Bombay HC: Whether the court can grant maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC to wife after her divorce if she fails to incorporate this fact by amending her application?

Since there was no dispute about divorce and it was a ground available for maintenance under Section 125 Explanation (b), the learned Magistrate could have considered these subsequent developments. Explanation (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rohtash Singh (supra) and recorded the finding in para 9 that on account of the Explanation quoted above, a woman who has been divorced by her husband on account of a decree passed by the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, continues to enjoy the status of a wife for the limited purpose of claiming maintenance allowance from her ex-husband. {Para 7}

8. There is no dispute on the law that such a right of divorcee exists till she remarries. There is no such averment that the respondent/wife was remarried. In view of the facts of the case and admitted position, the Court is of the view that the rule of pleading would not strictly apply in such cases. Therefore, the subsequent development of divorce has been correctly considered by the learned Revisional Court. Though the respondent/wife failed to establish that she was refused and neglected to maintain, the subsequent facts of divorce gave her a new ground which may be considered during the pendency of the application and the learned Magistrate ought to have considered it. The learned Revisional Court has corrected the errors of law of the Magistrate. However, the learned Revisional Court erred in granting the maintenance from 21.11.2005. If the right of the wife was accrued under Explanation (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code after the divorce and she was not entitled to the maintenance on the ground available under Section 125(1), she would not be entitled to the maintenance from the date of the desertion or filing the petition. Except this error, the judgment and order of the learned Revisional Court is legal, proper and correct. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 250 of 2008

Decided On: 25.09.2024

Kishor Fulchand Pawar Vs. Nanda

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Mehare, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/6101/2024,2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3115,2024:BHC-AUG:23068

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Supreme Court: Divorced Muslim woman is entitled to get maintenance from her husband U/S 125 of CRPC as long as she does not remarry

Cumulative reading of the relevant portions of judgments of this Court in Danial Latifi (supra) and Iqbal Bano (supra) would make it crystal clear that even a divorced Muslim woman would be entitled to claim maintenance from her divorced husband, as long as she does not remarry. This being a beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof must accrue to the divorced Muslim women. {Para 29}

30. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned orders are hereby set aside and quashed. It is held that even if a Muslim woman has been divorced, she would be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. after the expiry of period of iddat also, as long as she does not remarry.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2309 of 2009 

Decided On: 04.12.2009

Shabana Bano Vs. Imran Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B. Sudershan Reddy and Deepak Verma, JJ.

Author: Deepak Verma, J.

Citation:2010 ALL MR (cri)278 , MANU/SC/1859/2009

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Bombay HC: Wife is not entitled to maintenance if divorce is on ground of adultery

 Learned counsel for the Petitioner-wife would urge that,

even if the Petitioner is a divorcee, having regard to the provisions of

Sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 she is entitled for maintenance as she continues, to be a woman,

within the meaning of Sub-section (4) of Section 125 of the Act.

6. He would draw support from the Judgments of the Apex

Court in VANAMALA VS H.M.RANGANATHA BHATTA reported in 1995

DGLS (SC) 722 and ROHTAS SINGH VS RAMENDRI reported in 2000

DGLS (SC) 450 so as to support his aforesaid contentions. The sum

and substance of the submission is even if there is a decree of divorce

passed on the allegation of adultery, still bar under Sub-section (4) of

Section 125 of the Act, will not be attracted, as even after divorce, she

ceases to have the status of a wife but, she continues to be a woman.

 In the aforesaid background, both these Judgments will be

hardly of any assistance to the Petitioner. Considering the expressed

embargo on the right of the Petitioner, to claim maintenance

particularly, divorce was ordered on 27.4.2000 based on the allegation

of adultery, the Court below has rightly held that the Petitioner-wife is

not entitled for maintenance.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2547 OF 2016

Sanjivani Ramchandra Kondalkar vs.  Ramchandra Bhimrao Kondalkar & anr 

CORAM : NITIN W.SAMBRE,J

DATED : 18th DECEMBER, 2019

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Supreme Court: Divorced wife can not be denied maintenance U/S 125 even if divorce was on ground of desertion

The short question raised in these appeals is whether a wife, who has been divorced by the husband, on the ground that the wife has deserted him, is entitled to claim maintenance Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).

