Showing posts with label court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label court. Show all posts

Saturday, 1 June 2019

Whether court can appoint court commissioner as per provision of CRPC?

CrPC 284: Section 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code

When attendance of witness may be dispensed with and commission issued

  1. Whenever, in the course of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Court of Magistrate that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, the Court or Magistrate may dispense with such attendance and may issue a commission for the examination of the witness in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:
    Provided that where the examination of the President or the Vice-President of India or the Governor of a State or the Administrator of a Union Territory as a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, a commission shall be issued for the examination of such a witness.
  2. The Court may, when issuing a commission for the examination of a witness for the prosecution direct that such amount as the Court considers reasonable to meet the expenses of the accused including the pleader’s fees, be paid by the prosecution.
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Saturday, 27 April 2019

Whether filing of false affidavit before court amounts to contempt of court?

 It has been held in the case of Hiralal Chawala and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0432/1990 : [1990]1SCR325 that filing of false affidavit also amounts to Contempt of this Court. The Registry is, therefore, directed to issue show cause notice to Sh. S. C. Pabreja, returnable before us within four weeks from today, as to why action in contempt should not be taken against him for having filed a false affidavit in this court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

I.A. No. 18 in Civil Appeal No. 5502 of 1983

Decided On: 07.03.2003

U.P. Resi. Emp. Co-op. House B. Society Vs. New Okhla Indus. Deve. Authority and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.N. Variava and B.N. Agrawal, JJ.

 Citation : AIR 2003 SC 2723
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Sunday, 10 February 2019

When agreement giving option to parties to resolve dispute by arbitration or court can be treated as arbitration clause?


In the case at hand, as we find, Clause 15 refers to arbitration or court. Thus, there is an option and the Petitioner has invoked the arbitration Clause and, therefore, we have no hesitation, in the obtaining factual matrix of the case, for appointment of an arbitrator and, accordingly, Justice Prakash Prabhakar Naolekar, formerly a Judge of this Court, is appointed as sole Arbitrator to arbitrate upon the disputes which have arisen between the parties. The learned Arbitrator shall be guided by the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. The learned Arbitrator shall make positive efforts to complete the arbitration proceedings as per the Act of 2015.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 22 of 2018

Decided On: 14.09.2018

 Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide Rail Manufacture Co. Ltd.
Vs.
 Jade Elevator Components

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.M. Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 9 SCC 774
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Sunday, 16 September 2018

How to ascertain when dispute can be referred to arbitration?

 The aforesaid passage makes it clear as crystal that emphasis
has been laid on the intention of the parties to have their disputes
resolved by arbitration.


11. In the case at hand, as we find, Clause 15 refers to arbitration or
court. Thus, there is an option and the petitioner has invoked the
arbitration clause and, therefore, we have no hesitation, in the
obtaining factual matrix of the case, for appointment of an arbitrator
REPORTABLE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
 ARBITRATION PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 22 OF 2018 

M/s. Zhejiang Bonly Elevator Guide  Vs M/s. Jade Elevator Components.
Coram:
 Dipak Misra, CJI

A. M. Khanwilkar J

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud J.
Date: September 14, 2018
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Monday, 1 January 2018

Whether court can appoint arbitrator contrary to prior arbitration agreement ?

In Voestalpine Schienen GMBH v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited MANU/SC/0162/2017 : (2017) 4 SCC 665, the relevant Clause contemplated that the disputes be settled by three arbitrators from and out of a list of five engineers supplied by the Respondent therein. The Appellant had invoked arbitration on 14.06.2016 i.e. after the amending Act. When the list of five persons comprising of serving officers was supplied by the Respondents, an objection was taken that such procedure would lead to appointment of "illegal persons" in view of Section 12(5) read with Clause 1 of Schedule 7 of the Act. This Court considered that Section 12 of the Act was amended pursuant to the recommendations by the Law Commission which specifically dealt with the issue of "neutrality of arbitrators", and observed that if the arbitration Clause finds foul with the amended provisions, the appointment of the Arbitrator even if apparently in conformity with the arbitration Clause in the agreement, would be illegal and thus the Court would be within its powers to appoint such arbitrator(s) as may be permissible. Paragraph 18 sums up this aspect of the matter:

