Supreme Court: As per Order XII Rule 6 CPC, Admission Made In Criminal Case Can Be Used In Civil Proceedings

While dismissing the Second Appeal, the High Court took notice of the admissions made by the petitioner in the criminal proceedings and observed as under:-

"26. In the present case, learned Counsel for the appellant does not dispute the fact that, in the complaint dated 29thJuly 2009 lodged by him at PS.Jamia Nagar, which resulted in the registration of FIR178/2009. The appellant had indeed acknowledged the suit property to be owned by Respondent 1 and that he had been inducted into the suit property by Respondent 2 as caretaker. This admission finds place in the complaint as well as in the FIR. During the course of regarding of evidence in the criminal proceedings, following the FIR, the appellant, as PW-3, specifically admitted the fact of filing the aforesaid complaint by him at police station Jamia Nagar on 27thAugust 2009, resulting in the complaint being exhibited as Ex. PW-3/A. It is not the case of the appellant that, during the course of recording of the said evidence, there was any denial of the contents of the said FIR.

12. The entire debate revolves around the question whether the courts-below were justified to decree the suit in favour of the plaintiffs on the strength of the admission made by the petitioner in the course of the criminal proceedings and whether the trial court was justified to pass the final decree based on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

17. On the aspect of admission on the part of the petitioner, three courts have assigned cogent reasons. We need not disturb the concurrent findings recorded by the three courts-below in this regard.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal C No. 19868/2022

Date of Order: 07.05.2026

Sheikh Abedin Vs. Iqbal Ahmed and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/32097/2026

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Bombay HC: An admission made during cross-examination of a witness by counsel of one accused does not bind another accused if they are represented by different advocates

  Criminal Trial: Admission in Cross-Examination- In a criminal trial, an admission made during the cross-examination of a witness by the counsel of one accused does not bind another accused if they are represented by different counsels/advocates. Each accused is entitled to their own defense, and admissions made by one counsel cannot be used against another accused who is represented separately.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 38 OF 2022

Manohar s/o Kondiba Waghmare, Vs The State of Maharashtra .

CORAM : R. G. AVACHAT AND NEERAJ P. DHOTE, JJ.

JUDGMENT [Per : Neeraj P. Dhote, J.] : -

DATED : 31st JANUARY, 2025.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:1988-DB.

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Delhi HC: The expression "the matters before it" in the definition of "proof are wide enough to cover matters which are not "evidence" as defined in the Act

 "13. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

13.1 Proof: A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. "Evidence" of a fact and "proof" of a fact are not synonymous terms. "Proof", in the strict sense, means the effect of evidence.

13.2 Section 3 defines the expressions 'proved', 'disproved', and 'not proved' as under:-

"Proved" A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.

"Disproved" A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist.

"Not proved" A fact is said not to be proved when it is neither proved nor disproved.

13.3 Meanings of term "the matters before it"

The expression "the matters before it" in the definition of "proof" are wide enough to cover matters which are not "evidence" as defined in the Act. For instance, a fact may be orally admitted in the Court. The admission would not come within the definition of the word 'evidence' as given in this Act, but still it is a matter which the Court would have to take into consideration in order to determine whether the particular fact was proved or not. The Court is thus entitled to take into consideration all the matters before it which shall include the statement of the witnesses, admissions of the parties, confession of the accused, documents proved in evidence, judicial notice, demeanour of witnesses, local inspections and presumptions.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Mac. App. 1114/2017

Decided On: 28.09.2018

Suman Devi and Ors. Vs. Mahesh Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.R. Midha, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/3807/2018.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Is an admission by a father that his illegitimate child is legitimate binding on his successors?

