Showing posts with label disciplinary enquiry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label disciplinary enquiry. Show all posts

Monday, 12 May 2025

Bombay HC: If An Employee Is Exonerated In Disciplinary Proceedings, Interest Ought To Be Provided On Delayed Payment Of Retirement Benefits

 Thus, from a bare perusal of the order dated 09.05.2023, it is evident that the order imposing penalty dated 30.09.2008 and the rejection order dated 09.01.2013 were set aside on the ground of procedural irregularities. The said orders being set aside, S.M. Pillay would have to be treated as having retired on 31.01.2007 with a clean slate, consequently, being entitled to his retiral benefits, pension, etc. on the date of his retirement. The said payments were withheld on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. In view of the exoneration of S.M. Pillay in the disciplinary proceedings, the Petitioner would be entitled to interest on the delayed payment. Retirement benefits being due to him w.e.f. the date of his retirement, the delay in payment would have to be considered from 31.01.2007. {Para 9}


10. With reference to the contention of the learned Advocate for the Respondents that the proceedings filed by S.M. Pillay against the penalty order being abated, consequently Petitioner not being entitled to interest, will have to be rejected in view of the specific observation in the order dated 09.05.2023 which has set aside the penalty order on the ground of procedural irregularity. Mere observation that the proceedings stood abated would not come to the aid of the Respondent No.2 to deny Petitioner interest on delayed payments of the retiral benefits payable to S.M. Pillay. This is more so on account the fact that his retiral dues were withheld on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings.


11. S.M. Pillay retired from service on 31.01.2007 upon attaining the age of superannuation. Though S.M. Pillay was placed on the suspension on 22.01.2007, he was served with the charge memo on 05.02.2007. It is trite law that the departmental proceedings is not initiated merely by issuance of show cause notice, it is initiated only when charge-sheet is issued (see Union of India & Others versus K.V. Jankiraman MANU/SC/0445/1991 : 1991:INSC:209 : (1991) 4 SCC 109). Mr. Bhaskar Reddy, learned Advocate for the Petitioner submitted that the said Rules do not contemplate disciplinary proceedings after retirement of the employees. Mr. Tushad Kakalia, learned Advocate for Respondent No.2 was unable to point out any provision in the said Rules which would enable the Respondent No.2 to initiate or continue proceedings upon the retirement of its employees. This is an additional ground to hold that S.M. Pillay was denied his retirement dues, upon his retirement.


12. Upon exoneration of S.M. Pillay, the period of suspension Petitioner i.e. 22.01.2007 to 31.01.2007 would have to be considered on duty and consequently, he would be entitled to his full pay during the said period, less the subsistence allowance paid during the said period. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1918 of 2025

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Maheshwari Shanmugam Pillay Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge and Ashwin D. Bhobe, JJ.

Author: Ashwin D. Bhobe, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:17375-DB,MANU/MH/2387/2025.

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Sunday, 26 May 2024

Bombay HC: APP should recommend disciplinary action against investigating officer if accused was to be released on default bail due to his default

The applicant-Smt. Shobha wd/o Ambadas Matre has made specific allegation that the investigating agency failed to file charge-sheet within the prescribed period of 90 days in Crime No. 80/1998, with sole object to facilitate the release of accused/non-applicants, on bail in the case, which otherwise they would not have been entitled to. Such conduct of the investigating agency is not unknown to the Court. Justice Punchi in Aslam Babalal Desai 's case has made a reference to this aspect by observing that:

"It cannot be overlooked that a bail order under section 167(2) of the Code could even be managed through a convenient investigating officer, however, heinous be the crime. The Court would have to grant bail under the mandate of law, debarred as it is to see to the merits of the case at that stage. To say that thenceforth the Court is for ever shut to see to the merits of the case, though it otherwise has power to cancel bail is to deprive it of its elementary function to administer justice and weigh the claims on merit inter se. I would rather loath for such an interpretation as what would frustrate justice, and would on the other hand let the Court have the power to cancel bail, for once examining the merits of the case in such a situation."