18. Keeping in mind the afore-quoted recommendation of the Law Commission, with which spirit, Section 12 has been amended by the Amendment Act, 2015, it is manifest that the main purpose for amending the provision was to provide for neutrality of arbitrators. In order to achieve this, Sub-section (5) of Section 12 lays down that notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel or the subject-matter of the dispute falls under any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule, he shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. In such an eventuality i.e. when the arbitration Clause finds foul with the amended provisions extracted above, the appointment of an arbitrator would be beyond pale of the arbitration agreement, empowering the court to appoint such arbitrator(s) as may be permissible. That would be the effect of non obstante Clause contained in Sub-section (5) of Section 12 and the other party cannot insist on appointment of the arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement.

B. In cases governed by 1996 Act after the Amendment Act has come into force:

If the arbitration Clause finds foul with the amended provisions, the appointment of the Arbitrator even if apparently in conformity with the arbitration Clause in the agreement, would be illegal and thus the Court would be within its powers to appoint such arbitrator(s) as may be permissible.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 12627-12628 of 2017 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 25206-25207 of 2016) 

Decided On: 12.09.2017

Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Era Infra Engineering Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.


Citation: AIR 2017 SC 4450.

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Sunday, 31 December 2017

Whether it is permissible to raise issue of arbitrability of dispute at subsequent stage before court?

This Court, in Mcdermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors. MANU/SC/8177/2006 : (2006) 11 SCC 181, has held that the party questioning the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator has an obligation to raise the said question before the Arbitrator. It has been held as under:

51. After the 1996 Act came into force, Under Section 16 of the Act the party questioning the jurisdiction of the arbitrator has an obligation to raise the said question before the arbitrator. Such a question of jurisdiction could be raised if it is beyond the scope of his authority. It was required to be raised during arbitration proceedings or soon after initiation thereof. The jurisdictional question is required to be determined as a preliminary ground. A decision taken thereupon by the arbitrator would be the subject-matter of challenge Under Section 34 of the Act. In the event the arbitrator opined that he had no jurisdiction in relation thereto an appeal thereagainst was provided for Under Section 37 of the Act.

13. It is also necessary to observe that intervention of the court is envisaged only in few circumstances like fraud or bias by the Arbitrators, violation of natural justice. The court cannot correct the errors of the Arbitrators. That is evident from para 52 of the judgment in Mcdermott International Inc (supra), which is as under:

52. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it.

14. Therefore, the Division Bench was not justified while considering the arbitrability of the disputes for the first time, particularly, when the Respondent has not urged the issue relating to 'No Claims Certificate' before the Chief Justice, Arbitral Tribunal or before the learned Single Judge.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 15545-15546 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 39038-39039 of 2012)

Decided On: 03.10.2017

Chittaranjan Maity Vs. Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Jasti Chelameswar and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2017 SC 4588

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Saturday, 30 December 2017

Whether court can appoint arbitrator if arbitrator appointed by party refuses to act?

The decision in the case of S.B.P. and Company vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another [MANU/SC/1736/2009 : (2009) 10 SCC 293] is relied by the learned senior counsel since it is held therein that if the clause concerned does not provide that in the event of refusal of an Arbitrator to accept the appointment or arbitrate in the matter, an alternate Arbitrator would be appointed, the appointment of a substitute Arbitrator cannot be assumed as an implicit right of the party. Yet another decision in the case of State of West Bengal vs. National Builders [MANU/SC/0055/1994: (1994) 1 SCC 235] is cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Though it is rendered under the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is held therein that the Court can exercise the power to appoint the arbitrator, if the arbitrator appointed by the party refuses to act and the clause contained in the agreement does not debar filling of vacancy created as a result of such refusal.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU



C.M.P. No. 97/2016



Decided On: 06.09.2017



 JMC Projects (India) Limited

Vs.
Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Limited


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna, J.

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Saturday, 25 November 2017

Whether court will permit production of documents of one party in arbitration proceeding if it will jeopardise interest of said party?