 The Privy Council in Gopal Das and Anr. v. Sri Thakurji and Ors.   MANU/PR/0002/1943 : AIR 1943 PC 83, held that a statement made by a person is not only evidence against the person but is also evidence against those who claim through him. Section 18 of the Act lays down the conditions and the requirements satisfied for applying to a statement as an admission. We keep in our perspective Sections 17 and 18 of the Act while appreciating Exs. B-3 and B-6. {Para 14}

15.1. A mere perusal of the preface to Ex. B-6, mortgage deed, would show that Muthusamy Gounder treated Appellant No. 1, Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 3 as his sons. The document was executed for himself and on behalf of his minor sons. The statement is made by Muthusamy Gounder during the subsistence of his interest in the property mortgaged. Respondent No. 3 definitely claims through Muthusamy Gounder for the half share notionally partitioned in favour of Muthusamy Gounder. The Appellants also rely on the patta dated 27.04.1984 (Ex. B-3) standing in the name of Muthusamy Gounder and his sons; the voters lists, viz., Exs. B-4 and B-5, to show that Muthusamy Gounder and his sons lived as a family. By applying Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, we are convinced that Muthusamy Gounder made a statement describing Appellant No. 1 and Respondent No. 1 as his sons and treated as an admission by record. This statement satisfies the ingredients of Section 18 of the Act. Further, in the absence of contrary evidence and withdrawal of admission or explained through admissible evidence, the admission in the mortgage deed, viz., Ex. B-6, coupled with the joint patta and voters lists, declares the status of Appellant No. 1, Respondent No. 1, along with Respondent No. 3 as the sons of Muthusamy Gounder. At this juncture, we notice that the status derived through an admission in Ex. B-3 vis-�-vis Appellant No. 1 as a natural corollary could be extended to Appellant No. 3 as a child/daughter of Muthusamy Gounder. This is an inescapable consequential conclusion which the Court has to record.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 600 of 2024 

Decided On: 19.01.2024

Raja Gounder and Ors. Vs. M. Sengodan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0047/2024.

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Whether the court can make additions to the decree on admission during execution of decree if defendant has not filed his written statement?

This Court has time and again cautioned against the Execution Court adopting such an approach. In Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram,9 a three-judge bench held as follows:

It is a well-settled principle that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: it must take the decree as it stands, for the decree is binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit.

Yet again, in Meenakshi Saxena (supra) it was reiterated that:

The whole purpose of execution proceedings is to enforce the verdict of the court. Executing court while executing the decree is only concerned with the execution part of it but nothing else. The court has to take the judgment in its face value. It is settled law that executing court cannot go beyond the decree. But the difficulty arises when there is ambiguity in the decree with regard to the material aspects. Then it becomes the bounden duty of the court to interpret the decree in the process of giving a true effect to the decree. At that juncture the executing court has to be very cautious in supplementing its interpretation and conscious of the fact that it cannot draw a new decree. The executing court shall strike a fine balance between the two while exercising this jurisdiction in the process of giving effect to the decree. {Para15}

16. As is commonly known, the stream cannot rise above its source. Both Courts have, by selectively perusing the emails, altered the terms of the decree to include the loan amount into the agreement consideration. It is also imperative to note that such a reading was despite the clauses in the joint venture agreement entered into between the parties in 2017, which provided for a separate mechanism of settling all outstanding loans:

17. Thus, the joint venture agreement also contemplated a clear distinguishment between the bidding process and subsequent repayment of loan. The argument of the Respondent - that the use of words 'consolidated price' denotes inclusion of the loan amount - cannot be accepted ipso facto, considering that from the pleadings, it is clear that only the 50% shareholding valuation was discussed by the parties throughout, which was pegged at ` 70 crores by the Kotharis. Repayment of the loan amount in no manner constitutes a disruption of the 'smooth transition' envisioned as an aim of this transaction - thus its interpretation as such is erroneous.

It is undeniable that an Executing Court can construe a decree if it is ambiguous. However, as in the facts of the case herein, this cannot result in additions (to the terms of the consent, embodied in the email dated 28.03.2019) which were not agreed upon by the parties, since the decree was drawn on by consent of both parties at admissions stage itself. Both the single judge and Division Bench of the High Court have interpreted the Appellants' silence (manifest in their not filing any written statement) as acquiescence to the inclusion of the loan amount, which, is although worthy of adverse inference, cannot be the reason to justify expansion of the decree.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1312-1313 of 2023

Sanwarlal Agrawal and Ors. Vs. Ashok Kumar Kothari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Krishna Murari and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.

Author: S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Decided On: 21.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0151/2023

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Whether plaintiff's case can be proved based on the admission of defendants in their pleadings, oral evidence or the documents produced by them?

