Bar to Sue vs Suit Barred by Law: Supreme Court Clarifies Why Order II Rule 2 Cannot Be Used to Reject a Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)

S. Valliammai and Ors. Vs. S. Ramanathan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 372, MANU/SC/0362/2026

Decided On: 16.04.2026

Factual background in brief

The litigation arises from a Chettiar family dispute where the aged parents alleged that their advocate son exerted pressure and coercion to grab properties and bank deposits. The father and mother first filed O.S. No. 4722/2012 (the “first suit”) at Chennai seeking permanent injunction to protect (i) the residential Harrington Road property and (ii) the Standard Chartered Bank account, alleging intimidation, assault and coercion leading to execution of a settlement deed dated 04.11.2011.

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Supreme Court: Plaint Can't Be Rejected Under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC as Barred Under Order II Rule 2 CPC

5.21. We think that in a case where Order II Rule 2 of the Code applies, there is no legal bar to filing a suit but the reliefs sought for or the claims made therein cannot be granted if the conditions mentioned therein apply. For arriving at such a conclusion, there has to be evidence let in in order to determine whether the provision of Order II Rule 2 would apply to the suit or not. On the other hand, in the case of Order VII Rule 11(d), if there is express or implied bar for filing of a suit under any law then on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it has to be rejected. The suit need not proceed to record evidence on merits but only to the extent where evidence is necessary to be recorded for the purpose of rejection of the plaint such as on the ground of the suit being bit by law of limitation or on the principle of res judicata. Thus, the bar created by any law to the filing of a suit is different from a Plaintiff suing for certain claims or reliefs which he could not have claimed or sued having regard to Order II Rule 2 of the Code. Therefore, in our view, the application of Order II Rule 2 cannot be construed to be a ground for rejection of the plaint Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3624 of 2024

Decided On: 16.04.2026

S. Valliammai and Ors. Vs. S. Ramanathan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 372, MANU/SC/0362/2026

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Supreme Court: A fresh application seeking a rejection of a plaint, having the same substantive issue, is not maintainable despite being filed by a different applicant.

The High Court, in the impugned order, sought to avoid the application of res judicata on the ground that the first application was filed by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, whereas the second was filed by the legal representatives of Defendant No. 4. This reasoning does not commend itself to us. All Defendants are sons (or their legal representatives) of the same propositus. They share a common interest: they defend the same Partition Deed, resist the same suit for partition, and assert the same plea that the daughters have no right to the suit properties. They litigate under the same title within the meaning of Explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as reproduced above.{Para 37}

38. In Singhai Lal Chand Jain v. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna and Ors.   MANU/SC/0323/1996 : 1996:INSC:266 : (1996) 3 SCC 149, this Court clarified that if litigation was conducted bona fide to protect a common interest, the decision operates as res judicata against all persons interested in that right. In the present case, the Defendants collectively resisted the suit and participated in the first Order VII Rule 11 proceedings. The legal representatives of Defendant No. 4 cannot be heard to say that the 2013 order does not bind them merely because their predecessor did not file the application that gave rise to that order. The interest asserted is indivisible; the parties litigate under the same title.

39. We may further observe that Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." The Respondents' submission that the two applications were filed under different sub-clauses of Order VII Rule 11, the first under clause (d) alone and the second under clauses (a), (b) and (d) is of no consequence. The ground that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action [clause (a)] or is defective [clause (b)] could have been, and indeed ought to have been, raised in the first application. The mere invocation of additional sub-clauses in the second application does not take the matter outside the scope of res judicata. The substance of the issue, whether the plaint should be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by Section 6(5) of the H.S. Act, remains the same. A party cannot circumvent the finality of an adverse order by re-framing the same challenge under a different procedural provision.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Rejecting Benami Claims at the Threshold: Supreme Court’s 08.05.2026 Order VII Rule 11 Judgment Critically Examined

 

Executive overview

In its judgment MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs    D.A. SRINIVAS 2026 INSC 465  dated 8 May 2026, the Supreme Court has converted Order VII Rule 11 CPC from a largely under‑used procedural filter into a robust jurisdictional gatekeeper, particularly in suits tainted by benami arrangements, unlawful land transactions and disqualifications under succession law. The decision arises from a challenge to a trial court order rejecting a plaint as barred under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 ("Benami Act") and Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which was reversed by the Karnataka High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court restores and fortifies the approach of the trial court, while laying down an exacting standard for pleadings that seek to dress up benami and unlawful claims as innocuous civil disputes.

