Showing posts with label arbitration Act 1996. Show all posts
Showing posts with label arbitration Act 1996. Show all posts

Friday, 4 July 2025

Supreme Court Clarifies Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Arbitration: The Disortho v. Meril Landmark Ruling

 The Supreme Court of India recently delivered a significant judgment in Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited,2025 INSC 352,ARBITRATION PETITION NO.48 OF 2023,dated: MARCH 18, 2025that provides crucial clarity on determining jurisdiction in international commercial arbitration when contractual clauses conflict. This March 2025 ruling, authored by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, addresses one of the most complex issues in cross-border dispute resolution: which courts have the authority to appoint arbitrators when parties have chosen different laws and venues for their agreement.

The Contractual Dilemma

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Wednesday, 4 December 2024

Important provisions of National Highways Act, 1956

 3-G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.—(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority.

(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent, of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land.

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Saturday, 13 April 2019

Whether Arbitration Act will prevail over Delhi High court Act?

It is first to be noted that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a special statute vis-à-vis the Delhi High Court Act, which would be a general statute dealing with the jurisdiction and procedure of the High Court. It is well established principle of law that a special provision made on a certain matter would exclude the general provision in its application, with the provision of the special Act prevailing over the provision of a general Act. This principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant and Specialia Generalibus Derogant. Reference can be drawn to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jogendra Lal Saha v. State of Bihar and others, MANU/SC/0282/1991 : AIR 1991 SC 1148 and P.V. Hemalatha v. Kattamkandi Puthiya Maliackal Saheeda and others, MANU/SC/0501/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 2445.

13. The object and intent of the legislature in substituting the Explanation to Section 47 of the Act can be found in the 246th Report of the Law Commission, which has been reproduced hereinabove. The provision therefore, clearly intended to ensure that all challenges to a Foreign Award are made only before the High Court. Such intent cannot be defeated by applying a subsequent general law. In view of the above, the provisions of the Delhi High Court Act cannot be made applicable to the petitions seeking enforcement of the Foreign Awards.

14. In Kandla Export Corporation and Anr. v. M/s. OCI Corporation and Anr., MANU/SC/0112/2018, the Supreme Court relying upon its earlier judgment in Fuerst Day (supra) held that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 being a general provision vis-a-vis arbitration relating to appeals arising out of commercial disputes, would obviously not apply to the case of Section 50 of the Act. Applying the above ratio, it would be clear that the Delhi High Court Act would not apply to the petitions seeking enforcement of a Foreign Award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as amended by the Amendment Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Ex. P. 330/2015 and E.A. No. 387/2018

Decided On: 28.11.2018

Precious Sapphires Ltd. Vs. Amira Pure Foods Private Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Navin Chawla, J.

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Friday, 4 May 2018

Whether Incorrect Reference Regarding Applicability Of Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 Would Render Entire Arbitration Agreement Invalid?

Viewed thus, the High Court was not right in observing that there
could be no arbitration at all in the present case. In situations where the
relevant clause made reference to the applicability of “the provisions of the
Indian Arbitration Act and Rules made thereunder” as was the case in
MMTC Ltd. (Supra), on the strength of Section 85(2)(a) the governing
provisions in respect of arbitral proceedings which had not commenced
before 1996 had came into force would be those of 1996 Act alone. On the
same reasoning even if an arbitration agreement entered into after 1996 Act
had come into force were to make a reference to the applicable provisions
of those under Indian Arbitration Act or 1940 Act, such stipulation would be
of no consequence and the matter must be governed under provisions of
1996 Act. An incorrect reference or recital regarding applicability of 1940
Act would not render the entire arbitration agreement invalid. Such
stipulation will have to be read in the light of Section 85 of 1996 Act and in
our view, principles governing such relationship have to be under and in tune
with 1996 Act. As observed earlier, the requirements of “arbitration
agreement” as stipulated in Section 7 of 1996 Act stand completely satisfied
in the present matter nor has there been any suggestion that the agreement
stood vitiated on account of any circumstances in the realm of undue
influence, fraud, coercion or misrepresentation. In the circumstances, the
attempt must be to sub-serve the intent of the parties to resolve the disputes
by alternative disputes resolution mechanism. The High Court was,
therefore, completely in error.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4664 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14589 of 2016)

Purushottam s/o Tulsiram Badwaik  V Anil & Ors.

