Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, Complaint of sexual harassment becomes time barred?

 Section 9 of the Act postulates that any aggrieved woman may make a complaint, in writing, of sexual harassment at the work place to the Local Committee within a period of three months from the date of incident, and in the case of series of incidents, within a period of three months from the date of the last incident. The second proviso to Section 9 provides that the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the time of making the complaint not exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the circumstances prevailing prevented the woman from filing of the complaint within the period prescribed.{Para 13}

14. In other words, a complaint of sexual harassment is mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three months from the date of the last incident of such harassment or within a further extended period of three months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.

15. No doubt, the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw out a complaint at the threshold without collecting material on the factual aspects relating to the limitation. Nonetheless, where a complaint on the simple reading of the averments made therein appears to be patently barred by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure, without even calling the other side to participate in the proceedings.

23. The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place in April 2023. The subsequent incident of August 2023, whereunder the Appellant was removed as Director of CFRGS, with no financial implications arose out of a complaint received from the Central Government undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein Appellant was specifically named. The said action was taken completely independently on the basis of the complaint of NFCG alleging that the project report was not submitted within time and that the amount sanctioned for the project be refunded. It may be pertinent to note that the MoU was signed by the Appellant with the NFCG and the bank account was also under her control.

24. In view of the above, the incident of removal of Appellant as the Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of sexual harassment in connection with the previous incidents. It was based upon the report of NFCG, an independent body.

25. The inquiry into the project funds was taken up by the Executive Council and it was a collective decision and not a unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the said act would also not amount to an act of sexual harassment in conjunction with the previous reported acts.

26. The actions taken against the Appellant in August 2023, are administrative in nature and does not create a gender based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.

27. It would be important to refer to the expressions "in relation to" or "connected with" used in Section 3(2) of the Act. The use of the above expression clearly demonstrates that there has to be a direct link between the action complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment. In view of what has been said above, we find no such direct link between the last incident of sexual harassment which happened in April 2023, and those referred to subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023.

29. The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter. The administrative measures of August 2023, were independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused inconvenience to the Appellant or may have given an impression that they are in line with previous acts of harassment, but they were not part of the continued sexual harassment. The subsequent events have no connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident of April 2023, remains the last event related to sexual harassment.

32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as the discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the Appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 11786 of 2025.

Decided On: 12.09.2025

Vaneeta Patnaik Vs. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1106, MANU/SC/1270/2025.

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No Motor Accident Claim Should Be Dismissed As Time-Barred : Supreme Court's Interim Order In Plea Challenging S.166(3) MV Act

 It is made clear that during the pendency of these petitions, the tribunal or the High Courts shall not dismiss the claim petitions on the ground of such petitions as barred by limitation as prescribed under sub-Section (3) or Section 16(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. {Para 5}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal C No. 8412/2023, Special Leave to Appeal C No. 8413/2023

Date of Order: 04.11.2025

ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ayiti Navaneetha and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Dated: 04.11.2025 

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/84313/2025

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Delhi HC: Award Is Time-Barred U/S 34(3) Of Arbitration Act Due To Petitioner's Failure To Confirm Award Receipt On Affidavit

 In this case, there is a specific instruction for the Administrative Assistant to the Tribunal to serve a copy of the award. Other than the self- serving statements made across the bar that the copy of the award was not received on 23.08.2017 the Petitioner has not shown any document as to whether it has received the award. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Tribunal has to show as to when did it served the copy of the award on the Petitioner cannot be accepted. In the absence of any positive affirmation on affidavit from the Petitioner as to when was the award received, this Court cannot accept the mere ipse dixit of the Petitioner that as soon as the award was received it was filed by the Petitioner. {Para 24}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

O.M.P. (COMM) 49/2018, I.A. 1565/2018, I.A. 4650/2018, I.A. 4659/2018 and I.A. 9614/2018

Decided On: 12.12.2024

Indure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Aneja Construction (India) Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Subramonium Prasad, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/9015/2024.

