Whether Occupier Of Flat is Entitled To Transit Rent For Period Of Dispossession During Redevelopment?

The fact remains that as respondent no. 3 is in possession of the tenement in question and would now be handing over possession of such tenement to the petitioner/society. Hence considering the consistent view taken by this Court in Heritage Lifestyles and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Amar-Villa Co-Operative Housing Society and others MANU/MH/0380/2011 : 2011 (3) Mh.L.J. 865 and in Saikripa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. V/s. Osho Developers & Ors.1, the party who is dispossessed, would be entitled to the transit rent as it is such party who is put to hardship.{Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Commercial Arbitration Petition (L.) No. 4301 of 2022

Decided On: 16.03.2022

Maniar Associates LLP  Vs. Vijay Niwas Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1454/2022

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Can the government acquire a person's land without paying compensation on oral consent?

  In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings, has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass (supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment.

23. This court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical set of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2273 OF 2022 

 SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. Vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

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Supreme court: Forcible dispossession of a person of their private property by the government without following due process of law is violative of their human right

 Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case. {Para 25}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2273 OF 2022 

 SUKH DUTT RATRA & ANR. Vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.

 Coram: S. RAVINDRA BHAT; PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.

 Dated: April 06, 2022 

Author: S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

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Whether a person who has no legal right to a property can claim an injunction against a municipal corporation restraining it from dispossessing him from that property?

  However, it appears that the plaintiff in his pleadings has stated about previous possession simplicitor. But that too cannot be protected by granting injunction as prayed, because the eviction order was there against him. He was even offered alternate accommodation pursuant to his prayer, may be as freedom fighter. Therefore since the Corporation decided to give alternate accommodation, the plaintiff lost all his right in the property, i.e. the rights arising out of possession simplicitor. Because no legal right over the property is claimed, asserted and proved by the plaintiff. It is true that number of documents produced to show that he was in possession but mere possession in the absence of any right does not give protection to the plaintiff particularly in all the circumstances mentioned above.

{Para 22}

Bombay High Court

Motillal Mahadev Sharma (Since ... vs The Municipal Corporation Of ... on 1 April, 2005

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Under which circumstances separate suit for possession will be barred if third party is dispossessed in execution of decree?

The next limb of the argument based on Rule 99 to Rule 101 of Order 21 C.P.C., is that in a situation contemplated by Order 21, Rule 99, C.P.C., the procedure laid down therein has to be necessarily followed and it is not open to the person dispossessed to file a separate suit in view of the bar contained in Rule 101. In other words, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that after the amendment of Order 21, Rule 101 by the C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1976, the resort to suit is altogether barred and the application under Order 21, Rule 99 and the appeal under Rule 103 are the exclusive remedies available. We find it difficult to accept this contention. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the bar against filing of a separate suit would apply only if there was an application under Rule 99 but not otherwise. The third party aggrieved by dispossession in execution of a decree, may make an application to the Court complaining such dispossession. If he makes such an application, all questions including questions relating to right, title and possession in the properties shall be decided in that application as if it were a full-fledged suit for title and possession and no separate suit would lie for this purpose. However, an appeal lies under Rule 103 as if the order passed on such application is decree. We are unable to visualise the provisions of Rules 99 to 101 even after amendment as laying down an exhaustive Code on the remedies of the third parties dispossessed in execution of a decree for possession. The remedy under Order 21, Rule 99, C.P.C. is no doubt one of the remedies available to the person dispossessed. But, we are unable to construe Order 21, Rule 99 as placing a bar on bringing an independent suit for possession, without filing an application under the said Rule. Such a bar, in our view does not arise even by necessary implication.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Civil Revision Application No. 73 of 2001

Decided On: 13.09.2002

Sushila Sadanand Borkar  Vs. Maria Exaltacao Vaz

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

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Whether licensee can claim injunction against licensor to restrain him from dispossessing him?

If we examine the Easements Act, Section 63 speaks of the licensee's rights on revocation; it is profitable to extract it:

"63. Licensee's rights on revocation.--Where a license is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property."