Arbitration - Production of document - Applicant filed application to direct to Superintendent of Police CBI to produce charge-sheet and other documents filed in criminal complaint on file of Special Judge for CBI cases before arbitral Tribunal - Hence, this Application - Whether, documents which were directed to be produced before arbitrator were to be produced by Superintendent of Police, CBI - Held, discretion was conferred on Court to order request made by arbitral Tribunal or party by ordering that evidence could be produced directly to the arbitral tribunal - Arbitral proceedings were initiated at instance of applicant for recovery of sum from Respondent in respect of excess payments made to Respondent - Thus, Applicant had to prove his case on its own evidence without taking support from evidence of Respondent - Proceedings before arbitral Tribunal and CBI Court were totally two different proceedings and they were different in content and consequence - Further, evidentiary value of charge-sheet itself was questionable and if produced it could jeopardise interest of Respondent before Criminal Court - Thus, applicant had not made out case to exercise discretion in their favour under Section 27 of Act 1996 - Application dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

A. No. 3481 of 2006

Decided On: 29.09.2006

 Ennore Port Ltd. Vs.Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Rajeswaran, J.
Citation : AIR 2007 Mad 73
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Whether party can approach court for securing presence of witnesses if his request is not approved by arbitrator?

Section 27 of the Act permits the court assistance in taking evidence if the arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal applies to the court for assistance in taking evidence. In the present case, the petitioner has not obtained the approval of the arbitral tribunal before moving the court seeking its assistance for taking evidence by invocation of Section 27 of the Act. Therefore, the application as filed is not sustainable.
4. The Act is absolute silent about the procedure or the remedy which may be available to a party if the arbitral tribunal refuses to examine the witnesses of a party holding that they are not relevant for the proper disposal of the dispute inter se the parties pending adjudication before him. Therefore, the only remedy available to the petitioner is to file objections under Section 34 of the Act, if on pronouncement of an award, he is of the view that the arbitrator has not adjudicated upon the disputes under reference in accordance with law and procedure.
Delhi High Court
Sh. Satinder Narayan Singh vs Indian Labour Cooperative ... on 17 December, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2008 (1) ARBLR 355 Delhi

Bench: A Suresh
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Wednesday, 18 October 2017

Whether it is necessary for court impound document even if it is not considered in evidence?

Apart from the same, as per Section 33 of the Act, Court is vested with powers before whom any instrument chargeable in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same. Other powers are enumerated thereunder. In my considered opinion, when Ext. P1 agreement was produced before the Rent Control Court, as per Section 33 of the Stamp Act, there is an imperative duty cast upon the Rent Control Court to examine the instrument and having found that it is not duly stamped, it is left with no other option than to pass an order impounding the document. Therefore, it can be clearly seen that irrespective of the marking of the document or considering the same for the purpose of evidence, the Rent Control Court had no other option than to exercise the power conferred under Section 33. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Rent Control Court, impounding Ext. P1 document and imposing the stamp duty and penalty is bad. Moreover, the said order passed by the Munsiff Court is not under challenge anywhere. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

W.P. (C) No. 1368 of 2017

Decided On: 14.03.2017

Mujeeb Rahman Vs. Sakeer Ali and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.P. Chaly, J.
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Saturday, 14 October 2017

Whether decree against minor will be nullity if his guardian is not appointed by court?


Mr. Raghunathan drew my attention to Order 32, Rule 3 of the Code, which requires the Court to appoint a, proper person to be a guardian for the minor in a suit. Learned counsel pointed out that the mother in this case was not appointed by order of Court. I do not think this circumstance makes for any difference to my conclusion. Although the Court did not appoint the mother as guardian, it cannot be gainsaid that she is minor's legal guardian. It has been held that where the natural or legal guardian represents the minor a suit, the mere absence of a formal Court order appointing him or her as guardian ad litem will not vitiate the decree against the minor. See Rangammal v. Minor Appasami, MANU/TN/0227/1973 : AIR1973Mad12 . Raghavan J. in that case held that the decree passed against a minor in such a case is not a nullity.{PARA 7}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 1102 of 1977

Decided On: 18.03.1980

Saradamani Vs. Rajendran

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Balasubrahmanyan, J.