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Dated:May 2, 2018
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Sunday, 31 December 2017

Whether documents having genesis in conciliation proceeding can be introduced as evidence in other proceeding?

Mr. V. Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, has argued that Section 75 is in very wide terms and that parties are to keep confidential all matters relating to conciliation proceedings. He also referred to Section 81 of the Act, and stated that parties cannot rely upon or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, proposals made by the conciliator under Sub-clause (c) from which the said report emanated.

4. Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, has argued that quite clearly none of the sub-clauses in Section 81 would apply. In any case, according to him, the various sub-clauses in Section 81 only reflect the extent of confidentiality that arises out of the earlier Sections contained in Part III dealing with Conciliation, and that, therefore, the moment the case does not fit into any of the four pigeon holes of Section 81, the report can certainly be admitted into evidence and relied upon. He also cited a Canadian Supreme Court judgment, which we will deal with, in support of this proposition.

5. Sections 75 and 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read thus:

75. Confidentiality.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the conciliator and the parties shall keep confidential all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings. Confidentiality shall extend also to the settlement agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforcement.

81. Admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.- The parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings,-

(a) views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;

(b) admissions made by the other party in the course of the conciliation proceedings;

(c) proposals made by the conciliator;

(d) the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the conciliator.

On a reading of Section 75, it is clear that the object of the Section is sub-served by the expression "relating to" which is an expression of extremely wide import. (See: Renusagar Power Company Limited v. General Electric Company, MANU/SC/0001/1984 : (1984) 4 SCC 679 at 704). It is clear, therefore, that both the conciliator and the parties must keep as confidential all matters relating to conciliation proceedings.

6. The litmus test for determining whether the matter relates to conciliation proceedings was laid down by an earlier judgment of this Court. In Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearey Lal Kumar and Anr., MANU/SC/0001/1952 : [1952] S.C.R. 501, the question to be decided was as to whether a dispute or difference arose out of a certain insurance policy. This Court laid down that the test for determining whether a dispute or difference arose out of the said policy is whether recourse to the contract, by which the parties are bound, is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If it is found that such recourse is necessary, then the matter would certainly fall within the policy. Following this judgment, and applying it to the facts of this case, it is clear that recourse needs to be had to conciliation proceedings as the genesis of this demarcation report is only in conciliation proceedings and not otherwise.

7. This being the case, it is of no matter that the present case does not fall within the four pigeon holes contained in Section 81, as otherwise, if there are insidious encroachments on confidentiality, a free and fair settlement may never be arrived at, thus stultifying the object sought to be achieved by Part III of the 1996 Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10786 of 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9888 of 2015)

Decided On: 23.08.2017

 Govind Prasad Sharma and Ors. Vs. Doon Valley Officers Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 4968.

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Sunday, 15 October 2017

Whether arbitrator can adjudicate dispute between landlord and tenant,licensor and licensee?