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Supreme Court: A plaintiff arraigned as the principal accused in the murder of a testator is prima facie disqualified from claiming succession rights under that testator's Will

 25.5. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which such person committed or abetted the commission of murder. Section 27 further declares that where a person is so disqualified, the property shall devolve as if such person had predeceased the intestate. Section 30 recognises testamentary succession and enables any Hindu to dispose of property by Will or other testamentary disposition in accordance with the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other applicable law. Thus, the Hindu Succession Act contemplates both intestate and testamentary succession. Consequently, the bar under Section 25 applies equally to a person who seeks to inherit the estate of the deceased through testamentary succession.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7370 OF 2026

[Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 7924 of 2024]

MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs    D.A. SRINIVAS 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Dated: MAY 8, 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 465.

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Allahabad HC: Ordinary residence of child for the purpose of S 9 of Guardian and wards Act is mixed question of law and fact and it can not be decided in application for rejection of plaint

 In the instant case, the factum of 'ordinary residence' of the minor is a disputed question of fact and thus, the question whether the Court at Ghaziabad has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is a mixed question of law and fact. The aforesaid question cannot be determined without holding an enquiry into the factual aspects of the controversy and without framing a distinctive issue in this regard. The scope of scrutiny at the stage of consideration of an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code 1908 is confined only to the averments made in the petition. Thus, the question whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction being mixed question of law and fact cannot be decided by way of an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. {Para 31}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

First Appeal No. 373 of 2024

Decided On: 15.05.2024

Dheeraj Vs. Chetna Goswami

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Birla and Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, JJ.

Author: Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.

 Citation: 2024:AHC:87786-DB, MANU/UP/1908/2024

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Supreme Court: Order II Rule 2 CPC Doesn't Mean Different Causes Of Action From Same Transaction Must Be Included In Single Suit

 In S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore and Ors. reported in   MANU/SC/7017/2007 : 2007:INSC:34 : (2007) 11 SCC 75, this Court categorically held that if the Defendant wishes to show that the causes of action were identical in both suits, it is necessary for him to have marked the earlier plaint in evidence and then make out that there was a relinquishment of a relief by the Plaintiff, without the leave of the Court. It was also stated that Order II Rule 2 is directed towards securing an exhaustion of the relief in respect of a cause of action and not to the inclusion in one and the same action of different causes of action, even though they may arise from the same transaction. In other words, a number of causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall include the "whole of the claim" arising out of "one and the same cause of action". {Para 46}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025.

Decided On: 15.01.2025

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 73,MANU/SC/0071/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Defendant must file pleadings of previous suit to prove the identity of the cause of action in the two suits so as to bar second suit as per O 2 R 2 of CPC

In order that a plea of a Bar Under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure should succeed the Defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the Plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the Plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the Defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be established only if the Defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. It is common ground that the pleadings in CS 28 of 1950 were not filed by the Appellant in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Trial Judge, however, without these pleadings being on the record inferred what the cause of action should have been from the reference to the previous suit contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction. At the stage of the appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in the Appellant's case and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the record, a plea of a bar Under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable.

 {Para 6}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025.

Decided On: 15.01.2025

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 73,MANU/SC/0071/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Whether plaintiff will be barred to file second suit on the cause of action if he was not entitled to said relief at the time of filing of first suit?

V. The "entitlement to" along with the "availability of" the relief as a requisite in determining the applicability of Order II Rule 2.

72. The Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan (supra) elaborated on the true import of Order II Rule 2 as follows:

Shortly stated Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, enacts that if a Plaintiff fails to sue for the whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action in the first suit, then he is precluded from suing in a second suit in respect of the portion so omitted. To apply the Rule to the facts of the case their Lordships will have to consider what was the cause of action in Suit No. 8, on which the Plaintiffs founded their claims, and whether they included all the claims which they were entitled to make in respect of that cause of action in that suit. For, if they failed to include all the claims, then by force of Order 2, Rule 2, they are precluded from including the claim omitted in the present Suit No. 2.

