Supreme Court: In cases involving a child who has suffered injury or died, the loss of income must be computed on the basis of the minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the concerned State

For the purpose of emphasis, it is again clarified here that when a Tribunal or the High Court in appeal, is concerned with the case involving a child having suffered injury or having passed away, the calculation of loss of income necessarily has to be made on the matric of minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the respective State at the relevant point of time. It is our hope that this restatement helps avoiding such errors and thereby obviates the necessity of this Court's interference, applying well-established principles of law. {Para 15}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10278 of 2025 

Decided On: 08.08.2025

Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel Vs. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Citation: 2025INSC 1070,MANU/SC/1796/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Motor Accident Claims | If Claimant Doesn't Produce Income Proof, Insurer Must Furnish Applicable Minimum Wages Notification

 We may also observe that, in general, i.e., accidents involving adults, we are often confronted with situations where the Minimum Wage Data is not readily available and every so often, the question that has been made up to this Court hinges only on the calculation of income. In that view of the matter and in the hope of reducing the claimants need to file appeals to this Court or even the High Court, we deem it appropriate to direct that in cases where the claimant has failed to furnish appropriate details of income or adequate proof thereof, it shall be the responsibility and obligation of the contesting party, more particularly the insurance company to furnish before the Tribunal the applicable minimum wage as duly issued by the concerned government.{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10278 of 2025 

Decided On: 08.08.2025

Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel Vs. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Citation: 2025INSC 1070,MANU/SC/1796/2025.

Print Page

LLM Notes : Concept of Child under the Constitution of India and IPC, distinction between neglected juvenile and delinquent juvenile

 Concept of Child under the Constitution of India and IPC

1. Constitutional Definition and Provisions

   • The Indian Constitution implicitly recognizes a child as every human being below the age of 18 years, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).

   • Fundamental rights ensure protection of children, including equality (Article 14), non-discrimination (Article 15), and right to life and dignity (Article 21).

   • Specific provisions for children include:

     • Article 21A: Free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14 years.

     • Article 24: Prohibition of employment of children below 14 years in hazardous occupations.

     • Directive Principles (Article 39(e) and (f)) mandate the state to protect children from exploitation and ensure their healthy development.

Print Page

LLM Notes: Constitutional and Penal Code Conceptions of “Child”: A Critical Examination under Indian Law

 Main Takeaway: Indian law adopts distinct age thresholds for defining a “child” in constitutional versus criminal contexts, leading to inconsistencies that impact rights protection, criminal liability, and policy coherence.

I. Constitutional Conception of “Child”

The Constitution of India does not provide a single, express definition of “child.” Instead, it advances age-based protections and rights across fundamental rights and Directive Principles:

Print Page

Supreme Court: The court may award maintenance to wife up to 25% of husband's income and to child 15% of husband's income

 A sum of Rs. 250/- per month for the maintenance of the wife of a person occupying the position of the appellant cannot be said to err on the liberal side. The High Court in our opinion very rightly fixed that sum making it subject to the limit of 25 per cent of the income as found by the Income-tax authorities. We have no reason to take any different view. Subject to our observation as to the determination of the income of the appellant, the appeal against the wife is dismissed with costs.

{Para 21}

22. As regards the appeal in the case of the daughter, the High Court fixed the amount of monthly maintenance at Rs. 150/- till such time as she marries but so as not to exceed 15% on the average monthly income of the father. No ground was shown as to why we should make a variation in the amount fixed in her case. We uphold the finding of the High Court in this respect. There will be one set of hearing fee.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2564 and 2589 of 1966

Decided On: 20.10.1970

Kulbhushan Kumar Vs. Raj Kumari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.N. Ray and G.K. Mitter, JJ.

Author: G.K. Mitter, J.

Citation: 1970 INSC 225, MANU/SC/0349/1970,(1970) 3 SCC129.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Whether child in conflict with law is not entitled to be released on bail as per S 12 of Juvenile justice Act if he is tried as adult?

