Supreme Court: Hindu Succession Act ,2005 Amendment Does Not Limit Daughters' Pre-Existing Inheritance Rights U/S 8 of Hindu Succession Act

 (ii) Section 6(5) of the H.S. Act is a saving clause of narrow and strict application. It does not create a jurisdictional bar to the institution of a suit for partition. Whether a valid partition within the meaning of Section 6(5) has been effected, and whether such partition is binding on persons who were not parties to it, are contested questions of fact and law that must be adjudicated at trial. The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint at the threshold on the basis of Section 6(5).

(iii) The Appellants have an independent right Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act, 1956 as Class I heirs of the propositus who died intestate on 06.03.1985. This right accrued in 1985 by operation of the proviso to the erstwhile Section 6 read with Section 8, is independent of the 2005 Amendment, and is unaffected by Section 6(5). The suit is maintainable, at minimum, to the extent of the Appellants' claim in the share of the propositus.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: A partition carried out among the sons alone cannot defeat the daughters' succession rights in the father's share of the property

The operative reasoning of the High Court reads as follows:

In my opinion, even assuming that there is a partition in 2000 prior to 2004, even assuming that the daughters will not get the share, but it is not disputed that their father had died intestate. If they have a share in the father's share, still the suit can be maintained. If that is so, the Trial Court could not have rejected the plaint without even considering the scope of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. It is not for the Trial Court to find out whether the Plaintiffs would succeed or not. That is not the ground to reject the plaint. Even assuming that the Plaintiffs are likely to fail in the suit, that cannot be a ground to go into the merits and decide the matter Under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, rejection per se being misconceived, is liable to be set aside.

10. Two aspects of the 2013 order deserve emphasis. First, the High Court proceeded on the assumption most favourable to the Defendants, that the partition of 2000 is valid and that the daughters do not get a coparcenary share and still held the plaint to be maintainable because the father had died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8. In other words, the ratio of the 2013 order rested not on the coparcenary rights of daughters under the 2005 Amendment, but on the independent right of daughters as Class I heirs Under Section 8 of the Act. Second, this order was not challenged further by any party and attained finality. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court, issues were framed, and the suit was set down for evidence.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

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From Possession to Paper: SC reaffirms adverse-possession title as a “pre‑existing right” (Mukesh v. State of M.P., 2024 INSC 1026) -A View point

 The Supreme Court in Mukesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (decided 20 Dec 2024) held that where a compromise/consent decree merely recognises a litigant’s pre-existing right in the suit property (including a right that may have matured from continuous adverse possession), such a decree does not require compulsory registration under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, and—on the facts—cannot be treated as a “conveyance” attracting stamp duty for mutation.

This is significant for adverse possession because the Court expressly relies on Ravinder Kaur Grewal to reiterate that continuous, uninterrupted adverse possession can confer right, title and interest and can be used as a sword—supporting the “pre-existing right” analysis.

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Supreme Court: No Registration Or Stamp Duty Required For Compromise Decree Acquiring Property With Pre-Existing Right

 According to the Court, a compromise decree would not require registration if the below mentioned three conditions mentioned under Section 17(2)(vi) are fulfilled: -

"(i)There must be a compromise decree as per the terms of the compromise without any collusion;

(ii)The compromise decree must pertain to the subject property in the suit; and

(iii)There must be a pre-existing right over the subject property, and the compromise decree should not create a right afresh."

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14808 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP (C)No. 4293 of 2021)

MUKESH Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR. 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 1026

Dated: DECEMBER 20, 2024.

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What is the difference between section 14(1) and 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

 Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is a pivotal provision that transformed women's property rights under Hindu law. The two subsections work together but serve distinct purposes in defining a Hindu woman's ownership rights.

Section 14(1): General Rule of Absolute Ownership

Section 14(1) establishes the fundamental principle that "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner". This provision converts what was previously limited ownership into absolute ownership.

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Whether widow will acquire ownership right over property in her possession recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance?

 It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which belonged to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It was only in the Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that the objections raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour of Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved by her in the said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which could be drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956. {Para 19}

20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that such property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. The word "possessed by" and "acquired" used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.

21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019

Decided On: 18.05.2022

Munni Devi (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Rajendra (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0665/2022.

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Whether wife will get absolute right in property if his husband was having only life interest in said property?