 No doubt, as urged by Mr. Debal Banerjee, explanation II to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by deeming fiction includes a divorced woman to be a wife and, therefore, a woman who has been divorced by her husband can still claim maintenance Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure The question is how we should read the provisions of Sub-section (4) in this regard, especially when we deal with those women, against whom a decree for divorce has been obtained on the ground that they have deserted their husband. Once the relationship of marriage comes to an end, the woman obviously is not under any obligation to live with her former husband. The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife can only be read for the limited purpose for grant of maintenance and the deeming fiction cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex-husband. The husband cannot urge that he can divorce his wife on the ground that she has deserted him and then deny maintenance which should otherwise be payable to her on the ground that even after divorce she is not willing to live with him. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of Mr. Debal Banerjee.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 232-233 of 2015

Decided On: 19.09.2019

 Swapan Kumar Banerjee  Vs.  The State of West Bengal 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 4748

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Whether wife who has obtained divorce on ground of desertion is entitled to get maintenance?

Thereafter, in Rohtash Singh Vs. Ramendri & Ors . (2000) 3 SCC 180, this Court took a similar view:
"11. Learned counsel for the petitioner then
submitted that once a decree for divorce was
passed against the respondent and marital
relations between the petitioner and the
respondent came to an end, the mutual rights,
duties and obligations should also come to an
end. He pleaded that in this situation, the
obligation of the petitioner to maintain a
woman with whom all relations came to an end
should also be treated to have come to an end.
This plea, as we have already indicated above,
cannot be accepted as a woman has two distinct
rights for maintenance. As a wife, she is
entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from
any of the disabilities indicated in Section
125(4). In another capacity, namely, as a
divorced woman, she is again entitled to claim
maintenance from the person of whom she was
once the wife. A woman after divorce becomes a
destitute. If she cannot maintain herself or
remains unmarried, the man who was once her
husband continues to be under a statutory duty
and obligation to provide maintenance to her."
This view, which was taken by two-Judge Benches has
been confirmed in Manoj Kumar Vs. Champa Devi (2018) 12 SCC 748 by a three
judge bench, though, no specific reasons have been
recorded in the judgment. Mr. Debal Banerjee urged that
the matter requires reconsideration. We are not in

agreement with him for two reasons. Firstly, the view
taken in the first two judgments has been confirmed by a
three-judges Bench and, therefore, we cannot refer it to
a larger Bench.
Even otherwise, this view has been consistently
taken by this Court and the said view is in line with
both the letter and spirit of the Cr.P.C.
No doubt, as urged by Mr. Debal Banerjee,
explanation II to Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. by deeming
fiction includes a divorced woman to be a wife and,
therefore, a woman who has been divorced by her husband
can still claim maintenance under Section 125 of the
Cr.P.C. The question is how we should read the provisions
of sub-section (4) in this regard, especially when we
deal with those women, against whom a decree for divorce
has been obtained on the ground that they have deserted
their husband. Once the relationship of marriage comes to
an end, the woman obviously is not under any obligation
to live with her former husband. The deeming fiction of
the divorced wife being treated as a wife can only be
read for the limited purpose for grant of maintenance and
the deeming fiction cannot be stretched to the illogical
extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to
live with the ex-husband. The husband cannot urge that he
can divorce his wife on the ground that she has deserted
him and then deny maintenance which should otherwise be
payable to her on the ground that even after divorce she

is not willing to live with him. Therefore, we find no
merit in the contention of Mr. Debal Banerjee.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).232-233 OF 2015

DR. SWAPAN KUMAR BANERJEE Vs  THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL 

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
Dated:September 19, 2019.

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Leading Supreme Court judgment on maintenance to muslim woman

While upholding the validity of the Act, we may sum up our conclusions:

1) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act.

2) Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period.

3) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.

