Chhatisgarh HC: Whether the court can release accused prosecuted for possessing intermediate quantity of Ganja on bail?

 Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that 1.9 Kg (1900 gm) of contraband(Ganja) was seized from the possession of the applicant. Hence, the offence has been registered. {Para 3}

6. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, particularly considering that there is no criminal past of the applicant and further considering that intermediate quantity of Ganja has been seized from the possession of the applicant, and lastly considering his pre-trial detention, this Court is inclined to release the applicant on bail.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

MCRC No. 3553 of 2023

 Rahul Kumar Vijay Ram, Vs State Of Chhattisgarh 

Dated:15/6/2023

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What are important factors to be considered by JJB or children court while doing preliminary assessment of juvenile as per S 15 of Juvenile justice Act 2015?

 In the report submitted by the experts to the Board it does not deal with the aforementioned aspects, which are relevant in view of the language used under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 like family history and relationship, school and education, work with which the juvenile was engaged at the time of commission of offence, peer relationships, whether he has been trauma and abuse (physical, sexual and emotional abuse experience), mental health disorders/developmental disability. {Para 15}

16. The Act of 2015 enacted with laudable object of “best interest of child” therefore, at the time of conducting preliminary assessment of a child each provisions and the words used is to be given its fullest meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act of 2015. Rule 10 A (3) envisages that at the time of preliminary assessment child should be presumed to be innocent unless proved otherwise, therefore, while assessing the understanding of the juvenile, the consequences of the offences allegedly committed the mindset of the assessing Committee or the Board should be that the juvenile before it is innocent.

17. The order passed by the Board on 05.01.2023 would reveal that the Board considered the report of experts and further put some question to juvenile during the proceedings and came to the conclusion that juvenile is to be tried as an adult under the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015.

18. From the report of the experts relied upon by the Board it is clearly appearing that experts have not assessed the juvenile as mandated under Section 15 of the Act of 2015. There is no detailed report of the assessment made, no document is enclosed along with the report of conducting assessment, procedure adopted, factors assessed, mode of assessment, evaluation of child based on the stages of assessment and further there is no discussion of circumstances in which the juvenile allegedly committed the offence.

19. In absence of the aforementioned detailed assessment as mandated under Section 15 of the Act of 2015, I am of the considered view that the Board failed in its duty to comply with the provision under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 making preliminary assessment of the juvenile. The Children Court also have only considered the offence committed by the juvenile and the manner in which it was committed and failed to take note of the requirement under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 for preliminary assessment of juvenile. The Children Court also have considered only two line report submitted by the expert.

 In the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur

(Before Parth Prateem Sahu, J.)

Xyz  Vs  State of Chhattisgarh, through Police Station Sariya.

CRR No. 962 of 2023

Decided on May 2, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 4280.

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How to appreciate evidence in suit for recovery of money for supply of goods to government department?

 The plaintiff has filed affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC reiterating the plaint averment saying that he has supplied the material to the Block Development Officer Farasgaon valued at Rs. 61,464/-. In the cross examination he has admitted that no order has been issued in his favour for supply of material. It has stated that as per document (Ex.P-4) he was directed to supply material, which was supplied by him and additional to that order supply was demanded which he has provided and receipt has been obtained. He has also stated that he has no knowledge whether the material supplied to the defendants has been mentioned in the stock register or not. He has reiterated that for supply of goods two cheques of Rs. 20,000/- and 40,000/- have been issued on 14.07.2000, but the said cheques were not honoured and returned unpaid due to insufficient fund in the account on 10.01.2001. He has further admitted that he has filed a complaint before Chief Judicial Magistrate under section 138 of Negotiate Instruments Act which was dismissed for want of prosecution. {Para 6}

7. The defendants have examined in their support Devi Prasad Rai, Principal Govt. Higher Secondary School Farasgaon and BEO Farasgaon who has deposed in his examination-in-chief that tender is called when purchase of material is valued more than twenty thousand and tender will be allotted to the lowest quoted persons. As per office of Block Education Officer there is no mention about payment to plaintiff in cash or through cheque, if any material is received in the office then it has to be mentioned in the stock register. He has further stated that plaintiff has not given any bill to Block Education Officer, Farasgaon and purchase order has not been issued by the office. The witness was cross examined and in the cross examination he has denied that any order was given to the plaintiff. He has also denied that cheque (Ex.P-5) has been issued from the office. He has denied that plaintiff

is entitled to get interest on the some dues and he has stated that since no record is available in the office he has given this statement.