50. From the above statutory extract, it is clear that a licensee, on revocation of license, is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property. It does not contemplate eviction by due process. And, in fact, that waiting period is the due process, so to speak. The reason for this proposition, even de hors the statutory support, is not far to seek: a license creates no interest in the property; the seisin remains with the owner. In other words, the licensee only may use the immovable property, with no actual transfer of the very property.

51. Then, Sakkeer quoted with approval Chandu Lal v. MCD MANU/DE/0024/1978 : AIR 1978 Delhi 174 (FB), a Full Bench decision of Delhi High Court. In fact, Chandu Lal, as noted by Sakkeer, has held that a bare licensee having no interest in the property cannot maintain an action for its possession. A mere licensee has only a right to use the property. Such a right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, but is only a personal privilege. The license terminated, the licensor may deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets as the owner in possession of his property. He need not secure a decree of the Court to obtain this right.

52. Chandu Lal notes that a licensor can use reasonable force to secure or protect his possession. If he, however, uses excessive force, he may make himself liable to be punished under a prosecution, but he will infringe no right of the licensee. Then, it acknowledges that a person in exclusive possession of the property, no doubt, is prima facie considered a tenant, but he would not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy.

53. Settled as the above proposition of law has been, if we further examine, Section 64 of the Easements Act provides for the consequences that follow forceful eviction. It is profitable to extract Section 64:

"64. Licensee's rights on eviction. - Where a license has been granted for a consideration, and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right for which he contracted, he is entitled to recover compensation from the grantor."

54. It is explicit from Section 64 of the Easements Act that if a licensee has been evicted by the grantor for no fault of his, the remedy of the licensee is not restoration, but only restitution. Thus, the common law cannon of restoration ends in the face of statutory stipulation.

 Prima facie, I reckon the LL Agreement, dated 28th February 2010, is a license; it has come to an end; and the licensee's possession is permissive. The licensee's claim that it has exercised its option of renewal is a matter for trial. The property belongs to a society, which pleads that it has gone for the best, most lucrative offer of license from a third party and that is in the interest of the society, whose structures need, as it puts, much upkeep. Thus, the balance of convenience, too, lies in the licensor's favour. About the irreparable loss, first the licensee cannot be said to be possessing the property; in fact, it has not even alleged that the licensor has tried to dispossess it. And any loss it may sustain without its having the injunctive relief is a matter of reparation: it can be compensated. That is, it is no irreparable loss.

61. Thus, all the three cardinal principles of injunctive relief--prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss or hardship--are not in the licensee's favour.

So I reverse the findings of the Appellate Bench of the Small Cause Court and set aside the Order, dated 21st September 2018. As a result, the licensee's application for injunction stands rejected.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 12033 of 2018

Decided On: 03.07.2019

New Shivam Co-op. Hsg. Society Ltd. Vs.  Raj Publicity, Bandra (W)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Citation:   MANU/MH/1803/2019 

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Whether Dispossession of tenant by third party is dispossession of landlord?

 A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is dispossession of the landlord. The word "dispossessed" in Section 6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly, the expression "any person claiming through him" would bring within its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law. What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. The view of Calcutta High Court that where the tenant was forcibly ejected from the land by the third party, it may reasonably be held that landlord has also been dispossessed is the correct view. We find ourselves in agreement with the view of Bombay, Patna, Pepsu and Rajasthan High Courts and hold, as it must be, that there is nothing in Section 6 of the Act to bar a landlord from suing a trespasser in possession even when, at the date of dispossession, the property is in actual occupation of a tenant entitled to possession.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1930 of 2010

Decided On: 22.02.2010

Sadashiv Shyama Sawant  Vs. Anita Anant Sawant

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sathasivam and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

Citation: (2010) 3 SCC 385

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Whether in suit for recovery of possession it is necessary to join person who had actually dispossessed plaintiff?