4) The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (civil) 868 of 1986

Decided On: 28.09.2001

 Danial Latifi vs.  Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju and Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2001 SC 3958

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Whether wife can execute order passed in her favour under S 12 of Domestic violence Act after her divorce?

Moreover, our law recognises the right of a divorced wife to get maintenance till her remarriage. This Act of 2005 provides additional rights and remedies to the aggrieved person. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted then the wife will be forced to approach before the Magistrate to get maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is needed is that the existence of domestic relationship as defined in the Act is necessary to bring an action and to get relief under the Act of 2005. Existence of domestic relationship is not needed to execute the order granted under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 and the divorced wife who got an order of maintenance and other relief under the Act of 2005 prior to the decree of divorce is entitled to execute the same if she is unable to maintain herself and she has not remarried and for other reasons.

In the High Court of Calcutta

(Before Madhumati Mitra, J.)

Krishnendu Das Thakur v. State of West of Bengal and Another

C.R.R 3566 of 2018 and CRAN 1348 of 2019

Decided on June 28, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 969

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on grant of permanent alimony

 In the present case, on the husband's petition, a decree declaring the second marriage as null and void has been granted. The learned counsel has argued that where the marriage is found to be null and void - meaning non-existent in eye of law or non est, the present respondent cannot lay a claim as wife for grant of permanent alimony or maintenance. We have critically examined the provisions of Section 25 in the light of conflicting decisions of the High Court cited before us. In our considered opinion, as has been held by this Court in Chand Dhawan's case (supra), the expression used in the opening part of Section 25 enabling the 'Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act' 'at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto' to grant alimony or maintenance cannot be restricted only to, as contended, decree of judicial separation under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13. When the legislature has used such wide expression as 'at the time of passing of any decree,' it encompasses within the expression all kinds of decrees such as restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9, judicial separation under Section 10, declaring marriage as null and void under Section 11, annulment of marriage as voidable under Section 12 and Divorce under Section 13.

19. Learned counsel for the husband has argued that extending the benefit of Section 25 to even marriages which have been found null and void under Section 11 would be against the very object and purpose of the Act to ban and discourage bigamous marriages.

20. It is well known and recognized legal position that customary Hindu Law like Mohammedan Law permitted bigamous marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is only after the Hindu Law was codified by enactments including the present Act that bar against bigamous marriages was created by Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping into consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu Law, a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal being in contravention of the provisions of the Act but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse financially weak and economically dependant. It is with the purpose of not rendering a financially dependant spouse destitute that Section 25 enables the court to award maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree resulting in breach in marriage relationship.

21. Section 25 is an enabling provision. It empowers the Court in a matrimonial case to consider facts, and circumstances of the spouse applying and decide whether or not to grant permanent alimony or maintenance.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1774 and 1775 of 2001

Decided On: 13.12.2004

Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga Vs. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.M. Dharmadhikari and H.K. Sema, JJ.

Citation: (2005) 2 Supreme Court Cases 33 : (AIR 2005 SC 422)

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Whether Divorced wife can claim reliefs under domestic violence Act?

 In the case of Harbans Lal Malik v. Payal Malik (Criminal Revision Petition No. 253 of 2010, dated 29.07.2010), Delhi High Court has held that, “it is apparent that in order to make a person as respondent in a petition under Section 12, there must exist a domestic relationship between the respondent and the aggrieved person. If there is no domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the respondent, the Court of MM cannot pass an order against such a person under the Act.”

12. In the present case, there was no domestic relation on the date of filing of application under the DV Act and, therefore, the applicant/wife is not entitled for any protection under the said Act.

13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab(cited supra) has observed that, “there is no domestic relationship as husband and wife at the time of filing of petition. Therefore, proceedings under DV Act not maintainable.” In the present case, divorce was granted by the family Court vide order dated 30th June, 2008. Application under DV Act was filed in the year 2009. At the time of filing of application under the DV Act, the applicant was not the wife. There was no domestic relationship between them. Hence, orders passed by the learned JMFC, Nagpur and maintained by Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 235 of 2015 are perfectly legal and correct. There is no perversity or illegality in the impugned orders.

