Delhi HC: Father cannot use money in daughter's PPF account to pay maintenance

While it is shown that the account had been closed and money taken out by the Appellant / Defendant in accordance with PPF Act and closure was not illegal, but the question is, who is entitled to the money withdrawn from this PPF Account. {Para 24}

25. As discussed above, being the investment in the name of the child, she was entitled to receive the amount. The father may have taken the money to which the Plaintiff was entitled, but it was only in the fiduciary capacity, as a Guardian, but cannot be utilized by the father to off-set his responsibility of maintenance, towards the child.

26. In the present case, though savings in PPF Account were made by the Defendant / Plaintiff's father, but the same were for the benefit of the Plaintiff / Defendant's daughter, to which she was entitled after attaining the age of majority, i.e. 18 years on 13.11.2016. The amount could not have been transferred by the Defendant to his own Account and he was liable to give this money to the Plaintiff.

27. The Defendant may have been paying the paying Rs. 12,000/- to the Plaintiff, pursuant to Order dated 18.05.2016 of the learned Family Court, Dehradun from 16.06.2016 to 28.05.2018 and paid a total sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- to her during this period, but that was in recognition of his responsibility to maintain his daughter.

28. Learned District Judge has rightly observed that the responsibility to maintain the child, is an independent right of the father and it cannot be claimed to be adjusted against the amount of Rs. 8,13,853.79/-, which was an investment made by the father.

Ratio: The Delhi High Court recently held that a father cannot use the amount invested for his daughter’s education towards fulfilling his individual legal obligations of paying maintenance to his daughter and estranged wife.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RFA 285/2023 and CM Appl. 16953/2023

Decided On: 03.08.2026

Sudhir Kawatra Vs. Shamli Kawatra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Neena Bansal Krishna, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/5419/2026

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Supreme Court: What are the basis for grant of Future Prospects in Motor accident claim petition?

 8.1. With respect to the issue of Future Prospects, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) has held that in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, and was below 40 years of age, an addition of 40% of the established income should be granted towards Future Prospects.

Future Prospects are to be awarded on the basis of:

i. the nature of the deceased's employment; and

ii. the age of the deceased.

In the present case, it is claimed by the family of the deceased that he was engaged in making namkeen, and was earning a monthly income of about Rs. 15,000 per month. However, no evidence was brought on record to establish the same. The MACT as well as the High Court assessed the income of the deceased on the basis of the minimum wage of an unskilled worker. The nature of his employment being taken as a self-employed person.

The deceased was 24 years old at the time of the accident. Hence, future Prospects ought to have been awarded at 40% of the actual income of the deceased, instead of 50% as awarded by the High Court.

Hence, the judgment of the High Court on this issue is modified to that extent.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9581 of 2018.

Decided On: 18.09.2018

Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: Indu Malhotra, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1012/2018,(2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Father and Unmarried sister of deceased are entitled to get compensation under Motor Vehicles Act

 8.4. The Insurance Company has submitted that the father and the sister of the deceased could not be treated as dependents, and it is only a mother who can be dependent of her son. This contention deserves to be repelled. The deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had pre-deceased him. The deceased's father was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister. The deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Hence, they would be entitled to compensation as his dependents.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9581 of 2018.

Decided On: 18.09.2018

Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: Indu Malhotra, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1012/2018,(2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on grant of compensation under the head "Loss of Consortium"

8.7 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is Loss of Consortium.

In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', 'parental consortium', and 'filial consortium'.

The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse.1

Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."2

Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training."

Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.

Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognized that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child.

The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of Filial Consortium.

Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9581 of 2018.

Decided On: 18.09.2018

Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nanu Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: Indu Malhotra, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1012/2018,(2018) 18 Supreme Court Cases 130.

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Is an admission by a father that his illegitimate child is legitimate binding on his successors?

 The Privy Council in Gopal Das and Anr. v. Sri Thakurji and Ors.   MANU/PR/0002/1943 : AIR 1943 PC 83, held that a statement made by a person is not only evidence against the person but is also evidence against those who claim through him. Section 18 of the Act lays down the conditions and the requirements satisfied for applying to a statement as an admission. We keep in our perspective Sections 17 and 18 of the Act while appreciating Exs. B-3 and B-6. {Para 14}

15.1. A mere perusal of the preface to Ex. B-6, mortgage deed, would show that Muthusamy Gounder treated Appellant No. 1, Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 3 as his sons. The document was executed for himself and on behalf of his minor sons. The statement is made by Muthusamy Gounder during the subsistence of his interest in the property mortgaged. Respondent No. 3 definitely claims through Muthusamy Gounder for the half share notionally partitioned in favour of Muthusamy Gounder. The Appellants also rely on the patta dated 27.04.1984 (Ex. B-3) standing in the name of Muthusamy Gounder and his sons; the voters lists, viz., Exs. B-4 and B-5, to show that Muthusamy Gounder and his sons lived as a family. By applying Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, we are convinced that Muthusamy Gounder made a statement describing Appellant No. 1 and Respondent No. 1 as his sons and treated as an admission by record. This statement satisfies the ingredients of Section 18 of the Act. Further, in the absence of contrary evidence and withdrawal of admission or explained through admissible evidence, the admission in the mortgage deed, viz., Ex. B-6, coupled with the joint patta and voters lists, declares the status of Appellant No. 1, Respondent No. 1, along with Respondent No. 3 as the sons of Muthusamy Gounder. At this juncture, we notice that the status derived through an admission in Ex. B-3 vis-�-vis Appellant No. 1 as a natural corollary could be extended to Appellant No. 3 as a child/daughter of Muthusamy Gounder. This is an inescapable consequential conclusion which the Court has to record.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 600 of 2024 

Decided On: 19.01.2024

Raja Gounder and Ors. Vs. M. Sengodan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0047/2024.