Citation:AIR 1981 Madras 217

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Friday, 6 October 2017

Whether courts in India can grant interim relief even if place of Arbitration is outside India?


This is an application filed by the petitioner invoking Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'the Act') seeking an interim measure before commencement of the arbitral proceedings. Initially, the registry has noted a defect with respect to the request made by the petitioner before this Court to secure an interim measure under Section 9 of the Act, 1996, especially as per the agreement, the place of arbitration is designated in Singapore. The said question was considered by this Court and passed an order dated 20.2.2017, after hearing rival parties, whereby it is held that, as provided under sub section (2) of Section 2 of the Act it is evident that, subject to an agreement to the contrary the provisions contained in Section 9 shall apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, if an arbitral award made/to be made in such place is enforceable and recognized under provisions of Part II of Act, 1996. It is also found that the agreement specifically provides, the agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of India and shall be subject to the courts of Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala State and therefore, the application is maintainable before this Court under Section 9 of the Act, 1996, which has become final.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP(ICA) No. 1 of 2017

Decided On: 07.07.2017

 Female Health Company UK Plc.Vs. Hll Lifecare Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.P. Chaly, J.

Citation:AIR 2017 Kerala 149
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Monday, 2 October 2017

Whether court has power to remand case to arbitral tribunal?

On a bare reading of this provision, it is amply clear that the Court can defer the hearing of the application filed Under Section 34 for setting aside the award on a written request made by a party to the arbitration proceedings to facilitate the Arbitral Tribunal by resuming the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. The quintessence for exercising power under this provision is that the arbitral award has not been set aside. Further, the challenge to the said award has been set up Under Section 34 about the deficiencies in the arbitral award which may be curable by allowing the Arbitral Tribunal to take such measures which can eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. No power has been invested by the Parliament in the Court to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings for the limited purpose mentioned in Sub-Section 4 of Section 34. This legal position has been expounded in the case of McDermott International Inc. (supra). In paragraph 8 of the said decision, the Court observed thus:

8..... parliament has not conferred any power of remand to the Court to remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal except to adjourn the proceedings as provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act. The object of Sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Act is to give an opportunity to the arbitral tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings or to enable it to take such other action which will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.
The Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in the case of Bhaskar Industrial Development Limited (Supra) has expounded that the power of the Court Under Section 34 of the Act is not to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal after setting aside the arbitral award.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5172 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2370 of 2015)

Decided On: 20.04.2017

 Kinnari Mullick and Ors.Vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2017 SC 2785,(2018) 11 SCC328
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Whether court can relegate parties before arbitral tribunal after setting aside arbitral award as per S 34 of arbitration Act?

 In any case, the limited discretion available to the Court Under Section 34(4) can be exercised only upon a written application made in that behalf by a party to the arbitration proceedings. It is crystal clear that the Court cannot exercise this limited power of deferring the proceedings before it suo moto. Moreover, before formally setting aside the award, if the party to the arbitration proceedings fails to request the Court to defer the proceedings pending before it, then it is not open to the party to move an application Under Section 34(4) of the Act. For, consequent to disposal of the main proceedings Under Section 34 of the Act by the Court, it would become functus officio. In other words, the limited remedy available Under Section 34(4) is required to be invoked by the party to the arbitral proceedings before the award is set aside by the Court.

15. In the present case, the learned Single Judge had set aside the award vide judgment dated 07.03.2014. Indeed, the Respondent carried the matter in appeal before the Division Bench. Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument, without expressing any opinion either way on the correctness of this assumption, that the appeal was in continuum of the application Under Section 34 for setting aside of the award and therefore, the Division Bench could be requested by the party to the arbitral proceedings to exercise its discretion Under Section 34(4) of the Act, the fact remains that no formal written application was filed by the Respondent before the Division Bench for that purpose. In other words, the Respondent did not make such a request before the learned Single Judge in the first instance and also failed to do so before the Division Bench rejected the appeal of the Respondent.

