliability of Bhagchand's (A.D. 2) evidence from the viewpoint of him not being named in the list of eye witnesses in the criminal proceedings, without even mentioning as to why such absence from the list is fatal to the case of the Appellants. This approach of the High Court is mystifying, especially in light of this Court's observation [as set out in Parmeshwari (supra) and reiterated in Mangla Ram (supra)] that the strict principles of proof in a criminal case will not be applicable in a claim for compensation under the Act and further, that the standard to be followed in such claims is one of preponderance of probability rather than one of proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing in the Act to preclude citing of a witness in motor accident claim who has not been named in the list of witnesses in the criminal case. What is essential is that the opposite party should get a fair opportunity to cross examine the concerned witness. Once that is done, it will not be open to them to complain about any prejudice caused to them. If there was any doubt to be cast on the veracity of the witness, the same should have come out in cross examination, for which opportunity was granted to the Respondents by the Tribunal.

22. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of Courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eye-witnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely than not true. 

23. The observation of the High Court that the author of the FIR (as per its judgment, the owner-cum-driver) had not been examined as a witness, and hence adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Appellant-claimants, is wholly misconceived and misdirected. Not only is the owner-cum-driver not the author of the FIR, but instead he is one of the contesting Respondents in the Claim Petition who, along with insurance company, is an interested party with a pecuniary stake in the result of the case. If the owner-cum-driver of the car were setting up a defence plea that the accident was a result of not his but the truck driver's carelessness or rashness, then the onus was on him to step into the witness box and explain as to how the accident had taken place. The fact that Sanjeev Kapoor chose not to depose in support of what he has pleaded in his written statement, further suggests that he was himself at fault. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have shifted the burden of proof.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 4010-4011 of 2020 

Decided On: 08.12.2020

Anita Sharma and Ors. Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.

Author: Surya Kant, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0928/2020,(2021) 1 SCC 171.

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How to prove second marriage in departmental enquiry?

The allegations against the present petitioner are that when his first wife was alive, he performed second marriage with Ranjana and reason for that his first wife Sandhya was issueless for so many years. The learned AGP initially relied on two documents i.e. agreement dated 2-9-2002 in the nature of leave-in-relationship between the petitioner and his second wife Ranajana and the copy of the family arrangement deed dated 22-6-2002 between the petitioner and his first wife Sandhya. On perusal of the same, it appears that the petitioner made a contract with Ranjana as his first wife was issueless. On perusal of the contents of the leave-in-relationship contract, it appears that it was agreed between the petitioner and Ranjana to reside as a husband and wife. If these contents of the leave-in agreement are read coupled with the evidence of the priest namely Shri Dyneshwar Joshi and other relevant document, it appears that those documents are sufficient to prove that the petitioner has contracted the second marriage with Ranjana in spite of subsisting of his first marriage with Sandhya.

6. Standard of proof in the departmental enquiries are on the basis of the preponderance of probabilities and to prove such marriage, standard of proof is not required as high as required to prove the offence punishable under section 494 of Indian Penal Code, nor the marriage of the petitioner with Ranjana is independently in dispute, therefore, no high degree proof is required to prove such marriage in the departmental enquiry.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

W.P. No. 313 of 2011

Decided On: 12.04.2018

 Ashok Ramakant Choudhari Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.V. Nalawade and K.L. Wadane, JJ.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 725

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Whether employee can avoid departmental enquiry on ground of acquittal in criminal case?

 The charges against the petitioner herein are straight-forward and do not involve any complicated questions of law or fact for the departmental action against the petitioner to be arrested till the outcome of the criminal case lodged against him. This is not an indictment of the petitioner; just as the judgment of January 18, 2016 on the petitioner's plea of quashing the earlier departmental proceedings against him on the basis of his order of acquittal in the connected criminal matter was not an acceptance of the petitioner's culpability in the misconduct alleged against him. The judgment of January 18, 2016 and the view expressed herein are two sides of the coin, so to say, of the same principle. An acquittal of an accused of the criminal charges, without the criminal court affirmatively establishing his innocence, would not destroy the edifice of a pending departmental action on the same set of facts. Likewise, when the standards of proof in the two set of actions are distinct, the impending criminal trial on the same set of allegations cannot be a shield to an employee charged in a departmental action to keep the disciplinary proceedings indefinitely at bay.

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Anjan Biswas vs Central Bank Of India And Others on 24 June, 2016

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Whether standard of proof in election petition is different from civil suit?

 The finding recorded by the learned Principal Judge of the Small Causes
Court, Pune cannot be independently taken so as to come to a conclusion that
the Respondent No.4 has fallen foul of the statutory mandate and unseat the
Respondent No.4 in the absence of any issue/issues framed in that regard.  The
exercise  of  considering the  findings  recorded  by the  Trial  Court  and  then
referring it to issue or issues would be like putting the cart before the horse.
The said aspect is required to be considered in the context of the fact that in an
Election Petition the standard of proof is different than one in a Civil Suit

which is based on a preponderance of probabilities.  