In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in the hands of Chhimli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of maintenance. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Sheo Lal did not possess any property. He had only life interest in the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male. Smt. Chhimli could not have acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute. Right of Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chhimli, flows from the decree. Therefore, her right would not mature into full-fledged ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). She has acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time. Therefore, Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7919 of 2011

Decided On: 08.05.2018

 Basanti Devi (dead)  Vs. Rati Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 16 SCC 608

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When right in property acquired by Hindu female by compromise decree will not enlarge into full right?

It is an admitted position that on 23.12.1932 a compromise decree was passed in a suit filed by predecessors of the defendants against the predecessors of the plaintiffs. In terms of the compromise decree, the sons of Har Narain who were predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs agreed to give limited possessory rights to the predecessor of the defendant, namely, Sheo Lal.

In terms of the compromise, the consent decree was passed holding that "during the lifetime of Sheo Lal, he will not be entitled to sell or mortgage his property in any case", thereby meaning that Sheo Lal merely got restrictive possessory rights in terms of the decree dated 23.12.1932 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Hissar.

Further, it categorically provided that the suit property was to revert to the predecessors of the plaintiffs in case the widow predeceased Sheo Lal and in case Sheo Lal predeceases the widow, the widow shall be entitled to use the same during her life time. Thereafter, the suit property will revert to the predecessors of the plaintiff. It is thus clear that Sheo Lal was given a limited right in respect of the suit property. Sheo Lal died in the year 1961. Chimmli, wife of Sheo Lal died in 1976.

12. The suit was filed primarily on the ground that neither Sheo Lal nor his widow had any pre-existing right in the suit land since their rights flow from the compromise decree. After the death of Smt. Chimmli, the plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the land. It is clear that Sheo Lal was granted limited right not in recognition of his pre-existing right. Section 14(1) of the Act does not recognize the pre-existing right of a male Hindu. The suit property never became the self acquired property of Sheo Lal. Even his widow Chimmli did not hold the land in lieu of maintenance which can be enlarged into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The estate was conferred on Chimmli by virtue of the decree which created a new right. There were no pre-existing rights of either Sheo Lal or his widow Chimmli. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Smt. Chimmli would not have acquired a better right than Sheo Lal in the suit property. The rights of Sheo Lal as well as Smt. Chimmli flow from the consent decree.

13. In Tulasamma (supra), this Court has held that Hindu women's right to maintenance is the personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned and it is the duty to maintain her even if he has no property. The right to maintenance is a pre-existing right. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. It was further held that the claim for the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu family is legally a substitute of a share which she would have got in the property of her husband.

14. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to show that the property in the hands of Chimmli came in lieu of maintenance or on account of arrears of maintenance. The property in her hands came as a result of she being a successor of Sheo Lal. Sheo Lal did not possess any property. He had only life interest in the property which did not enlarge into a full right because Section 14(1) does not recognize the pre-existing right of a Hindu male. Smt. Chimmli could not have acquired a better right than her husband had in the property in dispute. Right of Sheo Lal, as also Smt. Chimmli, flows from the decree. Therefore, her right would not mature into full-fledged ownership by virtue of Section 14(1). She has acquired the right by virtue of the compromise decree for the first time. Therefore, Section 14(2) would apply to the instant case.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Basanti Devi (D) by LRS. & Ors Vs. Rati Ram & Ors.

[Civil Appeal No.7919 of 2011]

S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.

DATED: 8 MAY 2018
Citation: (2018) 16 SCC 608

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Whether it is necessary to register compromise decree if it creates right in property for first time?

Since defendant No.1 having no pre-existing right in the
property, therefore, right was allegedly conferred upon defendant
No.1 by way of decree dated 13.06.1995. Any right created for the
first time in respect of property worth more than Rs.100/- was legally
required to be registered. An effort was made by learned counsel for
the respondents to segregate the analogy of Bhoop Singh case
(supra) in the light of observations made in S. Noordeen Vs. V.S.

Thiru Venkita Reddiar, 1996(1) RRR 750 and Som Dev and
others Vs. Rati Ram and another, 2006(4) RCR (Civil) 303. It was
contended that a compromise decree does not require registration
unless decree involves any immovable property valued above
Rs.100/-. Having considered the aforesaid submission in the light of
facts of the present case, particularly observations made by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in remand order, this Court deems it appropriate
to answer third substantial question of law in favour of the plaintiffsappellants.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
 RSA No.3938 of 2004(O&M)
 Date of Decision-11.01.2017

Hari Ram  V  Madan Lal 

CORAM:- MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH
Citation: AIR 2017 P&H 69

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When family settlement is compulsorily registrable?

