Showing posts with label common law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label common law. Show all posts

Thursday, 13 July 2017

When high court should not direct execution of lease deed?

In the light of aforesaid decision, when we consider the overall conduct of Mesco in the instant case, we are fully satisfied that the High Court has adventured into an avoidable illegality while directing execution of lease deed. It is a settled law that equity follows the rule of common law in respect of such contracts. Renewal of lease is a privilege and if a tenant wishes to claim the privilege, he must do so strictly within the time limited for the purpose. This Court has further considered the question where there is no time limit, an application may be made within a reasonable time. If delay is on the part of lessee for renewal arising out of mere neglect on his part and which could have been avoided by reasonable diligence, would not entitle him to claim renewal. Applying the same principle to the instant case, it is apparent that the conduct of Mesco was unfair and unpardonable. The conduct disentitled it from indulgence by Court in any manner. We are constrained to observe that a number of times the High Court had unnecessarily directed the matter to be reconsidered and on each and every occasion there was rejection of the representation by the concerned authorities. Thus, no equitable consideration was available with Mesco to invoke the writ jurisdiction for the reliefs sought. Relief granted is not permissible as per law.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Orissa Industrial Infra.Dev. ... vs M/S Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd. & Ors on 14 February, 2017
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Monday, 10 July 2017

How to ascertain limitation for seeking declaration that there was no marriage?

 If a party wants a declaration that there was no marriage and no marriage was conducted and thereby the status of the wife or husband should not be given to any of the spouses, then it will be a relief outside the purview of the matrimonial laws under the statutes no such declaration be possible and that is a common law remedy available which was codified into a right under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Once such declaration has to be sought for, which is not coming under the purview of the Marriage Laws as per the statutes provided for that purpose, then the bar under Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act will not be attracted and for such suits or proceedings, the general of limitation available for seeking such declaration alone can be attracted.
47. This aspect has been considered by the Allahabad High Court in the decision reported in R.P. Agrawal v. Smt. Urmila Devi (MANU/UP/0787/1981 : 1982 Allahabad Law journal 260), where it has been held that, where an application for maintenance under Section 488of Code of Civil Procedure 1898(old) was filed by alleging solemnisation of marriage before coming into force of Hindu Marriage Act to have that marriage declared invalid could be governed by Article 58 and not residuary Article 113 and hence would be barred by limitation, when filed after expiry of three years from the date of application under Section 488. Further as Hindu Law of Marriage which was in force before the commencement of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 did not provide for a suit for a declaration that the marriage solemnised while the applicant's husband by earlier marriage was alive and invalid. Further even going by the dictum mentioned above, it will be seen that, in order to attract the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, for nullifying the marriage or dissolving the marriage, it can be done only on the grounds available therein and solemnisation of the marriage must be admitted. Further in this case, appellant is not admitting the marriage, but only admitting the relationship and he wanted a declaration that there was no marriage at all.
48. Further it was admitted by the appellant that, even in the year 1988, when they started residing separately, the respondent filed an application for maintenance for herself and for the minor child and in that case, the appellant admitted the existence of marriage and suffered an order against him. Even in the subsequent proceedings between the parties also, he did not object the existence of marital relationship between the parties, which was necessary for deciding the issues in those cases. So he did not object the status of the respondent as his wife for want of customary marriage at the first point of time when it occurred for consideration. But suffered an order against him.
49. Article 58 of Limitation Act which reads as follows:
In both these articles, the Limitation will start when the right to sue first accrues.
50. As far as the appellant is concerned, that has accrued to him when the respondent had made a claim for maintenance, alleging that she is the legally wedded wife of the appellant and a suit filed long after suffering an order of maintenance namely nearly 17 years of that cause of action is highly belated and barred by limitation. Since it is a question of law which has to be considered by the court even if it is not raised that can be considered by the appellate court at the appellate stage in an appeal filed by the appellant invoking the power under Order 41 Rule 22 and 33 of Code of Civil Procedure. So the suit filed after three years of the accrual of the cause of action to the appellant to challenge the same, is clearly barred by limitation and on that ground also the appellant is not entitled to get the relief claimed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Mat. Appeal No. 351 of 2006
Decided On: 16.06.2017
 D. Sivadasan
Vs.
 Santha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Shaffique and K. Ramakrishnan, JJ.


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Sunday, 28 May 2017

Whether civil court has jurisdiction to try cases if relief is claimed against companies?