Presently it has become a very common practice to obtain bail, in default, by 'such dubious method. Therefore, this Court proposes to incorporate certain steps to be taken by the investigating officer, the prosecutor, magistrate and the disciplinary authority of the Investigating Agency, as a measure to prevent the misuse of section 167 Criminal Procedure Code for obtaining bail in default which is inherent in section 167 of Criminal Procedure Code, as observed in Aslam Babalal Desai's case thus : The prosecution cannot be allowed to trifle with individual liberty if it does not take its task seriously and does not complete it within the time allowed by law." All actions of the State or its authorities and its officers must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and within the limits set up by law. Therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the investigating agency to conclude investigation within the prescribed period 60/90 days, as contemplated in section 167(2). A duty is cast on the Investigating officer to satisfy the Magistrate as to why he could not file the charge-sheet within the prescribed time, by filing his explanation, giving special reasons supported by an affidavit and case diary on or before last date of the prescribed period and on the date charge-sheet is filed beyond the prescribed period to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself that in the facts and circumstances brought before him such investigation could not have been completed within prescribed period for justifiable reasons. If the Magistrate is satisfied that the explanation so given is reasonable, he may record so which will result in absolving the investigating officer and his obligation under law and committing the default. If the Magistrate finds that there is no justifiable reasons for not filing the charge-sheet within prescribed time then he should record so and then it will be the duty of the learned Public Prosecutor to submit his report to the Disciplinary authority of the Investigation Officer for appropriate action, against the investigation officer for such default in performing the duty. Thereafter the disciplinary authority is expected to proceed in the matter and submit his action taken report to the concerned Magistrate, through their prosecuting agency. This procedure will provide safeguard to the misuse of authority by investigating agency and also serve the interest of justice by promoting the mandate as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Cri. Applns. Nos. 600 and 601 of 1999

Decided On: 07.06.1999

Bhulabai Vs. Shankar Barkaji Matre and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: J.N. Patel, J.

Citation: 1999 (3) Mh.L.J 227,MANU/MH/1445/1999.

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Sunday, 19 November 2023

Whether disciplinary inquiry can be initiated against any public servant for committing the offence of adultery after joseph shine Judgment?

 In fact, this Court posed the following question. In a given case, the authority is presented with the following set of facts. An officer is proceeded against Under Section 45 of the 1950 Act; the charge against him is adultery; it is alleged, in other words, that he has committed adultery within the meaning of Section 497 Indian Penal Code which has been struck down. Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned Counsel for the original Petitioner, very fairly submits that, the fact that Section 497 Indian Penal Code has been struck down may not stand in the way of the authorities proceeding against the officer with the aid of the provisions contained in Section 45 of the 1950 Act. Of course, he adds that the decision must finally depend upon the play of facts.{Para 22}


23. This Court in the case in question was concerned only with the validity of Section 497 Indian Penal Code and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.' for brevity). This Court spoke through separate but concurrent judgments. Apart from the lead judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, former Chief Justice of this Court, and with whom, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar concurred, the other learned Judges wrote separate opinions. However, they agreed that Section 497 Indian Penal Code and Section 198 Code of Criminal Procedure were unconstitutional. The premise on which the provision was struck down was that it offended Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.


In this case, this Court had no occasion, whatsoever, to consider the effect of the provisions of the Acts in question. In fact, we may notice that it is not as if this Court approved of adultery. This Court has found that adultery may be a moral wrong (per Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra). This Court has also held that it will continue to be a ground for securing dissolution of marriage. It has also been described as a civil wrong.


24. In view of the fact that the scheme of the Acts in the context, in particular, of Article 33 of the Constitution did not fall for the consideration of this Court, we must necessarily observe and clarify that the judgment of this Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India MANU/SC/1074/2018 : (2019) 3 SCC 39 was not at all concerned with the effect and operation of the relevant provisions in the Acts which have been placed before us by the applicant. In other words, this Court was neither called upon nor has it ventured to pronounce on the effect of Sections 45 and 63 of the 1950 Act as also the corresponding provisions in other Acts or any other provisions of the Acts.


25. We only make this position clear and dispose of the miscellaneous application.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Miscellaneous Application No. 2204 of 2020 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017 and Miscellaneous Application No. 1702 of 2021 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017

Decided On: 31.01.2023

Joseph Shine Vs. Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: K.M. Joseph, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0133/2023.

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Sunday, 13 August 2023

Can Management Initiate a Disciplinary Enquiry Against an Employee for Expressing his Grievances in Messages Sent in a Private WhatsApp Group?"


When even prisoners have fundamental rights and it has 
been declared by the Apex Court that Part III of the Constitution does not stop at the prison gates, it would be ridiculous to suggest that the moment a person becomes a bank employee, he has to bid good-bye to Article 19(1)(a). The fundamental right insofar as it applies to the petitioner might have lost a bit of sheen but its core would remain with all vigor.