 In the aforesaid circumstances, when the Children’s

Court has rejected his application, without adverting to the

said facts and also the statutory mandate of Section 12, is an

unfortunate part. Merely because, he is directed to be tried as

an adult, he cannot be denied the beneft of Section 12. I am

fortified by the earlier view taken by this Court in the case of

Sandeep Ayodhya Prasad Rajak (Bail Application No.3838 of

2021 decided on 22/08/2022) and also in the case of Prasad

Subhash Khade Vs. State of Maharashta (Bail Application

No.1647 of 2020 decided on 18/03/2021).{Para15}

16. In any case, the J.J.Act focuses on a principle of

presumption of innocence and on the principle of best interest

as well as principle of repatriation and restoration, by virtue of

which, the applicant, who is a juvenile, has a right to be reunited with his family at the earliest and to be restored to the

same socio-economic and cultural status that he was in, before

coming under the purview of this Act, unless such restoration

and repatriation is not in his best interest. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

BAIL APPLICATION NO.2282 OF 2021

Date of Order: 21.10.2022

Shubham @ Bablu Milind Vs. The State Of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MHOR/142201/2022,2022:BHC-AS:26901

Print Page

Uttarakhand HC Rules: Bail Applications Under Section 12 of Juvenile Justice Act to be Considered Even if Child Transferred for Adult Trial

 Even if a CIL is transferred for trial as an adult under Section 18(3) of the Act, his bail application shall be entertained under Section 12 of the Act. This view has been consistently discussed and followed in various judgments of various High Courts. In the case of Ccl A vs. State Nct of Delhi, MANU/DE/1914/2020 : (2020) 10 DEL CK 0155, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has categorically held that, "even when a child is sent-up for trial as an adult before a Children's Court, the child does not become an adult or 'major', but is only to be treated differently considering the heinous nature of the offence alleged and consequent need for a stricter treatment of the offender, though still as a juvenile in conflict with law." The Hon'ble Delhi High Court further observed that, "even though a child may be sent-up for trial before the Children's Court as an adult, there is no provision in the JJ Act that requires any departure from considering the matter of release of such child on bail under section 12." Similar views have been expressed in the cases of Siddalinga SN Vs. State of Karnataka MANU/KA/0774/2023 : 2023:KHC(BB):9534, and Shubham Alias Bablu Milind Vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/MHOR/142201/2022. {Para 10}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

First Bail Application No. 273 of 2024

Decided On: 11.06.2024

X Vs. State of Uttarakhand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ravindra Maithani, J.

Citation:  MANU/UC/0195/2024.

Print Page

Karnataka HC: Bail Application of a minor to be considered under Section 12 of Juvenile Justice Act and not CrPC, even if the minor is to be tried as an Adult:

 Section 12(1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other law for the time being in force, a child, who is produced before the Board, shall be released on bail subject to proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act of 2015. Therefore, it is very clear that even if the child is ordered to be tried as a adult, as provided under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015, for the purpose of his bail application, Section 12 of the Act of 2015 would be applicable and his bail application cannot be considered under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. As is evident from Section 12 of the Act of 2015, the only embargo in not releasing a child on bail is that there appears a reasonable ground that his release is likely to bring him into any association with any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or that release of such a person would defeat the ends of justice. {Para 9}

10.  Petitioner's application which was filed under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. before the Special Court was required to be considered as if it is an application under Section 12 of the Act of 2015. Failure to do so has resulted in miscarriage of justice and petitioner's right to liberty has been effected.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 9582 of 2024

Decided On: 24.10.2024

XXX Vs. State and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Vishwajith Shetty, J.

 Citation: 2024:KHC:43235, MANU/KA/3957/2024.

Print Page

Understanding the Applicability of the POCSO Act: Can a Child Be Prosecuted Under POCSO Act?

 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) is a landmark legislation in India, designed to safeguard children from sexual abuse and exploitation. While the Act is primarily focused on protecting children as victims, questions often arise regarding its applicability and whether a child can be prosecuted under its provisions. This article explores these aspects in detail.

Who Does the POCSO Act Apply To?

The POCSO Act is a gender-neutral law that applies to:

Print Page

LLM Notes: Varying Definitions of Child and Juvenile in Indian Law

The concept of "child" in Indian law presents a complex landscape of varying age definitions that depend entirely on the specific legal context and purpose of each statute. Unlike many jurisdictions that maintain uniform definitions, India's legal framework demonstrates significant inconsistency in determining who qualifies as a child, with age limits ranging from as low as 7 years to as high as 21 years across different laws. This variation reflects the diverse objectives of different legislations, from child protection and labor regulation to criminal justice and marriage prevention.