7. On plain reading of the said provision it becomes clear that cause of action for suit arises when any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law. The relief that can be claimed in such a suit is of recovery of possession. This would mean that person who is in possession of such immovable property of which the plaintiff was dispossessed without his consent and otherwise than in due course of law would be a necessary party to the suit for claiming the relief effectively. If persons who have dispossessed are in possession of the property in question, they would obviously be necessary parties for recovery of possession in a suit under Section 6 of the Act. However, if dispossession is done through the agency of some persons who have passed on the possession to other persons, the latter being in actual possession from whom recovery can be sought, would be necessary parties for claiming an effective relief under Section 6 of the Act. The suit filed against those who are in actual possession for recovery of the immovable property under Section 6 of the Act can be effectively decided even in absence of the agents who have dispossessed plaintiff and transmitted the possession to the defendants. Therefore, the approach of the trial Court that in absence of the persons, who had dispossessed the plaintiffs having been made parties to the suit, the relief under Section 6 could not be granted against those who are actually in possession of that property is wholly misconceived and not warranted by the provisions of Section 6 of the said Act. in Virjivandas Madhavdas v. Mohammed All Khan, reported in ILR 5 Bom 208, the Bombay High Court in context of section 9 of the specific relief act, 1877 held that a person who has been ejected from his property in suing to recover it under section 9 of the specific relief act, 1877, may sue the actual ejector or the person under whose order or by whose authority the actual ejector had acted, or he may sue both; but the wrong doer who has taken possession is the one from whom primarily it is to be reclaimed. Therefore a suit filed against persons from whom possession is to be primarily reclaimed under Section 6 of the said Act can be decided notwithstanding that those who had actually dispossessed the plaintiffs were not made parties to the suit."

(emphasis supplied)

29. In the present case also, therefore, as it is the Applicant who is in actual possession of the suit property, the suit filed against him alone, without joining the agency of Recovery Officer from whom he has received the said possession, is definitely maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 455 of 2016

Decided On: 05.04.2018

 Kadir Ilahi Bagwan Vs. Usha  Anandrao Yadav

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Whether plea of res judicata is not applicable if plaintiff gives different date for dispossession?

 In the present suit, the Respondent Plaintiff alleged that he was dispossessed in September, 1983. The fact remains that earlier suit was dismissed on 21st February, 1981 and appeal against the decree of the trial court was pending before the appellate court which was dismissed on 16th July, 1985. Thus, the mere fact that the Respondent Plaintiff pleaded that he was dispossessed in September, 1983 which fact was not pleaded in the earlier suit filed in the year 1976 could not be a ground to hold that the earlier decision between the parties was not res judicata. The matter directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit was the claim of the Respondent Plaintiff to title to the suit property and right to the possession which was also the issue in the second suit. Mere fact that in the second suit he gave a different date of dispossession was not enough to hold that the principle of res judicata was not applicable particularly, when the second date of dispossession was during pendency of the proceedings in the earlier suit. Other reason given by the High Court that the defence put up by the Appellant Defendant in the present proceedings was not the defence in the earlier suit or that the defence was barred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act could be of no consequence. Even if the said defence is ignored or the Respondent Plaintiff is permitted to raise the plea of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, the plea of res judicata could not be ignored. Res judicata applies when issue in earlier suit is directly and substantially the same as in the subsequent suit irrespective of the plea taken with reference to such an issue in the two suits. The finding on the issue of title and right of possession, having been heard and finally decided in the earlier suit, operated as a bar to trial of the subsequent suit as rightly held by the trial court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 6994 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 29454 of 2012)

Decided On: 26.07.2016

Mohhamed Khan  Vs. Ibrahim Khan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Gopala Gowda and A.K. Goel, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 14 SCC495

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Whether plaintiff can recover possession of property even if suit is filed after expiry of six month?

 It was next contended on behalf of the appellant that in a suit for possession brought on the basis of title, the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he proves his title to the suit property as well as its possession within 12 years. According to the appellant, except in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff, for succeeding in the suit, has to prove both existing title to the suit property and its possession within 12 years. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. In our opinion the possession of the plaintiff prior to 1945 is a good title against all but the true owner. The defendants who are mere trespassers cannot defeat the plaintiff's lawful possession by ousting him from the suit property. Possessory title is a good title as against everybody other than the lawful owner. In Ismail Ariff v. Mohamed Ghouse, I.L.R.20 IndAp 99 the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that a person having possessory title can get a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Therein it was observed that the possession of the plaintiff was a sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant.

