Whether widow is entitled to get compensation under workman compensation Act if she remarries?

 Section 2(d) of the Employees' (Workmen's) Compensation Act, 1923 (for short referred to as the Act)defines "dependents". The provision reads as under: {Para 11}

2(d). 'Dependant' means any of the following relatives of a deceased employees namely; (i) a widow, a minor legitimate or adopted son, an unmarried legitimate or adopted daughter, or a widowed mother; and

12. A plain reading of the above definition makes it clear that as on the date of death; wife of the deceased who becomes a widow is treated as a dependant and is made eligible to receive compensation. The Act does not make a distinction between a person who remains widow or who re-marries again.

14. Similar question has fallen for consideration before the High Court of Rajasthan in case of R.B. Moondra and Company Vs. Bhanwari and Others Contention that widow is debarred from claiming the compensation on account of re-marriage is rejected. Para 19 reads as under:

The last contention that the widow became debarred from claiming compensation on account of her remarriage has also no force because in the Act there is no such provision that after remarriage widow of the deceased would not be regarded as a dependent. Under Section 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a widow remains a dependant, within the meaning of that section so long as she is not remarried. But the definition of the 'dependant' under the Act is not so restricted and the fact that she has remarried will not disentitle her to claim compensation under the Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3122 of 2002

Decided On: 24.04.2013

Mandadi Adilakshmi Vs. Vallabhaneni Siva Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Naveen Rao, J.

Citation: 2014 ACJ 950 (AP), MANU/AP/0562/2013.

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Whether widow can become the absolute owner of property inherited from her husband even if she is not in actual possession of it?

On a careful perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is quite vivid that under Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, to get attracted, the property must be possessed by the female Hindu on coming into force of the Act of 1956. The object of this provision is firstly, to remove the disability of a female to acquire and hold property as an absolute owner and secondly, to convert any estate already held by woman on the date of commencement of the Act as a limited owner, into an absolute estate. {Para 17}

19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva and others (1970) 1 SCC 786 while considering the meaning of “any property possessed by a female Hindu” quoted with approval the following words of Justice P.N. Mookherjee in the matter of Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta  AIR 1957 Cal 557 (at page 559):

“The opening words in “property possessed by a female

Hindu” obviously mean that to come within the purview of

the section the property must be in possession of the

female concerned at the date of the commencement of the

Act. They clearly contemplate the female's possession

when the Act came into force. That possession might have

been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised

by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate

in the disputed property is claimed to have been

transformed into absolute estate under this particular

section, was at least in such possession, taking the word

“possession” in its widest connotation, when the Act came

into force, the section would not apply.”

and Their Lordships held :

“In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct

view as to how the words “any property possessed by a

female Hindu” should be interpreted.”

20. In Eramma (supra), the Supreme Court held that the property possessed by a female Hindu as contemplated in the Section is clearly the property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act and negatived a claim under Section 14(1) of the Act in view of the fact that the female Hindu possessed the property on the date of the Act by way of a trespass after she had validly gifted away the property, and further held that the need for possession with a semblance of right as on the date of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act was thus emphasized.

21. In the matter of Dindayal and another v. Rajaram AIR 1970 SC 1019 it was held that before any property can be said to be “possessed” by a Hindu woman as provided in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, two things are necessary (a) she must have a right to the possession of that property, and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively.

22. Thereafter, in the matter of V. Tulasamma and others v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. (1977) 3 SCC 99, their Lordships considered the real nature of incidence of Hindu widow's right of maintenance and scope and ambit of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956 and held as under: -

“The words “possessed by” used by the Legislature in

Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and

include the State of owning a property even though the

owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same.

Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a

preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act

had been passed but had not been given actual possession

under a final decree the property would be deemed to be

possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would

get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well

settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be

under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the

section does not contemplate the possession of any rank

trespasser without any right or title.”

23. In the matter of Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others9, the Supreme Court pointed out the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 would come into play and held that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 would come into play. It was further held that if she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Second Appeal No.356 of 2001

Judgment delivered on: 28-6-2021

Loknath Vs  Sindhu, W/o Akhil Kolta,

Coram:

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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Whether the court can deny compensation in motor accident claim petition to the widow if she remarries or became self-reliant during the pendency of proceeding?

1) A divorced wife or a widow can also maintain a

petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is a

proposition now beyond doubt. Even if a remarried widow is

not a dependent of the deceased, absence of dependency

will not dis-entitle the widow to become a legal

representative. In the judgment in Manjuri Bera v. Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd. [2007 ACJ 1279], the Apex Court held

that compensation constitutes part of the estate of the

deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the

deceased would inherit the estate. Going by the said

judgment, even employed sons and married daughters can

maintain an application under Section 166 of the Act. The

principle underlying the exposition would equally apply to a

remarried widow.