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.11334 OF 2015 
ALONG WITH 
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3379 OF 2015
Shri Vijay Waman Deshmukh 
Versus
Pune Municipal Corporation 
CORAM : R. M. SAVANT, J.
DATE   : 29th April 2016
Citation:2016(4) MHLJ 917

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on appreciation of evidence in civil/matrimonial proceeding

The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities. A. prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he links that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second. Within the wide range of probabilities the court has often a difficult choice to make but it is this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of probabilities lies. Important issues like those which affect the status of parties demand a closer scrutiny than those like the loan on a promissory note : "the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue" Per Dixon, J. in Wright v. Wright (1948) 77 C.L.R. 191 at p. 210; or as said by Lord Denning, "the degree of probability depends on the subject-matter. In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear" Blyth v. Blyth [1966] 1 A.E.R. 534 at 536. But whether the issue is one of cruelty or of a loan on a pronote, the test to apply is whether on a preponderance of probabilities the relevant fact is proved. In civil cases this, normally, is the standard of proof to apply for finding whether the burden of proof is discharged.

Supreme Court of India

Dr. N.G. Dastane vs Mrs. S. Dastane on 19 March, 1975

Equivalent citations: AIR 1975 SC 1534, (1975) 2 SCC 326, 1975 3 SCR 967

Bench: N Untwalia, P Goswami, Y Chandrachud

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What will be standard of proof for permitting conduct of DNA test?

The issue involved in this case is whether a person disputing paternity of the child can seek for subjecting the mother and child to DNA test to determine paternity. This issue has been answered by the Apex Court in Teeku Dutta's case, (supra). In paras 10 and 11 it was held thus :

"10. In matters of this kind the Court must have regard to Section 112 of the Evidence Act. This Section is based on well known maxim pater is best quem nuptiae remonstrant (he is the father whom the marriage indicates). The presumption of legitimacy is this, that a child born of a married woman is deemed to be legitimate, it throws on the person who is interested in making out the illegitimacy, the whole burden of proving it. The law presumes both that a marriage ceremony is valid, and that every person is legitimate. Marriage or filiation (parentage) may be presumed the law in general presuming against vice and immorality.

11. It is rebuttable presumption of law that a child born during lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. This presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderance of evidence, and not by a mere balance of probabilities."

 In the view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court, it is to be held that in maintenance proceedings, the party disputing the paternity of the child has to prove his 'non access' with the mother of the child during the relevant time in order to dispel the presumption under Section 112of the Evidence Act and such presumption shall have to be displaced by leading strong preponderance of evidence and not by mere filing a petition for determining the paternity by medical tests i.e. DNA, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside.

Andhra High Court

Smt. Didde Sundara Mani And Anr. vs Didde Venkata Subbarao And Anr. on 9 June, 2005

Equivalent citations: 2005 (2) ALD Cri 237, 2005 CriLJ 3618, I (2006) DMC 83

Bench: G Mohammed

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Whether standard of proof in departmental enquiry is by preponderance of probabilities?

 It is interesting to note that the learned Single Judge went to the extent of observing that the concept of preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur[3], this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 

Supreme Court of India

G.M.(Operations) S.B.I. & Anr vs R.Periyasamy on 10 December, 2014

Author: S A Bobde

Bench: J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde

Citation;(2015) 3 SCC 101

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Standard of proof in case of accident claim petition

 The argument, though attractive, is devoid of any force for the reason that in order to prove guilt against an accused in a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In a claim petition, the claimants have to prove their case summarily and it cannot be dismissed on the ground that the driver of the offending vehicle has earned acquittal order. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in case titled as N.K.V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. vs. M. Karumai Ammal and others etc., reported in MANU/SC/0321/1980 : AIR 1980, SC 1354.

10. It is also beaten law of the land that the negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle has to be decided on the hallmark of preponderance of probabilities and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further also, the claimants claiming compensation in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not to be seen as an adversial litigation, but is to be determined while keeping in view the aim and object of granting compensation. My this view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in Dulcina Fernandes and others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and another,MANU/SC/1028/2013 : (2013) 10 SCC 646.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
FAO No.34 of 2007
Decided on: August 29, 2014.
Union of India and another.
...Appellants
VERSUS
Sonam Chomo and others.

The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir,
Citation: 2015(2)ALLMR (JOURNAL)94

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Leading Judgment on ingredients Of Offence Punishable U/S 498 A Of IPC

C. Veerudu Vs. State Of A.P.(1989) CR. L.J. NOC 52(A.P.)

• S. 498 A The sole constituent of offence u/s 498 A is cruelty which means 'wilful conduct'. The Word wilful contemplates obstinate and deliberate brhaviour on part of offender for it to amount to cruelty. Thus 'Mensrea' is an esssential ingredient of the offence.
• The principles are that the standard of proof of cruelty are higher in degree in criminal law than in civil law under the matrimonial causes.
• The intention or mensrea on the part of one spouse to injure the other is not a necessary element of cruelty in civil law for martimonial causes while it is an essential element in criminal law.
• It is enough if crulety is proved by preponderance of probabilities in civil law while in criminal trials the coduct of cruelty has to be proved beyond all resonable doubt.
• It is immaterial in civil law whether respondent's conduct was aimed at the other spouse or is due to unwarranted indifference attributable perhaps to selfishness or laziness while it is very much material in criminal proceeding and for relief of matrimonial causes in civil law the conduct of spouse need not necessarily result in danger to life, limb or health but a reasonable apprehension of such danger is enough, whereas section 498 A contemplates such a conduct besides being wilful to result in the likelihood of driving the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health.

[ In the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 756 of 1987. ] 1

VEERULU V/S STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, decided on Friday, June 10, 1988.  Judge(s) : BHASKARA RAO

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