Showing posts with label confidential information. Show all posts
Showing posts with label confidential information. Show all posts

Friday, 4 July 2025

Understanding Negative Covenants Under Indian Law: Judicial Enforcement and Legal Boundaries

Basic Concept of Negative Covenant

A negative covenant, also known as a restrictive covenant, is a contractual provision that restricts one party from carrying out certain specified actions. These covenants may involve some form of compensation to the party that consents to the restriction. Negative covenants are commonly found in employment contracts, mergers and acquisitions, bond documents, and land use agreements.

Section 27 of Indian Contract Act, 1872

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Tuesday, 31 December 2024

Whether client lists maintained by the Plaintiff, can be deemed proprietary information or trade secrets, deserving legal protection?

  It is important to examine whether such client lists, even if they are maintained by the Plaintiff, can be deemed proprietary information or trade secrets, deserving legal protection. In this Court‟s view, a client list, by itself, is not automatically protected as confidential information simply by virtue of its existence. To be considered a trade secret or confidential information, the list must have economic or business value that requires safeguarding against competitors. {Para 26}

27. The mere existence of a client list does not confer proprietary rights over it in a way that would prevent former employees from using it, unless there is evidence that the list is compiled through proprietary methods, or that it holds specific commercial value that could harm the business if disclosed. It is also essential to distinguish between information that is generally known or accessible in the public domain and information that is truly confidential, which would merit the protection of an injunction.

28. In this context, while a company may claim that its client list is confidential, the Court must scrutinize whether such information is truly proprietary or whether it simply reflects business relationships that are already in the public domain. If the client details are publicly known or easily ascertainable by competitors, it would be unreasonable to grant an injunction based on a claim of confidentiality.

29. Therefore, the issue at hand is not merely whether the Defendant has knowledge of the Plaintiff‟s clients, but whether that knowledge rises to the level of confidential information or trade secrets that can be protected by legal measures such as an injunction. Without clear evidence that the client list holds economic value and that its use would harm the Plaintiff‟s business interests, the Plaintiff‟s request for an injunction based solely on the existence of a client list cannot be sustained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 C.S. (OS) 1011/2024

 CIGMA EVENTS PRIVATE LIMITED  Vs DEEPAK GUPTA & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Dated: 24.12.2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Delhi HC: How far can an employer prevent its employees from using the information gained by employees during the course of employment?

 26. It is important to examine whether such client lists, even if they are maintained by the Plaintiff, can be deemed proprietary information or trade secrets, deserving legal protection. In this Court‟s view, a client list, by itself, is not automatically protected as confidential information simply by virtue of its existence. To be considered a trade secret or confidential information, the list must have economic or business value that requires safeguarding against competitors.

27. The mere existence of a client list does not confer proprietary rights over it in a way that would prevent former employees from using it, unless there is evidence that the list is compiled through proprietary methods, or that it holds specific commercial value that could harm the business if disclosed. It is also essential to distinguish between information that is generally known or accessible in the public domain and information that is truly confidential, which would merit the protection of an injunction.

28. In this context, while a company may claim that its client list is confidential, the Court must scrutinize whether such information is truly proprietary or whether it simply reflects business relationships that are already in the public domain. If the client details are publicly known or easily ascertainable by competitors, it would be unreasonable to grant an injunction based on a claim of confidentiality.

29. Therefore, the issue at hand is not merely whether the Defendant has knowledge of the Plaintiff‟s clients, but whether that knowledge rises to the level of confidential information or trade secrets that can be protected by legal measures such as an injunction. Without clear evidence that the client list holds economic value and that its use would harm the Plaintiff‟s business interests, the Plaintiff‟s request for an injunction based solely on the existence of a client list cannot be sustained.

30. A competitor, even when aware of which particular entity, individual, or person a business is currently engaged with, has the right to approach such individuals or persons to canvas their own business. It is ultimately the customer's discretion to decide which business or entity they choose to engage with. The mere creation of a database containing client or customer details, followed by a claim of confidentiality over it, does not bestow a monopoly over those customers. Furthermore, even if a person has gained knowledge about the Plaintiff's operational plans, they cannot be restrained from disclosing such plans to a competitor, provided that the information was retained in their mind. The competitor's decision-making cannotbe presumed to have been solely influenced by such disclosure.

31. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in American Express Bank Ltd. v. Priya Puri: 2006 SCC OnLine Del 638, had held that mere knowledge of the plaintiff‟s operational strategies or plans, when carried in an individual‟s mind, does not give rise to an actionable claim for injunctive relief. A competitor may be aware of these plans, but they cannot be automatically considered to have been influenced by them. The plaintiff is not entitled to restrain the competitor from acting based solely on this knowledge.


32. This Court is of the view that the plaintiff has failed to produce any document or evidence demonstrating that Defendant No. 2 was bound by any agreement that prohibited him from carrying on his own business, either during his tenure with the plaintiff company or post resignation from the directorship of the company. Therefore, the alleged use of client information or industry knowledge by the Defendant No. 2 cannot be restrained, as such knowledge does not constitute proprietary information or trade secrets of the plaintiff.

33. It is well-established that non-compete clauses during employment are enforceable; however, post-employment restrictions must be both reasonable and necessary to protect trade secrets or proprietary information. The defendant‟s use of general industry knowledge, gained during their employment with the plaintiff, cannot be prohibited unless it is shown that such knowledge constitutes confidential or proprietary information.

34. The plaintiff‟s contention that the Defendants used confidential

information, including the client details and vendor codes, which were allegedly generated using the Plaintiff‟s client database, is not

supported by any compelling evidence. As held by a Co-ordinate

Bench of this Court, in Manipal Business Solutions Private Limited

v. Aurigain Consultants Private Limited & Ors.: CS(OS) 190/2022, a

director or employee of a company will naturally become familiar

with the company‟s operations and clientele during their employment. This does not, however, grant them exclusive rights to the company‟s customer list or operational details.

35. The Plaintiff‟s claim that certain information is confidential and

proprietary cannot prima facie be termed as such, as much of this

information, including details about clients, business operations, and

event types, is widely available through public sources such as press

releases, social media posts, and public collaborations. As observed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Manipal Business Solutions Private Limited v. Aurigain Consultants Private Limited & Ors.: (Supra), confidential information must possess distinct commercial value. If information is already in the public domain, it cannot be classified as a trade secret deserving protection. The relevant extract from the judgment is as follows:

“ 37. According to Mr. Mehta, the same include customer

data, agent data, contract data, employee data, market data

and business plans.

38. I may at the outset state here that the plaintiff is not

claiming any copyright in the above information. It is only

claiming that the data is confidential. Even if such an

argument was to be raised, the question would be whether

the above information shall fall within the definition of

copyright as defined under Section 13(1) of the Copyright

Act. This Court in a series of judgments including the

judgment in the case of Navigators Logistics Ltd. (supra),

has in paragraphs 22 to 35, by referring to the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. DB

Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1, held that to claim copyright, the

author must produce the material created with exercise of

his skill and judgment, which must not be so trivial that it

would be characterised as a purely mechanical exercise.

The Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff therein,

being a juristic person is incapable of being the author of

any literary work in which a copyright may exist, though it

may be the owner of copyright. As the plaintiff had failed to

disclose the identity of the author, it could not claim any

copyright in a list of customers/clients with their contact

numbers.

39. Even the plea of confidentiality taken by Mr. Mehta is

unsustainable, as merely stating that there exists some

confidential and secret information does not convince this

Court that such information is, in fact confidential, more so,

when the plaint and the pleadings do not disclose the nature

of the information / data of which confidentiality is

claimed. I find that no material / document connected with

the aforesaid data / information has been filed by the

plaintiff. In fact this aspect has been accepted by Mr. Mehta

during his submissions.

***

41. It has not been filed nor shown to the satisfaction of this

Court, as to what exactly is the confidential information,

how it is confidential, and how, if at all, the defendant

company has used such information to the detriment of the

plaintiff.

***

44. A reading of the above reproduced paragraphs would

reveal that not every customer/client list would qualify as

confidential information or trade secret unless the

confidentiality about it is of economic/business/commercial

value. It is held that in any employment, every employee

would get to know some information without any special

effort. All such persons cannot be said to be in knowledge

of trade secrets or confidential information and every

knowledge of such facts cannot be labeled as trade secret or

confidential information. If an employee on account of his

employment has gathered some business

knowledge/acumen or ways of dealing with clients, the

same would not be termed as confidential information,

disclosure of which would harm the plaintiff. Unless there

is some material on record to show that the defendant had

come to know of any confidential information / trade secret

concerning the plaintiff and its business, no injunction can

be granted, more so when such trade secret / confidential

information have not even been spelt out. The learned

Single Judge, referring to the decision in American Express

Bank (supra) has observed that a competitor even after

knowing which particular entity/an individual/person is

currently in business with, can approach such

individual/person to canvas about itself, and it is for the

customer to decide which business/entity to choose.

