Showing posts with label collusion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label collusion. Show all posts

Thursday, 13 August 2020

Whether Judgment debtor can resist the execution of decree if it fails to challenge compromise decree?

True, the trial Court has simply recorded the terms of the compromise. But this compromise carries with it all the elements highlighted in Roshan Lal, a judgment of the Supreme Court's three-Judge Bench: "The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law."

33. About the plea of collusion, I must note that the Society has already raised that issue in an independent suit but did not pursue it. It has not even arrayed, in these proceedings, the President eo nominee. Besides, the courts below have, on facts, rejected the Society's plea of collusion. First, the court that passed the decree has inherent jurisdiction. Second, the procedural lapses, if any, have not gone to the root of the matter to nullify that decree. Third, the Society filed a suit on the same cause but later abandoned it. Fourth, in a revision, this Court will not upset findings of fact.

34. In the above context, so long as the decree has remained unchallenged, the Society or its members cannot be heard saying that despite their earlier failed attempt, they still can obstruct the decree. Such an approach, if approved, falls foul of the Rule of Law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 296 of 2008

Decided On: 11.09.2019

 Nira and Palm Product Producers Co-op. Society's Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. Nirmala Yeshwant Pethe and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3150/2019
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Friday, 28 December 2018

Supreme Court: Decree passed after impleading some of legal heirs is binding on legal heirs who were not party to proceeding

 It is true that the cases of the Madras and Orissa High Courts did not relate to the estate of a Muslim debtor. But the rule, as already stated, stated, is one of procedure and not of personal law, and applies to a Muslim debtor's estate as well as to a Hindu debtor's estate. It is true that in the case of a debtor who is sued for recovery of the debt, and if he died after the institution of the suit, there is some order of the court-express or implied - recognising that the person sought to be brought on record are the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased debtor. The court records a conclusion, if not expressly, by implication, that they represent the estate. It was held by this court, as already stated earlier, in a recent judgment in Daya Ram's case that failure to bring the other heirs on record, if there is a bona fide enquiry as to the existence of the heirs does no affect the validity of the decree and the proceeding taken thereunder. In a suit instituted against the heirs of a deceased debtor, it is the creditor who takes upon himself the responsibility to bring certain persons as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased on the record. If he has proceeded bona fide and after due enquiry and under a belief that the persons who are brought on the record are the only legal representatives, it would make no difference in principle that in the former case the heirs have been brought on the record during the pendency of the suit, the creditor having died since the institution of the suit and in the other at the instance of the plaintiff certain persons are impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased person. In either case, where after due enquiry certain persons are impleaded after diligent and bona fide enquiry in the genuine belief that they are the only persons interested in the estate, the whole estate of the deceased will be duly represented by those persons who are brought on the record or impleaded and the decree will be binding upon the entire estate. This rule will of course not apply to cases where there has been fraud or collusion between the creditor and the heir impleaded or where there are other circumstances which indicate that there has not been a fair or real trial, or that the absent heir has a special defense which was not and could not be tried in the earlier proceeding.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 432 of 1963

Decided On: 23.09.1965

N.K. Mohammad Sulaiman Vs. N.C. Mohammad Ismail and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.C. Shah, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, S.M. Sikri and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation: AIR. 1966 S.C. 792


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Thursday, 19 October 2017

Whether court can grant injunction to person whose possession over property is not legal?

It is a settled principle of law that in order to claim prohibitory (temporary or permanent) injunction, it is necessary for the Plaintiff to prima facie prove apart from establishing other two ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that his possession over the suit land is "legal". In this case, it was not so and nor it could be for the simple reason that as far back on 21.08.1976, the Tribunal had already declared the land held by the Plaintiff to be in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed under the Act. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff was neither holding the land nor could he be held to be in its lawful possession so as to enable him to exercise any ownership rights against any other private party over the suit land. The Appellant had then very limited rights left to exercise under the Act in relation to the suit land and such rights were available to him only against the State. Such is not the case here.


38. Lastly, this being a simple suit for grant of permanent injunction between the two private parties in relation to the land which was subject matter of the State Ceiling Laws, was liable to be dismissed on the short ground apart from many others as detailed above that any order that may be passed by the Civil Court would adversely affect and interfere in the rights of the State under the Act, which had not been impleaded as party Defendant.