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Whether the rule of Estoppel will prevent sons from claiming rights in the self acquired property of their grand father, if their father has relinquished his rights in that property?

What estoppel brings about, however, is preventing a party from setting up the right, which, but for the estoppel, he would have in the property. In this regard, we may notice the following discussion under the caption 'Death or disability of the representor' (pages 125-126) in the work Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner:

Death or disability of the representor

128. In case of the death, or the total or partial disability (whether by reason of insolvency, infancy, lunacy, coverture, or otherwise), of the representor at the time of the proceedings in which the question of estoppel is raised, the liability to the estoppel, speaking generally, devolves upon, or is transmitted to, the same persons, in accordance with the same rules, and subject to the same conditions, as the liability of such a representor to proceedings for the avoidance of a contract procured by the representation.

Where the representor has died between the date of the representation and the date of the raising of the estoppel, the executor or administrator, or (in case of title to, and estates in, land) the heir or devise, of the deceased representor is bound by the representation to the same extent as the representor would have been, and succeeds to all the burdens of estoppel in respect thereof to which, at the date of his decease, such representor was subject...

23. It will be noticed that the father of the Appellants, by his conduct, being estopped, as found by us, is the fountainhead or the source of the title declared in Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. It is, in other words, only based on the relationship between Shri Chandran and the Appellants, that the right Under Section 8(a) of the Hindus Succession Act, purports to vest the right in the Appellants. We would think, therefore, that Appellants would also not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. If the principle in Gulam Abbas (supra) applies, then, despite the fact that what was purported to be released by Shri Chandran, was a mere spec successionis or expectation his conduct in transferring/releasing his rights for valuable consideration, would give rise to an estoppel. The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel. We also find no merit at all in the attempt at drawing a distinction based on religion. The principle of estoppel applies without such distinction.

24.  Having received valuable consideration and allowed his father Shri Sengalani Chettair to proceed on the basis that he was free to deal with the property without the prospect of being haunted by any claim whatsoever as regards the property by Shri Chandran, a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by Shri Chandran. Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by Shri Chandran or his children, viz., the Appellants.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 521-522 of 2023.

Decided On: 25.01.2023

Elumalai and Ors. Vs. M. Kamala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: K.M. Joseph, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0077/2023, 2023/INSC/83

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Whether child has a right to be maintained as per the status of his father?

However, at the same time, the Respondent-husband cannot be absolved from his liability and responsibility to maintain his son Pranav till he attains the age of majority. Whatever be the dispute between the husband and the wife, a child should not be made to suffer. The liability and responsibility of the father to maintain the child continues till the child/son attains the age of majority. It also cannot be disputed that the son Pranav has a right to be maintained as per the status of his father. It is reported that the mother is not earning anything. She is residing at her parental house at Jaipur. Therefore, a reasonable/sufficient amount is required for the maintenance of her son including his education etc. which shall have to be paid by the Respondent-husband, irrespective of the decree of dissolution of marriage between the Appellant-wife and the Respondent-husband. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6374 of 2021

Decided On: 01.12.2021

Neha Tyagi Vs. Deepak Tyagi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and A.S. Bopanna, JJ.

Author: M.R. Shah, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1172/2021.

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Under which circumstance Compromise between some of the parties in partition suit will become invalid and no valid decree can be passed based on said compromise?

  The present case depicts as to how on February 27, 1991 the court recorded the alleged agreement and compromise in a casual manner. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. The statute requires the Court to be first satisfied that the agreement or compromise which has been entered into between the parties is lawful, before accepting the same. Court is expected to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of the Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. {Para 11}

13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, "the Court shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise "which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act..." shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal Under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 43 of the Code.

(Emphasis supplied)

91. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the cross-appeal filed by the Original Defendant No. 2, questioning the legality and validity of the settlement was maintainable in law.

92. We shall now look into the circumstances, as highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendant No. 2, rendering the settlement agreement dated 28.03.1991 invalid and not binding Under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

First, the alleged compromise agreement has admittedly not been signed by the Plaintiff who concededly has a share in the property as a coparcener. A written consent of all parties is necessary.

Secondly, a coparcenary undivided property in specie (Plot No. 140) has been allotted to Defendant 2 by Defendant No. 1 over which the Plaintiff also has an interest.

Thirdly, there is variance between the agreement and the compromise petition producing the agreement.