Creating a database of clients/customers and then claiming

confidentiality on it does not create a monopoly over such

customers. That apart, even if a person has amassed

knowledge with regard to the plaintiff‟s plan of operation,

he could not be injuncted from disclosing such plans to the

competitor, if he has carried such plans in his head and even

the competitor could not be said to be driven by such

disclosure alone. I agree with the aforesaid conclusion

arrived at by the Coordinate Bench of this Court.


57. I agree with the conclusion of the Court that a client list cannot be construed as confidential information to claim any right. The judgment relied upon has no applicability. ”

36. It is also established that every employee gains knowledge during the course of their employment, and not all such knowledge can be classified as a trade secret or confidential information. If an employee acquires business knowledge, such as ways of dealing with clients, through ordinary experience, it cannot be considered confidential information. Disclosure of such knowledge would not harm the plaintiff unless it is demonstrated that the defendant had access to specific trade secrets or proprietary information.

37. Therefore, the details of customers, while potentially known to employees of a business, cannot be deemed proprietary or protected trade secrets. Such information can easily be acquired by others through observation, independent canvassing, or minimal effort. It is unreasonable to treat such details as confidential when they are accessible with little effort and at minimal cost.

38. In light of the above, this Court finds that the injunction sought by the Plaintiff would curtail the Defendants' ability to seek future employment or business opportunities. Restricting an individual‟s freedom to seek better prospects, merely on the grounds that they possess information that is readily available or ascertainable, is an impermissible restraint on trade and employment. Such restrictions are contrary to public policy, as enshrined in Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 C.S. (OS) 1011/2024

 CIGMA EVENTS PRIVATE LIMITED  Vs DEEPAK GUPTA & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Dated: 24.12.2024.

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Tuesday, 8 September 2020

Leading Supreme Court on obtaining information from courts under RTI, Confidential Information and Data Protection

In order to consider the contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Prashant Bhushan, let us briefly refer to the various categories of information held by the High Court, which are broadly as under:

(a) information held by the High Court relating to the parties to the litigation/proceedings - pleadings, documents and other materials and memo of grounds raised by the parties;

(b) orders and judgments passed by the High Court, notes of proceedings, etc.;

(c) In exercise of power of superintendence over the other courts and tribunals, information received in the records submitted/called for by those courts and tribunals like subordinate judiciary, various tribunals like Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal and other tribunals;

(d) information on the administrative side of the High Court viz. appointments, transfers and postings of the judicial officers, staff members of the High Court and the district judiciary, disciplinary action taken against the judicial officers and the staff members and such other information relating to the administrative work.

(e) Correspondence by the High Court with the Supreme Court, Government and with the district judiciary, etc.;
and

(f) information on the administrative side as to the decision taken by the collegium of the High Court in making recommendations of the Judges to be appointed to the High Court; information as to the assets of the sitting Judges held by the Chief Justice of the High Court.

25. Information under the categories (a), (b) and (c) and other information on the judicial side can be accessed/certified copies of documents and orders could be obtained by the parties to the proceedings in terms of the High Court Rules and the parties to the proceedings are entitled to the same. So far as the third parties are concerned, as of right, they are not entitled to access the information/obtain the certified copies of documents, orders and other proceedings. As per Rules framed by the High Court, a third party can obtain the certified copies of the documents, orders or judgments or can have access to the information only by filing an application/affidavit and by stating the reason for which the information/copies of documents or orders are required. Insofar as on the administrative side i.e. categories (d), (e) and (f), one can have access to the information or copies of the documents could be obtained under the Rules framed by the various High Courts or under the Rules framed by the High Court under the RTI Act. Insofar as the disclosure of information as to the assets of the Judges held by the Chief Justice of the High Court, the same is now covered by the judgment of the Constitution Bench reported in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal MANU/SC/1561/2019 : 2019 (16) SCALE 40.