- Age-Based Variations Across Different Legal Frameworks

14-Year Age Limit Laws

Multiple labor-focused legislations define a child as someone who has not completed 14 years of age. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 specifically states that a "child means a person who has not completed his fourteenth year of age". Similarly, the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 defines "child means a person who has not completed fourteen years of age". The Factories Act, 1948 also adheres to this 14-year threshold for defining children in industrial employment contexts.

15-Year Age Limit Specifications

The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 establishes a unique 15-year threshold, defining "child means a person who has not completed his fifteenth year". This law specifically prohibits the employment of children in any capacity within motor transport undertakings. The Plantations Labour Act, 1951 similarly defines "child means a person who has not completed his fifteenth year" in certain provisions, though some sections maintain the 14-year limit.

18-Year Universal Standard

The most commonly adopted age limit of 18 years appears in several major child protection laws. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines a child as "a person who has not completed eighteen years of age". The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012 states that "child means any person below the age of eighteen years". The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 defines a "minor" as "a person who is below the age of 18 years".

- Fundamental Differences Between Child and Juvenile Concepts

Scope and Application Context

The term "child" encompasses a broader protective framework covering civil, family, and welfare matters, while "juvenile" specifically refers to young individuals in conflict with criminal law.  Children are protected under various civil legislations concerning education, labor, marriage, and general welfare, whereas juveniles are specifically addressed within the criminal justice system.

Legal Framework Orientation

Child-focused laws emphasize protection, welfare, and prevention of exploitation across multiple life domains including education, health, and safety. Juvenile justice laws, conversely, concentrate on rehabilitation, reformation, and reintegration of young offenders back into society. The Juvenile Justice Act specifically addresses "children in conflict with law" and "children in need of care and protection".

Age Determination Philosophy

Child definitions vary based on the specific protection or regulation needed, while juvenile classification maintains consistency around criminal responsibility and rehabilitation capacity. The juvenile justice system assumes that individuals under 18 lack the maturity for full criminal responsibility and require specialized treatment.

- Gender-Specific and Special Case Definitions

Marriage-Related Age Distinctions

The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 presents gender-specific definitions where "child means a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not completed eighteen years of age". This law reflects traditional concepts of marriageable age while attempting to prevent child marriages.

Educational Age Parameters

The Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009 specifically targets children "in the age group of six to fourteen years" for free and compulsory elementary education. This law creates both a lower and upper age boundary, focusing on the critical educational development period.

Criminal Responsibility Framework

The Indian Penal Code establishes a unique framework where children below 7 years are considered incapable of committing crimes, while those between 7-12 years may be held responsible only if they demonstrate sufficient maturity to understand the consequences of their actions. This graduated approach recognizes developing cognitive abilities.

- Sector-Specific Legal Variations

Industrial and Labor Protection Laws

Manufacturing and industrial sectors predominantly adopt the 14-year threshold to balance child protection with economic realities. The Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, Factories Act, and Child Labour Act all prohibit employment of children below 14 years in their respective sectors.

Transportation and Mining Industries

The Motor Transport Workers Act extends protection to 15 years, recognizing the additional risks in transportation work. The Mines Act, 1952 provides the strongest protection by prohibiting anyone below 18 years from mine-related work.

Family and Personal Laws

Family-oriented legislation like the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act maintains the 18-year standard for determining legal capacity regarding property, custody, and guardianship matters .

- Contemporary Challenges and Legal Implications

Jurisdictional Confusion

The varying definitions create significant challenges in legal application, particularly when cases involve multiple laws or when determining which protective framework applies. Courts must navigate these inconsistencies when adjudicating matters involving young individuals.

International Standards Alignment

While the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines anyone below 18 as a child, India's domestic laws demonstrate significant deviation from this international standard. This creates complications in implementing international child protection protocols.

Enforcement and Implementation Issues

The lack of uniformity in child definitions complicates enforcement efforts, particularly in cases involving exploitation, trafficking, or abuse where multiple laws may apply simultaneously. Law enforcement agencies must determine which definition applies based on the specific circumstances and legal framework involved .