Fourthly, the judgment dated 01.08.2000 of the first appellate court accepting the compromise does not make allotment of the property allotted in specie to the Defendant No. 2. The first appellate court has proceeded on the wrong premise that the Defendant No. 2 has surrendered her rights to the Defendant No. 1. The first appellate court was further wrong in specifically noting that the compromise agreement does not cause any prejudice to the rights of the Plaintiff and therefore can be given effect.

Fifthly, the compromise agreement was entered into by beckoning a smaller share to the Defendant No. 2, while she has a larger share in view of Vineeta Sharma (supra). The consideration for the alleged compromise/settlement was therefore inadequate and whole agreement has to fall to the ground due to changed and supervening circumstances effectuated by change in law.

Lastly, even otherwise, the allotment of a co-ownership property in a specie to one coparcener cannot be modified in a preliminary decree. Moreover, under Hindu Law, the gift/renunciation/relinquishment or alienation by one coparcener of his undivided coparcenary interest to another coparcener without consent of other coparceners is void.

93. It is now well settled that Under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. (See: Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, MANU/SC/0032/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 270.)

94. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the Plaintiff has not put her signature on the deed of settlement, which was produced before the High Court in first appeal. The Plaintiff has made herself very clear that she never joined in the settlement between her brother i.e., the Defendant No. 1 and her sister i.e., the Defendant No. 2. On this ground alone, the settlement could be said to be unlawful, being without any written consent of all the parties. In a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot be maintained.

95. In Nityamoni Dasi v. Gokul Chandra Sen reported in MANU/WB/0534/1910 : (1911) 9 Ind Cas 210 (Cal), the Calcutta High Court observed:

... The decree of the Subordinate Judge must be set aside and the whole case retried, because as this is a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot possibly be maintain ed.....

96. In Vir Singh and Ors. v. Kharak Singh and Ors. reported in MANU/LA/0229/1924 : AIR 1925 Lah 280, all the proprietors had not assented to the compromise, Moti Sagar, J. observed:

...the alleged compromise not having been assented to by all the proprietors was clearly contrary to law and the Court was, therefore, fully justified in refusing to enforce it....

97. In Taraprasanna Sarkar and Anr. v. Kalikamohan Sarkar and Ors. reported in MANU/WB/0026/1923 : AIR 1924 Cal 80 Mookerjee and Rankin, JJ., held:

...There can be no compromise binding upon, all the parties to a partition suit until and unless all the parties have joined in the compromise:...

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors. Vs. Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the daughter is entitled to get share in the ancestral property of her father If Law Gets Amended Before Passing Final Decree In Partition Suit?

 Before we proceed to discuss the dictum, as laid by this Court in Vineeta Sharma (supra) we must look into the decision of this Court in the case of Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra). In Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra) this Court, in paras 11, 12, 13 & 14, observed as under:

11. The new Section 6 provides for parity of rights in the coparcenary property among male and female members of a joint Hindu family on and from 9-9-2005. The legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. According to the new Section 6, the daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own rights and liabilities in the same manner as the son. The declaration in Section 6 that the daughter of the coparcener shall have same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as she would have been a son is unambiguous and unequivocal. Thus, on and from 9-9-2005, the daughter is entitled to a share in the ancestral property and is a coparcener as if she had been a son.

12. The right accrued to a daughter in the property of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, by virtue of the 2005 Amendment Act, is absolute, except in the circumstances provided in the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 6. The excepted categories to which new Section 6 of the 1956 Act is not applicable are two, namely, (i) where the disposition or alienation including any partition has taken place before 20-12-2004; and (ii) where testamentary disposition of property has been made before 20-12-2004. Sub-section (5) of Section 6 leaves no room for doubt as it provides that this Section shall not apply to the partition which has been effected before 20-12-2004. For the purposes of new Section 6 it is explained that "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or partition effected by a decree of a court. In light of a clear provision contained in the Explanation appended to Sub-section (5) of Section 6, for determining the non-applicability of the section, what is relevant is to find out whether the partition has been effected before 20-12-2004 by deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or by a decree of a court. In the backdrop of the above legal position with reference to Section 6 brought in the 1956 Act by the 2005 Amendment Act, the question that we have to answer is as to whether the preliminary decree passed by the trial court on 19-3-1999 and amended on 27-9-2003 deprives the Appellants of the benefits of the 2005 Amendment Act although final decree for partition has not yet been passed.

13. The legal position is settled that partition of a joint Hindu family can be effected by various modes, inter alia, two of these modes are (one) by a registered instrument of a partition and (two) by a decree of the court. In the present case, admittedly, the partition has not been effected before 20-12-2004 either by a registered instrument of partition or by a decree of the court. The only stage that has reached in the suit for partition filed by Respondent 1 is the determination of shares vide preliminary decree dated 19-3-1999 which came to be amended on 27-9-2003 and the receipt of the report of the Commissioner.