 In our considered opinion, the question involved in the appeal remains no longer res integra and stands answered by two decisions of this Court in Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. vs. Navrang Studios & Another, 1981(1) SCC 523 and Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. vs. SBI Home Finance Ltd. & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 532 against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
19. So far as Natraj Studio’s case (supra) is concerned there also, the landlord had filed a civil suit against the tenant in the Small Causes Court, Bombay claiming therein the tenant's eviction from the leased premises. There also, the tenant was  inducted pursuant to "leave and license" agreement executed between the landlord and the tenant.
20. The tenant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 contending therein that since the "leave and license" agreement contained an arbitration clause for resolving all kinds of disputes arising between the parties in relation to the “leave and license” agreement and the disputes had arisen between the parties in relation to the “leave and license” agreement, such disputes could only be resolved by the arbitrator as agreed by the parties in the agreement. It was contended that the civil suit was, therefore, not maintainable and the disputes for which the suit has been filed be referred to the arbitrator for their adjudication.
21. This Court (Three Judge Bench) speaking through Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy rejected the application filed by the tenant under Section 8 of the Act and held, inter alia, that the civil suit filed by the landlord was maintainable. It was held that the disputes of such nature cannot be referred to the arbitrator.
22. This is what Their Lordships held as under:
“24. In the light of the foregoing discussion and the authority of the precedents, we hold that both by reason of Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and by reason of the broader considerations of public policy mentioned by us earlier and also in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain, the Court of Small Causes has and the arbitrator has not the jurisdiction to decide the question whether the respondent-licensor landlord is entitled to seek possession of the two Studios and other premises together with machinery and equipment from the appellant-licensee tenant. That this is the real dispute between the parties is abundantly clear from the petition filed by the respondents in the High Court of Bombay, under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act seeking a reference to Arbitration. The petition refers to the notices exchanged by the parties, the respondent calling upon the appellant to hand over possession of the Studios to him and the appellant claiming to be a tenant or protected licensee in respect of the Studios.
The relationship between the parties being that of licensor-landlord and licensee tenant and the dispute between them relating to the possession of the licensed demised premises, there is no help from the conclusion that the Court of Small Causes alone has the jurisdiction and the arbitrator has none to  adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties.”
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Himangni Enterprises vs Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia on 12 October, 2017
Author: A M Sapre
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Wednesday, 20 September 2017

Whether parties or arbitrator can rely on documents having genesis in conciliation proceeding?

 Sections 75 and 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read thus:
“75. Confidentiality.— Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the conciliator and the parties shall keep confidential all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings. Confidentiality shall extend also to the settlement agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforcement.
81. Admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.— The parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings,—
(a) views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;
(b) admissions made by the other party in the course of the conciliation proceedings;
(c) proposals made by the conciliator;
(d) the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the conciliator.”
6. On a reading of Section 75, it is clear that the object of the section is sub-served by the expression “relating to” which is an expression of extremely wide import. (See: Renusagar Power Company Limited v. General Electric Company, (1984) 4 SCC 679 at 704). It is clear, therefore, that both the conciliator and the parties must keep as confidential all matters relating to conciliation proceedings.
7. The litmus test for determining whether the matter relates to conciliation proceedings was laid down by an earlier judgment of this Court. In Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearey Lal Kumar, [1952] S.C.R. 501, the question to be decided was as to whether a dispute or difference arose out of a certain insurance policy. This Court laid down that the test for determining whether a dispute or difference arose out of the said policy is whether recourse to the contract, by which the parties are bound, is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If it is found that such recourse is necessary, then the matter would certainly fall within the policy. Following this judgment, and applying it to the facts of this case, it is clear that recourse needs to be had to conciliation proceedings as the genesis of this demarcation report is only in conciliation proceedings and not otherwise.
8. This being the case, it is of no matter that the present case does not fall within the four pigeon holes contained in Section 81, as otherwise, if there are insidious encroachments on confidentiality, a free and fair settlement may never be arrived at, thus stultifying the object sought to be achieved by Part III of the 1996 Act.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(Before R.F. Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.)
Govind Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. Doon Valley Officers Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. 
Civil Appeal No. 10786 of 2017
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 9888 of 2015)
Decided on August 23, 2017
Citation:2017 SCC OnLine SC 1001,(2018) 11 SCC 501.
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Sunday, 20 November 2016

Whether Arbitration Act 1996 is applicable to proceeding under multi-state co-operative societies Act?

The scheme of the 2002 Act which replaces the 1984 Act is a little different. Section 84 of the 2002 Act corresponds to Section 74 and 76 of the 1984 Act. With this difference-that disputes that have been referred to arbitration are now to be settled or decided by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Registrar, and the provisions, therefore, of the 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act shall apply to such arbitration as if the proceedings for arbitration were referred for settlement or decision under the provisions of the said Act.