Conclusion

The concept of "child" in Indian law demonstrates remarkable fluidity, with definitions ranging from 7 to 21 years depending on the specific legal context and protective objectives. While juvenile justice laws maintain relative consistency around the 18-year threshold for criminal matters, child protection spans a much broader spectrum of age-based definitions. This variation reflects India's attempt to balance diverse social, economic, and cultural considerations while providing age-appropriate protections across different sectors. However, this fragmented approach creates significant challenges in legal application and enforcement, highlighting the need for greater harmonization while maintaining context-specific protections .

 The concept of "child" in Indian law demonstrates significant variation across different statutes, with age limits ranging from under 14 years to under 21 years depending on the specific legislation and its objectives. This diversity reflects the different contexts and purposes for which child protection laws were enacted.

Variation in Age Definitions Across Laws

Under 14 Years:

• Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986: Defines a child as "a person who has not completed his fourteenth year of age"

• Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966: States that "child means a person who has not completed fourteen years of age"

• Dangerous Machines (Regulation) Act, 1983 and Minimum Wages Act, 1948 also follow the 14-year threshold.

Under 15 Years:

• Plantations Labour Act, 1951: Defines "child means a person who has not completed his fifteenth year"

• Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961: Uses the same 15-year definition for regulating conditions of motor transport workers

Under 16 Years:

• Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956: Defines "child" as a person below 16 years of age, while "minor" refers to persons aged 16 to 18 years.

Under 18 Years:

• Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015: Defines a child as "a person who has not completed 18 years of age".

• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012: States that "child means any person below the age of eighteen years".

• Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009: Considers "child" as any person below 18 years.

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Define "child" as any person below eighteen years.

Gender-Specific Definitions:

• Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006: Provides different age thresholds based on gender - "child means a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not completed eighteen years of age".

Constitutional Framework

The Indian Constitution provides foundational protection for children through various articles:

• Article 21A: Guarantees free and compulsory education to children aged 6-14 years.

• Article 24: Prohibits employment of children below 14 years in hazardous industries.

• Article 45: Directs states to provide early childhood care and education for children below six years.

Reasons for Variation

The different definitions exist because each law addresses specific aspects of child protection and welfare. Labor laws focus on physical capacity for work, hence the lower age limit of 14 years, while laws addressing sexual offenses and juvenile justice use 18 years to ensure comprehensive protection during adolescence. Marriage laws reflect traditional social practices and legal capacity considerations, explaining the gender-specific age differences.

Challenges and Implications

This variation in definitions creates several challenges:

• Implementation difficulties: Different age thresholds can lead to confusion in enforcement

• Potential loopholes: Children may fall through gaps in protection due to inconsistent definitions

• Legal inconsistencies: The same individual might be considered a child under one law but not another

The lack of uniformity has led to calls for harmonizing the definition of "child" across all Indian legislation, with many experts suggesting alignment with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as anyone below 18 years of age. This would ensure more coherent and effective child protection measures across all areas of law.

Child and Juvenile Definitions in Indian Law

Comprehensive Comparison Table

Legal Framework	Age Limit	Definition	Scope/Application
Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986	14 years	Person who has not completed 14 years	Labor protection in hazardous occupations
Factories Act, 1948	14 years	Person who has not completed 14 years	Industrial employment protection
Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, 1966	14 years	Person who has not completed 14 years	Tobacco industry labor protection
Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961	15 years	Person who has not completed 15 years	Transportation sector employment
Plantations Labour Act, 1951	15 years	Person who has not completed 15 years	Plantation sector employment
Juvenile Justice Act, 2015	18 years	Person who has not completed 18 years	Criminal justice and child protection
POCSO Act, 2012	18 years	Any person below 18 years	Sexual offence protection
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956	18 years	Person below 18 years	Family law and guardianship
Right to Education Act, 2009	6-14 years	Children in age group 6-14 years	Elementary education provision
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006	Male: 21 years, Female: 18 years	Gender-specific age limits	Marriage prevention
Mines Act, 1952	18 years	Person below 18 years	Mining industry protection
Indian Penal Code	7 years (minimum), 7-12 years (conditional)	Below 7: no criminal capacity, 7-12: conditional	Criminal responsibility

Key Differences: Child vs Juvenile

Aspect	Child	Juvenile
Scope	Broad protective framework (civil, family, welfare)	Specific to criminal justice system
Focus	Protection, welfare, exploitation prevention	Rehabilitation, reformation, reintegration
Age Variation	7-21 years (context-dependent)	Primarily 18 years (criminal law)
Legal Framework	Multiple laws with varying definitions	Juvenile Justice Act primarily
Application	Education, labor, marriage, health, safety	Criminal proceedings and corrections