The tenor of the aforesaid document shows that the right in

the property has been created for the first time in favour of the plaintiff

through the family settlement (Ex.P-1), the plot in question was allotted

to defendant from the defence quota being an Army Officer. As already

discussed, it is not established that the plaintiff has paid or contributed

any amount for the purchase of the said plot, so he was not having any

pre-existing rights in the said plot. So, the family settlement (Ex.P-1) was

compulsorily registrable, but the same is an unregistered document, hence

the same is in admissible in evidence and will not convey any right, title

or interest in the suit property in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, he cannot

claim himself to be the owner in possession of the plot in dispute to the

extent of 50% share by the dint of the family settlement Ex.P-1.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

 AT CHANDIGARH.

R.S.A No.1526 of 2014(O&M)

Date of decision : 01.12.2016

Hargursharan Singh

V

Lt. Col. Hargobind Singh

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DARSHAN SINGH

Citation: AIR 2017 P&H 3

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Whether civil court has jurisdiction to try cases if relief is claimed against companies?

 In Santosh Poddars’ case (supra), the Division
Bench of this court was dealing with a suit where
the plaintiffs had prayed for a declaration that 
defendant 1 therein had ceased to be a director of
Poddar Tyres Limited, defendant 3 therein, with
effect from 31/12/1990. They sought a further
declaration that all meetings of the Board of
Directors of defendant 3 company held after
31/12/1990 and in particular, the meetings allegedly
held on 23/3/1991 and 10/6/1991 are illegal,
invalid, nonest and the resolutions passed at these
meetings are illegal, invalid and nonest and not
binding on defendant 3 company or the plaintiffs. A
further declaration was sought that they continued
to be the directors of defendant 3 company and
their purported cessation as such directors is
invalid, illegal, nonest and void. In yet another suit,
similar declaration was sought. The suits were filed
in the City Civil Court at Bombay. The plaintiffs
had taken out a notice of motion for interim relief.
In the affidavits in reply filed by the defendants, a
preliminary objection was taken to the jurisdiction
of the City Civil Court to entertain and try the suits.
The City Civil Court framed a preliminary issue as
to whether it has jurisdiction to entertain and try the
suit in view of the provisions of section 10 of the
said Act read with the Notification dated 29/5/1959.
This court referred to sections 2(11) and 10
of the said Act and came to the conclusion that
whenever there is any reference under the said Act
to any proceedings before a Court under that Act,
(other than proceedings relating to an offence under 
the Act), the court which will have jurisdiction shall
be the High Court or, if there is the requisite
Notification, the District Court. However, there is
no ouster of the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court
in all cases where the provisions of the said Act
may be attracted. It was further observed that it is
only in respect of those proceedings which are
expressly contemplated under the said Act under
any specific provision that the court which is
referred to in that section would be the special
court, namely the High Court or the Notified
District Court. In all other cases, ordinarily the civil
courts would continue to have jurisdiction. In this
behalf, the Division Bench placed reliance on the
judgment of the single judge of this court in Rao
Saheb Manilal Gangaram Sindore v. M/s.
Western India Theatres Ltd., LXIV Bom.L.R.
532.
9. The Division Bench also referred to Dhulabhai’s
case (supra) and finally observed as under:
"From the provisions of the Companies
Act, we do not find anything by which
we can infer that the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court is ousted. The very fact that
section 2(11) is part of the definition
clause under the Companies Act under
which a Court is defined to mean the
Court as prescribed under section 10,
clearly shows that whenever the term
‘the court’ is used in any section of the
Companies Act, the term ‘Court’ will
have to be interpreted with reference to
section 10. These sections will have no
application where any general civil suit
is filed. The definition clause is attracted
only when resort is had to a proceeding
under the Companies Act under a
section which prescribes resort to a
Court. Under the Companies act, powers
are conferred not only on Courts but
also on other authorities like the
Company Law Board, the Central
Government and the Registrar. Where a
power is vested by the Act in a Court,
that Court has to be ascertained with
reference to section 10. Beyond so
specifying the Court competent to deal
with such a matter, section 10 cannot
be construed as investing the Company
Court with jurisdiction over every
matter which may arise in respect of a
Company or as divesting Civil Courts of
their jurisdiction."
10. The trial court has placed reliance on this
judgment and I find the reliance placed on this
judgment to be apt. It is pertinent to note that in that
case also, the declaration was sought that all
meetings of the Board of Directors of defendant 3
company and the resolutions passed at these
meetings are illegal, invalid and nonest and not
binding on defendant 3 company or the plaintiffs
and defendant 1 had ceased to be a director of
Poddar Tyres Limited. A further declaration was
also sought that the plaintiffs continued to be the
directors of defendant 3 company and their
purported cessation as such directors is invalid,
illegal, nonest and void. In the present case also, a
declaration is sought that the appointment of 
defendants 3 and 4 as directors of defendant 1 is
illegal, null and void and of no consequence
whatsoever and any acts, deeds and/or things of any
nature whatsoever done by defendant 1 company in
pursuance of the alleged appointment of defendants
3 and 4 as the directors and/or any other act, deed,
thing done by defendants 3 and 4 in exercise of
powers in the alleged capacity as directors of
defendant 1 is illegal, null and void and not
binding. A similar declaration is sought that any
resolutions allegedly passed in any purported
meeting of shareholders or of Board of Directors of
defendant 1 allegedly held by the Kapoor family or
any of them is illegal, null and void and of no
consequence whatsoever.
13. In that case, the Division Bench was
considering section 155 of the said Act. Section 155
of the said Act vests jurisdiction in the company
judge, and impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of the
civil court in respect of rectification. After referring
to Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of
India, AIR 1988 SC 752, this court observed that
this judgment is an authority for the proposition that
if a pre-existing right in common law is recognised
by the statute and a new statutory remedy for this
enforcement provided, without expressly excluding
the civil court’s jurisdiction, then both the common
law and the statutory remedies might become 
concurrent remedies. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
FIRST APPEAL NO. 62 OF 2016