13. Thus it can be seen that Section 84(4) and (5) of the new Act provide for a different scheme. Equally, Section 94 which provides for execution of certain decisions and orders made under the 2002 Act, mentions various Sections, but Section 84 is conspicuous by its absence. This is obviously for the reason that the entire proceedings have now to be conducted under the 1996 Act, including execution of the arbitration Award made under the said Act. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8756 of 2016

Decided On: 06.09.2016

 Ludovico Sagrado Goveia Vs. Cirila Rosa Maria Pinto and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.
Citation: 2016 SCCONLINESC906:(2016) 9 SCC 615,MANU/SC/0978/2016
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Saturday, 22 October 2016

Whether legality and validity of substantive contract can be determined U/S 45 of arbitration Act 1996?

 It is settled law that an arbitration agreement is an
independent or “self contained” agreement. In a given case, a
written agreement for arbitration could form part of another
agreement, described by Lord Diplock as the “substantive
contract”35 by which parties create contractual rights and
obligations. Notwithstanding the fact that all such rights and
obligations arising out of a substantive contract and the
agreement to have the disputes (if any, arising out of such
substantive contract) settled through the process of arbitration
are contained in the same document, the arbitration
agreement is an independent agreement. Arbitration
agreement/clause is not that governs rights and obligations
35 Aughton Ltd. v. MF Kent Services Ltd. (1991) 57 BLR 1 (CA)
“the status of a so-called ‘arbitration clause’ included in a contract of any nature is different
from other types of clauses because it constitutes a ‘self contained contract collateral or
ancillary to’ ‘the substantive contract’. These are the words of Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulkan
v. South India Shipping [1981] AC 909. It is a self-contained contract, even though it is, by
common usage, described as an “arbitration clause”. It can, for example, have a different proper
law from the proper law of the contract to which it is collateral. This status of “self-contained
contract” exists irrespective of the type of substantive contract to which it is collateral. .

arising out of the substantive contract: It only governs the way
of settling disputes between the parties.36
46. In our opinion, the scope of enquiry (even) under the
Section 45 is confined only to the question whether the
arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed” but not the legality and validity of the
substantive contract.
 Before parting with the case, we consider it
apposite to deal with one issue relating to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Court under Section 45 of the
Act which reads as under:
“45.Power of judicial authority to refer parties
to arbitration.- Notwithstanding anything
contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial
authority, when seized of an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement referred to in section 44, shall, at
the request of one of the parties or any person
claiming through or under him, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.”
26) Mere reading of Section 45 would go to show that
the use of the words "shall" and "refer the parties to

arbitration" in the section makes it legally obligatory
on the Court to refer the parties to the arbitration once
it finds that the agreement in question is neither null
and void nor inoperative and nor incapable of being
performed. In other words, once it is found that the
agreement in question is a legal and valid agreement,
which is capable of being performed by the parties to
the suit, the Court has no discretion but to pass an
order by referring the parties to the arbitration in
terms of the agreement.
27) In this case, I find that the Trial Court though
allowed the application filed by the respondent
(defendant) under Section 45 of the Act by recording
the findings that the agreement in question is legal
and proper and capable of being performed but it did
not pass any consequential order as required under
Section 45 by referring the parties to the arbitration in
terms of Section 12.2(a) and instead simply dismissed
the suit as not maintainable.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8299 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.33227 of 2015)
Sasan Power Limited 
Versus
North American Coal Corporation
India Private Limited
Chelameswar, J.
Citation: 2016 SCCONLINESC855
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Sunday, 24 July 2016

When there is deemed service of notices and award under arbitration Act?

