Showing posts with label S 6 of hindu succession Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 6 of hindu succession Act. Show all posts

Sunday, 7 June 2026

Supreme Court: After Intestate Succession under Hindu Succession Act, One Co-Heir Cannot Alienate Shares Of Others Acting As Karta

Accordingly, in the context of Section 8, the question of karta-ship ordinarily does not arise merely because the property has come from a paternal ancestor. The heirs succeed as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, and the property devolves by succession rather than by survivorship.


8. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, it has been held that upon the death of Dajiba, Darubai and her four step daughters became tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, to the tune of 1/5th each. When each of them have separate and identifiable shares, in the considered view of this Court, there arises no question of the Defendant acting as karta to sell off a part of the property on account of legal necessity, be it for whatever reason, for she only had the right to do whatever she wished with the 1/5th share of the property that vested with her.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8358 of 2026 

Decided On: 01.06.2026

Darubai and Ors. Vs. Kamalabai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0605/2026

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Sunday, 24 May 2026

Supreme Court: Under which circumstances a subsequent change of law will not render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata

The second limb of the High Court's reasoning, that Vineeta Sharma constitutes a 'change in law' which overrides res judicata is equally unsustainable. It is true that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra), this Court in Para 9 held that a subsequent change in law can render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata. However, this exception applies only where the legal basis of the earlier decision has been undermined by the subsequent pronouncement. {Para 40}


41. The question, therefore, is whether Vineeta Sharma effects any change in the law relevant to the 2013 order. The answer, in our view, is in the negative. The 2013 order proceeded on the basis that even assuming the daughters are not coparceners and the partition is valid, the father died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act. Vineeta Sharma (supra) deals with the scope of the 2005 Amendment vis-à-vis coparcenary rights and the saving clause for pre-2004 partitions. It holds, inter alia, that daughters become coparceners by birth, that the 2005 Amendment is retroactive in nature, and that Section 6(5) saves only partitions effected before 20.12.2004 by registered deed or court decree. What Vineeta Sharma (supra) does not do is alter the settled position which was the foundation of the 2013 order, that where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves Under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters. The "basis" of the 2013 judgment remains entirely undisturbed by Vineeta Sharma. The High Court's reasoning that Vineeta Sharma (supra) did away with the basis of the 2013 order is, with respect, erroneous.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.
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Supreme Court: Hindu Succession Act ,2005 Amendment Does Not Limit Daughters' Pre-Existing Inheritance Rights U/S 8 of Hindu Succession Act

 (ii) Section 6(5) of the H.S. Act is a saving clause of narrow and strict application. It does not create a jurisdictional bar to the institution of a suit for partition. Whether a valid partition within the meaning of Section 6(5) has been effected, and whether such partition is binding on persons who were not parties to it, are contested questions of fact and law that must be adjudicated at trial. The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint at the threshold on the basis of Section 6(5).


(iii) The Appellants have an independent right Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act, 1956 as Class I heirs of the propositus who died intestate on 06.03.1985. This right accrued in 1985 by operation of the proviso to the erstwhile Section 6 read with Section 8, is independent of the 2005 Amendment, and is unaffected by Section 6(5). The suit is maintainable, at minimum, to the extent of the Appellants' claim in the share of the propositus.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.
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Supreme Court: A partition carried out among the sons alone cannot defeat the daughters' succession rights in the father's share of the property

The operative reasoning of the High Court reads as follows:

In my opinion, even assuming that there is a partition in 2000 prior to 2004, even assuming that the daughters will not get the share, but it is not disputed that their father had died intestate. If they have a share in the father's share, still the suit can be maintained. If that is so, the Trial Court could not have rejected the plaint without even considering the scope of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. It is not for the Trial Court to find out whether the Plaintiffs would succeed or not. That is not the ground to reject the plaint. Even assuming that the Plaintiffs are likely to fail in the suit, that cannot be a ground to go into the merits and decide the matter Under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, rejection per se being misconceived, is liable to be set aside.