2)  In Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai

[(1987) 3 SCC 234], the Apex Court held that a legal

representative is one who suffers on account of death of a

person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not

necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. Widow of

a deceased victim, even after remarriage, continues to be

the legal representative of her husband. The right of

succession accrues immediately on the death of the

husband and in the absence of any provision, she cannot be

divested from the property vested in her due to remarriage.

The right of the widow is a statutory right and the remarriage

does not affect that right.{Para 18}

3)  It is to be noted that the 1st appellant would not

have thought of a remarriage, but for the untimely death of

her husband. It was not a remarriage on account of divorce.

The Court has to consider the psychological hurdles that the

widow will face on account of remarriage. The society is

changing. The age old concept of a remarried widow cutting

off all relations with the family of her ex-husband, is

becoming a story of the past. Fact remains that the 1st

respondent was dependent on the deceased and would

have remained so, but for the demise of her husband

consequent to the accident. The death has indeed resulted

in loss of dependency. After the death of husband, a widow

may go for employment and become self-dependent or may

opt for remarriage. Either way, the loss of dependency

consequent to the death of the husband does not cease

merely because she has remarried or became self-reliant.

The word dependency and legal representative, therefore,

should receive a pragmatic interpretation. While computing

compensation for dependency of a widow on the death of

her husband under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988, her remarriage shall not be a decisive factor.{Para 22}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE N.NAGARESH

MACA.No.1936 OF 2008

GLANIS,W/O.LATE ANIL ABRAHAM, Vs  LAZAR MANJILA,S/O. JOY MANJILA,

Dated this the 30th day of June, 2020

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Whether the court can reduce compensation granted to a widow in a motor accident claim petition due to her remarriage?

In my view, merely because widow of the said deceased was remarried within one year from the date of death of the deceased or even within the shorter period, that would not make the widow dis-entitled to make claim for compensation on the ground that the said widow was not dependent on the date of filing claim application. Such widow continues to represent the estate of the said deceased and thus was entitled to make claim for compensation irrespective of change of her marital status after demise of the said deceased. The status of the claimant as dependent has to be considered on the date of death of the said deceased and not on the date of date of making an application for seeking compensation arising out of such death of the husband. The Tribunal thus rightly considered the claim of the respondent no. 1 being widow of the said deceased in view of the death of her husband due to the said accident, along with the claim of the respondent no. 2 being also one of the legal heirs and representative of the said deceased.

27. This Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mona and others (supra) has held that Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a social legislation and the same must be interpreted to further its objective. Remarriage cannot be an impediment in claiming compensation nor can it be a ground to reduce the compensation to which the widow is otherwise entitled to. In my view, the said judgment of this Court squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal (Stamp) No. 28929 of 2014 and Civil Application No. 991 of 2015

Decided On: 20.12.2019

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs.  Sushama Mahendra Sonawane and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka, J.

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 6001

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Whether a widow is entitled to get compensation in motor accident claim petition after her remarriage?

1) The Jammu and Kashmir High Court and the Rajasthan High

Court have held that the re-marriage of widow cannot deprive her

of compensation payable for the death of her husband in the

following cases:-

(i) In Seema Malik vs. Union of India, 2005 ACJ 1389, the

Jammu and Kashmir High Court examined the judgments of various

High Courts on this issue and held as under:-

“5. Another issue which is required to be taken

note of is with regard to the rights of a widow to

claim maintenance even if she re-marries. The

because a widow has remarried, is not to be

made a ground for declining her compensation.

In Hariram v. Commissioner for Workmen's

Compensation, 1994 ACJ 1094 (MP), the view

expressed was that the widow on remarriage

cannot be deprived of her right of getting

compensation. In the above case the argument

put across was that as the widow had re-

married, therefore, the entire amount be given

to the father of the deceased. It was held that

this legal proposition cannot be sustained. The

reasoning given was that the inheritance never

remains in abeyance and, therefore, rights of a

widow are to be taken and recognised on the

date when her husband dies. Therefore, she

cannot be deprived of her right of getting

compensation.

2)  I am in respectful agreement with the view of the Jammu &

Kashmir High Court and the Rajasthan High Court and hold that the remarriage/possibility of the remarriage will not deprive a person from compensation for the death of his/her spouse. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision: 3rd February, 2010

MAC.APP. 512-13/2006

D.T.C. Vs MEENA KUMARI 

CORAM :-

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA

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Notes on changes brought about by Hindu Succession( Amendment) Act,2005

Hindu succession amendment Act 2005 has brought about following important changes:

1) Equal rights for daughters- After 2005 amendment daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth, a coparcener in her own right and has same rights and liabilities as a son.