In the High Court of Bombay

(Before M.G Giratkar, J.)

Sadhana v. Hemant

Criminal Revision Application (Revn) No. 121 of 2018

Decided on April 18, 2019, 

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 659

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Whether former wife is relative of husband and can be prosecuted for offence U/S 498A of IPC?

 It appears from the materials on record that the
respondent No.2 got married with one Rakeshkumar Bhavsar
in the year 1995. In the wedlock, two children were born. On
29.06.2001, Rakeshkumar Bhavsar passed away. After about
nine years from the date of the demise of Rakeshkumar
Bhavsar, the respondent No.2 got married with one
Bhavinbhai, i..e, the original accused No.1. Bhavinbhai was
married to the applicant herein. The marriage of Bhavinbhai
with the applicant was dissolved in a customary manner. It
appears that Bhavinbhai, after getting married to the
respondent No.2 herein, went back to his divorced wife, i.e.,
the applicant herein. This led to the matrimonial disputes
between the respondent No.2 and her husband, namely,
Bhavinbhai-original accused No.1. In the dispute between the
husband and wife, the applicant, who happens to be the first
wife of Bhavinbhai, has been arraigned as an accused. I am
informed that the applicant herein has also now got married
for the second time.
3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the

parties and having considered the materials on record, I am of
the view that even if the entire case of the prosecution is
believed or accepted to be true, none of the ingredients to
constitute the offence of cruelty within the meaning of section
498-A of the IPC are spelt out so far as the applicant herein is
concerned. Let us assume for the moment that the husband of
the respondent No.2 went back to his first wife, i.e., the
applicant herein, the fact remains that as the marriage was
dissolved, the applicant herein would not fall within the ambit
of “the relative of the husband”. Even otherwise, there is no
case worth the name against the applicant. The applicant may
be the cause for the matrimonial disputes between the
husband and wife, bu for that, she cannot be prosecuted for
the offence under section 498-A of the IPC.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 19574 of 2015

HONEYBEN ASHOKBHAI PATEL. Vs STATE OF GUJARAT 
CORAM:  MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 30/11/2017

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Whether it can be said that wife is living in adultery if she is having mere friendship with some man?

A Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of K. Veeriah Vs. Muthulakshmi and others, 1999 Cr.L.J. 624, while dealing with the ground of living in adultery has held as under: 

"The term "adultery" is to be understood in the light of the social ideas of the community as being a serious breach of the matrimonial tie. "Living in adultery"- mere friendship with a man does not amount to adultery within the meaning of Section 125 (4) Cr.P.C.. "Living in adultery" means the following of a course of continuous adulterous conduct. While determining the factum of "Living in adultery" the Court must consider evidence on living in quasi-permanent union with man with whom she was allegedly committing adultery. It is for the husband to prove that the wife is continuously committing violation of the marriage bed, indulging in adulterous life, by living in quasi-permanent union with her paramour. In other words, "living in adultery" means an outright adulterous conduct where the wife lives in a quasi permanent union with a man with whom she is committing adultery, shortly before or after the petition for maintenance. It is only when the husband proves satisfactorily beyond reasonable doubt that his wife was living in adultery, she will not be entitled to maintenance and not otherwise. When an allegation of adultery is made against the wife, the Court is bound to enquire into her conduct. In the said enquiry, the husband has to begin his case and the wife must be given an opportunity for adducing evidence to rebut the allegation of "living in adultery." The words "living in adultery" are merely indicative of the principle that a single or occasional lapse from virtue is not a sufficient reason for refusing maintenance. To reiterate the continued adulterous conduct is what is meant by "living in adultery." 

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 357 of 2009 

Mahesh @ Mahesh Chand v State Of U.P. & Others 

Hon'ble Amar Singh Chauhan,J. 