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Bombay HC: Removal Of Objections In Any Proceedings Before An Authority Does Not Render The Proceedings Time Barred

Correction/removal of objections in any proceeding before a Court or an authority does not render proceeding time barred, particularly when the objection does not alter the nature of the proceeding. In this case, it is an admitted fact that Petitioner had purchased the stamps and it is only a ministerial act that Petitioner's partner's name was voluntarily corrected to include the Petitioner's name. Naturally, therefore, removal of such objection would relate back to the date of the original application. {Para 29 }

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 8021 of 2019

Decided On: 09.01.2023

Freedom City Ventures Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Ahuja, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0046/2023,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 3.

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Can the court grant a conditional decree for specific performance of contract if vendor can not execute sale deed without permission of competent authority?

  It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific performance will always be subject to the condition to the grant of the permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven years elapsed from the date of filing of the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, and amendment on the grounds set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accrued to the respondent. {Para 4}

SUPREME COURT

K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.

K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. S Vs. Alliance Ministries And Others

Spl. Leave Petn. (Civil No. 9397 of 1995

1st May, 1995

Citation: 1995 ALLMR ONLINE 586 (S.C.)

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Can the court permit an amendment of plaint to add a prayer for specific performance of the contract if that relief is time-barred?

 Apart from this, a perusal of the original plaint and the proposed amendment filed on behalf of the  petitioner would show that the cause of action for the proposed prayer for grant of decree of specific performance and declaration was very much available to the petitioner when he filed the suit for permanent injunction on 11.09.2013. Having failed to incorporate prayers for aforesaid reliefs and restricting the suit only for the relief of permanent injunction, clearly shows that the attempt subsequently made by the petitioner by filing application for amendment on 24.01.2017 was barred by operation of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. It is clear that the petitioner was now seeking to change the very nature of the suit, which was impermissible. {Para 12}

16. In the case of K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. .vs. Alliance Ministries (supra) referred to in the above quoted judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:-

"4. It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific performance will always be subject to the condition to the grant of the permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven years elapsed from the date of filing fo the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, any amendment on the grounds  set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accrued to the respondent."

17. The position of law as elucidated in the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents shows that in the present case also prayers sought to be added by the petitioner by way of amendment were not only barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but also by operation of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C.

18. Insofar as the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that relief of specific performance could have been sought by the petitioner only after the competent authority had granted regularisation under the provisions of the Gunthewari Act, as noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit .vs. Ramesh Chander (supra), nothing prevented the petitioner to make a prayer for decree of specific performance when the suit for permanent injunction was filed on 11.09.2013. The Court would certainly have the power to pass a decree of specific performance in favour of the petitioner, which would be a conditional decree, subject to the competent authority in the present case granting order of regularisation under the provisions of the Gunthewari Act. Therefore, the said submission raised on behalf of the petitioner is also untenable.

Bombay High Court

Mangesh S/O Madhukar Giri vs Lata D/O Ganpatrao Korde And ... on 23 January, 2019

Bench: Manish Pitale

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Whether landlord is entitled to get eviction decree if tenant fails to pay time barred rent?

The issue involved in this petition is; whether the plaintiff-landlord was entitled to decree of eviction in a suit filed on 5th September, 1994 on the ground of default in payment of rent for February, 1998 and December, 1990, even though the same fell beyond the period of three years prior to the date of the suit.

 At this stage we may clarify that the decree of eviction has been sustained by both the courts below on both the aforestated grounds namely personal necessity of the landlord and willful default in payment of rent by the tenant.

 In this case we are concerned with the ground of default which falls under Section 11(1)(d) and which states that where the amount of two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by reason of non payment within the time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable then such default would constitute ground for eviction. It is interesting to note that the expression used in Section 1 l(l)(d) is "lawfully payable" and not "lawfully recoverable" and therefore, Section 11(1)(d) has nothing to do with recovery or arrears of rent On the contrary Section 11 (l)(d) provides a ground for eviction of the tenant in the eviction suit. It is well settled that law of limitation bars the remedy of the claimant to recover the rent for the period beyond three years prior to the institution of the suit, but that cannot be a ground for defeating the claim of the landlord for decree of eviction on satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 11 (l)(d) of the said Act, 1982. In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and Ors., reported in AIR (1958) SC 328 it has been held that when the debt becomes time barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt.

For the foregoing reasons special leave petition is dismissed.