16. In the case of MMTC (supra), the Madras High Court, while dealing with the purport of Section 34(4) of the Act in paragraph 22 (C) of the reported judgment, observed thus:

(C)........... On the other hand, Section 34(4) of the new Act, does not prescribe any condition precedent on the substance of the matter but prescribes three procedural conditions namely that there should be an application Under Section 34(1) of the new Act and that a request should emanate from a party and the Court considers it appropriate to invoke the power Under Section 34(4) of the new Act.

Again, in paragraph 22 (e) (IV) of the reported judgment, it observed thus:

But under the 1996 Act, the Court has only two sets of powers after the award is pronounced viz.,

(i) to set aside the award Under Section 34(2); or

(ii) to adjourn the proceedings to enable the arbitral tribunal to resume the proceedings or take such other action as in the opinion of the tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.

In the case of Raitani Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Gauhati High Court, placing reliance on the decision in MMTC (supra) in paragraph 8 of its decision, observed thus:

But unfortunately in the present case, the award given by the arbitration panel on 13.07.2012 was quashed in its entirety and the appeal Under Section 34 is no more pending before the Court. Therefore, invoking the powers conferred under Sub-section (4) of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to facilitate the arbitration panel to take rectificatory steps is not an option in this matter. Moreover neither of the contesting party in this dispute have applied for an additional award and therefore it may not be appropriate to direct the arbitration panel to re-decide on the six un-decided claims of the contractor.

The Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in the case of Bhaskar Industrial Development Limited (Supra) has expounded that the power of the Court Under Section 34 of the Act is not to remand the matter to the Arbitral Tribunal after setting aside the arbitral award.

17. A priori, it must follow that the Division Bench committed manifest error in issuing direction in the concluding part of the impugned judgment, as reproduced hereinbefore in paragraph No. 7. Such direction could not have been issued in the fact situation of the present case. The impugned direction suffers from the vice of jurisdictional error and thus cannot be sustained. We have no-option but to quash and set aside the same.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5172 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2370 of 2015)

Decided On: 20.04.2017

 Kinnari Mullick and Ors.Vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2017 SC 2785
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Sunday, 9 April 2017

When Delay in sending FIR to court is not fatal to prosecution case?

 FIR as well as the inquest report both mentioned
the accused Anjan Dasgupta.   The inquest report has
not   been   questioned   on   any   account.   The   offence,
having been committed at around 4­5 PM, registration
of the FIR at the police station between 7.30 to 8.00
PM   does   not   cause   any   reason   to   draw   any   adverse
inference,   more   so,   when   after   the   occurrence,   the
deceased was taken to the nearby nursing home where
he was declared dead and body remained there till the
inquest   was   over.   The   another   circumstance,   which
have   been   heavily   relied   by   trial   court   and
reiterated   before   us   by   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant is dispatch of the FIR to the Magistrate
with delay.   This Court in  Pala Singh v. State of
Punjab   1972   (2)   SCC   640  has   held   that   delay   in
forwarding the FIR to court is not fatal in a case in
which   investigation   has   commenced   promptly   on   its
basis. 
20. The I.O. after receipt of the information of an
offence by R.T. message had arrived at the scene on
17.40   hours,   which   clearly   proves   the   prompt
commencement of the investigation. FIR was dispatched
on   22nd  June,   2000   which   has   also   been   accepted   by
trial court.   When no questions were put to I.O. in
his   cross­examination   regarding   the   delay   in
dispatch, at the time of hearing, the accused cannot
make capital of the said delay in forwarding the FIR.
This Court in Rabindra Mahto and Another v. State of
Jharkhand 2006 (10) SCC 432  has held that in every
case from the mere delay in sending the FIR to the
Magistrate, the Court would not conclude that the FIR
has been recorded much later in time than shown. It
is   only   extraordinary   and   unexplained   delay,   which
may   raise   doubts   regarding   the   authenticity   of   the
FIR. 
21. The present is the case, where recording of the
FIR   on   16th  June,   2000   itself   has   been   proved,
accepted by the trial court also, thus mere dispatch
of the FIR on 22nd June, 2000 from the police station
to the Magistrates' Court has no bearing on the basis
of which any adverse presumption can be drawn.  From
the above discussion, we are of the clear view that
the FIR was genuine FIR and trial court committed an
error   in   drawing   adverse   inference   against   the
prosecution and refusing to attach value to the FIR. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
    CRIMIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 298 OF 2006
ANJAN DASGUPTA
     V
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.
Dated: NOVEMBER 25, 2016.
Citation: 2017 CRLJ 529 SC
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Thursday, 23 March 2017

Whether civil suit becomes property of court as soon as it is filed?