After the parties lead evidence on the basis of the respective pleadings and tender oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the case of the plaintiff could be proved even on the basis of the admission by the defendants in their pleadings, oral evidence or by the documents produced by the defendants, which may in fact support the plaintiff.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

L.P.A. No. 5 of 1984

Decided On: 25.11.2005

Tulsabai and Ors. Vs.  Sakharam Bhanu Chavan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.P. Deshpande and Vasanti A. Naik, JJ.

Author: Vasanti A. Naik, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1270/2005,2006(2) MHLJ 219

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Golden principles for deciding application for amendment of written statement

  What emerges from the various authorities cited above is that normally, amendment to a written statement is allowed subject to a few exceptions, these exceptions are:

(i) The proposed amendment which the defendant seeks to make, should not cause injustice to the plaintiff and the admissions made in favour of the plaintiff should not be allowed to be withdrawn.

(ii) The proposed amendment should not be allowed, if inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts are sought to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings.

(iii) The proposed amendment should not be allowed if it amounts to, or results in, defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. {Para 23}

24. The law, as regards amendment of written statements, is, thus, almost settled. The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are applicable with equal force to the amendments of the written statements. However, the Courts are more generous in allowing amendment of written statement as the question of prejudice is less likely to operate in the case of written statement. The defendant has a right to take alternative pleas in defence, which, however, is subject to an exception that by proposed amendment, the opponent should not be subjected to prejudice. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed, which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided that the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute defence taken. However, inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side, which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed, which amounts to, or results in, defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. The delay, in filing a petition for amendment of the pleadings, should be properly compensated by costs. Error or mistake, which, if not fraudulent, should not be, ordinarily, made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of a written statement. Above, all, no admission made in favour of a plaintiff, can be allowed to be withdrawn by amendment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI

Decided On: 30.10.2006

Uttam Chand Kothari Vs.  Gauri Shankar Jalan and Ors.

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Can the court pass a decree on admission under O12 R 6 of CPC if there is no clear and categorical admission?

Be that as it may, the arguments advanced by both the sides, in our view can be appreciated by the Trial Court by affording opportunity to them to lead evidence. As per the pleadings, there may be admission to the extent of execution of the Lease Agreement, rate of rent and monthly payment but simultaneously the defense taken by the Defendant is also based on ATSI, II and III. In view of the contents of those agreements and terms specified therein, the defense as taken by the Appellant/Defendant is plausible or not is a matter of trial which may be appreciated by the Court after granting opportunity to lead evidence by the respective parties. There may be admission with respect to tenancy as per lease agreements but the defense as taken is also required to be looked into by the Court and there is need to decide justiciability of defense by the fullfledged trial. In our view, for the purpose of Order XII Rule 6, the said admission is not clear and categorical, so as to exercise a discretion by the Court without dealing with the defense as taken by Defendant. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, as confirmed by the High Court, only on admission of fact without considering the defense in exercise of power under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC is hereby set aside. {Para 22}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4545 OF 2022

 Karan Kapoor Vs Madhuri Kumar

Coram: INDIRA BANERJEE; J., J.K. MAHESHWARI, J. 

Dated: July 06, 2022 

Coram: J.K. Maheshwari, J.

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How to appreciate evidence in case of admission of guilt by law student about plagiarism?

 The vehement contention of the University Counsel

that, petitioner in his mail dated 02.03.2020 has admitted

the ‘offence of plagiarism’, is difficult to countenance;

petitioner had sent a mail of the kind vide Annexure-R5, is

true, though unfairly enough, he has not whispered about

this in the Writ Petition; it is a representation ‘to

reconsider my case’ of plagiarism and not an admission;

true it is that, there are a few stray sentences such as ‘This

is my first plagiarism violation’; however, the same is

followed by other sentences which seek to explain why it is

not a case of plagiarism; he has specifically stated that

certain things needed to be mentioned as they are and,

that would not amount to plagiarism; even in his mail

dated 28.2.2020 at Annexure-R1 to the S.O., he has

written ‘This is my first violation’; but this too is followed

by a denial in the very same paragraph.

