Showing posts with label in laws. Show all posts
Showing posts with label in laws. Show all posts

Sunday, 5 January 2025

Bombay HC: In-Laws Keeping Young Child Away From Mother In Defiance Of Court Order Is Cruelty U/S 498A IPC

 As mentioned above, the daughter of respondent No. 2, who is now only around four years old is kept away from her. A judicial order passed by the Competent Court of law is also not being obeyed. Although, the daughter is with husband, we have already recorded above that the applicants herein are assisting his husband in the sense that his whereabouts are not being disclosed. Keeping a young child of four years old away from her mother in defiance of Court order also amounts to mental harassment amounting to cruelty in as much as it would certainly cause grave injury to mental health of respondent No. 2, mother of the child. Such act of the in-laws amounts to cruelty within the meaning of Explanation (a) to Section 498-A of IPC. We further record that the said mental harassment is continuing from day to day till date. It is a continuing wrong. {Para 13}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 2376 of 2023

Decided On: 11.12.2024

Rekha and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi and R.W. Joshi, JJ.

Author: R.W. Joshi, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/7440/2024.

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Monday, 12 August 2024

Bombay HC: In-Laws Can't Be Booked U/S 498A of IPC Merely On Allegations That They Supported Husband Who Subjected Wife To Cruelty

 In the case of R. P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab, reported in MANU/SC/0086/1960 : 1960:INSC:61 : AIR 1960 SC 866, the Hon'ble Apex Court had summarized the categories of cases where inherent powers can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. The three categories are reproduced here-in below :


(i) where it manifestly appears that there is legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;


(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;


(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. {Para 15}


16. In our opinion, the case of the present Applicants would fall under the category (ii) from the above referred three categories, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint taken to its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. Merely, remarks in the complaint about the supporting the accused No.1 while narrating some of the incidents would not per se amount to committing the offences which they have been alleged of. It would be unfair to continue the prosecution against the present Applicants for the conduct of the accused No.1, in which they have been unfortunately dragged. From the various incidents which have been narrated by the Respondent No.2 as well as the witnesses, who are her near relatives, there does not appear to be complicity of the present Applicants. The continuation of present proceedings against the Applicants would cause injustice and hardship to the Applicants. Even otherwise, the material collected during the investigation does not support the charges levelled against the present Applicants. The malafide proceedings initiated against the present Applicants needs to be curbed at this stage itself, in order to prevent abuse or process of law and miscarriage of justice, since it is obvious that the allegations are not supported by any other cogent material and have been made with a view to wreak vengeance against the present Applicants.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application (APL) No. 1241 of 2014 and Interim Application No. 779 of 2020

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, J.

Decided On: 25.07.2024.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4875/2024.

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Thursday, 26 January 2023

Is Mental Cruelty as per S 498A of IPC Possible Even If In-Laws Reside Separately?

 These allegations in the FIR some of which can be found in the statements of the witnesses show that these applicants, prima facie, subjected non-applicant no. 2 to humiliation, harassment and cruelty of such a nature as is contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC and therefore, we are of the view that there is prima facie case made out against each of the applicants, inspite of their sometimes residing away from the place where non-applicant no. 2 resided. One cannot forget the fact that cruelty as envisaged under Section 498-A of the IPC is not only physical, it also takes within its fold several other forms of cruelty, including mental cruelty. The mental cruelty is an abstract concept and it is a matter of experience for a person who is subjected to cruelty. Many a times certain taunts are made against another person but it all depends upon the manner in which the person takes those remarks or responds to them. Sometimes, the taunts might be seen to be innocuous by one person, while they may not be necessarily so perceived by another person. There are also certain derogatory remarks, which have been held by Supreme Court to be presumptively constituting cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the IPC, as for example consistently suspecting fidelity of wife {See A. Jayachandra Vs. Annel Kaur [MANU/SC/1023/2004 : (2005) 2 SCC 22]}. Such being the nature of mental cruelty, it is not necessary that it must take place in the physical presence of persons and that it can be handed out even from a distant place. Here, in this case, for meting out mental cruelty to non-applicant no. 2, of course, in prima facie way, these applicants seems to have employed modern means of communication i.e. telephone etc. and on many occasions, they have also remained present in the company of non-applicant no. 2. Therefore, this is not a case where the applicants, by virtue of their separate residence, could be presumed to not have treated non-applicant no. 2 in a cruel manner. {Para 7}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application (APL) No. 1660 of 2022

 Sunita Kumari and Ors. Vs.  State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: S.B. Shukre, J.