In my view, the stand taken by the petitioners in the
rejoinder that the petitioner no.1 does not reside at House No.247, Acoi,
Karaswada, Mapusa, Bardez, Goa – 403 507 is inconsistent and contrary
to the statement made in the petition. It is thus clear that the petitioners
have not come to this Court with clean hands. This Court in the case of
Apex Encon Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. L & T. Finance Ltd. & Anr.
(supra) and in the case of Jasvinder Kaur Vs. L & T Finance Ltd. &
Anr. (supra) after adverting to the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) of the
Arbitration Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act has held that
the notices are sent by the Registered Post A.D. at the last known
addresses of the petitioners and the same have not been returned by the
postal authority and therefore, it would amount to a deemed service of
such notices and proceedings. In my view, the said two judgments
squarely apply to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the
aforesaid two judgments.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.1231 OF 2014
Francisco A. D'Souza 
 Vs.
L & T Finance Ltd. 
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
 DATE :  30th April 2015
Citation:2016 (3) ALLMR803

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Thursday, 21 July 2016

Whether S 9A of CPC is applicable to proceeding U/S 34 of Arbitration Act 1996?

As   indicated   above,   the   two   objections   on   the   ground   of
limitation as also on the ground of maintainability of the suit before the
Learned Principal District Judge, Nashik were raised by invoking Section
9A of the CPC. The question therefore arises is whether an application
under Section 9A of the CPC is maintainable in a proceedings filed under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act. It is trite that the 1996 Act is a self contained

Code   which   governs   the   procedure   for   arbitration   and   sets   out   the
remedies which are available to the parties. There is no provision in the
1996 Act which indicates that Section 9A of the CPC is applicable. The
Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners fairly conceded to the said
position. However, the Learned Counsel sought to place reliance on the
judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2002 SC 2308 in the matter
of M/s. I.T.I. Vs. M/s. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd.,
wherein the Apex Court has held that an order passed by the District Court
in an Appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
is revisable under Section 115 of the CPC. The Learned Counsel also
sought to  place  reliance   on   the  judgment of  a Division  Bench  of   the
Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 2004(2) R.A.J. 659 in the matter
of B. Rama Swamy Vs. B. Ranga Swamy, wherein the Division Bench of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the application for restoration of
a proceeding under Section 34 can be filed. The Division Bench observed
that the Civil Court has all the powers under the CPC to dispose of an
Appeal or a Petition filed under Section 34 of the CPC. In my view, the said
judgments  do not further  the  case  of the  Petitioners in  so far  as the
applicability of Section 9A is concerned. In so far as a proceeding or a
Petition under Section 34 of the said Act is concerned, the same is as and
by way of a remedy to a party aggrieved by the Award. There is nothing in

Section 34 or any other provision of the said Act to indicate that Section
9A   of   the   CPC   applies   and   that   a   plea   of   the   maintainability   of   the
application or proceeding under Section 34 can be raised. In so far as the
judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. I.T.I. (Supra) is concerned, the Apex
Court was concerned with a challenge to an order passed in an Appeal
filed under Section 37 of the 1996 Act and it is in the said context that the
Apex Court observed that remedy by way of a Civil Revision is not barred.
In so far as the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in B. Rama Swamy's case (Supra) is concerned, the facts in the
said case were that the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation   Act   was   dismissed   for   default   and   the   issue   before   the
Division   Bench   of   the   Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   was   whether   an
application for restoration is maintainable.  It is in the said facts that the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the relevant
provisions of the CPC are applicable. However in so far as Section 9A is
concerned it gives an avenue to a party to question the maintainability of a
proceeding on the point of jurisdiction it therefore cannot be invoked
unless so provided. As indicated herein above there is nothing in the 1996
Act to indicate that the said provision applies to a Petition filed under
Section 34. Hence the objection on the ground of limitation would have to
be considered at the hearing of the Petition under Section 34. In my view

the applications Exhs.12, 13 and 14 filed under Section 9A were therefore
not maintainable and since the applications are not maintainable, the
adjudication pursuant thereto would be of no consequence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.2379 OF 2011
 Hariprasad Mohanlal Soni, 
Versus
Malegaon Municipal Corporation, 
CORAM  :  R.M. SAVANT, J.
DATE      :  24th FEBRUARY, 2015
Citation:AIR 2016 Bom178
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