14. A preliminary decree determines the rights and interests of the parties. The suit for partition is not disposed of by passing of the preliminary decree. It is by a final decree that the immovable property of joint Hindu family is partitioned by metes and bounds. After the passing of the preliminary decree, the suit continues until the final decree is passed. If in the interregnum i.e. after passing of the preliminary decree and before the final decree is passed, the events and supervening circumstances occur necessitating change in shares, there is no impediment for the court to amend the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree redetermining the rights and interests of the parties having regard to the changed situation. {Para 59}

60. Thus, in Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra) this Court made the following things explicitly clear:

(i) The equal share given to the daughter of a coparcener governed by Hindu Mitakshara Law along with brothers is by way of a substantive right;

(ii) Though the substantive right is created on and from 9-9-2005, it relates back to the incidence of birth;

(iii) The substantive right would not be available only if the coparcenary property is disposed of or alienated including by any partition or testamentary disposition of property before 20-12-2004 and;

(iv) If there is disposition of a coparcenary property by any partition, such partition must be by execution of a Deed of Partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of the Court.

(v) A preliminary decree of partition only determines the rights and interests of the parties. It is only by a final decree that the immovable property of joint Hindu family is partitioned by metes and bounds. After the passing of the preliminary decree, the suit continues until the final decree is passed. If in the interregnum i.e. after passing of the preliminary decree and before the final decree is passed, if there is any change in law necessitating determination of shares accordingly then, there would be no impediment for the Court to amend the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree redetermining the rights and interests of the parties having regard to the changed situation.

20. Now, it is well settled that it is the duty of a court, whether it is trying original proceedings or hearing an appeal, to take notice of the change in law affecting pending actions and to give effect to the same. (See G.P. Singh: Interpretation of Statutes, 7th Edn., p. 406.) If, while a suit is pending, a law like the 1993 Act that the civil court shall not decide the suit, is passed, the civil court is bound to take judicial notice of the statute and hold that the suit -- even after its remand -- cannot be disposed of by it.

78. This Court in Vineeta Sharma (supra) clarified the entire position as follows:

107. Once the constitution of coparcenary changes by birth or death, shares have to be worked out at the time of actual partition. The shares will have to be determined in changed scenario. The severance of status cannot come in the way to give effect to statutory provision and change by subsequent event. The statutory fiction of partition is far short of actual partition, it does not bring about the disruption of the joint family or that of coparcenary is a settled proposition of law. For the reasons mentioned above, we are also of the opinion that mere severance of status by way of filing a suit does not bring about the partition and till the date of the final decree, change in law, and changes due to the subsequent event can be taken into consideration.

Xxx xxx xxx

114. In the instant case, the question is different. What has been recognised as partition by the legislation Under Section 6, accordingly, rights are to be worked out. This Court consistently held in various decisions mentioned above that when the rights are subsequently conferred, the preliminary decree can be amended, and the benefit of law has to be conferred. Hence, we have no hesitation to reject the effect of statutory fiction of the proviso to Section 6 as discussed in Prakash v. Phulavati [MANU/SC/1241/2015 : (2016) 2 SCC 36: (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] and Danamma [Danamma v. Amar, MANU/SC/0064/2018 : (2018) 3 SCC 343: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 385]. If a daughter is alive on the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act, she becomes a coparcener with effect from the date of the Amendment Act, irrespective of the date of birth earlier in point of time.

APPLICATION OF THE AFORESAID PRINCIPLES OF LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE

80. It is in the aforesaid background that daughters are entitled to 1/3rd share in all the properties as scheduled in the plaint. The same would be in accordance with the dictum as laid in Vineeta Sharma (supra), while passing the final decree. At the cost of repetition, we state that by virtue of the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court, which was confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the issues decided therein will be deemed to have become final but as the partition suit is required to be decided in stages, the same can be regarded as fully and completely decided only when the final decree is passed. As the law governing the parties has been amended before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party benefitted by such amendment (like the two daughters in the case on hand) can make a request to the Trial Court to take cognizance of the Amendment and give effect to the same.

81. We do not find any merit in the submissions canvassed by Mr. Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants that in a partition suit, the preliminary decree cannot be varied in the final decree proceedings, despite the amendment of the law governing the parties.

82.The only thing that needs to be done now is to give effect to the amendment in the provisions of Section 6 of the 1956 Act and redetermine the shares of the parties accordingly. To put it straight, the Plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share in all the properties of her Late father. The issue whether all the properties were ancestral as raised on behalf of the Appellants pale into insignificance.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors. Vs. Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0326/2023.

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Supreme Court alters order requiring father to visit son in court premises considering welfare of son

 In a matter of the present nature, it is needless to mention,

as rightly observed by the High Court, the welfare of the child is

also to be kept in view by the Court. However, at this stage we

find that the repeated visitation rights in the Court premises,

would also not be in the interest of the child as the environment

during which the visitation rights are exercised, would also

matter.