This Court has come to a strange situation wherein repeatedly the suits and appeals were permitted to be withdrawn by the petitioner on the ground of formal defect. What is permitted under the court under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) is to permit the plaintiff/plaintiffs to 'withdraw from the suit' and not the suit as such. When a suit is filed, it is the property of the court and not that of the party. A party cannot be permitted to withdraw a suit; at the most he can only be permitted to withdraw from the suit.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
OP(C) No. 1130 of 2015 (O)
Decided On: 24.06.2015
Asok Kumar 
Vs.
 Koottala Kshethra Samithy and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:B. Kemal Pasha, J.
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Monday, 13 March 2017

Whether court can direct accused to face trial as per S 319 of CRPC without recording evidence?

In a case  Hardeep   Singh   Vs.   State   of   Punjab   and
Others   (supra)  relied upon by the learned counsel for the
respondent No.4, the Supreme Court in the reference had
formulated   certain   question   and   so   far   as   question   no.3
which is relevant for the present discussion is reproduced
herein below :­
question no.3 :­
“Whether the word 'evidence' used in Section
319(1)   Cr.P.C.   has   been   used   in   a
comprehensive   sense   and   includes   the
evidence collected during investigation or the
word   'evidence'   is   limited   to   the   evidence
recorded during trial ?”
12. The   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   while   answering   the
aforesaid question in paragraph no.81 to 85 made following
observations :­
81. An inquiry can be conducted by the Magistrate or court at any
stage during the proceedings before the court. This power is
preserved with the court and has to be read and understood
accordingly. The outcome of any such exercise should not be an
impediment in the speedy trial of the case. Though the facts so
received by the magistrate or the court may not be evidence, yet it is
some material that makes things clear and unfolds concealed or
deliberately suppressed material that may facilitate the trial. In the

context of Section 319 Cr.P.C. it is an information of complicity.
Such material therefore, can be used even though not an evidence in
strict sense, but an information on record collected by the court
during inquiry itself, as a prima facie satisfaction for exercising the
powers as presently involved.
82. This pre-trial stage is a stage where no adjudication on the
evidence of the offences involved takes place and therefore, after the
material alongwith the charge-sheet has been brought before the
court, the same can be inquired into in order to effectively proceed
with framing of charges. After the charges are framed, the
prosecution is asked to lead evidence and till that is done, there is no
evidence available in the strict legal sense of Section 3 of the
Evidence Act. The actual trial of the offence by bringing the accused
before the court has still not begun. What is available is the material
that has been submitted before the court along with the charge-sheet.
In such situation, the court only has the preparatory material that has
been placed before the court for its consideration in order to proceed
with the trial by framing of charges.
83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be utilized, rather it is
that material after cognizance is taken by a court, that is available to
it while making an inquiry into or trying an offence, that the court
can utilize or take into consideration for supporting reasons to
summon any person on the basis of evidence adduced before the
Court, who may be on the basis of such material, treated to be an
accomplice in the commission of the offence. The inference that can
be drawn is that material which is not exactly evidence recorded
before the court, but is a material collected by the court, can be
utilized to corroborate evidence already recorded for the purpose of
summoning any other person, other than the accused. This would
harmonize such material with the word ‘evidence’ as material that
would be supportive in nature to facilitate the exposition of any other
accomplice whose complicity in the offence may have either been
suppressed or escaped the notice of the court.