 Supreme Court of India

Sri Bhimsen Gupta vs Sri Bishwanath Prasad Gupta on 3 February, 2004

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Whether the court should recognize time-barred payment made by Judgment debtor outside the court?

  Now, the law says further that if money is paid or adjustment of decree of any kind is arrived at outside the Court, it should be promptly got recorded and certified as contemplated by Rule 2. This can be done either by the J. D. or by the decree-holder; but in the very nature of things, a judgment-debtor should be more concerned in having such payment or adjustment recorded and certified by the Court. Article 125 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 30 days for applying to the Court for recording; an adjustment or satisfaction of the decree, from the date of payment or adjustment. There is no provision for extending the said period. Since by virtue of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI "a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid (in accordance with Rule 2) shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree", any payment or adjustment not certified or recorded in accordance with Rule 2 of Order XXI is no payment or adjustment in law. Any such payment or adjustment cannot be recognized by the Court executing the decree -- unless of course, the decree-holder himself admits the same. Therefore, when a decree-holder takes out execution, the judgment-debtor will not be entitled to plead -- if by the date of his plea a period of thirty days has expired from the date of payment or adjustment, as the case may be -- that he has paid the money due, or has otherwise adjusted the decree, outside the Court. It is, no doubt, true that the use of the expression 'may' - in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 has given room for controversy and argument; but, in my opinion, the said expression has to be construed and understood in the light of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, and if so read, the expression 'may' is liable to be construed and understood as 'shall'. By placing this construction no inconsistency arises between Order XXI, Rule 2 and Section 47. When Section 47 declares that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree shall be enquired into and determined only by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, it does not mean that the provisions in Order XXI, Rule 2 read with Article 125 of the Limitation Act should be ignored. Indeed, one should read them together harmoniously. As stated hereinbefore, the several Rules in Order XXI supplement, illustrate and elaborate the provisions contained in Part-II of the Code. The object behind Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI is to shut out any plea of payment, or adjustment, which is not promptly got recorded and certified under the said Rule. The idea is to preclude any such pleas and leave no room for them.

20. For the above reasons, I hold, agreeing with Upendralal Waghray, J. that the payment allegedly made by the judgment-debtor on 5-1-1979 not having been recorded and certified in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2(2), C.P.C., cannot be recognized by the executing Court in E.P. No. 73/1981, because the application alleging such payment was made, even in the earlier E.P., (E.P. No. 20/1979), beyond 30 days of the payment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 2413 of 1983

Decided On: 29.04.1988

P. Narasaiah  Vs. P. Rajoo Reddy

Hon'ble Judges:

B.P. Jeevan Reddy, K. Amareswari and Upendralal Waghray, JJ.

Citation: MANU/AP/0166/1989,AIR 1989 AP 264 (FB)

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Whether executing court can entertain time-barred application for setting aside a sale?

The executing Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an
application for setting aside a sale after the prescribed
period by invoking Section 148 of the Code or by
applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

6. The application under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code being an application under the provisions of Order 21, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on its own language, is not applicable specifically.

7. We are thus left with the question whether Section 148 of the Code would be applicable to the present case or not. Again Section 148 of the Code would not be applicable to the present case for the simple reason that the time for making an application under Rule 89 of Order 21 of the Code is riot fixed by the Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2647 of 1984

Decided On: 13.05.1994

Mohan Lal  Vs.   Hari Prasad Yadav and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kuldip Singh and Yogeshwar Dayal, JJ.

Citations: 1994 SCC (4) 177, JT 1994 (4) 116

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Whether complaint for dishonour of cheque is maintainable if cheque is issued for discharging time barred loan?

The controversy in the case on hand is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this court. The cheque issued for discharging liability for a time barred loan would constitute a fresh promise and consequently liability under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in the event of dishonor of such cheque will have to be fastened on the defaulter. It is not in dispute that loan was sanctioned in the year 2003. Respondent No. 1 has not seriously assailed issuance of cheque by him on 7.9.2009. The cheque issued amounts to promise within the meaning of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act and on account of dishonor of such a cheque, complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act would be maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 2013

Decided On: 20.01.2017

 Pragati Credit Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs.  Suresh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indira Jain, J.

Citation: 2017 ALLMR (CRI) 3081

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When court should allow time barred amendment of plaint?