27. Rule 151 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 requires a third party applicant seeking copies of documents in any civil or criminal proceedings to file an application/affidavit stating the reasons for which those documents are required. As such, the High Court Rules do not obstruct a third party from obtaining copies of documents in any court proceedings or any document on the judicial side. It is not as if the information is denied or refused to the applicant. All that is required to be done is to apply for the certified copies with application/affidavit stating the reasons for seeking the information. The reason insisting upon the third party for stating the grounds for obtaining certified copies is to satisfy the court that the information is sought for bona fide reasons or to effectuate public interest. The information is held by the High Court as a trustee for the litigants in order to adjudicate upon the matter and administer justice. The same cannot be permitted by the third party to have access to such personal information of the parties or information given by the Government in the proceedings. Lest, there would be misuse of process of court and the information and it would reach unmanageable levels. If the High Court Rules framed Under Article 225 provide a mechanism for invoking the said right in a particular manner, the said mechanism should be preserved and followed. The said mechanism cannot be abandoned or discontinued merely because the general law - RTI Act has been enacted.

28. As discussed earlier, the object of the RTI Act itself recognizes the need to protect the institutional interest and also to make optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information. The procedure to obtain certified copies under the High Court Rules is not cumbersome and the procedure is very simple - filing of an application/affidavit along with the requisite court fee stating the reasons for seeking the information. The information held by the High Court on the judicial side are the "personal information" of the litigants like title cases and family court matters, etc. Under the guise of seeking information under the RTI Act, the process of the court is not to be abused and information not to be misused.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1966-1967 of 2020 

Decided On: 04.03.2020

Chief Information Commissioner Vs.  High Court of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R. Banumathi, A.S. Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author:R. Banumathi, J.
Citation:(2020) 4 SCC 702
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Sunday, 6 May 2018

Whether husband can obtain salary details of wife under right to information Act?

It cannot be lost sight of in this case that the relation between the person seeking information of the lady, who is employed in a private company, is that of a husband and wife. On account of a marital discord, the wife has dragged the husband before the District Court. For the purposes of his litigation, the husband requires the information about the salary and provident fund accumulations of the wife. Such information could also be acquired by the husband by making an application before the District Court. Rather than perpetuating the hardships of the husband, the CIC has found it fit to direct the petitioner to disclose the said information.

19. In this backdrop, it is imperative that the petitioner must first come to a conclusion, either under sub-clauses (e) or (j) of Section 8(1) that the information is confidential and cannot be disclosed. It is only when the competent authority justifies the non-disclosure under the first part of sub-clauses (e) or (j) that that the second part in the said sub-clauses would have to be considered to the extent of whether the information is required to be disclosed in larger public interest. In my view, the petitioner has failed in the first place to justify it's refusal to disclose the information. The husband seeking information cannot be said to be a stranger or a third party. The information sought by him also cannot be said to be confidential.

20. In my view, if matrimonial matters are being prosecuted by the parties, there should not be any embargo on divulging the PF accumulations of the wife since the said information is sought by the husband to be placed before the District Court. It also cannot be ignored that the wife is not before this Court and has not challenged the impugned order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 10690 of 2017

Decided On: 06.09.2017

The Central Public Information Officer Vs.  The Central Information Commissioner and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 795
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Friday, 4 May 2018

Whether police manual is confidential document?

 Respondent No. 2 in the present case is not seeking any
information as contemplated under section 8(1) (e), (g) and (h). Police

Manual cannot be equated with the information and therefore, there is
no impediment in giving copies thereof to him. Sub-section 8(2) has no
application in the present facts and circumstances of the case. Judicial
note can be taken of the fact that police manual is Government
publication and copies of same are easily available. We therefore, do
not find any error in the impugned order. The petitions are devoid of any
merits. The same are accordingly dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 9971 OF 2013
The State of Maharashtra 
V/s.
The Chief Information Commissioner & anr. 

 CORAM : RANJIT MORE &
 SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV, JJ.
 DATE : APRIL 19, 2018.

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Friday, 14 April 2017

Whether conversation taking place between accused and investigating officer can be brought in public domain?