f) It has been a long settled position of law that a

stray sentence giving the impression of admission of the

guilt shall not be interpreted in isolation when the rest of

the matter in the representations suggests the contra; one

has to gather a holistic impression from reading the entire

text and not a few sporadic sentences appearing here &

there in a script, whilst considering if what is stated

amounts to admission. An acclaimed jurist of yester

decades Mr.Rupert Cross in his treatise ‘EVIDENCE’, (3rd

Edn. London- Butterworks 1967) at page 433 states: “An

admission being any statement … which is adverse to a

party’s case, the only conditions of admissibility, when the

statement emanates from the party himself concern the

capacity in which he is acting and the reception of the

entirety of the statement…”; it is more so when one is

dealing with the educational career of young minds like the

petitioner herein; loose & lavish wording of the

representations, need to be given a due discount; the

respondent –University is not justified in seeking shelter

under a leaking umbrella of a poor student.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT

WRIT PETITION NO. 9395 OF 2020 (EDN-RES)

BETWEEN:

SRI HRUDAY. P B Vs  THE VICE CHANCELLOR, THE NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY,

DATED:  18TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020

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Whether court can insist on plaintiff to prove his case if it can not allow withdrawal of implied admission in a written statement?

What is important to note is that the proviso to Rule 5 gives to the Court the power to insist that notwithstanding the fact that there is an implied admission, because of non-traversing of a fact, the plaintiff proves his statement by adducing evidence. The exercise of this discretion cannot be arbitrary and the Court may have to bear in mind the standard of drafting obtaining at the place, where the suit is instituted. Thus, in a given case, when the counsel's default leads to an implied or express admission, the remedy of the defendant does not lie in withdrawing the admission by making amendment in the written statement, but in making out a case for the Court to exercise its powers under the proviso to Rule 5 of Order 8 and insist upon the plaintiff to prove his case notwithstanding the admission - implied or express - made in the written statement. In the case at hand too, if the learned trial Court finds that non-traversing of the statements made in paras 3 and 15 to 19 of the plaint have been impliedly admitted by the defendant and still if the defendant satisfies the learned trial Court that such admission was due to fault of his earlier counsel, the Court may, if satisfied, insist on the plaintiffs, to prove the statements made in paras 3 and 15 to 19 of the plaint.

36. Coupled with the above, it is pertinent to note that apart from the fact that Order VIII, Rule 5 permits the Court to insist on a plaintiff to prove a fact notwithstanding an implied admission, which the defendant might have made, even Section 58 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that notwithstanding a defendant's admission, express or implied, made in his written statement, a Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI

Decided On: 30.10.2006

Uttam Chand Kothari Vs.  Gauri Shankar Jalan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

I.A. Ansari, J.

Citation: AIR 2007 Gau 20, 2007 (1) GLT 37, MANU/GH/0209/2006

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Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on the admissibility of admission given by accused in his first information report

 The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court, viz., how and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or whether the appellant's statement in Court denying the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses is correct of not. Admissions are admissible in evidence under s. 21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against a person who makes them. Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to s. 21 are of the circumstances in which an accused could prove his own admissions which go in his favour in view of the exceptions mentioned in s. 21 to the provision that admissions could not be proved by the person who makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions of an accused can be proved against him.

15. The Privy Council in very similar circumstances, held long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor L.R. 44 IndAp 137 such first information reports to be admissible in evidence. The report was held admissible because it was not a confession and it was helpful in determining the matter before the Court.

17. In Nisar Ali's case MANU/SC/0032/1957 : 1957CriLJ550 Kapur J. who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts :

"An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was made by a person who was a co-accused. A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under s. 145 of that Act. It can not be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence."

18. It is on these observations that it has been contended for the appellant that his report was inadmissible in evidence. Ostensibly, the expression 'it cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused supports the appellant's contention. But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record or that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first information report cannot be used against the maker when he be an accused and necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused. Further, the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is significant and indicates what the Court meant was that the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the co-accused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court did not mean - as it had not to determine in that case - that a first information report which is not a confession cannot be used as an admission under s. 21 of the Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under any other provision of that Act.

19. We therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility of the first information report lodged by the appellant is not sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it in evidence and have made proper use of it.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 1963

Decided On: 24.01.1964

Faddi  Vs.  The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M. Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.

Citations: 1964 AIR 1850, 1964 SCR (6) 312

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What are exceptions to rule that evasive denial in pleading amounts to admission in proceeding before the family court?