Mind Map Structure for Memorization

CHILD AND JUVENILE DEFINITIONS IN INDIAN LAW
│
├── CHILD CONCEPT
│   │
│   ├── 14-YEAR THRESHOLD
│   │   ├── Child Labour Act 1986
│   │   ├── Factories Act 1948
│   │   └── Beedi & Cigar Workers Act 1966
│   │
│   ├── 15-YEAR THRESHOLD
│   │   ├── Motor Transport Workers Act 1961
│   │   └── Plantations Labour Act 1951
│   │
│   ├── 18-YEAR THRESHOLD
│   │   ├── Juvenile Justice Act 2015
│   │   ├── POCSO Act 2012
│   │   ├── Hindu Minority Act 1956
│   │   └── Mines Act 1952
│   │
│   ├── SPECIAL CASES
│   │   ├── RTE Act: 6-14 years
│   │   ├── Child Marriage Act: M-21, F-18
│   │   └── IPC: Below 7 (no capacity), 7-12 (conditional)
│   │
│   └── CHARACTERISTICS
│       ├── Broad protective scope
│       ├── Context-dependent definitions
│       └── Civil/family/welfare focus
│
└── JUVENILE CONCEPT
    │
    ├── PRIMARY DEFINITION
    │   └── Below 18 years (criminal law context)
    │
    ├── LEGAL FRAMEWORK
    │   └── Juvenile Justice Act 2015
    │
    ├── CATEGORIES
    │   ├── Children in conflict with law
    │   └── Children in need of care and protection
    │
    └── CHARACTERISTICS
        ├── Criminal justice specific
        ├── Rehabilitation focused
        └── Consistent age threshold

Memory Aids for Exam Preparation

Age-Based Mnemonics

• 14 Years: "Factories, Labour, Beedi" (FLB = Fourteen Limit Base)

• 15 Years: "Motor Transport, Plantations" (MTP = Fifteen Plus)

• 18 Years: "Juvenile POCSO Hindu Mines" (JPHM = Eighteen Maximum)

Quick Reference Categories

Labor Protection Laws (14-15 years)

• Focus: Employment prohibition

• Industries: Manufacturing, transport, plantations

General Protection Laws (18 years)

• Focus: Comprehensive welfare

• Areas: Criminal justice, sexual offenses, family law

Special Case Laws

• Education: 6-14 years (RTE)

• Marriage: Gender-specific (M-21, F-18)

• Criminal capacity: Graduated (7, 7-12, 18)

Exam Strategy Points

Key Contrasts to Remember:

• Child = Broad protection across multiple domains

• Juvenile = Specific to criminal justice system

• Age varies by law's purpose and sector

• No uniform definition across Indian legislation

Critical Legal Principles:

• Protective intent varies by sector

• Economic vs. welfare considerations

• International standards vs. domestic variations

• Gender-specific applications in certain laws

Print Page

LLM Notes: Critically Evaluate the Status of Children in India

The status of children in India is a complex and multifaceted issue, situated at the intersection of legal, social, economic, and cultural factors. Despite constitutional guarantees and a comprehensive legal framework, children in India continue to face significant challenges regarding their survival, development, protection, and participation.

1. Legal and Policy Framework

India has developed an extensive legal and policy framework for child rights, drawing from both international and national sources. The Constitution of India guarantees fundamental rights to all children, including the right to life, equality, and education. Key legislations such as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, provide statutory protection for various aspects of child welfare.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Adoption By Widow Would Relate Back To Date Of Husband's Death, gift deed executed by widow will be held null and void