10. Two aspects of the 2013 order deserve emphasis. First, the High Court proceeded on the assumption most favourable to the Defendants, that the partition of 2000 is valid and that the daughters do not get a coparcenary share and still held the plaint to be maintainable because the father had died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8. In other words, the ratio of the 2013 order rested not on the coparcenary rights of daughters under the 2005 Amendment, but on the independent right of daughters as Class I heirs Under Section 8 of the Act. Second, this order was not challenged further by any party and attained finality. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court, issues were framed, and the suit was set down for evidence.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.
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Saturday, 25 April 2026

Questions and answers on law {Part 93}

 Q :- What are Coparcenary rights of daughter? Whether after death of daughter, her children can claim rights in coparcenary property?

Ans:- “Coparcenary is a narrower body within a Mitakshara joint Hindu family, consisting of persons who acquire an interest in coparcenary property by birth. After the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, under Section 6, the daughter of a coparcener also becomes a coparcener by birth in her own right, in the same manner as a son, with equal rights and liabilities, including the right to claim partition. The Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma clarified that this right of the daughter is by birth, and it is not necessary that the father should have been alive on 9 September 2005. However, the amendment does not reopen dispositions, alienations, partitions, or testamentary dispositions validly effected before 20 December 2004.So far as the daughter’s death is concerned, if she had acquired a share in the coparcenary property, that share devolves by succession upon her legal heirs. Therefore, her children can claim the share devolving through her, but they do not become coparceners in the maternal grandfather’s HUF merely by virtue of being her children.”

One liner

“Section 6 gives daughters equal coparcenary rights by birth. After her death, her interest devolves on her heirs; hence her children can succeed to her share, but they do not become coparceners in her father’s HUF solely on that basis.”


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Sunday, 19 November 2023

Under which circumstance Compromise between some of the parties in partition suit will become invalid and no valid decree can be passed based on said compromise?

  The present case depicts as to how on February 27, 1991 the court recorded the alleged agreement and compromise in a casual manner. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. The statute requires the Court to be first satisfied that the agreement or compromise which has been entered into between the parties is lawful, before accepting the same. Court is expected to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of the Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. {Para 11}

13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, "the Court shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise "which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act..." shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal Under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 43 of the Code.

(Emphasis supplied)

91. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the cross-appeal filed by the Original Defendant No. 2, questioning the legality and validity of the settlement was maintainable in law.


92. We shall now look into the circumstances, as highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendant No. 2, rendering the settlement agreement dated 28.03.1991 invalid and not binding Under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure:


First, the alleged compromise agreement has admittedly not been signed by the Plaintiff who concededly has a share in the property as a coparcener. A written consent of all parties is necessary.


Secondly, a coparcenary undivided property in specie (Plot No. 140) has been allotted to Defendant 2 by Defendant No. 1 over which the Plaintiff also has an interest.


Thirdly, there is variance between the agreement and the compromise petition producing the agreement.

Fourthly, the judgment dated 01.08.2000 of the first appellate court accepting the compromise does not make allotment of the property allotted in specie to the Defendant No. 2. The first appellate court has proceeded on the wrong premise that the Defendant No. 2 has surrendered her rights to the Defendant No. 1. The first appellate court was further wrong in specifically noting that the compromise agreement does not cause any prejudice to the rights of the Plaintiff and therefore can be given effect.


Fifthly, the compromise agreement was entered into by beckoning a smaller share to the Defendant No. 2, while she has a larger share in view of Vineeta Sharma (supra). The consideration for the alleged compromise/settlement was therefore inadequate and whole agreement has to fall to the ground due to changed and supervening circumstances effectuated by change in law.


Lastly, even otherwise, the allotment of a co-ownership property in a specie to one coparcener cannot be modified in a preliminary decree. Moreover, under Hindu Law, the gift/renunciation/relinquishment or alienation by one coparcener of his undivided coparcenary interest to another coparcener without consent of other coparceners is void.


93. It is now well settled that Under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. (See: Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, MANU/SC/0032/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 270.)


94. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the Plaintiff has not put her signature on the deed of settlement, which was produced before the High Court in first appeal. The Plaintiff has made herself very clear that she never joined in the settlement between her brother i.e., the Defendant No. 1 and her sister i.e., the Defendant No. 2. On this ground alone, the settlement could be said to be unlawful, being without any written consent of all the parties. In a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot be maintained.


95. In Nityamoni Dasi v. Gokul Chandra Sen reported in MANU/WB/0534/1910 : (1911) 9 Ind Cas 210 (Cal), the Calcutta High Court observed:


... The decree of the Subordinate Judge must be set aside and the whole case retried, because as this is a suit for partition of joint property, a decree by consent amongst some only of the parties cannot possibly be maintain ed.....