 It was pointed out on behalf of the appellant that none of the allegations of mental cruelty narrated in Paragraph No. 17 of this judgment as well as pleadings in the original petition was specifically denied by the respondent in her counter statement and therefore, they must be deemed to be admissions in proof of allegations of cruelty by virtue of the principle as to evasive denial incorporated in Order VIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the C.P.C.').

21. The rules of pleading incorporated in the C.P.C. equally apply to the proceedings before the family Courts also by virtue of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The general principle flowing from Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of the C.P.C. that a defendant who proposes to deny the truth of an allegation against him/her ought to do it either specifically or necessary implication in lieu of mere general or evasive denial, applies to the family courts also. Evasive denial in the pleadings of a defendant is treated by law to be an admission of the truth of allegations made against him, unless the court in its discretion is of the opinion that the undenied fact must, nonetheless, be proved otherwise than by such deemed admission. In other words, the courts have necessary discretion to take exception to such admissions and to look for independent evidence instead of fully relying on them. The exceptional cases for such exercise of discretion ordinarily relate to decisions involving issues as to status, relationship of parties and also matters of which court cannot possibly draw inference as to the truth having regard to their evidentiality. In this context, Section 23(1) of the HM Act in its application to matrimonial courts dealing with cases arising under the said Act is also very relevant. The aforesaid Section mandates that in the proceedings under the Act whether defended or not, the courts are to arrive at just decisions based only on total satisfaction drawn from the entirety of materials on record apart from the deemed admission flowing from the evasive denial referable to Order VIII Rule 5 of the C.P.C. by following the guidelines mentioned in Section 23(1). This Section does not permit passing of a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty when the wronged spouse is proved to have condoned the cruelty of the offending spouse. So also, when the spouse sues for dissolution of marriage after taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability also, the said provision empowers the court to refuse the relief sought notwithstanding that the truth of the allegation was not denied specifically or by necessary implication.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Mat. Appeal No. 547 of 2013

Decided On: 18.02.2020

Santhosh Kumar S. Vs.  Jayasree Damodaran

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Shaffique and T.V. Anilkumar, JJ.

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Whether it is necessary to prove that there was joint family for seeking partition of joint family property?

Re: Burden of Proof:

26. Initial burden of proving that himself and defendants constituted the joint family was on the plaintiff. Mere admission that he was the son of defendant no. 1 does not lead to the presumption that himself and defendants constituted the joint family and were the members of the joint family.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

R.S.A. Nos. 1813/2015 and 2188/2016 (DEC-PAR-INJ)

Decided On: 04.04.2019

 M. Krishna Vs.  M. Ramachandra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.S. Mudagal, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Karnat 188

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Whether admission given in legal notice can be relied on if attention of witness is not drawn to that admission?

In the other two decisions, cited by Sri H.S. Dwarakanath on this point, it has been held that admission furnishes the best evidence. Examined whether a sentence found in Ex. P11 amounts to an admission or not, it has to be stated that, though defendants had been called upon in the said notice to handover possession of schedule property to plaintiff by executing a sale deed, the same does not amount to admission. The reason being that whilst P.W. 1 was being cross examined, his attention was not drawn to Ex. P11, particularly with reference to the sentence purporting to be an admission. When P.W. 1 in his examination in chief affidavit asserted to have taken possession, his attention should have been drawn to this sentence and questioned. Since Ex. P11 is a legal notice issued on behalf plaintiff, whatever that has been stated there amounts to previous statements and he should have been cross examined. Section 145 provides for contradicting a witness on his previous statement. Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act also provides for proving former statements inconsistent with any other part of evidence of a witness. Therefore to apply the rule of admission, attention of the witness must be drawn to previous contradictory statement or the so called admission and afforded an opportunity of explaining it; without this procedure being followed, no inference based on such an admission can be drawn. Moreover the admission, must not only be clear and unambiguous, but also of such a nature as to compel or persuade the court in the given set of circumstance to believe and act upon it. A stray circumstance, can never be considered as admission; what is found in Ex. P11 is that kind of a sentence which can hardly be treated as an admission. Therefore the finding of the trial court about possession of schedule property being with plaintiff is not erroneous.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Regular First Appeal Nos. 1056 and 1028 of 2012

Decided On: 08.02.2019

Venkatamma Vs.  B.S. Suryaprakash 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sreenivas Harish Kumar, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 (NOC) 824 KAR

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To what extent deposition of witness made in earlier proceeding can be marked?