73. Order II Rule 2(1) reads that - "every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the Plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action...". Similarly, Order II Rule 2(3) reads that - "A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs...". It is necessary that the same intention also be read into Order II Rule 2(2) which reads that - "where a Plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished". The phrase "any portion of his claim" must essentially be understood to mean any portion of his claim which he is entitled to make for the simple reason that there cannot be a deliberate or intentional relinquishment of any portion of a claim, if the Plaintiff was not entitled to it. Therefore, the true import of the bar Under Order II Rule 2 must be that it operates to preclude a Plaintiff from instituting a second suit, on the same cause of action, for a claim, any portion of a claim, or reliefs, which the Plaintiff was entitled to avail at the time of filing of the first suit.

74. There may arise a situation where the Plaintiff may be entitled to a relief but such a relief was not available at a certain point in time. In other words, that obtaining such a relief was impossible due to the circumstances which existed during the institution of the first suit. It is our opinion that, in such scenarios, Courts must give such an interpretation to the principles Under Order II Rule 2 that is not bogged down by mere technicalities.

75. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan reported in   MANU/RH/0033/1964 : AIR 1964 Raj 114 wherein the High Court had opined that Order II Rule 2 does not require that a person must seek all the remedies to which he may be entitled to even though it would be impossible for him to obtain the remedy from the opposite party. Herein, it was not possible for the Plaintiff to obtain the relief of possession from the Respondent No. 2 in his initial suit since the Respondent No. 2 himself was put in actual possession of the property much after the institution of the first suit. In such circumstances, it could not be said that the Plaintiff had intentionally relinquished any portion of his claim or that he omitted to ask for a relief which he could otherwise obtain. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

8. Now, in the present case, when the Petitioner filed the first suit on 14th August, 1946, his claim was only for a declaration to the effect that the adoption of Respondent No. 2 by Pusharam was invalid in law and for the relief that the adoption-deed should be cancelled. According to the admission of Respondent No. 2 himself he was not in possession of the property in respect of which the second suit was filed on 1st July, 1954. It cannot therefore, be said that the Plaintiff had intentionally relinquished any portion of his claim or that he omitted to ask for a relief which he could get from Respondent No. 2. Even if he had sued for possession against Respondent No. 2, he could not obtain a decree for possession against a person who was admittedly not in occupation of the same. It would, therefore, have been futile on the part of the Petitioner to sue for possession against Respondent No. 2 at that time. Order 2, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure does not require that a person must seek all the remedies to which he may be entitled even though it be impossible for him to obtain them from the opposite party. It is true that Respondent No. 2 had obtained a decree for possession against the landlords on 18th February, 1946, i.e., about six months prior to the institution of the Petitioner's suit, but the Petitioner was not a party to that suit. It had nowhere been mentioned in the judgment of the learned Members of the Board of Revenue if the Petitioner was even aware of the decree which Respondent No. 2 had obtained against the landlords Moreover, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the said decree was in the knowledge of the Petitioner, then too, he could not sue for possession, because Respondent No. 2 was not put in actual possession of the property in execution of the decree. It was about three years after, i.e., on 11th March, 1949 that Respondent No. 2 got possession of the property. In our opinion, the learned Members committed an error, which is patent on the face of the record, in holding that the Petitioner ought to have sued for possession at the time when he filed the first suit on 14th August, 1946.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of 2025.

Decided On: 15.01.2025

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 73,MANU/SC/0071/2025.

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Supreme Court: Plaint With Multiple Reliefs Cannot Be Rejected under O 7 R 11 of CPC Just Because Some Reliefs Are Barred

Even if we would have been persuaded to take the view that the third relief is barred by Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the plaint must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the case on hand, the first and second reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI ACT and are within the civil court's jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint cannot be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. {Para 24}

25. If the civil court is of the view that one relief (say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the view that Relief B is barred by law, the civil court must not make any observations to the effect that relief B is barred by law and must leave that issue undecided in an Order VII, Rule 11 application. This is because if the civil court cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same logic, it ought not to make any adverse observations against relief B.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1876 of 2016, 

Decided On: 09.01.2025

Central Bank of India and Ors. Vs. Prabha Jain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 95, MANU/SC/0095/2025.

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Whether the court can direct striking out of pleading if suit is partly not maintainable?