 It is the said finding of the trial Court that was set aside by the High Court in the first appeal with respect to the alienation under the gift deed dated 27.08.2008. A careful scanning of the impugned common judgment of the High Court would reveal that the sound reasoning of the trial Court in regard to this issue was interfered with and set aside without detailed discussion and at the same time without providing any good and sustainable reason therefor. It appears that the High Court was carried away by the fact that the gift deed is a registered one. We have already taken note of the fact that in order to be valid, acceptance of the gift is a pre-requisite. When the very case of one of the donees of the gift viz., the Defendant No. 4 that the property was in the possession of the donor herself till her death itself would reveal that the properties were not delivered and in other words in the legal sense there was no acceptance. The fact that Defendant No. 4 himself depose before the Court that he was not aware of the fact as to in whose possession the gifted properties lie with, would justify the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court. True that the First Appellate Court will be having the power to reappreciate the entire evidence and to substitute any finding of the trial Court if it is legally required. At the same time, when once it is found that a sound reasoning given by a trial Court for returning a finding with respect to a definite issue the same cannot be likely interfered without giving appropriate sustainable reasons. The position with respect to the gift deed is discussed in detail by the trial Court and when it arrived at the conclusion that the pre-requisite for making the same valid was absent such a finding could be reversed only if it is found that the said finding was based on perverse precision of evidence. In the case on hand, the discussion as above would reveal that the pre-requisite to constitute a valid gift is lacking and the evidence discussed by the trial Court would support the said finding we do not find any reason for the Appellate Court to interfere with the same. The declaration that gift deed dated 27.08.2008 is null and void is made by the trial Court in the aforesaid circumstances and it is only as a necessary sequel that the trial Court held that the Appellant/Plaintiff is entitled to entire 'B' and 'C' Schedule properties as the sole legal heir of deceased Defendant No. 1. As noted hereinbefore, DW-1 herself in her written statement admitted the adoption of the Appellant/Plaintiff as her son and the registered adoption deed could fortify the same. When that be so the finding that the Appellant is entitled to the said properties being the sole legal heir of deceased Defendant No. 1 cannot be said to be faulty as it is the inevitable consequence of application for the 'Doctrine of Relation Back' and the ratio of the decisions in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar's case (supra) and Sripad Gajanan Suthankar's case (supra).{Para 29}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 36-37 of 2025.

Decided On: 02.01.2025

Mahesh Vs. Sangram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Author: C.T. Ravikumar, J.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Sale Deed Executed After Adoption By Mother For Pre-Adoption Property Binding On Adopted Child

 Obviously, in the case on hand, the factum of adoption of the Appellant/the Plaintiff by Defendant No. 1 after the death of adoptive father, on 16.07.1994 is established by the Appellant/the Plaintiff and it is pertinent to note that the same was admitted by Defendant No. 1 as well, in her written statement. In such circumstances, in view of the 'Doctrine of Relation Back' and by applying the law laid down in Sripad Gajanan Suthankar's case (supra) relied on with agreement in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar's case (supra) the adoption by Defendant No. 1, the widow of Bhavakanna Shahpurkar, would relate back to the date of death of the adoptive father which is 04.03.1982 but then all lawful alienations made by Defendant No. 1 would be binding on the Appellant/Plaintiff. As held in Sripad Gajanan Suthankar's case (supra) in paragraph 11 his right to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the capacity of Defendant No. 1 who made the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation. {Para 22}

23. The first among the alienations under challenge in the case on hand is the one where Defendant No. 1 effected sale of the properties covered by registered sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in respect of 'A' Schedule property in favour of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3. There is concurrency with respect to the said issue between the trial Court and the High Court. The Courts have held that Defendant No. 1 got absolute right to effect the sale of the property covered thereunder and that the sale was done in favour of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in accordance with the law. Admittedly, in regard to the sale, Defendant No. 1 executed the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 and she was not having a case that she had not received sale consideration. By applying the 'Doctrine of Relation Back' and the ratio of decisions in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar's case (supra) and Sripad Gajanan Suthankar's case (supra) it can only be held that the Appellant/Plaintiff is bound by the said alienation. This is because of the cumulative effect of the compromise decree in OS No. 122 of 2009 followed by Ext.D14 and the allotment of share based on the same. In this context it is also relevant to note that the factum of execution of the sale deed is not disputed by the Appellant but his contention is only that Defendant No. 1 could not have sold the property without his consent and knowledge. Though the alienation was subsequent to his adoption by virtue of the fact that Defendant No. 1 got absolute right and title in regard to the property covered by the said sale deed dated 13.12.2007 and that a valid sale was effected following the procedures, the challenge of the Appellant against the said alienation of property by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 is not liable to be interfered with. We have no hesitation to hold that the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the High Court in regard to the said sale deed warrant no interference. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 36-37 of 2025.

Decided On: 02.01.2025

Mahesh Vs. Sangram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Author: C.T. Ravikumar, J.