96. In Vir Singh and Ors. v. Kharak Singh and Ors. reported in MANU/LA/0229/1924 : AIR 1925 Lah 280, all the proprietors had not assented to the compromise, Moti Sagar, J. observed:


...the alleged compromise not having been assented to by all the proprietors was clearly contrary to law and the Court was, therefore, fully justified in refusing to enforce it....


97. In Taraprasanna Sarkar and Anr. v. Kalikamohan Sarkar and Ors. reported in MANU/WB/0026/1923 : AIR 1924 Cal 80 Mookerjee and Rankin, JJ., held:


...There can be no compromise binding upon, all the parties to a partition suit until and unless all the parties have joined in the compromise:...

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors. Vs. Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the daughter is entitled to get share in the ancestral property of her father If Law Gets Amended Before Passing Final Decree In Partition Suit?

 Before we proceed to discuss the dictum, as laid by this Court in Vineeta Sharma (supra) we must look into the decision of this Court in the case of Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra). In Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra) this Court, in paras 11, 12, 13 & 14, observed as under:


11. The new Section 6 provides for parity of rights in the coparcenary property among male and female members of a joint Hindu family on and from 9-9-2005. The legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. According to the new Section 6, the daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own rights and liabilities in the same manner as the son. The declaration in Section 6 that the daughter of the coparcener shall have same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property as she would have been a son is unambiguous and unequivocal. Thus, on and from 9-9-2005, the daughter is entitled to a share in the ancestral property and is a coparcener as if she had been a son.


12. The right accrued to a daughter in the property of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, by virtue of the 2005 Amendment Act, is absolute, except in the circumstances provided in the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 6. The excepted categories to which new Section 6 of the 1956 Act is not applicable are two, namely, (i) where the disposition or alienation including any partition has taken place before 20-12-2004; and (ii) where testamentary disposition of property has been made before 20-12-2004. Sub-section (5) of Section 6 leaves no room for doubt as it provides that this Section shall not apply to the partition which has been effected before 20-12-2004. For the purposes of new Section 6 it is explained that "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or partition effected by a decree of a court. In light of a clear provision contained in the Explanation appended to Sub-section (5) of Section 6, for determining the non-applicability of the section, what is relevant is to find out whether the partition has been effected before 20-12-2004 by deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or by a decree of a court. In the backdrop of the above legal position with reference to Section 6 brought in the 1956 Act by the 2005 Amendment Act, the question that we have to answer is as to whether the preliminary decree passed by the trial court on 19-3-1999 and amended on 27-9-2003 deprives the Appellants of the benefits of the 2005 Amendment Act although final decree for partition has not yet been passed.


13. The legal position is settled that partition of a joint Hindu family can be effected by various modes, inter alia, two of these modes are (one) by a registered instrument of a partition and (two) by a decree of the court. In the present case, admittedly, the partition has not been effected before 20-12-2004 either by a registered instrument of partition or by a decree of the court. The only stage that has reached in the suit for partition filed by Respondent 1 is the determination of shares vide preliminary decree dated 19-3-1999 which came to be amended on 27-9-2003 and the receipt of the report of the Commissioner.


14. A preliminary decree determines the rights and interests of the parties. The suit for partition is not disposed of by passing of the preliminary decree. It is by a final decree that the immovable property of joint Hindu family is partitioned by metes and bounds. After the passing of the preliminary decree, the suit continues until the final decree is passed. If in the interregnum i.e. after passing of the preliminary decree and before the final decree is passed, the events and supervening circumstances occur necessitating change in shares, there is no impediment for the court to amend the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree redetermining the rights and interests of the parties having regard to the changed situation. {Para 59}


60. Thus, in Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra) this Court made the following things explicitly clear:


(i) The equal share given to the daughter of a coparcener governed by Hindu Mitakshara Law along with brothers is by way of a substantive right;


(ii) Though the substantive right is created on and from 9-9-2005, it relates back to the incidence of birth;


(iii) The substantive right would not be available only if the coparcenary property is disposed of or alienated including by any partition or testamentary disposition of property before 20-12-2004 and;


(iv) If there is disposition of a coparcenary property by any partition, such partition must be by execution of a Deed of Partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of the Court.