The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new case or cause of action is barred: Weldon v. Neale. 19 Q.B.D. 394 But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation: see Charan Das v. Amir Khan L.R. 47 IndAp 255 and L. J. Leach and Company Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. MANU/SC/0009/1957 : [1957]1SCR438
8. The Principal reasons that have led to the rule last mentioned are, first, that the object of Courts and rules of procedure is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for their mistakes [Cropper v. Smith] and secondly, that a party is strictly not entitled to rely on the statute of limitation when what is sought to be brought in by the amendment can be said in substance to be already in the pleading sought to be amended Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba approved in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 18 of 1963

Decided On: 10.09.1965

A.K. Gupta and Sons Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sarkar, Raghubar Dayal and V. Ramaswami, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1967 SC 96

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SHORT NOTES ON LIMITATION ACT PART 3

S 18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing:-

Acknowledgment means a definite, clear admission of existing liability.

It is not necessary that there should be promise to pay. An acknowledgment does not create any new right of action but only enlarges the time and has the effect of making a new period run from the date of acknowledgment. Under this section, an acknowledgment is not limited in respect of a debt only, it may be in respect of “any property or right” which is the subject matter of the suit. There must be an unqualified,or an admission qualified by a condition which is fulfilled.

Ingredients of S 18 and essentials of a valid acknowledgment:-

To constitute a valid acknowledgment and thus to give a fresh period of limitation under this section,the following conditions must be satisfied.

1) The acknowledgment must have been made before the expiration of the period prescribed.

2) The acknowledgment must have been made by the party against whom the right is then claimed or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability.

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How to prove execution of revival letter for extending limitation for filing of suit?

 On the contrary, Indra Mal (DW-1) has stated in
examination in chief that the signatures at “A to B” on
Ex.2 to Ex.7 are not of his. These signatures are forged.
Though at one place, he has stated that on Ex.6 and Ex.7
also “A to B” part contains his signatures but it appears
that due to typographical error, the word “not” has been
left out. If we read the examination in chief in whole, it
reveals that at other places, he has not only refused his
signatures on revival letters but also stated that the
signatures are fabricated and forged. In cross examination,
he has further stated that on the revival / acknowledgment
letters Ex.2 to Ex.7, “A to B” signatures are not of his,
rather they are forged one.
9. Documents themselves cannot be taken to be of
any value unless their execution is proved by the legal,
relevant and material evidence of the person who has seen
the person signing the documents or who may be conversant
with the signatures of the person executing the documents.
In absence of any such evidence, Ex.2 to Ex.7 cannot be
said to have been established as valid acknowledgment by
the defendant. In the instant matter, the Manager of the
Bank, examined to prove the acknowledgments has admitted
that he was not posted in that Bank branch at the time of
their execution. Moreover, he has specifically said that
he cannot identify the signatures of the defendant.
Therefore, acknowledgments cannot be taken to be validly
proved. The learned courts below have not noticed this
aspect of the matter. The case N.T. Vijayakumar & Ors. vs
The Allahabad Bank, reported in 1999(2) Civil Court Cases,
571 (Karnataka) cited by the appellant is squarely
applicable in the instant case. In absence of valid proof of
execution of debt acknowledgments, the benefit of
protection of section 18 or 19 of the Limitation Act is not
available to the plaintiff Bank and as such, the suit filed
in the year 2003 for recovery of loan disbursed in the
year 1985, stands time barred.
Reportable
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B.Civil Second Appeal No. 242 / 2013

Indra Mal v State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur,

MR. JUSTICE VIJAY KUMAR VYAS
Dated: 04/01/2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 Raj 66

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Whether arbitration award allowing time barred claim can be set aside?

The arbitral tribunal totally failed to appreciate that once the
cause of action has commenced when the breaches were alleged to have
been committed by the petitioner even according to the respondents

much prior to 14th January, 1997 did not stop. There was no part payment
made by the petitioner admittedly to the respondents arising out of such
demand by the respondents in the year 1997, nor the petitioner
acknowledged any liability to pay the said amount during the period
between 1997 and 2000. The impugned award is contrary to section 9 of
the Limitation Act and over looking the fact that the cause of action even
according to the respondents had commenced for recovery of
compensation / damages prior to 14th January, 1997 when the breach of
contract was alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. In my
view, since the arbitral tribunal has allowed the time barred claims, the
award is in conflict with the public policy and deserves to be set-aside on
this ground also.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.275 OF 2012
CMC Limited 

 Vs.
Unit Trust of India 
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

         PRONOUNCED ON :   6th  February, 2015 
Citation: 2016(2) ALLMR589

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Whether rejection of delay condonation application for filing first appeal amounts to dismissal of first appeal?