In view of the above precedential guidance, it is clear that as it is the case of the revision petitioner/respondent in the instant OP that the witness (PW 1) made a statement in his present 

deposition contrary to certain admissions, which he made in the deposition given by him in the former judicial proceeding, the contrary statements in his said previous deposition can be confronted to him in his cross-examination; and, on such confrontation, if he admits the confronted portions or statements in his previous deposition, such admissions can be recorded by the Trial Court in his present deposition; however, if, on such confrontation, he denies the previous statements in his previous/former deposition, which are contrary to his statements in his present deposition, then the confronted portions only of the previous deposition given in former judicial proceeding can be permitted to be marked, but, the entire deposition cannot be permitted to be marked in the instant case, in view of the facts and the legal position obtaining.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

CRP No. 4853 of 2018

Decided On: 25.04.2019

 Telanakula Kasi Viswanadham  Vs.  Pokuri Maruthi Prasad

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M. Seetharama Murti, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 AP 79

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Whether decree for specific performance of contract on admission can be granted in absence of specific pleading?

 I do not see how it is open to the Plaintiff to now get indirectly that which it completely failed to get by a frontal application squarely placing a case for amendment to include a prayer for specific performance. In any case, I do not see how any decree for specific performance can be passed on some sort of implicit or implied averment. The law in that regard is clear. A claim for specific performance is a distinct cause of action and it requires to be pleaded and proved in a specific manner. It cannot be assumed to exist as a cause of action buried somewhere in the pleadings, or arrived at by a process of necessary implication.

The Defendant, MTDC, does not agree that the Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance. It says in terms that the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. It has always said so. What the Plaintiff is doing is to substitute pleading and proof of its own readiness and willingness by relying on the Defendant's assertion that the Defendant was always ready and willing. This is what is lost in translation. What MTDC is really saying is no admission at all. It is saying that although MTDC was always ready and willing to perform its obligations, the Plaintiff was not, and hence the termination. This is the averment in full. The law is settled, too, that an pleading (and an admission) must be read in full. There can be no admission of a case not pleaded. On any reading of the Written Statement as a whole, it cannot be said that the Defendant's case is that the Plaintiff is now entitled to the relief of specific performance. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Notice of Motion No. 270 of 2016 in Suit No. 3762 of 2002

Decided On: 12.02.2019

 K. Raheja Corp. Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Patel, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 206

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Whether admission given by accused during investigation is substantive evidence?

 Bar Under Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure, no doubt, operates in regard to the statement made to a Police Officer in between two points of time, viz., from the beginning of the investigation till the termination of the same. In a case where statement containing not a confession but admission, which is otherwise relevant and which is made before the investigation commences, may be admissible. We need not, however, say anything more.

42. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla and Ors. MANU/SC/0168/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 1406, a Bench of three learned Judges, after approving Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), had occasion to consider the distinction between confession and admission. This Court went on to hold as follows:

45. It is thus seen that only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession but when a confession falls short of actual admission of guilt it may nevertheless be used as evidence against the person who made it or his authorised agent as an "admission" Under Section 21. The law in this regard has been clearly - and in our considered view correctly - explained in Monir's Law of Evidence(New Edn. at pp. 205 and 206), on which Mr. Jethmalani relied to bring home his contention that even if the entries are treated as "admission" of the Jains still they cannot be used against Shri Advani. The relevant passage reads as under:

The distinction between admissions and confessions is of considerable importance for two reasons. Firstly, a statement made by an Accused person, if it is an admission, is admissible in evidence Under Section 21 of the Evidence Act, unless the statement amounts to a confession and was made to a person in authority in consequence of some improper inducement, threat or promise, or was made to a Police Officer, or was made at a time when the Accused was in custody of a Police Officer. If a statement was made by the Accused in the circumstances just mentioned its admissibility will depend upon the determination of the question whether it does not amount to a confession. If it amounts to a confession, it will be inadmissible, but if it does not amount to a confession, it will be admissible Under Section 21 of the Act as an admission, provided that it suggests an inference as to a fact which is in issue in, or relevant to, the case and was not made to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, a statement made by an Accused person is admissible against others who are being jointly tried with him only if the statement amounts to a confession. Where the statement falls short of a confession, it is admissible only against its maker as an admission and not against those who are being jointly tried with him. Therefore, from the point of view of Section 30 of the Evidence Act also the distinction between an admission and a confession is of fundamental importance.