Read important judgments on Hindu succession amendment Act 2005:
Click here

2) Doctrine of pious obligation abolished;

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Whether widow is entitled to get provident fund money of her deceased husband after her remarriage?

Mr.S.K.Mani, learned Counsel for the respondent agreed with regard
to the legal point raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In fact,
he very fairly produced the judgment of this Court in Selvi v. K.Alagarsamy
reported in 2010 (2) TN MAC 328, wherein, after discussing various provisions
of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Hindu Widows Re-marriage Act, 1856, the  
right of the widow not only to remarry, but also to inherit the property of
the late husband has been declared and the women including widows are treated 
as co-parcener on par with the males.
        5. Paragraph 24 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:
        "24. The Honourable Supreme Court in Cherotte Suganthan (Died) through 
LRs. and others v. Cherotte Bharathi and others, 2008 (2) LW 102 analysed the
overriding effect of Hindu Succession Act (1956) on Hindu Widows Remarriage
Act, 1856. It was held that Section 2 of the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act,
1856 would not prevail over the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Act having regard to Sections 4 and 24 thereof. It is further held that Hindu
Widows were brought on equal footing in the matter of inheritance and
succession along with the male heirs. Section 14(1) of the Act, stipulates
that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or
after the commencement of the Act, will be held by her as a full owner
thereof. All the aforesaid Acts namely, Hindu Widows Remarriage Act, 1856,
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hindu Widow Remarriage (Repeal) Act, 1983 and Act   
39 of 2005 which deleted Section 24 of Hindu Succession Act with effect from
09.09.2005, recognise the right of the widows not only in remarriages but
also in inheriting the properties of the late husband. In nut-shell, the
women including widows are treated as co-parcener on par with the males."

        6. It is very disheartening to note that the appellant lost her second
husband within fifteen days of the remarriage and her position has not been
improved any more. 
        7. As stated above, she is entitled to a share in the Provident Fund
amount on par with the respondent, who is the mother of the deceased husband.
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT               

DATED: 15.12.2016  

CORAM   

MR.JUSTICE N.KIRUBAKARAN             

C.M.A(MD)No.1397 of 2006   
and 
M.P(MD)No.1 of 2006  

Yashodha      Vs.  Chellammal                                     

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Whether on remarriage of son's widow , power of son's mother to adopt will revive?

The relevant facts in Gurunath v. Kamalabai, may be briefly put thus. The disputed property belonged to Krishta- rao who died leaving behind two widows--Radhabai and Ganga- bai--and a son Dattatraya. Dattatraya died in 1913 leaving behind his widow Sundarabai and a son Jagannath. Sundarabai died soon after the death of her husband and a year later Jagannath also died. Gangabai, the junior widow of Krishtarao, adopted Gurunath, the appellant before this Court, who filed a suit claiming certain rights as the adopted son of Krishtarao. One of the issues arising in the case related to the validi- ty of Gurunath's adoption. A Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court examined several decisions of the Privy Coun- cil including the judgment in Arnarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh, [1933] L.R. 60 I.A. 242, and said that the rule, "That the interposition of a grand-

son, or the son's widow, competent to continue the line by adoption brings the mother's power of adoption to an end;"

was being followed for a very long time and has become a part of Hindu law. They also approved the observation of Chandavarkar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramkrishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao, [1902] I.L.R. 26 Bom. 526, to the following effect:

"Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving a natural born or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never afterwards be revived."

They also quoted with approval another part of the judgment of Chandavarkar, J., stating that when a son dies before attaining full legal competence and does not leave either a widow or a son or an adopted son then the power of the mother which was in abeyance during his lifetime revives but the moment he hands. over that torch to another, the mother can no longer take it. In view of these observations in the judgment in Gurunath's case there does not appear to be any scope for holding that on the remarriage of the son's widow the power of the son's mother to adopt revives.

Supreme Court of India

Sau Ashabai Kate vs Vithal Bhika Nade on 17 October, 1989

Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 670, 1989 SCR Supl. (1) 464

Bench: Sharma, L.M. (J)

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Whether Widow who remarries loses rights over late husband's property?

Section 14(1) categorically states that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The explanation to section 14(1) clarifies that property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever etc. We do not find any provision in Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in pari materia with section 2 of the Hindu Widows' Re-Marriage Act, 1856. In other words, there is no provision that disqualifies a widow of a male Hindu from inheriting from her husband if she remarries, after his death.