It is well settled legal position, that the genuineness of the document has to be proved by the plaintiff who relies upon the document and thereafter it is for the defendants to dislodge the

credibility of the document as fake, sham and bogus document. In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the work order was issued in his favour and genuineness of the challan has also not been proved. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to examine the witnesses who has delivered the goods and thereafter the concerning officer has put his signature on the challan, no witnesses was examined by the plaintiff in his support. It is well settled practice in the government department that supply order is always made in writing but no

work order has been placed by the plaintiff before the trial Court. 

19. In the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering the fact that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he has supplied the material despite this, the learned trial Court has held that plaintiff has supplied material to the defendants and he is entitled to receive Rs. 60,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from 2004 till the payment is actual made is perverse, contrary to record and deserves to be set aside by this Court.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

FA No. 120 of 2007

State of Chhattisgarh  Vs M/s. Hindustan Supply Agency, 

Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas

Judgment Delivered on 20/04/2022

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Whether Unmarried daughter can claim expenses of marriage from their parents under the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act?

  The maintenance is defined under Section 3(b)(ii) of the Act of 1956, as under:-

3. Definitions – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, –

(a) --- xx ----

(b) “Maintenance” includes----

(i) --- xx ---

(ii) In the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable

expenses of and incident to her marriage.

Reading of the aforesaid Section in unambiguous term includes the

expenses for marriage. The right includes the reasonable expenses of marriage of daughter and expenses incident to her marriage. In Indian society, normally expenses are required to be incurred for pre-marriage and also at the time of marriage. Thus, the centrality of Act of 1956 gives safeguard to both. So, a right is created to claim the expenses incident to marriage and the Courts also cannot be in denial mode, when such rights are claimed by unmarried daughters. Before and during marriage, the collective rituals are required to be performed, which come at a price. Unless the proceedings are allowed to be carried out at the instance of an unmarried daughter under the Act of 1956, claiming expenses for marriage, the statutory attempt cannot be terminated at threshold. Key question of right of unmarried daughters for anticipated expenses of marriage is required to be ascertained to grant reasonable expenses. {Para 7}

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

FAM No.79 of 2016

 Rajeshwari D/o Bhunu Ram, Aged Vs  Bhunu Ram S/o Dukhit Ram, 

D.B.: Hon'ble Shri Justice Goutam Bhaduri &

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal

Author: Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Dated: 21/03/2022

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Should the court permit the accused to recall a prosecutrix for cross-examination in an offence under the POCSO Act?

Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is facing trial under

Sections 363, 366 and 376 of IPC and section 5(1)/6 6 of the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012.

During trial, statements of mother and father of the prosecutrix

were recorded on 05.01.2019 & 03.08.2019 as PW-2 and PW-4

respectively and the prosecutrix was examined on 27.11.2018 as

PW-1. Now, prosecutrix had attained the age of majority and she

again approached the petitioner for having a love affair with him

and informed him that she had given the statements under

undue pressure of family members. On the basis of aforesaid

assurance of the prosecutrix, petitioner filed an application under Section 311 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for

re-examination of the prosecutrix and her parents and specific

reasons were assigned in the application filed as Annexure P/5

but learned trial Court vide its order dated 26.11.2021 has

rejected the application without appreciating the fact that the

statement of the prosecutrix was recorded under duress and

prosecutrix turned major only in the year 2021 (as per the

prosecution). Hence, the present petition filed by the petitioner.

 8. It is observed by above discussion, right to cross-examination is a part of right to fair trial which every person has in the spirit of right to life and personal liberty. In the case in hand, the ground of re-examination is that earlier the statement of the prosecutrix was recorded under duress but the learned trial court ignoring the aforesaid facts and summarily dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. The learned court below ought to have allowed the petition by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 311 Cr.P.C.