 SANCTITY OF INVESTIGATION:
There is yet another angle of looking at the issue. The(28 of 32)
sanctity attached to confidentiality of investigation is imperative
and the same cannot be allowed to be brought into public domain
because the very purpose of investigation would then be
compromised. The conversation which takes place between the
Investigating Officer and the accused is privileged and classified
and cannot be allowed to become common place. In a recent
decision in the case of Senior Intelligence Officer Vs. Jugal
Kishore Samra reported in (2011)12 SCC 362;
(MANU/SC/0731/2011), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the controversy as to whether the person, who is
arrested, has a right to insist for presence of an Advocate at the
stage of Police interrogation. The purpose behind seeking
presence of an Advocate during investigation or requiring
presence of witnesses during proceedings under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is virtually the same. Both are insisted upon so as to
ensure that the Investigating Officer does not misuse his position;
by using third degree methods, force, threat, coercion or duress
upon the accused during interrogation. After examining the entire
controversy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred
case went on to hold that the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Nandini Satpathy Vs. P.L.Dani
reported in (1978)2 SCC 424; (MANU/SC/0139/1978) ran
contrary to the ratio of two earlier Constitution Bench decisions in
the cases of Illias Vs. Collector of Customs, Madras reported
in 1969 (2) SCR 613; (MANU/SC/0297/1968) and Romesh
Chandra Mehta Vs. State of West Bengal reported in
1969(2) SCR 461; (MANU/SC/0282/1968). The relevant(29 of 32)
quotes made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above
judgment are extracted below:-
“In Poolpandi and Ors. v. Superintendent, Central Excise
and Ors.: (1992) 3 SCC 259, the question before a three
judge bench of this Court was directly whether a person
called for interrogation is entitled to the presence of his
lawyer when he is questioned during the investigation under
the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. On behalf of the persons
summoned for interrogation, strong reliance was placed on
Nandini Satpathy. The Court rejected the submission tersely
observing in paragraph of 4 of the judgment as follows:
“4. Both Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit strongly relied on
the observations in Nandini Satpathy v. P.L.
Dani: (1978) 2 SCC 424. We are afraid, in view
of two judgments of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of
W.B.: (1969) 2 SCR 461, and Illias v. Collector
of Customs, Madras: (1969) 2 SCR 613, the
stand of the Appellant cannot be accepted. The
learned Counsel urged that since Nandini
Satpathy case was decided later, the
observations therein must be given effect to by
this Court now. There is no force in this
argument.”
28. …….. Taking a cue, therefore, from the direction made in
DK Basu and having regard to the special facts and
circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct
that the interrogation of the Respondent may be held within
the sight of his advocate or any other person duly authorized
by him. The advocate or the person authorized by the
Respondent may watch the proceedings from a distance or
from beyond a glass partition but he will not be within the
hearing distance and it will not be open to the Respondent to
have consultations with him in course of the interrogation.”
The ratio of the above judgment was based on the Three
Judges Bench Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the(30 of 32)
case of Poolpandi Vs. Supdt., Central Excise reported in
(1992)3 SCC 259; (MANU/SC/0339/1992), wherein it was
held that the person called for interrogation is not entitled to
insist for presence of a lawyer during interrogation.
As observed above, there is a strong sanction for following
such a procedure because presence of a third person during
investigation would directly infringe in the privilege available to
the Investigating Officer to investigate the case without any
external interference and would adversely affect the
confidentiality attached to investigation. The steps taken by the
Investigating Officer during investigation are classified and are
recorded in the case diary which is a privileged document. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again held that no-one can
have access to the case diary except the Court or the
Investigating Officer. Reference may be had to judgments
rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sidharth Vs.
State of Bihar reported in AIR 2005 SC 4352;
(MANU/SC/0949/2005) and State of NCT of Delhi Vs. Ravi
Kant Sharma & Ors. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1135;
(MANU/SC/7098/2007). Thus, allowing presence of a witness
during confidential investigation would directly run contrary to
this proposition of law.
As an upshot of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of
the firm view that the ratio of the Judgments rendered by Division
Benches of this Court in the cases of Rameshwar and Surjeet
(supra) propounding that the information given by the accused to(31 of 32)
the Investigating Officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
should be recorded in presence of and attested by independent
witnesses do not lay down the correct proposition of law.
Furthermore, in view of decision of Three Judge Bench of
Supreme Court in the case of Poolpandi (supra) followed in the
case of Sr.Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence Vs. Jugal Kishore Samra (supra), the presence of
a witness at the time of investigation is absolutely impermissible
as it would breach the confidentiality of investigation. For the
sake of repetition, it may be noted here that the earlier decisions
of a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Poolpandi (supra) and the Two Judges Bench decisions in the
cases of Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Om Prakash
(supra) and State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs. Sunil & Anr.
(supra) were also not noticed and considered in Harjit Singh’s
case.
In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we answer the
reference in the following terms:
“In the entire scheme of Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Evidence Act, there is no
requirement that the information given by an
accused to the Investigating Officer under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act leading to the
discovery of a relevant fact should bear
attestation by independent witnesses and the
Division Bench Judgments in the cases of(32 of 32)
Rameshwar and Surjeet (supra) do not lay
down correct proposition of law on this
aspect.”
Reportable
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Leave To Appeal No. 94 / 2017
State of Rajasthan