(Emphasis supplied)

43. Section 21 of the Evidence Act provides as follows:

21. Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf.-Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the following cases:

(1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it is of such a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as between third persons Under Section 32.

(2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, when it consists of a statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue, made at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, and is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.

(3) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is relevant otherwise than as an admission.

44. Thus, what amounts to an admission can be used against the maker of the admission or his representative in interest. As to what constitutes an admission is to be found in Section 17 of the Evidence Act, which defines admission as follows:

17. Admission defined.-An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.

45. In Bharat Singh and Ors. v. Mst. Bhagirathi MANU/SC/0362/1965 : AIR 1966 SC 405, the true nature of the evidentiary value of admission, and whether without confronting the maker of the admission, it could be used, has been referred to and this is what this Court had to say:

19. Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17, and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence.

(Emphasis supplied)

46. From the statement of the law contained in V.C. Shukla and others (supra), it becomes clear as to what constitutes confession and how if it does not constitute confession, it may still be an admission. Being an admission, it may be admissible under the Evidence Act provided that it meets the requirements of admission as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act. However, even if it is an admission, if it is made in the course of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure to a Police Officer, then, it will not be admissible Under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it clearly prohibits the use of statement made to a Police Officer Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the purpose which is mentioned therein. Statement given Under Section 161, even if relevant, as it contains an admission, would not be admissible, though an admission falling short of a confession which may be made otherwise, may become substantive evidence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 714 of 2019 

Decided On: 24.04.2019

 Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

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Whether police can examine person named as accused in FIR U/S 161 of CRPC?

Therefore, the combined effect of these provisions can be summarized as follows:

Unless a person is Accused of an offence, he cannot claim the protection of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

40. Such a person, viz., person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the Accused in the eyes of law, can indeed be questioned and the statement is taken by the Police Officer. A confession, which is made to a Police Officer, would be inadmissible having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated Under Section 24 of the Evidence Act would also be inadmissible. A confession unless it fulfills the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra) and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission Under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, even if a statement contains admission, the statement being one Under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar Under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

41. Bar Under Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure, no doubt, operates in regard to the statement made to a Police Officer in between two points of time, viz., from the beginning of the investigation till the termination of the same. In a case where statement containing not a confession but admission, which is otherwise relevant and which is made before the investigation commences, may be admissible. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 714 of 2019 

Decided On: 24.04.2019

 Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs.  State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3363

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Questions and answers on law(Part 1)

1)Doctrine behind S 27 of evidence Act
Ans:In the matter of: Navaneethakrishnan V/s The State by Inspector of Police, Criminal Appeal No. 1134/2013 (Supreme court of India, Date of Decision: 16.04.2018, Coram: A.K. Sikri & R.K. Agrawal, JJ.) it was held that, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 incorporates the theory of confirmation by subsequent facts, that is, statements made in police custody are admissible to the extent that they can be proved by subsequent discovery of facts. Discovery statements made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can be described as those which furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed for a successful prosecution.
2) What is victimless Crime?

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Whether court can consider fact of retirement of landlord even if he has not incorporated said plea by amendment?

 Even before us it was admitted that the appellant had retired from service on the date stated by him. The appellant's retirement from service on the date as stated by him being admitted by the respondent the Appellate Authority was fully justified in taking that development into consideration. No prejudice was caused to the respondent because the appellant did not make any formal amendments in the pleadings or because the retirement order filed before the Authority was not accompanied with a formal petition under Order 41 Rule 27. The contention raised on behalf of the respondent is not highly technical and it is calculated only to frustrate the proceeding coming to a just- conclusion by making it quite incidental and completely subservient to the Court's procedures. We also fail to see how the two decisions relied upon by the counsel can support the case of the respondent. We thus find no merit in the submission.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4680 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8530/2007)

Decided On: 28.07.2008

A.K. Jain Vs. Prem Kapoor

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aftab Alam and Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2008 SC 3194,(2008)8 SCC 593

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