We are afraid that this is a misreading of the Madras High Court judgment. It was only on the peculiar facts of that case that want of Section 80 Code of Civil Procedure against one Defendant led to the rejection of the plaint as a whole, as no cause of action would remain against the other Defendants. This cannot elevate itself into a Rule of law, that once a part of a plaint cannot proceed, the other part also cannot proceed, and the plaint as a whole must be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11. In all such cases, if the plaint survives against certain Defendants and/or properties, Order VII Rule 11 will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole must then proceed to trial.

11. If only a portion of the plaint, as opposed to the plaint as a whole is to be struck out, Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Order VI Rule 16 states as follows:

16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-

a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or

b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or

c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. {Para 10}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10802 of 2017.

Decided On: 21.08.2017

Sejal Glass Ltd. Vs. Navilan Merchants Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.

Citation: 2017:INSC:783 : (2018) 11 SCC 780, MANU/SC/1098/2017.

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Supreme Court: Plaint is liable to be rejected if there is violation of S 12-A of The Commercial courts Act for Pre-institution mediation

 The seminal question which arises for consideration is whether the statutory pre-litigation mediation contemplated Under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') as amended by the Amendment Act of 2018 is mandatory and whether the Courts below have erred in not allowing the applications filed Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC'), to reject the plaints filed by the Respondents in these appeals without complying with the procedure Under Section 12A of the Act. {Para 2}

84. Having regard to all these circumstances, we would dispose of the matters in the following manner. We declare that Section 12A of the Act is mandatory and hold that any suit instituted violating the mandate of Section 12A must be visited with rejection of the plaint Under Order VII Rule 11. This power can be exercised even suo moto by the court as explained earlier in the judgment. We, however, make this declaration effective from 20.08.2022 so that concerned stakeholders become sufficiently informed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5333 of 2022.

Decided On: 17.08.2022

Patil Automation Private Limited and Ors. Vs. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: K.M. Joseph, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2022.

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Whether the court can reject plaint if plaintiff has not claimed appropriate reliefs?

 We have taken note that the grievance essentially put

forth by the respondents for which an application under

Order VII Rule 11 was filed, is that the appellant

herein, had not sought for an appropriate prayer to

declare the sale deeds dated 03.12.2015 and 26.02.2016 as

illegal, null and void and no court fee in that regard

was paid.

5. To that extent, we take note that the prayer, as

made, in any event, had been valued and the court fee has

been paid. Whether an appropriate prayer should have

sought, is a matter ultimately to be decided in the suit

and not an issue to be considered while deciding the

application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, in the manner

in which it had been done in the facts and circumstances

arising in the instant case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 4221 of 2023

SAJJAN SINGH  Vs  JASVIR KAUR & ORS.

Dated: 06th July, 2023.

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Under which circumstances the court can reject the plaint as barred by limitation?

The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power Under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly Under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [MANU/SC/0034/1977 : (1977) 4 SCC 467].) {Para 12}

7.1. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) is concerned, again there cannot be any dispute with respect to the proposition of law laid down by this Court that while deciding the application Under Order VII Rule XI, mainly the averments in the plaint only are required to be considered and not the averments in the written statement. However, on considering the averments in the plaint as they are, we are of the opinion that the plaint is ought to have been rejected being vexatious, illusory cause of action and barred by limitation and it is a clear case of clever drafting.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2717 of 2023

Ramisetty Venkatanna and Ors.  Vs. Nasyam Jamal Saheb and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author; M.R. Shah, J.

Decided On: 28.04.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0483/2023.

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Whether the court should reject the plaint if there is no specific pleading regarding fraud?

7.7 Even the averments and allegations with respect to knowledge of the plaintiffs averred in paragraph 19 can be said to be too vague. Nothing has been mentioned on which date and how the plaintiffs had the knowledge that the document was obtained by fraud and/or misrepresentation. It is averred that the alleged fraudulent sale came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs only when the plaintiffs visited the suit property. Nothing has been mentioned when the plaintiffs visited the suit

property. It is not understandable how on visiting the suit property, the plaintiffs could have known the contents of the sale deed and/or the knowledge about the alleged fraudulent sale.