Decided On: 22.12.2022.

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 5.

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Tuesday, 24 May 2022

Whether widow is entitled to get relief against her In-laws under the domestic violence Act?

 (iii) That is why, the expression 'domestic relationship' has been defined in an expansive manner to mean a relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household when they are related by marriage. We have also interpreted the word 'live' or 'lived' in the context of right to reside in Sub-section (1) of Section 17. The right to live in the shared household, even when the domestic relationship may have been severed for instance when a woman has been widowed owing to the death of her husband, entitles her to have remedies under the D.V. Act.

(c) Even in the case of relationship in the nature of marriage, during which period the woman suffered domestic violence and is thus an aggrieved person can seek remedies subsequent to the cessation of the relationship, the only pre-condition is that the allegation of domestic violence must relate to the period of the subsistence of relationship in the nature of marriage.

In our view, the question raised about a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed must be interpreted in a broad and expansive way, so as to encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in presentia but also a past domestic relationship. Therefore, the Parliament has intentionally used the expression 'domestic relationship' to mean a relationship between two persons who not only live together in the shared household but also between two persons who 'have at any point of time lived together' in a shared household.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs.  Kamlesh Devi

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Sunday, 28 May 2017

Whether husband can prove that wife caused cruelty to his relatives without examining them?

 To prove the accusation of humiliation caused to other family
members of the appellant/husband, we find that none of the family members
has been examined as witness with any specific act attributed to the
respondent/wife which can be termed as cruelty for purpose of seeking
divorce. While the appellant/husband has appeared as PW-1, he examined
his neighbour Sh.Om Prakash as PW-2 and Sh.A.K.Gaur – his brother-inlaw
as PW-3. None of these two witnesses deposed about any incident
which could prove any act of cruelty being committed by the 
respondent/wife till she stayed at her matrimonial home.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Dated: August 29, 2016
 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 49/2014
ANIL KUMAR SHARMA 
v
MANJU SHARMA 
CORAM:
 MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
 MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
Citation: AIR 2017 Delhi 3
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Friday, 3 February 2017

Whether Woman filing suit for partition against IN LAWS entitled to get exemption from payment of court fees?

It appears that in view of the case decided in
the year 2000 by the learned Single Judge (cited supra)
and as there was difference of opinion of other learned
Single Judge the matter of application of the notifications

to the probate proceeding was referred to larger Bench.
The Division Bench, as larger Bench, decided the point in
the case reported as 2008(3) AIR Bom R 820 (Re : Girish
Kanaiyalal Munshi). The Division Bench considered the
following point :-
"Whether a woman litigant who files a petition for
grant of Probate of a Will is exempted from payment of
Court Fees as per Government Notification dated 1st
October, 1994 duly amended by an explanatory
notification dated 23rd March 2000 ?"
6) In the aforesaid case, the Division Bench
considered almost all the cases decided by the learned
Single Judges of this Court in the past, including the
matters mentioned above and considered the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court who
had referred the matter to larger Bench. The Division
Bench accepted the views of the learned Single Judge who
had made request of reference and held that the petition
for probate of will is neither a petition in relation to any
property in dispute nor it arises out of or concerning a
matrimonial matter. When the larger Bench gave aforesaid
decision and held that benefit was not available, following
observations made at paragraph 26-D.

"26. After hearing the learned Senior Counsel Dr.
Tulzapurkar and the learned Advocate General and
in light of the extensive arguments forwarded on
behalf of the petitioner and the State, the various
judgments of this Court regarding the exemption
from payment of Court fees by women litigants and
several other relevant judgments of this Court and
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the following issues can
be clearly outlined.
A) . . . .
B) . . . .
C) . . . .
D) Lastly, the words 'property dispute arising out
of or concerning matrimonial matters' should be
given their plain and simple meaning, that is, a
dispute arising between parties to a marriage,
(attention may be brought to the reference made by
Deshmukh J. to the Family Courts Act sub-section (1)
of Section 7, to elucidate the meaning of the term
'matrimonial matters') and should therefore exclude
testamentary petitions wherein not only is there an
absence of dispute, other than in cases when
somebody files a caveat, it is not a matter between
two parties to a marriage."
7) In the case reported as 2013(7) ALL MR 138
(Shrinivas vs. Savitribai) learned Single Judge used the
observations made by the Division Bench at paragraph 26-
D, quoted above, and held that woman litigant, who has
filed suit for partition against her in-laws after the death
of her husband, is not entitled to exemption of Court fees
under th aforesaid Government Notifications.