9. In the result, I find some merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed only for re-examination of the prosecutrix.The learned trial court shall afford a chance to the petitioner to cross-examine the prosecutrix. 

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

CRMP No. 74 of 2022

Order delivered on : 25/02/2022

 Manish Sonkar Vs  State of Chhattisgarh

Dated: 25 /02/2022

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Whether the court can pass decree for judicial separation in petition for divorce by mutual consent?

 The provisions contained in Section 13-B of the Act, 1955 does

not provide for existence of a ground like the ones contained in

Section 13 for grant of divorce by mutual consent. There need

not be a serious dispute between a married couple for seeking

a divorce by mutual consent. It may happen in a given case that

there is no quarrel or dispute between the couple but yet their

actions and behaviour are not compatible with each other for

living a happy and peaceful married life, therefore, they may

seek divorce by mutual consent. If an application is otherwise

duly constituted and properly presented before the Court, it is

not for the Court to search for a ground or a reason, which has

compelled the parties to seek divorce by mutual consent.

11.Having regard to the fact that the parties presented the

application under Section 13-B by appearing before the trial

Court on 13.3.2018 and thereafter, again appeared on 7.4.2018,

27.10.2018, 4.12.2018 and 12.12.2018, the trial Court should

have passed the decree of divorce by mutual consent instead

of decree for judicial separation. {Para 10}

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

FAM No. 153 of 2019

 Smt. Sandhya Sen Vs Sanjay Sen 

DB.: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.K. Chandravanshi

Order On Board by Prashant Kumar Mishra , J.

Dated: 6/4/2021

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Whether Offence Of Extortion is Made Out In Absence Of Delivery Of Property?

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of the FIR it is nowhere reflected that on extortion made by the petitioner, complainant/respondent No.5 has delivered any valuable property to the petitioner, as such, he has not committed offence under Section 384 of IPC. Even from perusal of the final report, it is clear that the documents submitted by the investigating agency regarding statements of the witnesses, none of the witnesses has stated that on extortion made by the

petitioner by demanding Rs.25,00,000/- from respondent No.5. The respondent No. 5 has given Rs.25,00,000/- to the petitioner, as such, there is no ingredient of offence under Section 384 of IPC is made out.

16) It would be evident from the reading of Section 383 of the IPC that the

ingredients of 'extortion' are; (i) the accused must put any person in fear of

injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such

fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person

so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or

anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security;

(iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms 'dishonestly',

'illegally' and 'injury' used in "Section 383 of the IPC and in " Sections 24, 43

and 44 of the IPC respectively. On a careful consideration of the above

definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others

intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that

person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or

valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted

into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for 'extortion'.

17). Thus, what is necessary for constituting an offence of 'extortion' is that

the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury,

the victim has voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man

putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most

important ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be

available. Further, if a person voluntarily delivers any property without there

being any fear of injury, an offence of 'extortion' cannot be said to have been committed.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

WPCR No. 133 of 2017

Shatrughan Singh Sahu  Vs  State of Chhattisgarh 

Pronounced on 07-09-2021

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Whether widow can become the absolute owner of property inherited from her husband even if she is not in actual possession of it?

On a careful perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that under Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, to get attracted, the property must be possessed by the female Hindu on coming into force of the Act of 1956. The object of this provision is firstly, to remove the disability of a female to acquire and hold property as an absolute owner and secondly, to convert any estate already held by woman on the date of commencement of the Act as a limited owner, into an absolute estate. {Para 17}

19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva and others (1970) 1 SCC 786 while considering the meaning of “any property possessed by a female Hindu” quoted with approval the following words of Justice P.N. Mookherjee in the matter of Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta  AIR 1957 Cal 557 (at page 559):

“The opening words in “property possessed by a female

Hindu” obviously mean that to come within the purview of

the section the property must be in possession of the

female concerned at the date of the commencement of the

Act. They clearly contemplate the female's possession

when the Act came into force. That possession might have

been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised

by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate

in the disputed property is claimed to have been

transformed into absolute estate under this particular

section, was at least in such possession, taking the word

“possession” in its widest connotation, when the Act came

into force, the section would not apply.”

and Their Lordships held :

“In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct

view as to how the words “any property possessed by a

female Hindu” should be interpreted.”