V
Mangal Singh 
 MR. JUSTICE GOPAL KRISHAN VYAS
 MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA
 MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ BHANDARI
(LARGER BENCH)

Dated : 1st March 2017

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Sunday, 25 September 2016

Whether Employer can restrain ex-employee to trade in guise of Confidentiality Clause?

The learned counsel for the Plaintiff had submitted that the expression 'confidential information' is very wide and thus, it would not be practically impossible for the Defendant to establish that they were not using the confidential information in the context of their business. Consequently, the Defendants could not be permitted to carry on any competing business. In my view, this contention is also bereft of any merit as by expanding the width of the expression 'confidential information' to include information which is in public domain, the Plaintiff is not seeking protection of proprietary or confidential information, but is essentially seeking a restraint on trade. Plainly, if the expression of 'confidential information' is read in the manner as suggested by the Plaintiff, clause 4(b) (ii) of the Confidentiality and Invention Assignment Agreement for the Employee would in effect work as a covenant in restraint of trade and, therefore, would be void by virtue of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
21. The decision in the case of Diljeet Titus (supra) is wholly inapplicable in the facts of this case. In that case the issue was whether the copyright in the database - which included a client list and was admittedly copied by the defendants - vested with the defendants as they had worked on it or whether the same belonged to the plaintiff. The court held that "The mere fact that defendants would have done work for such clients while being associated with the plaintiff would not give them the right to reproduce the list and take it away" and therefore, restrained the defendants from using the same. Even so, the court clarified that "it is possible that a part of this information is retained in the memory of the defendants and if that is utilized no grievance can be made in this behalf. This would, however, be different from a copy made of the list.". The decision in Vogueserv International Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also turned on the issue of copyright. There is no dispute that the Defendants could be restrained from using the copyright material, but clearly, they cannot be restrained from using the material which is in public domain and from carrying on competing business after their employment with the Plaintiff has ceased.
22. The contention that the restriction to carry on competing business is for a limited time and is therefore, reasonable and consequently, enforceable cannot be accepted. Once it is held that in the guise of a confidentiality clause, the Plaintiff is attempting to enforce a covenant in restraint of trade, the same must be held to be void. As explained by Justice A.P. Sen in his concurring judgement in Superintendence Company of India (P) ltd. vs. Krishan Murgai: MANU/SC/0457/1980 : (1981) 2 SCC 246, a covenant in restraint of trade, whether partial or not is void by virtue of section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; the question whether a restriction is reasonable or not is relevant only if the case falls within the exception to section 27. The relevant extract of the said judgement are reproduced below:
"26. Now, so far as the present case is concerned, the law is to be found in section 27 of the Contract Act 1872, which reads:
"27. Agreement in restraint of trade void-Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void.
Exception: One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer or any other person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein, provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the business."
The section is general in terms, and declares all agreements in restraint void pro tanto, except in the case specified in the exception.
27. The question whether an agreement is void under section 27 must be decided upon the wording of that section. There is nothing in the wording of section 27 to suggest that the principle stated therein does not apply when the restraint is for a limited period only or is confined to a particular area. Such matters of partial restriction have effect only when the fact fall within the exception to the section.
28. A contract, which has for its object a restraint of trade, is prima facie, void. Section 27 of the Contract Act is general in terms and unless a particular contract can be distinctly brought within Exception 1 there is no escape from the prohibition. We have nothing to do with the policy of such a law. All we have to do is to take the words of the Contract Act and put upon the meaning which they appear plainly to bear. This view of the section was expressed by Sir Richard Couch C.J. in celebrated judgment in Madhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss MANU/WB/0020/1874 : [1874] Beng L. R. 76 at pp. 85-86 laying down that whether the restraint was general or partial, unqualified or qualified, if it was in the nature of a restraint of trade, it was void."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CS (Comm.) 482/2016
Decided On: 29.08.2016
Appellants: Stellar Information Technology Private Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Rakesh Kumar and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Vibhu Bakhru, J.
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