 M/s. Candolim Developers Pvt. Ltd. V Mr. Pravin Grover,


Coram:- F. M. REIS & NUTAN D. SARDESSAI, JJ.
 Date:- 13th October, 2016
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR117

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Whether property received by widowed daughter from her father in lieu of maintenance will become her absolute property?

Hindu Law- Hindu Succession Act, 1956- Sec. 14(1)- Moral obligation,

when becomes legal obligation- Discussed

In this matter, argument of the counsel for the petitioner that interest of

Smt. Parag Devi under gift deed dated 17.07.1956 was due to her pre-existing

right of maintenance as such it was enlarged under Section 14(1) of Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 as held by Supreme Court in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Vs.

Pentapati Rama Krishna and others passed in Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2007

decided on 6.11.2015, is also liable to be accepted. Supreme Court in

Laxmappa Vs. Balawa Kom Tirkappa Chavdi (Smt), (1996) 5 SCC 458, held

that the position of the married daughter is somewhat different. It is 

acknowledged that if the daughter is unable to obtain maintenance from her

husband, or, after his death, from his family, her father, if he has got separate

property of his own, is under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain

her. The High Court has concluded that it was clear that the father was under an

obligation to maintain the plaintiff-respondent. Seemingly, the High Court in

doing so was conscious of the declaration made in the gift deed in which she

was described as a destitute and unable to maintain herself. In that way, the

father may not have had a legal obligation to maintain her but all the same there

existed a moral obligation. And if in acknowledgment of that moral obligation

the father had transferred property to his daughter then it is an obligation wellfructified.

In other words, a moral obligation even though not enforceable under

the law, would by acknowledgment, bring it to the level of a legal obligation,

for it would be perfectly legitimate for the father to treat himself obliged out of

love and affection to maintain his destitute daughter, even impinging to a

reasonable extent on his ancestral property. It is duly acknowledged in Hindu

law that the Karta of the family has in some circumstances, power to alienate

ancestral property to meet an obligation of the kind. Court would be rather

construe the said paragraph more liberally in the modern context having regard

to the state of law which has been brought about in the succeeding years.

Therefore, in court‟s view, the High Court was within its right to come to the

conclusion that there was an obligation on the part of the father to maintain his

destitute widowed daughter. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD (LUCKNOW BENCH)

Consolidation No. 738 of 2006

Decided On: 26.02.2016

Prem Kali Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation Sitapur and Ors.

Coram:Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J.

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