(v) A preliminary decree of partition only determines the rights and interests of the parties. It is only by a final decree that the immovable property of joint Hindu family is partitioned by metes and bounds. After the passing of the preliminary decree, the suit continues until the final decree is passed. If in the interregnum i.e. after passing of the preliminary decree and before the final decree is passed, if there is any change in law necessitating determination of shares accordingly then, there would be no impediment for the Court to amend the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree redetermining the rights and interests of the parties having regard to the changed situation.

20. Now, it is well settled that it is the duty of a court, whether it is trying original proceedings or hearing an appeal, to take notice of the change in law affecting pending actions and to give effect to the same. (See G.P. Singh: Interpretation of Statutes, 7th Edn., p. 406.) If, while a suit is pending, a law like the 1993 Act that the civil court shall not decide the suit, is passed, the civil court is bound to take judicial notice of the statute and hold that the suit -- even after its remand -- cannot be disposed of by it.


78. This Court in Vineeta Sharma (supra) clarified the entire position as follows:


107. Once the constitution of coparcenary changes by birth or death, shares have to be worked out at the time of actual partition. The shares will have to be determined in changed scenario. The severance of status cannot come in the way to give effect to statutory provision and change by subsequent event. The statutory fiction of partition is far short of actual partition, it does not bring about the disruption of the joint family or that of coparcenary is a settled proposition of law. For the reasons mentioned above, we are also of the opinion that mere severance of status by way of filing a suit does not bring about the partition and till the date of the final decree, change in law, and changes due to the subsequent event can be taken into consideration.


Xxx xxx xxx


114. In the instant case, the question is different. What has been recognised as partition by the legislation Under Section 6, accordingly, rights are to be worked out. This Court consistently held in various decisions mentioned above that when the rights are subsequently conferred, the preliminary decree can be amended, and the benefit of law has to be conferred. Hence, we have no hesitation to reject the effect of statutory fiction of the proviso to Section 6 as discussed in Prakash v. Phulavati [MANU/SC/1241/2015 : (2016) 2 SCC 36: (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] and Danamma [Danamma v. Amar, MANU/SC/0064/2018 : (2018) 3 SCC 343: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 385]. If a daughter is alive on the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act, she becomes a coparcener with effect from the date of the Amendment Act, irrespective of the date of birth earlier in point of time.


APPLICATION OF THE AFORESAID PRINCIPLES OF LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE

80. It is in the aforesaid background that daughters are entitled to 1/3rd share in all the properties as scheduled in the plaint. The same would be in accordance with the dictum as laid in Vineeta Sharma (supra), while passing the final decree. At the cost of repetition, we state that by virtue of the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court, which was confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the issues decided therein will be deemed to have become final but as the partition suit is required to be decided in stages, the same can be regarded as fully and completely decided only when the final decree is passed. As the law governing the parties has been amended before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party benefitted by such amendment (like the two daughters in the case on hand) can make a request to the Trial Court to take cognizance of the Amendment and give effect to the same.


81. We do not find any merit in the submissions canvassed by Mr. Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants that in a partition suit, the preliminary decree cannot be varied in the final decree proceedings, despite the amendment of the law governing the parties.


82.The only thing that needs to be done now is to give effect to the amendment in the provisions of Section 6 of the 1956 Act and redetermine the shares of the parties accordingly. To put it straight, the Plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share in all the properties of her Late father. The issue whether all the properties were ancestral as raised on behalf of the Appellants pale into insignificance.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors. Vs. Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0326/2023.

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Monday, 23 May 2022

Can the daughter claim partition of joint family property without bringing property given to her towards dowry in hotchpotch?

 Such being the case, I am of the considered opinion

that a beneficiary of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession

Act cannot claim a benefit by way of partition as regard

to joint family properties without reference to the

properties already received by her at the time of

marriage as dowry/gift or otherwise. The said properties

at an undisputed point of time forming part of the joint

family property and the plaintiff having received it, the

same would also have to be made part of the partition

suit in order for the partition to be equitable hence,

those properties would also be amenable to partition.