Therefore, at this stage, we see no reason to dispose of the

instant petition but we direct that the visitation rights, as

granted by the Family Court, shall stand altered for the present

whereby the interim custody of the child shall be made over to the petitioner-father by the respondent-mother at the entrance of the RP Mall, Kollam, Kerala at 11:00 a.m on Sundays. The petitioner father may take the child to the said mall and exercise the visitation rights till 02:00 p.m. of the same day. The custody of the child shall be made over to the respondent-mother at the same spot (entrance of the mall) where the child was made over to the petitioner-father at 02:00 p.m.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 2437/2023

VERSUS

JUDGMENT

Date : 03-10-2023 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA

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Supreme Court expounds the law relating to right of illegitimate child in father's ancestral property

K. Conclusion

54. We now formulate our conclusions in the following terms:

(i) In terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 16, a child of a marriage which is null and void Under Section 11 is statutorily conferred with legitimacy irrespective of whether (i) such a child is born before or after the commencement of Amending Act 1976; (ii) a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under the Act and the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a petition under the enactment;

(ii) In terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 16 where a voidable marriage has been annulled by a decree of nullity Under Section 12, a child 'begotten or conceived' before the decree has been made, is deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree, if the child would have been legitimate to the parties to the marriage if a decree of dissolution had been passed instead of a decree of nullity;

(iii) While conferring legitimacy in terms of Sub-section (1) on a child born from a void marriage and Under Sub-section (2) to a child born from a voidable marriage which has been annulled, the legislature has stipulated in Sub-section (3) of Section 16 that such a child will have rights to or in the property of the parents and not in the property of any other person;

(iv) While construing the provisions of Section 3(1)(j) of the HSA 1956 including the proviso, the legitimacy which is conferred by Section 16 of the HMA 1955 on a child born from a void or, as the case may be, voidable marriage has to be read into the provisions of the HSA 1956. In other words, a child who is legitimate Under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the HMA would, for the purposes of Section 3(1)(j) of the HSA 1956, fall within the ambit of the explanation 'related by legitimate kinship' and cannot be regarded as an 'illegitimate child' for the purposes of the proviso;

(v) Section 6 of the HSA 1956 continues to recognize the institution of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law and the concepts of a coparcener, the acquisition of an interest as a coparcener by birth and rights in coparcenary property. By the substitution of Section 6, equal rights have been granted to daughters, in the same manner as sons as indicated by Sub-section (1) of Section 6;

(vi) Section 6 of the HSA 1956 provides for the devolution of interest in coparcenary property. Prior to the substitution of Section 6 with effect from 9 September 2005 by the Amending Act of 2005, Section 6 stipulated the devolution of interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property of a male Hindu by survivorship on the surviving members of the coparcenary. The exception to devolution by survivorship was where the deceased had left surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative in Class I claiming through a female relative, in which event the interest of the deceased in a Mitakshara coparcenary property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession and not by survivorship. In terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 6 as amended, on a Hindu dying after the commencement of the Amending Act of 2005 his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law will devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under the enactment and not by survivorship. As a consequence of the substitution of Section 6, the Rule of devolution by testamentary or intestate succession of the interest of a deceased Hindu in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has been made the norm;

(vii) Section 8 of the HSA 1956 provides general Rules of succession for the devolution of the property of a male Hindu dying intestate. Section 10 provides for the distribution of the property among heirs of Class I of the Schedule. Section 15 stipulates the general Rules of succession in the case of female Hindus dying intestate. Section 16 provides for the order of succession and the distribution among heirs of a female Hindu;

(viii) While providing for the devolution of the interest of a Hindu in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, dying after the commencement of the Amending Act of 2005 by testamentary or intestate succession, Section 6(3) lays down a legal fiction namely that 'the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place'. According to the Explanation, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener is deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property has taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether or not he is entitled to claim partition;

(ix) For the purpose of ascertaining the interest of a deceased Hindu Mitakshara coparcener, the law mandates the assumption of a state of affairs immediately prior to the death of the coparcener namely, a partition of the coparcenary property between the deceased and other members of the coparcenary. Once the share of the deceased in property that would have been allotted to him if a partition had taken place immediately before his death is ascertained, his heirs including the children who have been conferred with legitimacy Under Section 16 of the HMA 1955, will be entitled to their share in the property which would have been allotted to the deceased upon the notional partition, if it had taken place; and

(x) The provisions of the HSA 1956 have to be harmonized with the mandate in Section 16(3) of the HMA 1955 which indicates that a child who is conferred with legitimacy Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) will not be entitled to rights in or to the property of any person other than the parents. The property of the parent, where the parent had an interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed under the Mitakshara law has to be ascertained in terms of the Explanation to Sub-section (3), as interpreted above.

55. Before concluding, it would be necessary to clarify that the reference to the three Judge Bench in this batch of cases is confined to Joint Hindu families governed by Mitakshara law. This Court has, therefore, dwelt on the interpretation of the provisions of the HSA 1956 in relation to Joint Hindu families of that class.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2844 of 2011,

Revanasiddappa and Ors. Vs. Mallikarjun and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I.

Decided On: 01.09.2023

Citation: 2023/INSC/783 : MANU/SC/0956/2023.

