Showing posts with label confidentiality clause. Show all posts
Showing posts with label confidentiality clause. Show all posts

Sunday, 31 December 2017

Whether documents having genesis in conciliation proceeding can be introduced as evidence in other proceeding?

Mr. V. Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, has argued that Section 75 is in very wide terms and that parties are to keep confidential all matters relating to conciliation proceedings. He also referred to Section 81 of the Act, and stated that parties cannot rely upon or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, proposals made by the conciliator under Sub-clause (c) from which the said report emanated.

4. Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, has argued that quite clearly none of the sub-clauses in Section 81 would apply. In any case, according to him, the various sub-clauses in Section 81 only reflect the extent of confidentiality that arises out of the earlier Sections contained in Part III dealing with Conciliation, and that, therefore, the moment the case does not fit into any of the four pigeon holes of Section 81, the report can certainly be admitted into evidence and relied upon. He also cited a Canadian Supreme Court judgment, which we will deal with, in support of this proposition.

5. Sections 75 and 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read thus:

75. Confidentiality.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the conciliator and the parties shall keep confidential all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings. Confidentiality shall extend also to the settlement agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforcement.

81. Admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.- The parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings,-

(a) views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;

(b) admissions made by the other party in the course of the conciliation proceedings;

(c) proposals made by the conciliator;

(d) the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the conciliator.

On a reading of Section 75, it is clear that the object of the Section is sub-served by the expression "relating to" which is an expression of extremely wide import. (See: Renusagar Power Company Limited v. General Electric Company, MANU/SC/0001/1984 : (1984) 4 SCC 679 at 704). It is clear, therefore, that both the conciliator and the parties must keep as confidential all matters relating to conciliation proceedings.

6. The litmus test for determining whether the matter relates to conciliation proceedings was laid down by an earlier judgment of this Court. In Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearey Lal Kumar and Anr., MANU/SC/0001/1952 : [1952] S.C.R. 501, the question to be decided was as to whether a dispute or difference arose out of a certain insurance policy. This Court laid down that the test for determining whether a dispute or difference arose out of the said policy is whether recourse to the contract, by which the parties are bound, is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If it is found that such recourse is necessary, then the matter would certainly fall within the policy. Following this judgment, and applying it to the facts of this case, it is clear that recourse needs to be had to conciliation proceedings as the genesis of this demarcation report is only in conciliation proceedings and not otherwise.

7. This being the case, it is of no matter that the present case does not fall within the four pigeon holes contained in Section 81, as otherwise, if there are insidious encroachments on confidentiality, a free and fair settlement may never be arrived at, thus stultifying the object sought to be achieved by Part III of the 1996 Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10786 of 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9888 of 2015)

Decided On: 23.08.2017

 Govind Prasad Sharma and Ors. Vs. Doon Valley Officers Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 4968.

Print Page

Friday, 6 October 2017

Whether courts in India can grant interim relief even if place of Arbitration is outside India?


This is an application filed by the petitioner invoking Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') seeking an interim measure before commencement of the arbitral proceedings. Initially, the registry has noted a defect with respect to the request made by the petitioner before this Court to secure an interim measure under Section 9 of the Act, 1996, especially as per the agreement, the place of arbitration is designated in Singapore. The said question was considered by this Court and passed an order dated 20.2.2017, after hearing rival parties, whereby it is held that, as provided under sub section (2) of Section 2 of the Act it is evident that, subject to an agreement to the contrary the provisions contained in Section 9 shall apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, if an arbitral award made/to be made in such place is enforceable and recognized under provisions of Part II of Act, 1996. It is also found that the agreement specifically provides, the agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of India and shall be subject to the courts of Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala State and therefore, the application is maintainable before this Court under Section 9 of the Act, 1996, which has become final.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP(ICA) No. 1 of 2017

Decided On: 07.07.2017

 Female Health Company UK Plc.Vs. Hll Lifecare Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.P. Chaly, J.

Citation:AIR 2017 Kerala 149
Print Page

Wednesday, 20 September 2017

Whether parties or arbitrator can rely on documents having genesis in conciliation proceeding?