Hence, the contention of Sri.A.Nagarajappa, learned

counsel for the petitioner that these properties were

independently purchased (Item no. 9 from Defendant

no. 9 and Item No. 10 from third parties) and would not

be amenable for partition is an issue that would have to

be decided after trial and cannot be adjudicated upon at

this stage. The assertions clearly and categorically made

is that the 1st defendant had executed nominal sale

deeds in respect of item Nos.9 and 10 properties. {Para 16}

17. It is for the parties to establish during the course of trial

as to whether the properties belonged to the joint family

or not. If the properties belong to the joint family, then

the same would be amenable for partition. If the

plaintiffs were able to establish that the properties had

been independently purchased out of their own funds

and the said properties are not joint family properties,

then the same would not be amenable for partition.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU 

WRIT PETITION NO.39982 OF 2018 (GM-CPC)

SMT.HEMALATHA Vs SRI.VENKATESH

BEFORE

 MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

Dated: 16TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022

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Saturday, 13 March 2021

Whether the court can take into consideration change in the law as well as changes due to subsequent events in the final decree proceeding or appeal in partition suit?

  Once the constitution of coparcenary changes by birth or death, shares have to be worked out at the time of actual partition. The shares will have to be determined in changed scenario. The severance of status cannot come in the way to give effect to statutory provision and change by subsequent event. The statutory fiction of partition is far short of actual partition, it does not bring about the disruption of the joint family or that of coparcenary is a settled proposition of law. For the reasons mentioned above, we are also of the opinion that mere severance of status by way of filing a suit does not bring about the partition and till the date of the final decree, change in law, and changes due to the subsequent event can be taken into consideration. {Para 99}

125. The severance of status may take place from the date of filing of a suit; however, a decree is necessary for working out the results of the same, and there may be a change of rights during the pendency of the suit for allotting definite shares till final decree is passed. There are cases in which partition can be reopened on the ground of fraud or mistake, etc. or on certain other permissible grounds. In appropriate cases, it can be reopened at the instance of minor also.

129. Resultantly, we answer the reference as under:

iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class­I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.

Supreme Court of India
Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma on 11 August, 2020

Author: Arun Mishra
ARUN MISHRA, J,S. Abdul Nazeer J,M.R. Shah J.
Dated:August 11, 2020.
Read full Judgment here: Click here

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 641,2021(1) MHLJ648.
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Thursday, 13 August 2020

Supreme Court: Precaution to be taken by the court if, in the suit for partition of joint family property filed by a daughter, defence of prior partition is taken

Earlier, an oral partition was permissible, and at the same time,
the burden of proof remained on the person who asserted that there was a partition. It is also settled law that Cesser of Commonality is not conclusive proof of partition, merely by the reason that the members are separated in food and residence for the convenience, and separate residence at different places  due to service or otherwise does not show separation. Several acts, though not conclusive proof of partition, may lead to that conclusion in conjunction with various other facts. Such as separate occupation of portions, division of the income of the joint property, definement of shares in the joint property in the revenue of land registration records, mutual transactions, as observed in Bhagwani v. Mohan Singh, AIR 1925 PC 132, and Digambar Patil v. Devram, AIR 1995 SC 1728.

125. The severance of status may take place from the date of filing of
a suit; however, a decree is necessary for working out the results of
the same, and there may be a change of rights during the pendency of
the suit for allotting definite shares till final decree is passed. There
are cases in which partition can be reopened on the ground of fraud or
mistake, etc. or on certain other permissible grounds. In appropriate
cases, it can be reopened at the instance of minor also.
126. The protection of rights of daughters as coparcener is envisaged
in the substituted Section 6 of the Act of 1956 recognises the partition
brought about by a decree of a court or effected by a registered
instrument. The partition so effected before 20.12.2004 is saved.

127. A special definition of partition has been carved out in the
explanation. The intendment of the provisions is not to jeopardise the
interest of the daughter and to take care of sham or frivolous
transaction set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her
right as coparcener and prevent nullifying the benefit flowing from the
provisions as substituted. The statutory provisions made in section
6(5) change the entire complexion as to partition. However, under the
law that prevailed earlier, an oral partition was recognised. In view of
change of provisions of section 6, the intendment of legislature is clear
and such a plea of oral partition is not to be readily accepted. The
provisions of section 6(5) are required to be interpreted to cast a heavy
burden of proof upon proponent of oral partition before it is accepted
such as separate occupation of portions, appropriation of the income,
and consequent entry in the revenue records and invariably to be
supported by other contemporaneous public documents admissible in
evidence, may be accepted most reluctantly while exercising all
safeguards. The intendment of Section 6 of the Act is only to accept
the genuine partitions that might have taken place under the
prevailing law, and are not set up as a false defence and only oral ipse
dixit is to be rejected outrightly. The object of preventing, setting up of
false or frivolous defence to set at naught the benefit emanating from
amended provisions, has to be given full effect. Otherwise, it would