84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood in its wider
sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the
stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The court,
therefore, should be understood to have the power to proceed against
any person after summoning him on the basis of any such material as
brought forth before it. The duty and obligation of the court becomes
more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously on such material
after evidence has been led during trial.
85. In view of the discussion made and the conclusion drawn herein
above, the answer to the aforesaid question posed is that apart from
evidence recorded during trial, any material that has been received by
the court after cognizance is taken and before the trial commences,
can be utilized only for corroboration and to support the evidence
recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
The word ‘evidence’ is thus, limited to the evidence recorded during
trial.
13. In the instant case, admittedly, the learned Magistrate
has not recorded any evidence.  However, learned Magistrate
has   passed   the   impugned   order   on   the   basis   of   certain
material   that   has   been   received   by   the   court   through
respondents no.2 and 3 (original accused) after cognizance is
taken and before trial commences. The Supreme Court in the
aforesaid paragraphs made observations that such material
collected by the Court  can be utilized to corroborate the
evidence already recorded for the purpose of summoning any
other person other than accused and accordingly answered
the said question.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 686 OF 2007
Milind S/o Manohar Apte,

V
 The State of Maharashtra.

CORAM : V.K. JADHAV, J.
Dated: November 18, 2016
Citation: 2017(2) MHLJ213
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Saturday, 11 February 2017

Where communication of termination order is served on employee,court at that place will have jurisdiction to try said case

Therefore, the ratio of the judgment in the case of Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. (supra) will have no application and will not help the petitioner for holding that this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Even as per the case of Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. (supra) at least a part of cause of action has to arise in Delhi for this Court to have territorial jurisdiction to file a case, and no part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi in the present case because simply existence of an order in the file of the Government at Delhi does not create any right or liability, and which right or liability is created only on communication of the order, and which order dated 28.10.2015 in the present case was communicated to the petitioner at Goa.
10. In view of the above, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction and the writ petition is therefore dismissed, and the petitioner can always approach the competent court of territorial jurisdiction in accordance with law.
In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Before Valmiki J. Mehta, J.)
Mr. P.K.S. Shrivastava 
v.
Union of India and Anr
W.P. (C) No. 10392/2015
Decided on December 1, 2016
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6149
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Tuesday, 31 January 2017

Whether court can grant permission to adduce secondary evidence without recording satisfaction about existence of document?

The   law   discussed   above   would   show   that   in   order   that
secondary evidence is admitted, form of the secondary evidence is not
material, it could be in any form as for example copy or duplicate copy of
the copy of the original document, oral evidence or any other form and
that   three   conditions,   which   constitute   foundational   facts,   must   be
fulfilled while pressing into service the provision of Section 65(c) of the
Indian Evidence Act, namely, (a) the original document is in existence
and has been executed by its executants, (b) it has been lost or destroyed
or  cannot   be   produced   in   reasonable   time   for   any  other   reason   not
arising   from   own   default   or   neglect   of   the   party   leading   secondary
evidence, and  (c) the copy is the true copy of the original.
If these conditions or any one of them are or is not proved,
the secondary evidence cannot be admitted.
13. In the instant case, what has been done by the impugned
orders is only grant of permission to adduce secondary evidence.   The

secondary evidence, which is a copy of   photostat copy of the original
Will has not been admitted in evidence so far.   For such secondary
evidence to be admitted, the party interested in adducing the secondary
evidence would have to satisfy the above referred conditions by leading
necessary evidence in that regard.  So, the party would be required to be
given an opportunity to lead necessary evidence in order to satisfy the
Court about fulfilling of the necessary conditions so that the Will in
question can be admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit.   That
stage has not reached so far.  As and when it reaches, the petitioners will
have all the opportunity to prove the respondent Nos.1 to 3 wrong or
satisfy the Court that the Will in question in fact does not exist and that it
has never been executed by late Smt. Sushila.  Therefore, learned Joint
Civil   Judge,   Senior   Division   has   rightly   held   that,   by   allowing   the
application   granting   permission   to   adduce   secondary   evidence,   no
prejudice   would   be   caused   to   the   rights   of   the   petitioners.     The
petitioners would certainly have a right to controvert the respondent
Nos.1 to 3 as well as respondent No.4 when they will say, subject to
necessary pleadings, that the original Will dated 6.11.1997 is in existence
and has been lost for the reasons not known to them.  Therefore, failure
to record a clear cut finding regarding satisfaction of the Court about
existence   or   otherwise   of   the   Will   in   question   has   not   caused   any
prejudice to the rights of the petitioners and in fact recording of such a
finding at this stage would have been premature.  After all the parties are