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



Civil Appeal No. 5817 of 2012



Decided On: 13.04.2017



 Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao Vs.  Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors.



Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and Navin Sinha, JJ.
Citation:(2017) 7 SCC 694,2018(1) MHLJ 94
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Sunday, 25 December 2016

How to appreciate evidence adduced by purchaser if there is collusion between father and son?


 In the present matter agreement was entered
into on 12-2-1974 and it can be said that possession of the
property was with the family of the plaintiffs and
defendant No.1 from prior to the date of agreement.
Though in the pleadings it is the case of the plaintiffs that
they were driven out of the house by defendant No.1 and
then they had started business in the premises in
Ambajogai, the record is otherwise and it shows that the
premises was given on rent basis to defendant No.1 and
he was the proprietor of the said business. When there is
collusion between defendant No.1 and plaintiffs, some
inference needs to be drawn against the plaintiffs and
defendant No.1 as there is power with the Karta of joint
Hindu family to decide as to whether there is legal
necessity for selling the property.
15) Learned counsel for the respondent placed
reliance on cases reported as 2010 (5) Mh.L.J. 713
(Ramchandra vs. Vasant), A.I.R. (33) 1944 Oudh 92 (Sant
Bakhsh Singh v. Lachhman Prasad) and the decision
given of this Court, other Hon'ble judge in Second Appeal
No.287/1989 (between Suryakant Manikrao Deshmukh
and Mahavir Sahebrao Maske). In those cases also when
the question of legal necessity was involved, the suit
involving setting aside of the sale, made by father and
father did not turn up to give evidence, presumption was
drawn that there was legal necessity. In the present
matter also there is evidence that the plaintiffs and
defendant No.1 are living together and they are benefited
by the consideration. As there is no evidence, the
inference is not possible that defendant No.1 was addicted
to bad vices and the sale proceeds were not utilized for
the family. If they are living together there was some
reason for the sale and the reason given by the defendant
No.2 is that the land was not giving sufficient income and
so they started business at Ambajogai. Thus necessary
probability was created by the defendant No.2 in his
favour on the point of legal necessity and the District
Court has not committed any error in holding that this
burden is discharged by the purchaser. In the result, the
point is answered against the appellants and the appeal
is dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Second Appeal No. 125 of 1992

 Shridhar s/o Bajirao Pawar,
V
 Bajirao s/o Dhondiba Pawar,
 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.

 DATE : 22 JULY 2016
Citation: 2016(6) ALLMR 280
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Thursday, 20 October 2016

What are rights of minor after attaining majority to challenge decree passed against him?