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Supreme Court: When A Person Has Relinquished Rights In Father's Self Acquired Property, His Sons Are Estopped From Claiming Share

  In the facts of this case, the case of the appellants may be noted. It is their case, that Shri Chandran, their father, himself did not have any right in the plaint schedule property. This is for the reason that being the separate property of Shri Sengalani Chettair, Shri Chandran did not have any right by birth. He himself had only, what is described a spec successionis within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not even the case of the appellants that they had any independent right in the plaint schedule property either at the time of their birth or at the time when their father died or even when their grandfather Shri Sengalani Chettair died in 1988. The right, which they claim, at the earliest point, can arise only by treating the property as the separate property of Shri Sengalani Chettair on his death within the meaning of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, we are unable to discard the deed of release executed by their father Shri Chandran in the year 1975 as a covenant within the meaning of Section 8 of the ‘1956 Act.’

{Para 21}

22. As far as the argument of the appellants that the appellants would have an independent right, when succession open to the estate of Shri Sengalani Chettair, when he died in 1988, in view of the fact that the appellants are the children of the predeceased son, viz., Shri Chandran, who died on 09.12.1978, we are of the view that there is no merit in the said contention. It is true that under Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property of a male Hindu, dying intestate, will devolve, firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule. The son of a predeceased son, it is true, is a Class I heir. Therefore, it could be argued that since Shri Sengalani Chettair died intestate, a right was created in the property in favour of the appellants, being the children of the predeceased son. What estoppel brings about, however, is preventing a party from setting up the right, which, but for the estoppel, he would have in the property. In this regard, we may notice the following discussion under the caption ‘Death or disability of the representor’ (pages 125-126) in the work Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner:

“Death or disability of the representor

128. In case of the death, or the total or partial disability (whether by reason of insolvency, infancy, lunacy, coverture, or otherwise), of the representor at the time of the proceedings in which the question of estoppel is raised, the liability to the estoppel, speaking generally, devolves upon, or is transmitted to, the same persons, in accordance with the same rules, and subject to the same conditions, as the liability of such a representor to proceedings for the avoidance of a contract procured by the representation.

Where the representor has died between the date of the representation and the date of the raising of the estoppel, the executor or administrator, or (in case of title to, and estates in, land) the heir or devise, of the deceased representor is bound by the representation to the same extent as the representor would have been, and succeeds to all the burdens of estoppel in respect thereof to which, at the date of his decease, such representor was subject…”

23. It will be noticed that the father of the appellants, by his conduct, being estopped, as found by us, is the fountainhead or the source of the title declared in Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. It is, in other words, only based on the relationship between Shri Chandran and the appellants, that the right under Section 8(a) of the Hindus Succession Act, purports to vest the right in the appellants. We would think, therefore, that appellants would also not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. If the principle in Gulam Abbas (supra) applies, then, despite the fact that what

was purported to be released by Shri Chandran, was a mere spec successonis or expectation his conduct in transferring/releasing his rights for valuable consideration, would give rise to an estoppel. The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel. We also find no merit at all in the attempt at drawing a distinction based on religion. The principle of estoppel applies without such distinction.

24.  Having received valuable consideration and allowed his father Shri Sengalani Chettair to proceed on the basis that he was free to deal with the property without the prospect of being haunted by any claim whatsoever as regards the property by Shri Chandran, a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by Shri Chandran. Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by Shri Chandran or his children, viz., the appellants.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.521-522 OF 2023

ELUMALAI @ VENKATESAN & ANR  Vs M. KAMALA AND ORS. & ETC

Author: K.M. JOSEPH, J.

DATED: JANUARY 25, 2023.

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Whether Insurance Company can recover MACT Compensation Amount from Father of Minor Driver?

 In the light of these findings, I am of the view that the learned Tribunal was justified in not accepting the appellant’s version that the keys of the insured vehicle were taken by his minor son from his bed side drawer without his knowledge and permission. Once the appellant, despite being aware that his son was a minor child, left the keys of his car at home and has failed to give any explanation as to why the keys of the car at home were left unattended when he himself was not there, the defence being taken by the appellant is apparently an afterthought in an attempt to somehow to escape his liability. Even otherwise, the appellant did not lead any independent witness in support of his plea that the car was being driven by his minor son without his knowledge and permission. {Para 7}

8. I may also note that as observed by the learned Tribunal, this plea of his minor son having taken the car without his permission, was not even taken by the appellant either before the concerned police authority or the Juvenile Justice Board. In a matter like this, when the parents of minor children permit him/her to drive a motor vehicle, not only they put the lives of their own children in danger but also endager the life of common citizens.

 Neutral Citation No.2023/DHC/000289

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

MAC.APP. 24/2023 & CM APPL 1722-24/2023

SHEKHAR NIJHAWAN Vs IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI

Date of Decision:- 13.01.2023

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Supreme Court: Daughter's Right To Inherit Self-Acquired Property Of Father Dying Intestate Recognized Under Customary Hindu Law

 Our Analysis

66. Right of a widow or daughter to inherit the self-acquired property or share received in partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate is well recognized not only under the old customary Hindu Law but also by various judicial pronouncements and thus, our answer to the question Nos. 1 and 2 are as under :-

“If a property of a male Hindu dying intestate is a self-acquired property or obtained in partition of a co-parcenery or a family property, the same would devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship, and a daughter of such a male Hindu would be entitled to inherit such property in preference to other collaterals.”