10. In Narayana Row v. Dharmachar, ILR. Mad. 514 a bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ. held that possession is, under the Indian, as under the English law, good title against all but the true owner. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent with the position that as against a wrong doer, prior possession of the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, is sufficient title, even if the suit be brought more than six months after the act of dispossession complained of and that the wrong-doer cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2342 of 1966

Decided On: 16.10.1969

Somnath Burman Vs. Dr. S.P. Raju and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.C. Shah and K.S. Hegde, JJ.

Citations: 1970 AIR 846, 1970 SCR (2) 869.

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Whether court can grant an injunction to the tenant of agricultural land against dispossession even if it has no jurisdiction to decide the issue of agrarian tenancy?

The abovementioned judgment reflects the correct position in law in the light of the provisions contained in Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code, though a specific reference to the same has not been made. That such is the legal position is also evident from the judgment of M. N. Chandurkar, Acting C.J. (as he then was) in Maruti Sambha v. Parshuram, 1983 Mah LJ 958. In paragraph 5 of the judgment it is stated as follows:-

"Now, in a suit for injunction simpliciter by a plaintiff who claims to be in possession, the plaintiff will be entitled to injunction only if he proves his possession on the date of the suit. It the plaintiff proves his possession on the date of the suit, the status of the defendant, who is alleged to be disturbing the possession of the plaintiff, is wholly irrelevant, because a tenant is not entitled to forcibly dispossess any person in possession against whom the tenant may have a right to claim possession."

8. The question is not ultimately what the other reliefs are claimed in the suit. If the plaintiff is alleging that he is in possession and therefore he wants his possession to be protected by an appropriate order made under O. XXXIX R. 1 of the Code, then the Court, considering whether he is prima facie in possession and other such factors as the balance of convenience, can give interim relief by way of injunction restraining the drefendant from disturbing the plaintiffs possession. If other issues which can be decided only by the authorities under the Tenancy Act arise, then those issues may be referred to the appropriate tenancy authorities, but it cannot be said that unless those issues are answered by the proper tenancy authorities no interim relief can be given by the Civil Courts under O. XXXIX R. 1 of the Code.

Bombay High Court

Laxmi And Ors. vs Savanta Bapu Mali on 31 January, 1985

Equivalent citations: AIR 1986 Bom 169, 1988 (4) BomCR 278, (1985) 87 BOMLR 159,1985 MHLJ 324

Bench: Jahagirdar

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Whether a person is entitled to get injunction against dispossession if other side does not assert that he is owner of suit property?

 The question, therefore, is that in view of the concurrent finding recorded by all the three courts below that the Appellant has been in possession of the property (at least from the year 1959) whether the injunction as prayed for by the Appellant can be denied? As can be seen from the judgment of the Privy Council referred to supra, a person such as the Appellant in possession of land has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. However, the rightful owner must assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the statutes of limitation applicable to the case.

15. We have carefully scanned through the written statement. There is no assertion that the Respondent is the real owner of the property though it is very boldly submitted before us that the State of Rajasthan is the owner of the property.

16. However, the Respondent is not the State of Rajasthan. What exactly is the legal character of the Respondent is not known? Assuming that the State of Rajasthan is the real owner of the property in question, whether the Respondent is legally authorized by the State of Rajasthan to recover possession of the suit scheduled property is not clear from the record.

17. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Respondent has some authority to evict the Appellant, the eviction must be by a process known to law, i.e., either by filing a suit to evict the Appellant or by resorting to some other procedure duly authorized by law. In this regard, learned Counsel for the Respondent placed reliance on Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which, no doubt, authorises the summary eviction of encroachers of the government property by following the procedure prescribed therein. However, from the written statement it does not appear that the Respondent² took any steps contemplated Under Section 91 of the said Act. It appears that the Respondent is under the belief that once Section 91 was invoked (in 1965), such an invocation for evicting the Appellant summarily can eternally be relied upon by anybody for evicting the Appellant.

18. Law, in our opinion, does not sanction such process. Even according to the Respondent, subsequent to the alleged eviction in 1965, the Appellant re-entered possession of the suit scheduled property. In which case if the Respondent desires to evict the Appellant again, the same must be done in accordance with law by initiating appropriate proceedings. Until such process of eviction in accordance with law is initiated, the Appellant's possession of the suit scheduled property is required to be protected.