Bombay High Court

Sanjay Purshottam Patankar vs Smt. Prajakta Pramod Patil on 25 June, 2015

CORAM: V.M. KANADE & B.P. COLABAWALLA JJ. 

PRONOUNCED ON : 25TH JUNE, 2015 

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What are ceremonies necessary for validating marriage of widow?

 Any customary rite as spoken to by witnesses shall be

taken as sufficient proof of marriage. We should indeed push for an

agenda that approves of minimum formalities so long as the society

recognizes them as sufficient. If after the ceremonies, however

informal and modest they were, the man and woman lived together

as husband and wife and that itself ought to be taken as sufficient.

Every State has responded in its own way to approve of expression

of intentions as sufficient to supplant elaborate ceremonies. In

Tamil Nadhu, the suya mariyada (self-respect) was statutorily

recognized by an amendment to the Hindu Marriage Act in 1967. In

Punjab, it is karewa form which is the approved form of remarriage

of a widow. Even a legislation legitimizing remarriage of widows

will obtain its full value only if it approves of minimal ceremonies

accompanying such functions as sufficient to validate the marriage.

It will be abominable to look for ceremonies like saptapati, a la

brahminical form, to legitimise a customary form of marriage

prevalent among jat sikhs. Section 7(2) shall be construed to include

any minimal ceremony, sans religiosity, so long as it is acceptable to

the community. Available literature on the subject suggests that

Widow re-marriage in the kerawa form prevalent in Punjab is

known 'as a marriage by a widow with the brother or some other

male relative of her deceased husband and requires no religious

ceremonies and confers all the rights of a valid marriage'

(underlining mine; see 38 P.R. 1879; 316 of 1879; 26 P.R. 1880; 36

P.R. 1881; 48 P.R. 1890; 98 P.R. 1890; 54 P.R. 1900-reproduced

from punjabrevenue.nic.in). In the book Haryana: Past and Present

by Suresh K.Sharma (Mittal Publications, 2006), it is stated (at page

45) "Karewa or a widow marrying one of the brothers of her

deceased husband is known among the Jats, Ahirs, Gujars and

Harijans is un-accompanied by ceremonies or any kind. The woman

merely resumes her jewels and coloured clothes which had ceased to

wear on her husband's death. Sometimes, there is a public ceremony

to give it a sanctimonious touch; generally living together is held to

constitute karewa." In Women and Social Reform in Modern India:

A Reader by Sumit Sarka, and Tanika Sarkar, (Indiana University

Press, 2008), the authors state: "The agrarian needs which allowed

bride price also sanctified widow-remarriage. Like the former, this

was also a feature which the agriculturist castes shared in common

with the lower castes. However, the custom of widow-remarriage as

followed here had special features of its own. Known as kerewa,

karao, or chaddal andazi, the custom was a throw back to the old

Rig-vedic niyog (levirate marriage) which was prevalent in the

geographical region of Haryana- Punjab and associated with the

early vedic Aryan settlements. Karewa, a white sheet coloured at the

corners, was thrown by the man over the widow's head signifying

his acceptance of her as his wife. This custom represented social

consent for cohabitation. There could be certain variations. For

example, it could take the form of placing churis (glass bangles) on

the widow's wrist in full assembly and sometimes even a gold nath

(nose ring) in her nose and a red sheet over her head with a rupee

tied in one of its corners. This could be followed by the distribution

of gur (jaggery) or sweets. Significantly, this form of marriage was

not accompanied by any kind of religious ceremony, as no woman

could be customrily married twice, that is, go through the ceremony

of biah (religious wedding). After Karewa the widow merely

resumed her jewels and coloured clothes which she had ceased to

wear on her husband's death. So much so that sometimes mere

cohabitation was considered sufficient to legitmize the relationship

and it conferred all the rights of a valid marriage.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Darbara Singh  vs Jaswant Kaur on 8 January, 2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN

Citation; AIR 2014 P&H 100

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Whether widow inheriting property of her deceased husband will be divested of said property after her remarriage?

The fact that in the year 1962 the plaintiff/respondent remarried would not divest her of her rights vested in her by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In support of this proposition the learned advocate for the respondent Shri Sangeet, advocate relied upon the case of Cherotte Sugathan (D) by L.Rs. and others vs Cherotte Bharathi and others [2008 AIR SCW 1525]. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly laid down that widow inheriting property of her husband on his death would become absolute owner and subsequent remarriage would not divest her of property in view of Sections 24 and 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is also observed that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 overrides provisions of Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856.

Bombay High Court

Baliram Atmaram Dhake vs Rahubai @ Saraswatibai on 7 January, 2009

Bench: P. R. Borkar

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