Print Page

Bombay HC: In-Laws Keeping Young Child Away From Mother In Defiance Of Court Order Is Cruelty U/S 498A IPC

 As mentioned above, the daughter of respondent No. 2, who is now only around four years old is kept away from her. A judicial order passed by the Competent Court of law is also not being obeyed. Although, the daughter is with husband, we have already recorded above that the applicants herein are assisting his husband in the sense that his whereabouts are not being disclosed. Keeping a young child of four years old away from her mother in defiance of Court order also amounts to mental harassment amounting to cruelty in as much as it would certainly cause grave injury to mental health of respondent No. 2, mother of the child. Such act of the in-laws amounts to cruelty within the meaning of Explanation (a) to Section 498-A of IPC. We further record that the said mental harassment is continuing from day to day till date. It is a continuing wrong. {Para 13}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 2376 of 2023

Decided On: 11.12.2024

Rekha and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi and R.W. Joshi, JJ.

Author: R.W. Joshi, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/7440/2024.

Print Page

Whether child welfare committee under Juvenile justice Act can hand over custody of child to mother when the matter is pending before the Family Court?

 5. In a case of identical nature, a Division Bench

of this Court in Shaiju S and others v. Child Welfare

Committee and others [2021 (6) KHC 573] has held as

under:

“11. We must at the outset note that the Committee

committed grave error in ordering custody to the mother

when the matter is pending before the Family Court. The

Committee ought to have restrained from entertaining a

dispute which is a subject matter of lis between the

parties. We must also note that wrangling between the

spouses in regard to custody will not confer any power on

the Committee to interfere in such matters and give

custody to one of them. Going by various provisions,

including Section 2(14)(v) of the Act, the Committee's role

would arise only when none of the parents is in a position

to take care or protect the child or children. The

Committee can step into at a stage to protect a child when

parents are not in a position to protect the child. The role

of the Committee commences from the stage where both

parents are not in a position to take care and protect the

child. The parens patriae principle to intervene is to

protect the child and act as a parent of the child when

parents fail to take care and protect the child. So also is

the matter of dispute between spouses. The Committee

would be justified in interfering with the custody of child

with one of the parent, if that parent is incapacitated or

failed completely to take care of the child.

12. The Committee cannot voluntarily interfere with

the custody of the children except on a circumstance

where it forms an opinion that the child requires care and

protection. Merely because the children are isolated from

the mother by the father, Committee cannot interfere with

the legal custody of the children by the father”.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 35830 OF 2024

SHITHU KS Vs  CHAIRPERSON, CHILD WELFARE COMMITTEE,

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated this the 12th day of December, 2024

Citation: 2024:KER:94086.

Read full Judgment here: Click here. 

Print Page

Kerala HC: Shuttling Child Between Two Forums Causes Inconvenience And Is Detrimental To Child's Welfare

 On scrutinizing the averments in

O.P.No.411/2024, it shows that that the 3rd respondent

does not have a case that his child is a child in need of

care and protection so as to attract the provisions of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2015. Even otherwise the respondent in the petition is

the biological mother of the child. Furthermore, the

filing of a second petition for an identical relief is

unwarranted because the Family Court is the Court of

competent jurisdiction to decide on the interim and

permanent custody of the child. The Family Court has

concurrent jurisdiction with the 1st respondent in matters

concerning the welfare of children. Since the 3rd

respondent has elected the Family Court, his subsequent

endeavour to approach the 1st respondent for identical

reliefs seems to be with an intention to harass the

petitioner. Unmindful of the above legal question, the 1st

respondent has ordered the 2nd respondent to produce

the child before them, when the matter is sub-judice

before the Family Court. {Para 4}

6.  Shuttling the child between the two

Forums will cause inconvenience to the child and is

detrimental to its paramount welfare.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 35830 OF 2024

SHITHU KS Vs  CHAIRPERSON, CHILD WELFARE COMMITTEE,

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated this the 12th day of December, 2024

Citation: 2024:KER:94086.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Mere desire of a child at a tender age is not a sole factor to be considered for deciding child custody

In view of the above, now it is settled that it is the

interest of the children that needs to be considered. Mere desire

of a child at a tender age is not a sole factor to be considered for

taking decision in respect of the custody. The child at the tender

age is not fully aware of his welfare. There is always tendency to

be with parent with whom they are residing. They are mostly

influenced by tutoring by the parents. Interaction with child is

thus influenced by such parents. In the present case also, this

court interacted with the children. The children naturally stated

that they are happy with the father. However, it must be

considered that presently children are in custody of the father

and as expected, answer has come in favour of the father. 