required   to   be   given   full   opportunity   for   proving   their   respective
contentions and this is what seems to be the import and effect of the
impugned   orders.     Then,   giving   of   permission   to   adduce   secondary
evidence by itself would not lead to an inference that secondary evidence
has   been   admitted.     As   stated   earlier,   for   admitting   the   secondary
evidence  the  necessary conditions  must   be  fulfilled  and  the  stage  of
fulfillment of those conditions or otherwise is yet to arrive and will arrive
when the parties stand before the Court for adducing necessary evidence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION No.5984 OF 2015
  Smt. Sumati @ Asha w/o. Late Anil Subhedar,
    
V
   Yashodhara w/o. Late Sunil Subhedar,
       Aged adult,
    
        CORAM  :   S.B. SHUKRE, J.
        DATE      :       16th SEPTEMBER, 2016.
Citation: 2016(6) ALLMR 507
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Monday, 30 January 2017

Whether court should issue warrant of arrest against husband if he is wilfully avoiding payment of maintenance?

At this juncture, this Court relevantly points out that ordinarily a Court of Law before passing an order for arrest and detention of the person concerned must be satisfied that he, despite having sufficient means has with a malafide intention, evades payment.


14.One cannot brush aside an important fact that before a Court of Law issues a notice or warrant of arrest against a concerned person, it must primordially satisfy subjectively as to whether the concerned person is liable to be arrested or not. Prior to the ordering of arrest of a person, the concerned Court/trial Court is having a discretion to issue notice to the aggrieved/affected by providing an opportunity to him requiring him to appear before the Court within the time fixed. In fact, it is not a prudent exercise of judicial discretion for a Court of Law to issue a warrant and notice simultaneously as per decision Puna Mahton V. Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 315.

As far as the present case is concerned, the Learned II Additional Family Court Judge, Chennai in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012 after marking the presence of the 1st Respondent/Wife and the Petitioner/Husband had stated that 'Payment is not made. Wife insisted that arrest may be made' and therefore, ordered arrest of the Revision Petitioner by 31.05.2016, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is per se not correct in the eye of Law. Just because the 1st Respondent/Wife had insisted for the arrest of the Revision Petitioner/Husband, the same cannot be ordered by the Learned II Additional Family Court Judge, Chennai in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012 either as a matter of routine or as a matter of course. Unfortunately, on 17.03.2016, straight away an order was passed by the trial Court to the effect that 'Payment was not made. Wife insisted that arrest may be made' and obviously only upon the insistence of the 1st Respondent /Wife seeking the arrest of the Petitioner/Husband, the same was complied with by the trial Court in ordering the arrest of the Petitioner by 31.05.2016. 


26.To put it succinctly, there is no indication in the impugned order that the trial Court was satisfied that the Revision Petitioner/ Husband despite having sufficient means had wilfully evaded the payment of arrears of maintenance amount in question. Also that, it is for the 1st Respondent/Wife to prove the means/resources of the Petitioner/Husband and in this regard, after enquiry, a finding has to be recorded by the trial Court. Unfortunately, in the instant case, in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012, when the impugned order was passed on 17.03.2016 ordering the arrest of the Petitioner/ Husband by 31.05.2016, no such exercise was resorted to. As such, on this score alone, the impugned order of the trial Court dated 17.03.2016 in M.P.No.198 of 2016 in M.P.No.495 of 2012 in M.C.No.145 of 2012 bristles with material irregularities and patent illegalities in the eye of Law. 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS 
Pronounced on :  29.04.2016
 
Coram
 Mr. JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL
Crl.R.C.No.624 of 2016
and
Crl.M.P.No.4357 of 2016


V.B.Kamalanathan

V.


K.Jayasree


Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL537
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