8) This Court would like to use the observations
made by the Division Bench, quoted above, and also the
interpretation of the decision made by the learned Single
Judge in the case of Shrinivas (cited supra). This Court
holds that when suit is filed by woman litigant for relief of
partition against her in laws, she cannot get the benefit of
the aforesaid Government Notifications as the matter is
not between the woman litigant and her husband and such
matters are excluded due to explanation added to the
Notification in the year 2000. So, this Court holds that no
interference is warranted in the order made by the
learned Judge of the trial Court. In the result, the petition
stands dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Writ Petition No.271 of 2016
Harsha Pradeep Patil.
V
Sayankabai Ragho Patil & Others. 
 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.

 DATE : 13 OCTOBER 2016
Citation: 2017(1) BOM C R 86
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Friday, 30 September 2016

Whether wife can be denied maintenance on ground that in laws are acquitted in dowry demand case?

Acquittal of the petitioner and his family members in
dowry demand case is no ground to deny maintenance to the
wife and the child. The petitioner cannot be absolved of his
liability to maintain the wife and the child on this score. The case
in hand is required to be decided on the preponderance of
probabilities and no strict standard of proof is required to be
proved.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
 Crl. Misc. No.M-33576 of 2013(O&M)
 Date of decision : 20.09.2016
Narender @ Kala .
v
Sunita

CORAM:- HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANITA CHAUDHRY

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Saturday, 14 May 2016

When prosecution for criminal misappropriation of stridhan is not tenable against IN-LAWS?

Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about
the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that
such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion
of the parents-in-law of the bride or other close relations so as to
attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As
noticed earlier, after marriage, Syamala Rani and first appellant
were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of
‘stridhana articles’ given to the bride, one has to take into
consideration the common practice that these articles are sent
along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of
common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in
connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in
her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been
residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the
dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return
the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case
and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do
not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for

proceeding against the appellants 2 to 6. Be it noted that
appellants 2 to 6 are also facing criminal prosecution for the
offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding
under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the
criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, in the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the
dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view,
continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is
not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)
BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS. 
Versus
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP.
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC309
Dated;January 19, 2016


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Saturday, 20 February 2016

Whether In laws of woman are liable to pay maintenance to her if her husband is not traceable?

From the principles enunciated in the above referred
decisions, it is apparent that any right which the wife has
during the subsistence of her marriage and during the lifetime
of her husband is against the husband and she has no right to
claim any relief against the father-in-law or sister-in-law or any

of the relatives of her husband inasmuch as the obligation to
maintain her lies only on her husband.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 3993 of 2014

ABDULRAHIM ABDULMIYA PIRZADA Vs  STATE OF GUJARAT 

CORAM:  MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
 Date : 21/01/2016

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Monday, 10 August 2015

When offence of misappropriation of streedhan by IN-LAWS is not made out?

In paragraph 4 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the cash and gifts which the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav had received during marriage were kept at the matrimonial home by all the accused persons including the applicant No. 1, who is accused No. 7, being the mediator for the marriage between the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav; and the applicant No. 2, who is accused No. 4, being the sister in law of the complainant-Non-applicant No. 2. It is an admitted position that both these applicants were not part of matrimonial home of the accused No. 1 and Non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, no offences relating to cheating and criminal breach of trust punishable under Sections 417 and 406 would be prima facie made out against these applicants. Besides, there is also no allegation in paragraph 4 that the Non-applicant No. 2 at any point of time demanded return of the Stridhan articles to her from those accused persons who are residing in her matrimonial home.
Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014
Decided On: 14.01.2015

 Gopal and Ors.
Vs.
 State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.
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