67. In the case at hands, since the property in question was admittedly the self-acquired property of Marappa Gounder despite the family being in state of jointness upon his death intestate, his sole surviving daughter Kupayee Ammal, will inherit the same by inheritance and the property shall not devolve by survivorship.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI

ARUNACHALA GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LRS. Vs. PONNUSAMY AND ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6659 OF 2011

20th January 2022

Author: KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Citation:  2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 59.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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How to appreciate evidence if a daughter claims in social media posts that she is earning a considerable income?

 As far as the second ground for modification is concerned, it is to the effect that she on her own, earns a handsome income from her modeling career. After considering the evidence placed on

record being, the printed copies of the photographs posted by his

daughter in the social media like instagram and her instagram

biography, where she has claimed that she earns an income of

Rs.72 lakhs to Rs.80 lakhs, learned Judge, in my considered

opinion, has rightly recorded that the photographs of instagram

and her instagram biography is not sufficient to hold that she has

independent and sufficient income.

7. It is well known fact that it is the habit of the youth of

today, to project a glossy picture and posting the same in the

social media though its contents may not be always true. Since

the petitioner’s contention that his daughter’s earning is Rs.72

lakhs to Rs.80 lakhs is based merely on his daughter’s

photographs posted in instagram and her instagram history, the

learned Judge has rightly disbelieved the same in the absence of

any independent evidence to be brought on record, to show her

earnings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.7633 OF 2021

Anil Chandravadan Mistry Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. 

CORAM : SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.

DATED : 16TH JUNE, 2022.

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Whether Son Can Claim Right Or Share In Parents' Flats While They Are Alive?

  At this stage we note that there is a Intervention Application

by one Asif Fazal Khan. He lives elsewhere at another address. He seeks leave to intervene. He says that he is the “de facto” guardian of Fazal for many years. There is absolutely nothing in his application to show this. Although the Petition by Sonia and her daughters annexes a large number of documents showing expenses and bills paid by Sonia and in Sonia’s name, there is not one scrap of paper adduced by Asif in support of his contention. {Para 7}

8. Asif then says that although his parents are alive, there are two flats and both are what he describes as “ a shared household”

and therefore he, the son, has some sort of enforceable legal right or entitlement to either or both of these flats. The submission is so illfounded and illogical that it only needs to be stated to be rejected. In any conceptualization of succession law for any community or faith, Asif can have no right, title or interest whatsoever in either of these flats — one in his father’s name and other in his mother’s name — so long as his parents are alive. The suggestion that Asif has a settled and enforceable share in either of the flats in the lifetimes of the real owners, his parents, is laughable. The fact that he is their son does not make either of their flats ‘a shared household’.

10. Asif has no rights in his father’s flats. He has nothing to show

that he has ever cared for his father.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 12047 OF 2021

Sonia Fazal Khan & Ors  Vs Union of India & Ors 

CORAM: G.S. Patel & Madhav J. Jamdar, JJ.

DATED: 16th March 2022

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Whether court can entertain the application of the senior citizen to evict his children from his self acquired property?

 Mr. Thorat then says that under Section 5 it is only an application for maintenance that can be entertained by the Tribunal. Mr. Shetty's application was for eviction. It says so. Therefore, according to Mr. Thorat, the Tribunal acted without jurisdiction, apart from the fact that it proceeded on a significant procedural illegality. {Para 8}

9. As to the jurisdictional question we do not believe the point is well taken. The definition of maintenance in Clause 2(b) reads thus:

“2(b) “maintenance” includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment.”

10. Clearly it includes residence; and this means residence of the senior citizen.

54. At this stage, we may mention that in Smt. S. Vanitha (supra), Supreme Court has taken the view that the Tribunal under the 2007 Act may have the authority to order an eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words, would be an incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be granted only after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute.

(Emphasis added)

12. In Jasani, therefore, the claim of the appellant was that the house was a ‘shared household’, i.e. that she had a legally definable right in the property itself. That is not the case before us at all, where Shweta accepts that she has no right in the flat in question. The mere use of the word ‘eviction’ is not by itself determinative. To constitute eviction, or to invoke any prohibition against eviction, it must be shown that some legally enforceable civil right of the appellant in the property itself has been determined and that the appellant has been denied that right. Removal of a person with no right in the premises is not eviction so as to attract any such prohibition. After all, as Jasani notes, the statutory intent is to protect senior citizens. It is not to foist on senior citizens an imaginary claim over their own property where the claimant has no such right to begin with. The statutory intent is not to limit the rights of senior citizens, but exactly the reverse.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before G.S. Patel and Madhav J. Jamdar, JJ.)

Writ Petition (L) No. 9374 of 2020

Shweta Shetty Vs State of Maharashtra 

Decided on November 25, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 4575

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Whether son can challenge alienation of joint family property by father for legal necessity?