Citation: 2017 CRLJ(NOC) 147 ALL

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on right of divorced wife to get maintenance

The principal contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a decree for divorce having been passed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground of desertion by the respondent, an order for maintenance could not have been passed in favour of the respondent on account of Sub-section (4) of Section 125 Cr. P.C.

Sub-section (4) of Section 125 Cr. P.C. provides as under :-

"(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent."

Under this provision, a wife is not entitled to any Maintenance Allowance from her husband if she is living in adultery or if she has refused to live with her husband without any sufficient reason or if they are living separately by mutual consent. Thus, all the circumstances contemplated by Sub-section (4) of Section 125 Cr. P.C. presuppose the existence of matri- monial relations. The provision would be applicable where the marriage between the parties subsists and not where it has come to an end. Taking the three circumstances individually, it will be noticed that the first circum-stance on account of which a wife is not entitled to claim Maintenance Allowance from her husband is that she is living in adultery. Now, adultery is the sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is married to a third person. This clearly supposes the subsistence of marriage between the husband and wife and if during the subsistence of marriage, the wife lives in adultery, she cannot claim Maintenance Allowance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The second ground on which she would not be entitled to Maintenance Allowance is the ground of her refusal to live with her husband without any sufficient reason. This also presupposes the subsistence of marital relations between the parties. If the marriage subsists, the wife is under a legal and moral obligation to live with her husband and to fulfil the marital obligations. She cannot, without any sufficient reason, refuse to live with her husband. "Sufficient reasons" have been interpreted differently by the High Courts having regard to the facts of indivisual cases. We are not required to go into that question in the present case as admittedly the marriage between the parties came to an end on account of a decree for divorce having been passed by the Family Court. Existence of sufficient cause on the basis of which the respondent could legitimately refuse to live with the petitioner is not relevant for the present case. In this situation, the only question which survives for consideration is whether a wife against whom a decree for divorce has been passed on account of her deserting the husband can claim Maintenance Allowance under Section 125 Cr. P.C. and how far can the plea of desertion be treated to be an effective plea in support of the husband's refusal to pay her the Maintenance Allowance.

Admittedly, in the instant case, the respondent is a divorced wife. The marriage ties between the parties do not subsist. The decree for divorce was passed on 15th of July, 1995 and since then, she is under no obligation to live with the petitioner. But though the marital relations came to an end by the divorce granted by the Family Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the respondent continues to be "wife" within the meaning of Section 125 Cr.P.C. on account of Explanation (b) to Sub-section (1) which provides as under :-

"Explanation. - For the purposes of this Chapter -

(a) ...................................................................

(b) "wife" includes woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried."

On account of the Explanation quoted above, a woman who has been divorced by her husband on account of a decree passed by the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, continues to enjoy the status of a wife for the limited purpose of claiming Maintenance Allowance from her ex-husband.

Supreme Court of India

Rohtash Singh vs Smt. Ramendri And Ors on 2 March, 2000

Bench: S. Saghlr Ahmad, D.P. Wadhwa

          
Special Leave Petition (crl.)  2763 of 1999

Citation:2000 (2) SCR 58

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Whether wife can be denied maintenance on ground that she has relinquished her right to maintenance under divorce deed?

 In another decision of the very coordinate bench in case
of Narendrabhai Chandubhai Shah V/s. State of Gujarat,
reported in 2013 (O) GLHEL-HC-231390 wherein, the Court
has construed the expression of ‘wife’ in the context of Section
125 of Cr.P.C. Here also, a compromise between the parties
took place and the proceedings came to be withdrawn by both
the sides and the decree in terms of compromise took place
and the application filed by the wife seeking maintenance
came to be partly allowed and the Revisional Court confirmed
the order of maintenance. It is in that context it has been held
that a woman who is a wife as per the explanation of Section
125 continues to be the wife even if divorced and not
remarried and she cannot be denied the maintenance under
Section 125. A right of a wife who is in destitute condition to
get the maintenance from her husband is always available to
her. Any compromise or a condition contained in the
agreement held to be against the public policy and not valid
and thereby, after referring the same, the Court has dismissed
the plea of the husband. While passing the judgment, the
Hon’ble Court has also taken into consideration the case of
the Apex Court as referred to above and therefore, in the
opinion of this Court, these two decisions cited learned
counsel for the respondents can come to the rescue and in the
background of these facts and circumstances, the petition
being devoid of merits, deserves to be dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2267 of 2011

RAJENDRABHAI VIRJIBHAI MAVADIA
V
STATE OF GUJARAT & 3.