{Para 12}

13. So far as better company and care is concerned, it is

seen that almost every member in the family of the husband is

occupied in the business. There is only grand-mother of the

children who is in the house for whole day. In the house of the

wife, she is always at home. She stays with her parents. There

are other relatives in the family. So far as deprivation of the

company is concerned, it needs to be noted that both the parties

are staying in the same town. Distance between the houses of

husband and wife is not more than 2 km. Thus, visitation by

parent would not be much difficult. Husband can always meet

children at convenient place. Husband and wife are related to

each other even prior to marriage. One more factor needs to be

considered is that there is one female child who is staying with

mother. If all the siblings stay together it would help children in

growing together. Being female child she requires care and

attention of the mother. Under Muslim Law, custody of the

children below 7 years is required to be with the wife.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

FIRST APPEAL NO. 1708 OF 2024 WITH CA/7330/2024 IN FA/1708/2024

Mukhtar S/o. Yunus Sayyad, Vs  Habiba W/o. Mukhtar Sayyad,

CORAM : KISHORE C. SANT, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 28th AUGUST, 2024

Print Page

Whether the Pocso court must record reasons if he could not record evidence of child within thirty days of taking cognizance of offence?

Even otherwise, Section 35 of the POCSO Act allows the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence to record evidence of the  child after a period of thirty days from the date on which cognizance of the offence has been taken. The only rider in this regard imposed by the provision of law is that the Court must record reasons for the delay. In the present case, while allowing recording of evidence after a period of thirty days from the date of taking of cognizance, the Special Court did not record any reasons for the delay. But, the deficiency would have to be considered only as an irregularity in the light of the petitioner not raising any specific objection to the application vide exhibit 24. If the petitioner had raised objection and showed that there was any possibility of prejudice being caused to his defence, the case would have been different and perhaps, the challenge now made to the order dated 2nd March 2016 by the petitioner would have been required to be considered in the perspective of the prejudice factor. This is not the case here and, therefore, I do not think that failure of the learned Special Judge to record reasons for belated recording of the evidence of the victim has resulted in an illegality, causing prejudice to the defence of the petitioner. 

{Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

Criminal Writ Petition No. 68 of 2018

 Shubham Vilas Tayade,  Vs The State of Maharashtra, through Police

Coram : S. B. Shukre, J

Dated : 31st January 2018

Print Page

Supreme Court: A sum of Rs. 40,000/- is to be paid to each of the parents towards loss of consortium on the death of a child

This Court in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Ors. MANU/SC/1012/2018 : (2018) 18 SCC 130 has held that a sum of Rs. 40,000/- is to be paid to each of the parents towards loss of consortium on the death of a child. Therefore, the Appellants are entitled to be awarded Rs. 40,000/- each towards loss of consortium.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6291 of 2019 

Decided On: 14.08.2019

Joginder Singh and Ors. Vs. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Author: Indu Malhotra, J.

Citation: 2019 (4) TAC 3, MANU/SC/1096/2019.

Print Page

Supreme Court: DLSA to ensure that child victims of sexual offenses are provided with counseling by a trained child counselor or child psychologist

 We have a suggestion to make before we part with judgment. Whenever a child is subjected to sexual assault, the State or the Legal Services Authorities should ensure that the child is provided with a facility of counselling by a trained child counsellor or child psychologist. It will help the victim children to come out of the trauma, which will enable them to lead a better life in future.

The State needs to ensure that the children who are the victims of the offence continue with their education. The social environment around the victim child may not always be conducive to the victim's rehabilitation. Only the monetary compensation is not enough. Only the payment of compensation will not amount to rehabilitation in a true sense.

Perhaps the rehabilitation of the girl victims in life should be part of the "Beti Bachao Beti Padhao" campaign of the Central Government. As a welfare State, it will be the duty of the Government to do so. 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 State of Rajasthan Vs. Gautam S/o. Mohanlal

[Criminal Appeal No. 3168 of 2023 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11331 of 2019]

Abhay S. Oka, J.

Print Page