7.8 Even the averments and allegations in the plaint with respect to fraud are not supported by any further averments and allegations how the fraud has been committed/played. Mere stating in the plaint that a fraud has been played is not enough and the allegations of fraud must be specifically averred in the plaint, otherwise merely by using the word “fraud”, the plaintiffs would try to get the suits within the limitation, which otherwise may be barred by limitation. Therefore, even if the submission

on behalf of the respondents – original plaintiffs that only the averments and allegations in the plaints are required to be considered at the time of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is accepted, in that case also by such vague allegations with respect to the date of knowledge, the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to challenge the documents after a period of 10 years. By such a clever drafting and using the word “fraud”, the plaintiffs have tried to bring the suits within the period of limitation invoking Section 17 of the limitation Act. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to bring the suits within the period of limitation by clever drafting, which otherwise is barred by limitation. 

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 500 OF 2022

C.S. Ramaswamy  Vs V.K. Senthil & Ors. 

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 30, 2022.

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Whether a party must pay Ad Valorem Court-Fees in Suit For recovery of Compensation And Damages?

  The moot question for consideration is whether the suit in question as framed was a money suit for compensation/damages falling under Clause (i) of Section 7 or was a suit falling in any of the categories specified in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. A reading of the relief clause would make it abundantly clear that this was a money suit for compensation/damages and not falling under any of the categories mentioned in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there would be no question at all for the applicability of Section 7(iv) of the Act. It would be a simple case of applicability of Section 7(i) of the Act and ad valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per Schedule 1 entry 1.{Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2064 OF 2022 

 STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS Vs DEV BRAT SHARMA

Coram: DINESH MAHESHWARI; VIKRAM NATH, JJ. 

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Dated: MARCH 16, 2022 

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Should the court reject the plaint if the caretaker of the property claims an interest in the property against the owner of the property?

 The respondent no.1-plaintiff filed a suit with the

following prayer:

a) for a declaration that the plaintiff is a

lawful occupier as caretaker/servant of the sole

owner of the A schedule property and occupier and

adverse possessor of the B Schedule property.

After the notice was served. The application under

Order VII Rule 11, CPC came to be filed at the behest of

the present appellant-defendant with an objection that the

suit proceedings at the instance of the respondent no.1-

plaintiff who had pleaded himself to be a

caretaker/servant, acquires no interest in the subject

property irrespective of his long possession, is not

maintainable under the law and as regards the plea of

adverse possession is concerned, it lacks material

particulars.

The Trial Judge dismissed the application on the

premise that these are the subject matter of disputes which

can be examined only after the written statement being

filed at the behest of the present appellant-defendant and

is not within the scope of Order VII Rule 11, CPC and order

of Trial Judge came to be confirmed by the High Court by

the impugned order assailed in the present proceedings.

After we heard counsel for the parties and taking into

consideration the material on record, in our considered

view, the Trail Court has committed a manifest error in

appreciating the pleadings on record from the plaint filed

at the instance of respondent no.1-plaintiff who as a

caretaker/servant can never acquire interest in the

property irrespective of his long possession and the

caretaker/servant has to give possession forthwith on

demand and so far as the plea of adverse possession is

concerned as it lacks material particulars and the plaint

does not discloses the cause of action for institution of

the suit.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5779 OF 2021

HIMALAYA VINTRADE PVT. LTD. Vs MD. ZAHID & ANR. 

Dated: SEPTEMBER 16, 2021

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Whether pendency of an application for rejection of plaint operates as stay to filing of written statement?

A perusal of the impugned order shows that the time for filing of the written statement has been granted without taking into consideration the provisions of Order VIII CPC. Under the provisions of Order VIII CPC, non-filing of the written statement within time entails consequences in law. The pendency of an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, does not operate as an automatic stay upon filing of the written statement. In fact, the settled legal position is that the written statement should be filed irrespective of an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC being pending. This is clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 4th July 2016, in R.K. Roja v. U.S. Rayadu and Ors., MANU/SC/0751/2016 : AIR 2016 SC 3282) where the Supreme Court held:

"7. In Saleem Bhai case (supra), this Court has also held that..."A direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 cannot but be a procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction of the trial court." However, we may hasten to add that the liberty to file an application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost opportunity to file the written statement."

The Supreme Court, has recently reiterated this principle in judgment dated 18th September 2020, titled Sagufa Ahmed and ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 3007-08/2020). The Court was considering the impact of the pandemic and the automatic extension of limitation and the manner in which the same is to be applied. The Supreme Court held:

"19. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only "the period of limitation" and not the period up to which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two Latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them."