10.There is something called “right to vent”. Every employee or a member of an organization will have some issue or the other with the management. To nurture a sense of grievance is quite natural. It is in the interest of the organization that the complaints find expression and ventilation. It will have a cathartic effect. If in the process, the image of the organization is affected, then the management can step in but not till then.

11.Let us assume that a group of employees are having a chat in one of their homes. So long as it is a private chat, it cannot attract the regulatory frame work of the management. The common law principle is “everyman's home is his castle”. If bar room gossip is published, that would definitely attract contempt of Court. But then, so long as it remains private, cognizance cannot be taken. The world has become a global village. It is connected by digital technology. The principles applicable to a chat in a home can be applied to what takes place in an encrypted virtual platform that has restricted access. Such an approach alone will be in consonance with liberal democratic traditions. We are yet to enter into the worlds envisaged by AldousHuxley in “Brave New World” and George Orwell in “1984”. What the respondent proposes amounts to thought-policing.

It is well settled that a charge memo can be quashed if assuming that all the acts attributed to the delinquent are taken to be true, still, it would not be amount to act of misconduct. As already held, the petitioner is very much possessed of the right to vent. The opinion was not expressed publicly. It was shared among the members of a private WhatsApp group. The management has not disclosed as to how they became aware of the post. It has not been shown as to how the bank's interest has been affected. There are some political leaders who make statements that are in bad taste and yet refuse to apologize. When I indicated that while the petitioner can criticise the management, the language also matters, he readily apologized. In these circumstances, the act committed by the petitioner cannot amount to misconduct. The impugned charge memo is quashed. {Para 20}

 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

W.P(MD)No.9754 of 2023

and

WMP(MD)No.8689 of 2023

A.Lakshminarayanan  Vs. The Assistant General Manager

CORAM

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Pronounced on : 08.08.2023.

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Tuesday, 14 March 2023

In departmental enquiry, whose statement will carry more weightage, either the delinquent or the Inquiry officer?

 The main ground on which the respondent attacked the order dated September 16, 1954, was that at the enquiry held by Mr. Byrne, he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, who deposed against him, and that the findings reached at such enquiry could not be accepted. But the question is whether that allegation has been made out. In para. 7 of his petition, the respondent stated :


"Despite repeated verbal requests of the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer did not permit him to cross-examine any witness, who deposed against him." {Para 7}

8. But this was contradicted by Mr. Byrne, who filed a counter-affidavit, in which he stated :


"(4) That it is incorrect that no opportunity was given to the petitioner at the time of the oral enquiry to cross-examine the witnesses who had deposed against the petitioner.


(5) That all witnesses were examined in petitioner's presence and he was asked by me at the end of each examination whether he had any questions to put.


(6) That the petitioner only put questions to one witness Shri P. Govindan Nair, and to others he did not."


9. On this affidavit, Mr. Byrne was examined in Court, and he repeated these allegations and added :


"I have distinct recollection that I asked Shri T.R. Varma to put questions in cross-examination to witnesses."

10. It was elicited in the course of his further examination that he did not make any note that he asked Shri T.R. Varma to put questions in cross-examination to witnesses, and that that might have been due to a slip on his part.


11. We have thus before us two statements, one by Mr. Byrne and the other by the respondent, and they are in flat contradiction of each other. The question is which of them is to be accepted. When there is a dispute as to what happened before a court or tribunal, the statement of the Presiding Officer in regard to it is generally taken to be correct, and there is no reason why the statement of Mr. Byrne should not be accepted as true. He was admittedly an officer holding a high position, and it is not suggested that there was any motive for him to give false evidence. There are moreover, features in the record, which clearly show that the statement of Mr. Byrne must be correct. The examination of witnesses began on April 20, 1953, and four witnesses were examined on that date, among them being Sri C.B. Tawakley. If, as stated by the respondent, he asked for permission to cross-examine witnesses, and that was refused, it is surprising that he should not have put the complaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was continued. To one of the witnesses Sri P. Govindan Nair, he did actually put a question in cross-examination, and it is difficult to reconcile this with his statement that permission had been refused to cross-examine the previous witnesses. A reading of the deposition of the witnesses shows that the Enquiring Officer himself had put searching questions, and elicited all relevant facts. It is not suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross-examination could have been but was not directed. We think it likely that the respondent did not cross-examine the witnesses because there was nothing left for him to cross-examine. The learned Judges gave two reasons for accepting the statement of the respondent in preference to that of Mr. Byrne. One is that there was no record made in the depositions of the witnesses that there was no cross-examination. But what follows from this ? That, in fact, there was no cross-examination, which is a fact; not that the request of the respondent to cross-examine was disallowed. Then again, the learned Judges say that the respondent was present at the hearing of the writ petition before them, that they put questions to him, and formed the opinion that he was sufficiently intelligent, and that it was difficult to believe that he would not have cross-examined the witnesses. We are of opinion that this was a consideration which ought not to have been taken into account in a judicial determination of the question, and that it should have been wholly excluded. On a consideration of the record and of the probabilities, we accept the statement of Mr. Byrne as true, and hold that the respondent was not refused permission to cross-examine the witnesses, and that the charge that the enquiry was defective for this reason cannot be sustained.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 118 of 1957