The right of the minor, after attaining majority in order to challenge earlier judgment and decree passed against him in terms of Order 32 Rule 3A of the C.P.C. has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kameshwari Devi v. Barhani as reported in (1997) 10 SCC 273 wherein it has been held as follows under para-4:-
It is true, as rightly contended by Dr. Shankar Ghose, learned Senior Counsel, that in a case where the estate of the minor is involved in an action for partition or any other suit, the estate of the senior is required to be properly represented taking all diligent steps by either guardian ad litem or the court guardian. If the interest or the estate of the minor is not protected necessarily, the minor on his attaining majority or within three years thereafter is entitled to file the suit under Section 7 of the Limitation Act, after cessation of the disability to question the correctness of a decree which is sought to be made binding on him. But in that case, the limited defence that could be open to him is that either the decree in the earlier suit was obtained by fraud/collusion or by negligence by the court guardian or that the guardian ad litem did not safeguard the interest of the estate of the minor. On proof of those facts, necessarily, the decree does not bind him and it is open to the court to go behind the decree and consider the right of the minor dehors the decree.
36. In the case of Asharfi Lal v. Smt. Koili (dead) as reported in AIR 1995 SC 1440 it has been held under following paragraphs which are as follows:-
9. The question is whether it is permissible for a minor to avoid a judgment delivered in an earlier proceeding to which he was a party on the ground of negligence of his next friend. In England, an infant plaintiff is as much bound by a judgment or order as an adult, even though there may have been irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings, unless there has been fraud or gross negligence on the part of his next friend. [See: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 24. Para 895. 12]. In Re Hoghton, Hoghton v. Fiddey, (1874) LR 18 Eq 573, Sir Richards Malins V. C., while considering the question whether an infant is to suffer by any negligence on the part of a next friend, has observed :
"The proposition that an infant of tender years may have her whole fortune wrecked by the neglect of their next friend is so monstrous that I cannot pay attention to it. She is entitled to have a next friend who is diligent and will protect her interests."
10. The Courts in India, by and large, have adopted the same approach. Till 1936 there was consensus of judicial opinion that it is permissible for a minor to a void a decree obtained against him if there is negligence on the part of his next friend in the conduct of the case. [See : Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v. Ramnandan Dubey, (1894) ILR 22 Cal. 8; Gursan Das Natha v. Ladakavahu, (1895) ILR 19 Bom. 571; Hanmantapa Chundruna Punnayyah v. Rajan Viranna, AIR 1922 Mad. 273; Kumar Ganganand Singh v. Maharaja Sir Rameshwar Singh Bahadur, AIR 1927 Pat 271; Imam Din v. Puran Chand, (1919) ILR 1 Lah 27 : (AIR 1920 Lahore 417); Siraj Fatma v. Mahmud Ali, (1932) ILR 54 All. 646 : (AIR 1932 All 293) (FB)].
11. In 1936, the Privy Council in Talluri Ventaka Seshaya v. Thadikonda Kotiswara Rao, AIR 1937 P. C.
1, considered the question whether a decree can be set aside on the ground of gross negligence in the context of a representative suit under Order 1, Rule 8, CPC. In that case, their Lordships, after noticing the decisions of the Calcutta High Court and Madras High Court, have observed :
"Their Lordships are not concerned to discuss the validity of these decisions, or the illusive distinction between negligence and gross negligence, as they are satisfied that the principle involved in these cases is not applicable to such cases as the present one. The protection of minors against the negligent actings of their guardians is a special one, and in these cases the plaintiff in the second suit was also the plaintiff in the former suit, although in the earlier suit he or she had sued through a guardian." [P. 4]
12. The Privy Council did not, however, agree with the view expressed in Karri Bapanna v. Yerramma, AIR 1923 Mad 718, that the principles of Section 44 of the Evidence Act can be extended to cases of gross negligence and observed :
"The provisions of S. 11 Civil P. C. are mandatory, and the ordinary litigant, who claims under one of the parties to the former suit can only avoid its provisions by taking advantage of S. 44,Evidence Act, which defines with precision the grounds of such avoidance as fraud or collusion. It is not for the Court to treat negligence, or gross negligence, as fraud or collusion, unless fraud or collusion is the proper inference from the facts." [P. 4]
13. After the said decision of the Privy Council, the matter has been considered by the various High Courts. Most of the High Courts have taken the view that though a judgment against a minor cannot be avoided on the ground of fraud or gross negligence on the part of his next friend under Section 44 of the Evidence Act, it is permissible for the minor to file a suit to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud or gross negligence on the part of his next friend. (See : Mahesh Chandra v. Manindra Nath, AIR 1941 Cal. 401; Eqappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1942 Mad, 384; Iftikar Hussain Khan v. Beant Singh, AIR 1946 Lah. 233 (FB); Mahammad Baksh v. Allah Din, AIR 1942 Oudh 33;
Kamkashya Narain Singh Bahadur v. Baldeo Sahai, AIR 1950 Pat. 97 (FB) and Rameshwar Prasad v. Ram Chandra Sharma, AIR 1951 All. 372 (FB)). The Bombay High Court has, however, taken a different view and has held that gross negligence, apart from fraud or collusion on the part of the next friend or guardian ad litem or a minor litigant cannot be made the basis of a suit to set aside a decree obtained against him. [See : Krishnadas Padmanabhrao Chandavarkar v. Vithoba Annappa Shetti, AIR 1939 Bom. 66 (67) (Full Bench)]. In that case Beaumont C. J. has disagreed with the earlier decisions of the said High Court on the view that the said decisions were based on a misconception of English law and that under the English law an infant cannot challenge a decree properly passed against him on the ground that his guardian ad litem was guilty of gross negligence in suffering the decree, and if that is so, there was no reason why such a cause of action should lie in British India. Meredith J., in Kamkashya Narain Singh Bahadur v. Baldeo Sahai (AIR 1950 Patna 97) (FB) (supra), has dealt with the English law on the subject and has pointed out that Beaumont C. J. in Krishnadas Padmanabhrao Chandavarkar v. Vithoba Annappa Shetti (AIR 1939 Bom 66) (FB) (supra) was not right in his appreciation of the English law on the subject. According to the learned Judge [Meredith J.] the substantive right to an infant, on attaining majority, to avoid a decree obtained against him owing to the gross negligence of his next friend was undoubtedly recognised in England from early times. The Privy Council in Talluri Venkata Seshayya v. Thadikonda Kotiswara Rao (AIR 1937 P. C. 1) (supra) has also pointed out that protection of minors against the neglect acting of their guardians is a special one. In the instant case, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that it is permissible for a minor to file a suit to set aside a decree on the ground of gross negligence on the part of his next friend. We are in agreement with the said view.
37. Plaintiffs, who have come forward and claimed relief to be adjudicated upon as well as be granted to them on the facts so enumerated in the plaint, is further found under obligation to substantiate the same by cogent and reliable evidence in terms of Section 101, 102 of the Evidence Act. Furthermore, in terms of Order 32 Rule 3A of the C.P.C. which permits the minor after attaining majority to challenge the previous decree being adverse to him on the ground of misconduct, gross negligence on the part of next friend or guardian, was required to, in terms thereof, to be duly substantiated by the cogent and reliable evidence.
Patna High Court
Bijendra Mandal & Ors vs Ganpat Mandal on 4 December, 2015
 First Appeal No.464 of 1983
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Tuesday, 2 September 2014