9. The provisions of Order VIII CPC provide a complete timeline and scheme for filing of the written statement. The said scheme would have to be followed. There are certain conditions that have to be satisfied for a party to seek condonation of delay in filing the written statement. The non-filing of the written statement within the time prescribed has consequences in law for parties. The grant of a further extension of time, in a casual manner simply upon an oral request without an application thereto being filed and explaining the delay in filing the written statement, would be contrary to law. Even the lockdown due to the pandemic can only extend the original period of limitation and not the period up to which delay can be condoned.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

C.R.P. 63/2020 and CM Appl. 23570/2020

Decided On: 23.09.2020

 Shyam Sunder Vs.  Shikha Arora 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prathiba M. Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1783/2020

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Whether court should return court fees to plaintiff if plaint is rejected?

 In a case of return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 invariably the plaint and the court-fee stamps on which also some part of the plaint and/or details thereof are typed and which have even been cancelled as per Section 30 of the Act, 1870 and the Rules are returned for presentation before the competent Court as it is, which on return, are accepted by the subsequent Court with a new registration number of the suit. The case at hand is an exceptional one where it was required to be returned. True, as stated by Shri Sudeep Seth, rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is very different from return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10, especially as, the former is covered in the definition of 'Decree' contained in Section 2(2) C.P.C., but, this would be material and relevant only if return of the original court-fee stamps filed with the plaint, which is rejected, is sought, as, that would be impermissible. Here the return is of additional court-fee stamps offered consequent to amendment of the plaint which were not accepted and the plaint was rejected on the ground of non deposit of additional court-fee. Moreover, the analogy of return of plaint is being referred only to emphasise the return of court-fee stamps along with it and that such return, unless specifically barred, is not impermissible in the peculiar facts of the present case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Misc. Single No. 6585 of 2014

Decided On: 27.04.2017

 Ravindra Kumar Gupta  Vs. Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajan Roy, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/0931/2017

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Whether the court should reject plaint if the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact?

 It is clear from a perusal of the aforesaid judgment that the policy of the section 14 of the Limitation Act is to afford protection to a litigant when he institutes a proceeding in a wrong court provided this act was done in good faith and bona fide. The section has to be interpreted liberally in a manner to advance the cause of justice rather than to abort the proceedings. The plaintiff has to establish the fact that the prior proceedings have been instituted/prosecuted in good faith and due diligence. This is obviously a question of fact which the plaintiff has to prove.

 I may note that usually the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. What defendant No. 1 seeks is an adjudication of the issue of limitation at the initial stage itself before even an opportunity has been given to the plaintiff to show that it was prosecuting the litigation before the Bombay High Court with due diligence and in good faith.{Para 22}

24. While considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC only averments made in the plaint are to be looked at and the accompanying documents. Reference in this context may be had to the judgment of this court in the case of Tilak Raj Bhagat vs. Ranjit Kaur wherein this court held as follows:-

"6. It may be worthwhile to mention here that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court has to look at the averments made in the plaint by taking the same as correct on its face value as also the documents filed in support thereof. Neither defence of the defendant nor averments made in the application have to be given any weightage. Plaint has to be read as a whole together with the documents filed by the plaintiff."

28. Hence, for the purpose of considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC only the averments made in the plaint have to be taken presuming them to be correct on the face of it along with the documents filed in support of the plaint. It is only in cases where the averments in the plaint itself indicate the cause of action to be barred by limitation that the plaint can be rejected at the initial stage. This must be on a mere ex facie reading of the plaint.

 As noted above, every act of the plaintiff in filing a suit in a court other than the court which as per the Agreement has exclusive jurisdiction, does not necessarily imply that the act was done without due diligence or in good faith. It would be for the plaintiff to lead evidence on this aspect. What the defendant want is that the defence of the defendant be taken into account and the plaint be dismissed without giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to lead evidence to show that the reason for pursuing the matter before the Bombay High Court was bona fide and with due diligence. This plea is clearly not permissible. On a ex-facie reading of the plaint it cannot be said that it is barred by limitation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 105/2018

Decided On: 15.06.2020

Modtech Furniture Private Ltd.  Vs.  NCUBE Planning Design Private Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jayant Nath, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1236/2020

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