20. In Eramma (supra), the Supreme Court held that the property possessed by a female Hindu as contemplated in the Section is clearly the property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act and negatived a claim under Section 14(1) of the Act in view of the fact that the female Hindu possessed the property on the date of the Act by way of a trespass after she had validly gifted away the property, and further held that the need for possession with a semblance of right as on the date of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act was thus emphasized.

21. In the matter of Dindayal and another v. Rajaram AIR 1970 SC 1019 it was held that before any property can be said to be “possessed” by a Hindu woman as provided in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, two things are necessary (a) she must have a right to the possession of that property, and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively.

22. Thereafter, in the matter of V. Tulasamma and others v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. (1977) 3 SCC 99, their Lordships considered the real nature of incidence of Hindu widow's right of maintenance and scope and ambit of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956 and held as under: -

“The words “possessed by” used by the Legislature in

Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and

include the State of owning a property even though the

owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.

Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a

preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act

had been passed but had not been given actual possession

under a final decree the property would be deemed to be

possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would

get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well

settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be

under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the

section does not contemplate the possession of any rank

trespasser without any right or title.”

23. In the matter of Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others9, the Supreme Court pointed out the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 would come into play and held that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 would come into play. It was further held that if she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Second Appeal No.356 of 2001

Judgment delivered on: 28-6-2021

Loknath Vs  Sindhu, W/o Akhil Kolta,

Coram:

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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How to prove the statement of delinquent recorded in preliminary enquiry?

Learned counsel for the State argued that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief only on the technical ground of non-supply of documents unless it is shown as to what prejudice was caused to the petitioner in his defence. It is contended that the petitioner, during preliminary enquiry, had given a statement on 7.9.1991 in which he admitted that he had interpolated the official records in order to mislead the authority and created an evidence of felling of trees which were otherwise illegally felled and transported away from the forest area. In his reply to charge sheet, the petitioner nowhere stated that he had never given any such statement of admission of his gilt on 7.9.1991 and he only gave evasive denial of charges against him. It is further submitted that all relevant documents as stated in Sr. No. 1 of his application dated 30.4.1992 were supplied to him and remaining documents demanded by the petitioner were not relevant to the charges because the charge No. 1 was not found proved against the petitioner and charge No. 2 was found proved on the basis of petitioner's own statement dated 7.9.1991 recorded during preliminary enquiry prior to issuance of charge sheet, which the petitioner did not dispute but only sought to justify at a later stage and not at the first instance while submitting his reply to the charge sheet. Once the petitioner had admitted having interpolated the records, the other ground of violation of principle of nature justice would not come to his aid and the enquiry cannot be said to be vitiated.

 A perusal of the enquiry report and the order of the Disciplinary Authority would at once reveal that the statement of Kishan Lal Sonwani, Kamta Ram Sahu as also pre-recorded statement of the petitioner himself was made a basis to sustain the charge No. 2 proved against him that he, acting in concert with Cherpa Gopal and Kishal Lal Sonwani, tampered the official record. As a matter of fact, the so called pre-recorded statement of the petitioner was used as an admission of the guilt by the petitioner. But this document was never supplied to the petitioner despite demand. This was the most crucial documents because the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority both have heavily relied upon this document to hold charge No. 2 proved against the petitioner. The petitioner in his memo of appeal and even before this Court has taken a categoric stand that he was coerced to put signature on certain documents. Whether or not the petitioner would not been able to make out his defence, on this aspect, is one thing, but it can certainly be concluded that non-supply of this crucial documents seriously prejudiced the petitioner. It would not out of place to mention here that so called statement of the petitioner was not even proved by examining the officer who is alleged to have recorded the said statement. Therefore, serious prejudice on account of non-supply of statement is writ large on the fact of it.{Para 24}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPS No. 935 of 2005

Decided On: 31.10.2017

Dhanpati Barik Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J.

Dated:MANU/CG/0595/2017

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