 Sections 75 and 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read thus:
“75. Confidentiality.— Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the conciliator and the parties shall keep confidential all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings. Confidentiality shall extend also to the settlement agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforcement.
81. Admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.— The parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings,—
(a) views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;
(b) admissions made by the other party in the course of the conciliation proceedings;
(c) proposals made by the conciliator;
(d) the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the conciliator.”
6. On a reading of Section 75, it is clear that the object of the section is sub-served by the expression “relating to” which is an expression of extremely wide import. (See: Renusagar Power Company Limited v. General Electric Company, (1984) 4 SCC 679 at 704). It is clear, therefore, that both the conciliator and the parties must keep as confidential all matters relating to conciliation proceedings.
7. The litmus test for determining whether the matter relates to conciliation proceedings was laid down by an earlier judgment of this Court. In Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearey Lal Kumar, [1952] S.C.R. 501, the question to be decided was as to whether a dispute or difference arose out of a certain insurance policy. This Court laid down that the test for determining whether a dispute or difference arose out of the said policy is whether recourse to the contract, by which the parties are bound, is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If it is found that such recourse is necessary, then the matter would certainly fall within the policy. Following this judgment, and applying it to the facts of this case, it is clear that recourse needs to be had to conciliation proceedings as the genesis of this demarcation report is only in conciliation proceedings and not otherwise.
8. This being the case, it is of no matter that the present case does not fall within the four pigeon holes contained in Section 81, as otherwise, if there are insidious encroachments on confidentiality, a free and fair settlement may never be arrived at, thus stultifying the object sought to be achieved by Part III of the 1996 Act.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(Before R.F. Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.)
Govind Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. Doon Valley Officers Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. 
Civil Appeal No. 10786 of 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 9888 of 2015)
Decided on August 23, 2017
Citation:2017 SCC OnLine SC 1001,(2018) 11 SCC 501.
Print Page

Sunday, 25 September 2016

Whether Employer can restrain ex-employee to trade in guise of Confidentiality Clause?

The learned counsel for the Plaintiff had submitted that the expression 'confidential information' is very wide and thus, it would not be practically impossible for the Defendant to establish that they were not using the confidential information in the context of their business. Consequently, the Defendants could not be permitted to carry on any competing business. In my view, this contention is also bereft of any merit as by expanding the width of the expression 'confidential information' to include information which is in public domain, the Plaintiff is not seeking protection of proprietary or confidential information, but is essentially seeking a restraint on trade. Plainly, if the expression of 'confidential information' is read in the manner as suggested by the Plaintiff, clause 4(b) (ii) of the Confidentiality and Invention Assignment Agreement for the Employee would in effect work as a covenant in restraint of trade and, therefore, would be void by virtue of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
21. The decision in the case of Diljeet Titus (supra) is wholly inapplicable in the facts of this case. In that case the issue was whether the copyright in the database - which included a client list and was admittedly copied by the defendants - vested with the defendants as they had worked on it or whether the same belonged to the plaintiff. The court held that "The mere fact that defendants would have done work for such clients while being associated with the plaintiff would not give them the right to reproduce the list and take it away" and therefore, restrained the defendants from using the same. Even so, the court clarified that "it is possible that a part of this information is retained in the memory of the defendants and if that is utilized no grievance can be made in this behalf. This would, however, be different from a copy made of the list.". The decision in Vogueserv International Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also turned on the issue of copyright. There is no dispute that the Defendants could be restrained from using the copyright material, but clearly, they cannot be restrained from using the material which is in public domain and from carrying on competing business after their employment with the Plaintiff has ceased.
22. The contention that the restriction to carry on competing business is for a limited time and is therefore, reasonable and consequently, enforceable cannot be accepted. Once it is held that in the guise of a confidentiality clause, the Plaintiff is attempting to enforce a covenant in restraint of trade, the same must be held to be void. As explained by Justice A.P. Sen in his concurring judgement in Superintendence Company of India (P) ltd. vs. Krishan Murgai: MANU/SC/0457/1980 : (1981) 2 SCC 246, a covenant in restraint of trade, whether partial or not is void by virtue of section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; the question whether a restriction is reasonable or not is relevant only if the case falls within the exception to section 27. The relevant extract of the said judgement are reproduced below:
"26. Now, so far as the present case is concerned, the law is to be found in section 27 of the Contract Act 1872, which reads:
"27. Agreement in restraint of trade void-Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void.
Exception: One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer or any other person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein, provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the business."
The section is general in terms, and declares all agreements in restraint void pro tanto, except in the case specified in the exception.
27. The question whether an agreement is void under section 27 must be decided upon the wording of that section. There is nothing in the wording of section 27 to suggest that the principle stated therein does not apply when the restraint is for a limited period only or is confined to a particular area. Such matters of partial restriction have effect only when the fact fall within the exception to the section.
28. A contract, which has for its object a restraint of trade, is prima facie, void. Section 27 of the Contract Act is general in terms and unless a particular contract can be distinctly brought within Exception 1 there is no escape from the prohibition. We have nothing to do with the policy of such a law. All we have to do is to take the words of the Contract Act and put upon the meaning which they appear plainly to bear. This view of the section was expressed by Sir Richard Couch C.J. in celebrated judgment in Madhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss MANU/WB/0020/1874 : [1874] Beng L. R. 76 at pp. 85-86 laying down that whether the restraint was general or partial, unqualified or qualified, if it was in the nature of a restraint of trade, it was void."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CS (Comm.) 482/2016
Decided On: 29.08.2016
Appellants: Stellar Information Technology Private Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Rakesh Kumar and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Vibhu Bakhru, J.
Print Page