 In Santosh Poddars’ case (supra), the Division
Bench of this court was dealing with a suit where
the plaintiffs had prayed for a declaration that 
defendant 1 therein had ceased to be a director of
Poddar Tyres Limited, defendant 3 therein, with
effect from 31/12/1990. They sought a further
declaration that all meetings of the Board of
Directors of defendant 3 company held after
31/12/1990 and in particular, the meetings allegedly
held on 23/3/1991 and 10/6/1991 are illegal,
invalid, nonest and the resolutions passed at these
meetings are illegal, invalid and nonest and not
binding on defendant 3 company or the plaintiffs. A
further declaration was sought that they continued
to be the directors of defendant 3 company and
their purported cessation as such directors is
invalid, illegal, nonest and void. In yet another suit,
similar declaration was sought. The suits were filed
in the City Civil Court at Bombay. The plaintiffs
had taken out a notice of motion for interim relief.
In the affidavits in reply filed by the defendants, a
preliminary objection was taken to the jurisdiction
of the City Civil Court to entertain and try the suits.
The City Civil Court framed a preliminary issue as
to whether it has jurisdiction to entertain and try the
suit in view of the provisions of section 10 of the
said Act read with the Notification dated 29/5/1959.
This court referred to sections 2(11) and 10
of the said Act and came to the conclusion that
whenever there is any reference under the said Act
to any proceedings before a Court under that Act,
(other than proceedings relating to an offence under 
the Act), the court which will have jurisdiction shall
be the High Court or, if there is the requisite
Notification, the District Court. However, there is
no ouster of the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court
in all cases where the provisions of the said Act
may be attracted. It was further observed that it is
only in respect of those proceedings which are
expressly contemplated under the said Act under
any specific provision that the court which is
referred to in that section would be the special
court, namely the High Court or the Notified
District Court. In all other cases, ordinarily the civil
courts would continue to have jurisdiction. In this
behalf, the Division Bench placed reliance on the
judgment of the single judge of this court in Rao
Saheb Manilal Gangaram Sindore v. M/s.
Western India Theatres Ltd., LXIV Bom.L.R.
532.
9. The Division Bench also referred to Dhulabhai’s
case (supra) and finally observed as under:
"From the provisions of the Companies
Act, we do not find anything by which
we can infer that the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court is ousted. The very fact that
section 2(11) is part of the definition
clause under the Companies Act under
which a Court is defined to mean the
Court as prescribed under section 10,
clearly shows that whenever the term
‘the court’ is used in any section of the
Companies Act, the term ‘Court’ will
have to be interpreted with reference to
section 10. These sections will have no
application where any general civil suit
is filed. The definition clause is attracted
only when resort is had to a proceeding
under the Companies Act under a
section which prescribes resort to a
Court. Under the Companies act, powers
are conferred not only on Courts but
also on other authorities like the
Company Law Board, the Central
Government and the Registrar. Where a
power is vested by the Act in a Court,
that Court has to be ascertained with
reference to section 10. Beyond so
specifying the Court competent to deal
with such a matter, section 10 cannot
be construed as investing the Company
Court with jurisdiction over every
matter which may arise in respect of a
Company or as divesting Civil Courts of
their jurisdiction."
10. The trial court has placed reliance on this
judgment and I find the reliance placed on this
judgment to be apt. It is pertinent to note that in that
case also, the declaration was sought that all
meetings of the Board of Directors of defendant 3
company and the resolutions passed at these
meetings are illegal, invalid and nonest and not
binding on defendant 3 company or the plaintiffs
and defendant 1 had ceased to be a director of
Poddar Tyres Limited. A further declaration was
also sought that the plaintiffs continued to be the
directors of defendant 3 company and their
purported cessation as such directors is invalid,
illegal, nonest and void. In the present case also, a
declaration is sought that the appointment of 
defendants 3 and 4 as directors of defendant 1 is
illegal, null and void and of no consequence
whatsoever and any acts, deeds and/or things of any
nature whatsoever done by defendant 1 company in
pursuance of the alleged appointment of defendants
3 and 4 as the directors and/or any other act, deed,
thing done by defendants 3 and 4 in exercise of
powers in the alleged capacity as directors of
defendant 1 is illegal, null and void and not
binding. A similar declaration is sought that any
resolutions allegedly passed in any purported
meeting of shareholders or of Board of Directors of
defendant 1 allegedly held by the Kapoor family or
any of them is illegal, null and void and of no
consequence whatsoever.
13. In that case, the Division Bench was
considering section 155 of the said Act. Section 155
of the said Act vests jurisdiction in the company
judge, and impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of the
civil court in respect of rectification. After referring
to Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of
India, AIR 1988 SC 752, this court observed that
this judgment is an authority for the proposition that
if a pre-existing right in common law is recognised
by the statute and a new statutory remedy for this
enforcement provided, without expressly excluding
the civil court’s jurisdiction, then both the common
law and the statutory remedies might become 
concurrent remedies. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
FIRST APPEAL NO. 62 OF 2016

 M/s. Candolim Developers Pvt. Ltd. V Mr. Pravin Grover,


Coram:- F. M. REIS & NUTAN D. SARDESSAI, JJ.
 Date:- 13th October, 2016
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR117
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