Decided On: 18.09.1957

Union of India (UOI) Vs. T.R. Varma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar and T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, JJ.

Author: T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0121/1957,1957 AIR 882, 1958 SCR 499

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Saturday, 12 November 2022

Whether Unfair trial can be cured by fair appeal?


 It is then urged by learned Counsel for the appellant that the provision of an appeal under Section 22-A of the Act is a complete safeguard against any insufficiency in the original proceeding before the Council, and it is not mandatory that the member should be heard by the Council before it proceeds to record its finding. Section 22-A of the Act entitles a member to prefer an appeal to the High Court against an order of the Council imposing a penalty under Section 21(4) of the Act. It is pointed out that no limitation has been imposed on the scope of the appeal, and that an appellant is entitled to urge before the High Court every ground which was available to him before the Council. Any insufficiency, it is said, can be cured by resort to such appeal. Learned counsel apparently has in mind the view taken in some cases that an appeal provides an adequate remedy for a defect in procedure during the original proceeding. Some of those cases are mentioned in Sir William Wades erudite and classic work on "Administrative Law" But as that learned author observes, "in principle there ought to be an observance of natural justice equally at both stages", and if natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right of appeal is not so much a true right of appeal as a corrected initial hearing: instead of fair trial followed by appeal, the procedure is reduced to unfair trial followed by fair trial.

And he makes reference to the observations of Megarry J. in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] 1 Ch. 34. Treating with another aspect of the point, that learned Judge said :


If one accepts the contention that a defect of natural justice in the trial body can be cured by the presence of natural justice in the appellate body, this has the result of depriving the member of his right of appeal from the expelling body. If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being stripped of his right to appeal to another body from the effective decision to expel him. I cannot think that natural justice is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless have the effect of depriving the member of his right of appeal when a valid decision to expel him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation would be a powerful result to be achieved by what in law is a mere nullity; and it is no mere triviality that might be justified on the ground that natural justice does not mean perfect justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body.

The view taken by Megarry, J. was followed by the Ontario High Court in Canada in Re Cardinal and Board of Commissioners of Police of City of Cornwall [1974] 42 D.L.R. (3d) 323. The Supreme Court of New Zealand was similarly inclined in Wislang v. Medical Practioners Disciplinary Committee [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 29 and so was the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Reid v. Rowley [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 472.

{Para 17}

18. But perhaps another way of looking at the matter lies in examining the consequences of the initial order as soon as it is passed. There are cases where an order may cause serious injury as soon as it is made, an injury not capable of being entirely erased when the error is corrected on subsequent appeal. For instance, as in the present case, where a member of a highly respected and publicly trusted profession is found guilty of misconduct and suffers penalty, the damage to his professional reputation can be immediate and far-reaching. "Not all the King's horses and all the King's men" can ever salvage the situation completely, notwithstanding the widest scope provided to an appeal. To many a man, his professional reputation is his most valuable possession. It affects his standing and dignity among his fellow members in the profession, and guarantees the esteem of his clientele. It is often the carefully garnered fruit of a long period of scrupulous, conscientious and diligent industry. It is the portrait of his professional honour. In a world said to be notorious for its blase attitude towards the noble values of an earlier generation, a man's professional reputation is still his most sensitive pride. In such a case, after the blow suffered by the initial decision, it is difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an appellate decision. Such a case is unlike an action for money or recovery of property, where the execution of the trial decree may be stayed pending appeal, or a successful appeal may result in refund of the money or restitution of the property, with appropriate compensation by way of interest or mesne profits for the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it seems to us, there is manifest need to ensure that there is no breach of fundamental procedure in the original proceeding, and to avoid treating an appeal as an overall substitute for the original proceeding.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1911 and1912 of 1980

Decided On: 21.10.1986

 Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.S. Pathak and Sabyasachi Mukherjee, JJ.