This Court in the case of Chandrakant Govind Sutar
.vs. M. K. Associates and another reported in 2003 (1) Mh.L.J.
1011 considered the duty of the Counsel towards his client as well
as duty towards the Court with reference to the Advocates Act as
well as the Civil Procedure Code. Regarding the order passed
below the application for condonation of delay, when such order is
passed at the stage of first appeal, it was specifically observed by
this Court that when application for condonation of delay is
allowed by the subordinate Court, in those cases revision under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be available. In
other words, when an order is passed dismissing the application
for condonation of delay in preferring the First Appeal, the
revision application against such order was held not tenable as the
consequence of dismissing the application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal results in disposing the appeal as time
barred. Therefore, remedy by way of Second Appeal is available
in such cases.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, AT NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO.128 OF 2013

 Smt.Shewantabai Kashinath Kumbhare Vs Purushottam s/o. Mahadeorao Ambatkar,

CORAM: A.P.BHANGALE, J.
DATED : 3rd February, 2014.
Citation;2015(7) ALLMR425

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Whether a party can be impleaded in appeal when appeal has become time barred against him?

If the remedy of appeal against the two objectors, Haji Ismail and

Hamid Khan, has become barred by law of limitation, question of
granting any permission to implead the objectors as party respondents in
the proceedings before the lower Courts by relegating the matter to them
would not arise. No doubt, this Court has adequate power to remand the
case to the lower Court under Order 41 Rule 23-A as held in the case of
Setu Madhavrao Vyankatapatulu V/s. Food Corporation of India
reported in AIR 1985 Gujarat 27, referred to me by the learned Counsel
for the appellants, but the question of remand would not arise as the
belated stage.
objectors, for the the reasons stated earlier, cannot be impleaded at this
The third substantial question of law is, therefore,
answered as in the negative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

SECOND APPEAL NO.441 OF 2011
S.A. No.441 of 2011


Sheikh Yusuf  V Haji Mohammad Jamil Ahemad, 
CORAM : S.B. SHUKRE, J.

Pronounced On : 23rd APRIL, 2014
Citation; 2015(2) MHLJ

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Whether promise to pay time barred debts under Section 25 of Contract Act should be express promise?

The award passed was challenged on the ground that claim sought to be passed since was barred by limitation, the award passed was not correct. The claim forming the base of dispute was based on a promise to pay an amount in writing under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA). The claim was preferred well after three years since it become due. Section 25 deals with Agreement without consideration. Such agreement is void unless in writing and registered, or is a promise to compensate for something done, or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law. Sub-section (3) of Section 25 provides for a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt.

In the instant matter, promise to pay in writing was stated to be made through a letter which though disputing and denying the payment as claimed (in terms of figures) and it was mentioned that correct figure could be arrived only by way of mutual verification. It was further mentioned that payment legally due is not denied.

The Court observed that whatever was shown as outstanding figure was disputed and denied for want of mutual verification and clarification, but dues per se was not denied. Arbitrator considered this aspect as an admission on the part of the Petitioner and accordingly a promise to pay and since it was in writing the same was an express promise to pay. Unless the Petitioner could show that the demand is illegal, the express promise to pay would have to be performed by payment.

The promise to pay must be express. An implied promise to pay inferred from an acknowledgment could not be made the basis of the suit to recover a debt barred at the time of the acknowledgment and since S. 25(3) relates to promise to pay a debt, already time barred.

In the instant matter, the Petitioner failed to show the Arbitrator and also the  Court how the demand made was not legal and consequently the petition was dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

M/s. Gem Synth Resins Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Mahendra Rosin and Turpentine Pvt. Ltd.

ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 168 OF 2012
Coram:
:  MRS. ROSHAN DALVI, J.

:  11   JUNE, 2014.
   th 

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