19. In the context of the right of the recovery of possession of immoveable property by a person who was dispossessed from such property, this Court, in Nair Service Society Ltd. (supra), while dealing with Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) opined:

...The uniform view of this Court is that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised, the Plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the Defendant does not avail him....(para 14)

20 In the light of the above principle of law laid down by this Court and in view of the fact that there is no clear pleading in the case on hand as to who is the real owner of the suit schedule property and absence of any assertion that the Respondent is the owner of the property, we are of the opinion that the Appellant is entitled for an injunction, as prayed, subject, of course, to the right of the true owner of the property (whoever it is) to evict the Appellant in accordance with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7119 of 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8767 of 2012)

Decided On: 01.08.2014

 Ram Daan Vs.  Urban Improvement Trust

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Jasti Chelameswar and A.K. Sikri, JJ.

Citation:2015(1) MHLJ 34

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When landlord can sue on the basis of title?

After considering the various judgments the proposition of

law laid down in paragraph 18 is not of any person dispossessed but

relates only to a landlord dispossessed in respect of the property let

out to the tenant of which the tenant has been dispossessed forcibly

by the third party. Consequently the forcible dispossession is the

essential requirement. Dispossession contemplates the actual

possession either of the landlord himself or of his tenant through

whom he claims or sues.

Mr. Jagtiani would rely upon the following specific part of

paragraph 18 of the judgment which runs thus :

A person is said to have been dispossessed when he has been

deprived of his possession; such deprivation may be of actual

possession or legal possession. Possession in law follows

right to possession. The right to possession, though distinct

from possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself

for certain purposes.

He would argue that any person dispossessed may be in actual

possession or legal possession and that the Plaintiff is certainly in

legal possession since he has the right to possess. However, the right

to possess must be followed by possession since it is held that the

possession in law follows the right to possession. It may be treated as

equivalent to possession but there must be possession for a Plaintiff to

be dispossessed.

The explanation of the distinction between physical and legal

possession in Halsbury Laws of England set out in paragraph 19 of the

Judgment further shows that the legal possession may exist without

de facto possession. A person may be deemed to be in legal

possession though not having de facto possession. Such is

constructive possession. Consequently it is held in paragraph 21 of

the judgment that dispossession of the tenant is dispossession of the

landlord. If the tenant was forcibly thrown out by a trespasser, the

landlord has the implied right of entry to recover possession. As the

landlord would continue in legal possession through his tenant who is

in actual possession but not contrary to his tenant who was in

possession. Hence if the tenant is in physical possession the landlord

retains possession through him.

Consequently one of them must be in actual physical possession

and must be forcibly dispossessed.

If a landlord is in such constructive possession and claims

through the tenant, he can certainly sue U/s.6 because his tenant is in

possession and has been wrongfully, illegally and forcibly

dispossessed without his consent. If not, the landlord himself must be

in possession and must be wrongfully, illegally and forcibly

dispossessed without his consent.

53. In this case the landlord's right is certainly impinged by the

claim of the Defendants. Such a claim may be wholly false, frivolous,

misconceived, malicious and even vexatious. The Plaintiff as the

landlord would certainly have right to recover the possession but only

by following due legal process. He cannot claim to be in possession

merely because his last statutory tenant has expired without any act

on his part in taking possession of the suit flat after her death and

putting up a lock thereon. This the landlord can do by suing on title.

That would be the action on trespass such as this case is. That would

be for recovery of possession from the Defendants as trespassers.

However, that is not an action U/s.6 of the Specific Relief Act; it is an

action for recovery of immovable property on title U/s.5 of the Act as

the person “entitled” to possession of the suit property.

Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2013.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

SUIT NO.2955 OF 2010

Shaikh Jaber Abdulah J AI Sabah 

Vs.

Ravindra Mukund Chafe & Anr. 

CORAM : MRS. ROSHAN DALVI, J.

DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT : 19th December, 2013

Citation;2014(3) ALLMR293 Bom

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