Author: R.S. Pathak, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0083/1986

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Tuesday, 28 June 2022

Whether principles of natural justice violated if an enquiry report is not given to a delinquent employee?

 As stated above, Annexure – A8 enquiry report and PR

minutes were given to the applicant only along with Annexure – A7 show cause notice after the Government accepted the findings in the enquiry report and provisionally decided to impose a penalty. It is pertinent to note that the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority in the instant case were not one and the same. This is in violation of the principles of natural justice and the same cannot be condoned at all, as held in B. Karunakar's Case (supra)

“The findings or recommended punishment by the

enquiry officer are likely to affect the mind of the

disciplinary authority in his concluding the guilt or

penalty to be imposed. The delinquent is, therefore,

entitled to meet the reasoning, controvert the

conclusions reached by the enquiry officer or is entitled

to explain the effect of the evidence recorded. Unless

the copy of the report is supplied to him, he would be in

dark to know the findings, the reasons in support

thereof or nature of the recommendation on penalty. He

would point out all the factual or legal errors committed

by the enquiry officer. He may also persuade the

disciplinary authority that the finding is based on no

evidence or the relevant material evidence was not

considered or overlooked by the enquiry officer in

coming to the conclusions, with a view to persuade the

disciplinary authority to disagree with the enquiry

officer and to consider his innocence of the charge, or

even that the guilt as to the misconduct has not been

established on the evidence on records or disabuse the

initial impression formed in the minds of the

disciplinary authority on consideration of the enquiry

report. Even if the disciplinary authority comes to the

conclusion that charge or charges is/are proved, the case

may not warrant imposition of any, penalty. He may

plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances to impose

no punishment or a lesser punishment. For this purpose

the delinquent needs reasonable opportunity or fair play

in action. The supply of the copy of the report is neither

an empty formality, nor a ritual, but aims to digress the

direction of the disciplinary authority from his

derivative conclusions from the report to the palliative

path of fair consideration. The denial of the supply of

the copy, therefore, causes to the delinquent a grave

prejudice and avoidable injustice which cannot be cured

or mitigated in appeal or at a challenge under Art. 226

of the Constitution or S.19 of the Tribunal Act or other

relevant provisions. Ex post facto opportunity does not

efface the past impression formed by the disciplinary

authority against the delinquent, however, professedly

to be fair to the delinquent. The lurking suspicion

always lingers in the mind of the delinquent that the

disciplinary authority was not objective and he was

treated unfairly. To alleviate such an impression and to

prevent injustice or miscarriage of justice at the

threshold, the disciplinary authority should supply the

copy of the report, consider objectively the records, the

evidence, the report and the explanation offered by the

delinquent and make up his mind on proof of the charge

or the nature of the penalty. The supply of the copy of

the report is thus, a sine qua non for a valid, fair, just

and proper procedure to defend the delinquent himself

effectively and efficaciously. The denial thereof is

offending not only Art.311(2) but also violates Arts. 14

and 21 of the Constitution. {Para 7}

8. The argument on the side of the Government before the

Tribunal that there is no specific rule in the Kerala Police

Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules to give enquiry report at the stage of drawing up of the same to the delinquent cannot be accepted at all. The right to receive the report is considered as the essential part of reasonable opportunity to be extended to the person affected by the report and a refusal to furnish the report amounts to denial of the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. Even if such right is not explicitly stated in the regulations or statute, that right being a fundamental and essential part of the natural justice, must be read into every regulation or rules. There is nothing in the rules aforesaid

which excludes the operation of the principle of natural justice

entitling the delinquent to be served with a copy of the enquiry

report before accepting the report or proposing a punishment. It is trite that the principles of natural justice must be read into the

unoccupied interstices of the statute/rules or regulations unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (KAT) No. 130 of 2022

JAYACHANDRAN V  Vs STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR

&

MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED NIAS C.P.

Author: Mohammed Nias.C.P., J.

Dated: 16th day of June, 2022

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Friday, 13 November 2020

Whether high court should initiate a departmental enquiry against Judicial officer on the ground that he has passed the wrong order?

That is why we again repeat that one of the responsibilities of the High Court on the administrative side is to ensure that the independence of the District judiciary is maintained and the High Court acts as a guardian and protector of the District judiciary.


16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the concerned judicial officer. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8950 of 2011

Decided On: 26.09.2019

 Krishna Prasad Verma (D) thr. L.Rs.  Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/1364/2019, 2020(2) MHLJ 296

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