When plaintiff is not entitled to get cancellation of sale deed?

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - S. 100 - second appeal - plaintiff filed suit for cancellation of sale deed contending that when property was sold by mother and brother of plaintiff, plaintiffs were minor and their interest in the property was not taken care of - on facts, suit filed in collusion with venders of property - Trial Court dismissed suit - held, suit being abuse of process of court plaintiff not entitled to relief claimed - Trial Court was justified in dismissing suit - appeal dismissed.
    5.2 This Court further finds that, and it is also the finding of the Court  below  that,  not  only  the  plaintiffs  were  not  entitled  for declaration as prayed for, but there was connivance of the plaintiffs with  the  family  members,  being  defendant  Nos.  3,4  &  5,  and thereby they had attempted to abuse the process of law. There is also finding to the effect that, the bona­fide purchaser is kept in litigation throughout these decades by one of the family members, since the prices of the property has gone up. The tendency to abuse the process of law needs to be curbed, for which even cost needs to be imposed. While recording so, this Court has kept in view the observations of Honourable the Supreme Court of India in the  case  of  Rakesh  Kumar  Goel  V.  U.P.  State  Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and others, reported in AIR 2010 SC 2451, which is to the effect that, filing of a petition before the Court of law is not like buying a lottery ticket that if luck favours, might bring a windfall, but would cost no more than the expresses of litigation. This litigation is no exception to what is observed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India as recorded above. Further, this Court has also kept in view the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme  Court  of  India  in  the  case  of  Salem  Advocate  Bar Association vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 which is to the effect that, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that unscrupulous  parties  take advantage  of the fact that  either  the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded against the unsuccessful party, unfortunately it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs, such a practice also encourages filing of frivolous  suits. The dismissal  of this Second  Appeal  in these  facts,  without  imposing  costs,  would  encourage  filing  of frivolous suits and appeals. Under these circumstances, cost is required  to  be  imposed  and  the  same  should  not  be  nominal either. In the facts of this case, the cost is quantified as Rs.25,000/­.

    GUJARAT HIGH COURT
    Hon'ble Judges:Paresh Upadhyay, J.

    Vaghela Suryaba Ranchhodji Versus Becharbhai Adarbhai Patel-decd.


    SECOND APPEAL No. 194 of 2013 ; J.Date :- JANUARY 08, 2014

    Equivalent Citation(s): 2014 (2) GLR 1068 : 2014 JX(Guj) 58,AIR 2014(NOC) 449 GUJ
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    Saturday, 28 April 2012

    When lis pendese will not affect alienated property?

    one acquiring interest pendente lite in a proceeding which is lit pendens is bound by the decree without regard to its form, or whether it is erroneous, and it is immaterial that the relief granted in the suit is the result of agreement or compromise, except where it is the result of fraud or collusion between the parties.
    Calcutta High Court
    Bharat Ramanuja Das Mohant vs Sarat Kamini Dasi And Ors. on 14 April, 1921
    Equivalent citations: 66 Ind Cas 273

    Bench: A Mookerjee, Buckland

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