become very easy to deprive the daughter of her rights as a

coparcener. When such a defence is taken, the Court has to be very
extremely careful in accepting the same, and only if very cogent,
impeccable, and contemporaneous documentary evidence in shape of
public documents in support are available, such a plea may be
entertained, not otherwise. We reiterate that the plea of an oral
partition or memorandum of partition, unregistered one can be
manufactured at any point in time, without any contemporaneous public document needs rejection at all costs. We say so for exceptionally good cases where partition is proved conclusively and we caution the courts that the finding is not to be based on the preponderance of probabilities in view of provisions of gender justice and the rigor of very heavy burden of proof which meet intendment of Explanation to Section 6(5). It has to be remembered that courts cannot defeat the object of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act. The exception is carved out by us as earlier execution of a registered document for partition was not necessary, and the Court was rarely approached for the sake of family prestige. It was approached as a last resort when parties were not able to settle their family dispute amicably. We take note of the fact that even before 1956, partition in other modes than envisaged under Section 6(5) had taken place.

128. The expression used in Explanation to Section 6(5) ‘partition
effected by a decree of a court’ would mean giving of final effect to
actual partition by passing the final decree, only then it can be said
that a decree of a court effects partition. A preliminary decree
declares share but does not effect the actual partition, that is effected
by passing of a final decree; thus, statutory provisions are to be given
full effect, whether partition is actually carried out as per the
intendment of the Act is to be found out by Court. Even if partition is
supported by a registered document it is necessary to prove it had
been given effect to and acted upon and is not otherwise sham or
invalid or carried out by a final decree of a court. In case partition, in
fact, had been worked out finally in toto as if it would have been
carried out in the same manner as if affected by a decree of a court, it
can be recognized, not otherwise. A partition made by execution of
deed duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, also refers to
completed event of partition not merely intendment to separate, is to
be borne in mind while dealing with the special provisions of Section
6(5) conferring rights on a daughter. There is a clear legislative
departure with respect to proof of partition which prevailed earlier;
thus, the Court may recognise the other mode of partition in
exceptional cases based upon continuous evidence for a long time in
the shape of public document not mere stray entries then only it

would not be in consonance with the spirit of the provisions of Section
6(5) and its Explanation.
R E P O R T A B L E
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. DIARY NO.32601 OF 2018

VINEETA SHARMA Vs  RAKESH SHARMA 
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Tuesday, 11 August 2020

Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on right of daughter in ancestral property as coparcener since her birth

 Resultantly, we answer the reference as under:
(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter
born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities.
(ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with
effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004.
(iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.
(iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of ClassI
as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.
(v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the
statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition
duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or
effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where
plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition
is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a
decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral
evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.
{Para 129} 
130. We understand that on this question, suits/appeals are
pending before different High Courts and subordinate courts. The
matters have already been delayed due to legal imbroglio caused by
conflicting decisions. The daughters cannot be deprived of their right
of equality conferred upon them by Section 6. Hence, we request that
the pending matters be decided, as far as possible, within six months.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and answer, we overrule the
views to the contrary expressed in Prakash v. Phulavati and
Mangammal v. T.B. Raju & Ors. The opinion expressed in Danamma @
Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar is partly overruled to the extent it is

contrary to this decision.
R E P O R T A B L E
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. DIARY NO.32601 OF 2018

VINEETA SHARMA Vs  RAKESH SHARMA 


ARUN MISHRA, J,S. Abdul Nazeer J,M.R. Shah J.
Dated:August 11, 2020.
Read full Judgment here: Click here

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 641,2021(1) MHLJ648.
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Saturday, 28 December 2019

Whether daughter can claim share in joint family property prior to death of father?