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.J. SHASTRI
Date :5/08/2016
Citation:2016 CRLJ4487 Guj

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When wakf board is liable to pay maintenance to divorced muslim wife?

    Both   the   learned   Judicial   Magistrate   First   Class 
Pathri   and   the   learned   Sessions   Judge,   Parbhani,   who   decided 

Criminal   Revision,   found   that,   the   petitioner   is   liable   to   pay 
monthly maintenance of Rs.300/­ to the respondent no.1 in view 
of the Provisions of Section 4 (2) of Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.578 OF 2000


District Wakf Officer,

VERSUS
 Zulakhabee d/o Aminkhan


CORAM : V.M.DESHPANDE, J. 
Dated    : July 24, 2014
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)964

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Whether a divorced wife is widow after death of husband?

A widow is a woman, as we
understand from the meaning of the term in its ordinary sense, whose
husband is dead and who has not married again. A man is husband of
a woman only as long as there is no snapping of matrimonial relations
by a divorce a vinculo or dissolution of marriage or death.

 In the case of Smt. Rambai Vs. Ramesh Kumar reported at
AIR 1996 M.P. 144 cited before me by learned Counsel for the
appellants, the meaning assigned to the word 'widow' in 'Words and
Phrases” Permanent Edition, Vol.45 page 141 has been approved by
the learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court. The learned
Judge has held that, “Where husband and wife are divorced a vinculo,
the wife after the husband's death is not his 'widow' ....” The relevant
observations of the learned Judge are to be found in paragraph 12 and
same are reproduced thus;
“.......In 'Words and Phrases” Permanent Edition, Vol.45
page 141 under the heading 'divorced wife', the word
'widow' means a woman who has lost her husband by
death and has no application to a divorced woman.
Where husband and wife are divorced a vinculo, the wife
after the husband's death is not his 'widow' and entitled
to dower..”
 In view of the above, the argument of learned Counsel for
the respondent that respondent is a widow and dependant of the
deceased cannot be accepted and argument of learned Counsel for the
appellants in this regard needs to be upheld. I, therefore, find that in
the instant case, for the purpose of enquiry under the Act, 1923, the
respondent cannot be said to be enjoying the status of widow of
deceased Kishore. Once we find that so far as the enquiry under the

Act, 1923 is concerned, the respondent was not the widow of deceased
Kishore, she would be out of the scope and ambit of the definition of
the term, 'dependent' as given in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923, which describes, inter alia, a widow of a
deceased workman as his dependant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
FIRST APPEAL NO. 544 OF 2013

Smt. Varsha Kishore Tode Vs  Smt. Vandana Kishore Tode

Citation; 2014(4) MHLJ 206 Bom
CORAM : S. B. SHUKRE, J.
DATED : JANUARY 09, 2014.

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Whether divorced wife can file proceeding under Domestic violence Act for economic abuse?

Thus, definition of "Economic abuse" means that if a woman is deprived of any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled reliefs under the law, or custom whether payable under the order of the Court or otherwise, to her as an aggrieved person out of necessity can be granted. The definition further has mentioned the word "maintenance". Therefore, if there is an order of the Court to pay maintenance to the "aggrieved person" then if such maintenance is stopped or aggrieved person is deprived of such maintenance, it can be considered as an economic abuse. Maintenance also relates back to past matrimonial relationship. Thus this section also fortifies the interpretation of "domestic relationship." extending to the past relationship. The word "otherwise" used after the order of the Court is again broad and can be stretched for a proper legal interpretation. Thus, the obligation to look after the children can be taken in the sweep of word "otherwise". Therefore, in the present case, the order of the Sessions Court is illegal and needs to be interfered with and hence is set aside. The view given by the JMFC is found to be correct and the said order is maintained by this order. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (PANAJI BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 126 of 2013

Decided On: 13.02.2014

Appellants: Aradhana Walkade
Vs.
Respondent: Chandrashekar Vaidya

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Mridula R. Bhatkar, J.