  Once the factum of existence of legal necessity

stood proved, then, in our view, no co-coparcener

(son) has a right to challenge the sale made by the

karta of his family. The plaintiff being a son was one of

the co-coparceners along with his father Pritam Singh.

He had no right to challenge such sale in the light of

findings of legal necessity being recorded against him.

It was more so when the plaintiff failed to prove by any

evidence that there was no legal necessity for sale of

the suit land or that the evidence adduced by the

defendants to prove the factum of existence of legal

necessity was either insufficient or irrelevant or no

evidence at all.” {Para 26} 

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7037 OF 2021

BEEREDDY DASARATHARAMI REDDY  Vs V. MANJUNATH AND ANOTHER 

Author: SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated: DECEMBER 13, 2021.

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Is the father not liable to provide maintenance to his son eighteen years old if the mother is earning?

 It is further pertinent to note that it is true that in majority of households, women are unable to work due to sociocultural as well as structural impediments, and, thus, cannot financially support themselves. However, in households wherein the women are working and are earning sufficiently to maintain themselves, it does not automatically mean that the husband is absolved of his responsibility to provide sustenance for his children. A father has an equal duty to provide for his children and there cannot be a situation wherein it is only the mother who has to bear the burden of expenses for raising and educating the children.

10. This Court cannot shut its eyes to the reality that simply attaining

majority does not translate into the understanding that the major son is earning sufficiently. At the age of 18, it can be safely assumed that the son is either graduating from 12th standard or is in his first year of college. More often than not, it does not place him in a position wherein he can earn to sustain or maintain himself. It further places the entire burden on the mother to bear the expenses of educating the children without any contribution from the father, and this Court cannot countenance such a situation.

The context of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to ensure that the wife and the children of the husband are not left in a state of destitution after the divorce. The husband must also carry the financial burden of making certain that his children are capable of attaining a position in society wherein they can sufficiently maintain themselves. The mother cannot be burdened with the entire expenditure on the education of her son just because he has completed 18 years of age, and the father cannot be absolved of all responsibilities to meet the education expenses of his son because the son may have attained the age of majority, but may not be financially independent and could be incapable of sustaining himself. A father is bound to compensate the wife who, after spending on children, may hardly be left with anything to maintain herself.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  IN THE MATTER OF:

  CRL. REV. P. 549/2018

 URVASHI AGGARWAL Vs  INDERPAUL AGGARWAL

 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD 

Dated : 5th OCTOBER, 2021

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Whether the court can make out a case of cruelty against husband U/S 498A of IPC based on stale letters issued by the wife to her father?

  The prosecution has relied upon the letters and the counsel

for the Appellant would argue that the letters are very stale, being of the years 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988 whereas the incident had taken place at a much later point of time i.e. in 1994.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant had argued that

the letters are antiquated and much period has passed after they

were written. Perusal of the said letters would reflect the consistent conduct of the Appellant being an alcoholic, subjecting the deceased to beating on being drunk, being abusive to her and the scenario continue for over four years when the letters were

addressed. In despair, she sought assistance from her father and her helplessness could be seen when she is demanding money and

assistance from her father and requesting him to come to her

rescue. The harassment meted out to her is spelt out from the said letters. The father of the deceased has spoken about the continuous harassment meted out to his daughter by her husband on consuming liquor and then abusing and clobbering her. PW-5 deposes that he used to meet his daughter, whenever he used to visit Thane and on such visit, Shobha used to narrate the illtreatment meted out to her by her husband. There is no challenge to the said version of PW-5.

 The letters brought on record by the father of the deceased, no

doubt, relate back to 5 years, prior to the incident, but the

testimony of the daughter (PW-4) and the father of the deceased

PW-5 speak of the continuous harassment to the deceased at the

hands of the Appellant. The allegations levelled go unchallenged

and there is no denial or any suggestion given that the Appellant

has given up drinking and had stopped the harassment or illtreatment to his wife on consumption of liquor. The consistency in the behaviour of the Appellant clearly makes out a charge of cruelty attracting Section 498A of the IPC.

11. For the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC, cruelty has been

set out as any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to

drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or

danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the

woman. The conduct of the Appellant would squarely fall within

the four corners of cruel treatment, which would make it

punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. Cruelty can be

physical or mental and merely because a woman has tolerated the harassment at the hands of her husband for a long period of time, it cannot be said that his behaviour has ceased to be cruel. Here is a woman, who suppressed her feelings and emotions stirring inside her on account of the harassment and ill-treatment at the hands of her husband, but when she is unable to escape the cruel treatment and is unable to put an end to the said treatment, she takes the extreme step of putting an end to her life. The cruelty being spread over a period of time does not make a woman numb so that she did not suffer the agony, discomfort meted out to her and the conduct continues to be cruel though it continued as a normal feature of married life of Shobha. For this reason, the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant that the letters are stale and cannot be relied upon, and deserves a rejection.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.589 OF 1998

Pandurang Ganpat Thalkar, Vs  The State of Maharashtra,

CORAM : MRS. BHARATI DANGRE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 30TH JUNE, 2021.

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