Citation: 2014ALLMR(Cri)1658, 2014(2)BomCR(Cri)588

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Whether mutually divorced wife is entitled to get maintenance?

Similarly there would be no question of the husband
and wife  living separately  by mutual consent because after
divorce there  is no need for consent to live separately. In
the context,  therefore, sub-section (4) of Section 125 does
not apply  to the  case of  a woman who has been divorced or
who  has  obtained  a  decree  for  divorce.  In  our  view,
therefore, this contention is not well founded.
     Counsel for the appellant also pointed out that some of
the High Courts had taken a similar view. Reference was made
to the case of  Kongini Balan Vs. M. Visalakshy, 1986 (92)
Criminal Law  Journal 697 (Kerala), wherein it was held that
a wife who obtains  a divorce by mutual  consent cannot be
denied maintenance by virtue of Section 125 (4) of the Code.
Similar view  was taken in Krishan Kumar Vs. Kiran, 1 (1991)
DMC 248  (Madhya Pradesh)  wherein  it was  held  that  the
expression 'living  separately by  mutual consent'  does not
cover cases  of those  living separately due to divorce. The
same view  was expressed  in M.  Ramakrishna  Reddy  Vs.  T.
Jayamma and Another, 1992 (98) Criminal Law Journal 1368. In
that case  divorce was obtained by  mutual consent  on  the
ground of  incompatibility  and  thereafter  the  woman  was
living separately,  it was  held  that this  could  not  be
construed to be an agreement for living separately by mutual
consent and  hence the woman was entitled to maintenance. We
think these  decisions are  in conformity  with  the  plain
language of  sub-section (4)  of section  125 which  we have
construed hereinbefore. 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


SMT. VANAMALA Vs. SHRI H.M.RANGANATHA BHATTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/07/1995
citations: 1995 SCC (5) 299, JT 1995 (5) 670

BENCH:
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
SEN, S.C. (J)

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Whether Divorced wife is entitled to get maintenance, whatever may be the reason for divorce?

The phraseology used in Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) of the Code would not
admit of creating classes of divorced wives. A divorced wife is a
divorced wife, whatever may be the reasons for divorce and
whatever may be the procedure adopted or forum chosen. If wife
divorced on the ground of desertion, who has a better reason to be
disentitled, because a husband cannot be said to have refused or
neglected to maintain her, is held entitled to maintenance as
divorced wife, since she herself deprived husband of the chance to
maintain her, wives divorced for other reasons would certainly be
entitled to be maintained

Bombay High Court

Smt. Gita W/O Chandrashekhar ... vs Sushree Geeta D/O Ramnath Sharma on 20 January, 2009

Bench: R. C. Chavan

Dated : 20-1-2009

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Whether divorced wife who has voluntarily surrendered right to claim maintenaince can claim maintenaince u/s 127 of CRPC on proof of change in circumstances?

Under Section 127 of the Code, even though a divorced women had voluntarily surrendered to claim maintenance from her divorced husband on proof of change in the circumstances, she can maintain a petition under Section 127 of the Code, and as long as the divorced wife has not been remarried and or not living in adultery, husband cannot shirk from his responsibility to maintain a divorced wife. Section 127 can be pressed into service only for cancellation of maintenance ordered in favour of a wife under Section 125 if she had voluntarily surrendered her right to claim maintenance from the divorced husband while obtaining a divorce. But the same cannot be made applicable to a divorced woman who is claiming maintenance considering the changed circumstances in her life.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1588 /2010

 Dr. Shahid Rizwan Khan 

v e r s u s

 Dr. Smt. Masoor 

CORAM: A.P.BHANGALE , J.

DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 7/7/ 2011

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