 Section 6 of the Act has been amended on 09.09.2005 effacing devolution by survivorship through insertion of intestate succession in Mitakshara Coparcenary by substituting the concept of intestate succession for giving equal shares to daughter at par with sons by virtue of their birth. As evident in Section 6(3), the provisions of amended Section 6 can only be invoked in case of property being ancestral. However, it is significant to note that the phrase "devolution of coparcenary property" only takes place when succession opens and not before. It is well settled that succession opens on death of Karta i.e. Tulsiram in this case. As a necessary corollary, Tulsiram being alive, the suit in issue was not maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

S.A. No. 257/2015

Decided On: 05.08.2019

Chandribai   Vs.  Tulsiram 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Vandana Kasrekar, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 MP 206
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Friday, 20 September 2019

Latest Supreme Court and Bombay HC Judgments

Whether Adultery Judgment passed by Supreme Court will operate retrospectively?

Hon'ble Apex Court in Maj. Genl. A.S Gauraya v. S.N Thakur (supra) has held that law laid down by the Supreme Court applies to all pending proceedings even with retrospective effect.
8. There is no dispute about the decision of the Supreme Court in the above cited decisions. In view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court holding Section 497 of Indian Penal Code is not an offence, the punishment awarded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhiwapur in Summary Criminal Case No. 41/2010 is liable to be quashed and set aside. Hence, following order.

In the High Court of Bombay
(Before M.G Giratkar, J.)

Rupesh  Haribhau Mundle, v. Shri Charandas  Fulchand Chandanbawane

Criminal Revision Application No. 2 of 2018
Decided on December 14, 2018
Citation:2018 SCC OnLine Bom 6292
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Monday, 2 September 2019

Leading Supreme court Judgment on share of widow in property of her deceased husband

Before considering the implications of Explanation 1, it is necessary to remember that what Section 6 deals with is devolution of the interest which a male Hindu has in a Mitakshare coparcenary property at the time of his death. Since Explanation 1 is intended to be explanatory of the provisions contained in the section, what the Explanation provides has to be correlated to the subject matter which the section itself deals with. In the instant case the plaintiff's suit, based as it is on the provisions of Section 6, is essentially a claim to obtain a share in the interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the coparcenary property. Two things become necessary to determine for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiff. One, her share in her husband's share and two, her husband's own share in the coparcenary property. The proviso to Section 6 contains the formula for fixing the share of the claimant while Explanation 1 contains a formula for deducing the share of the deceased. The plaintiff's share, by the application of the proviso, has to be determined according to the terms of the testamentary instrument, if any, made by the deceased and since there is none in the instant case, by the application of the rules of intestate succession contained in Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act. The deceased Khandappa died leaving behind him two sons, three daughters and a widow. The son, daughter and a widow are mentioned as heirs in class I of the Schedule and therefore, by reason of the provisions of Section 8(a) read with the 1st clause of Section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs. As between them the two sons, the three daughters and the widow will take equally, each having one share in the deceased's property Under Section 10 read with Rules 1 and 2 of that section. Thus, whatever be the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff's share therein will be 1/6th.

9. The next step, equally important though not equally easy to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the coparcenary property because after all, the plaintiff has a 1/6th interest in that share. Explanation 1 which contains the formula for determining the share of the deceased creates a fiction by providing that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death. One must, therefore, imagine a state of affairs in which a little prior to Khandappa's death, a partition of the coparcenary property was effected between him and other members of the coparcenary. Though the plaintiff, not being a coparcener, was not entitled to demand partition yet, if a partition were to take place between her husband and his two sons, she would be entitled to receive a share equal to that of a son. (see Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, para 315). In a partition between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth being Khandappa's wife, the plaintiff. Khandappa would have therefore got a 1/4th share in the coparcenary property on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and his sons.

10. Two things are thus clears : One, that in a partition of the coparcenary property Khandappa would have obtained a 1/4th share and two, that the share of the plaintiff in the 1/4th share is 1/6th, that is to say, 1/24th. So far there is no difficulty. The question which poses a somewhat difficult problem is whether the plaintiff's share in the coparcenary property is only 1/24th or whether it is 1/4th plus 1724th, that is to say, 7/24th. The learned trial Judge, relying upon the decision in Shiramabai which was later overruled by the Bombay High Court, accepted the former contention while the High Court accepted the latter. The question is which of these two views is to be preferred.

11. We see no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th by ignoring the 1/4th share which she would have obtained had there been a partition during her husband's life time between him and his two sons. We think that in overlooking that 1/4th share, one unwittingly permits one's imagination to boggle under the oppression of the reality that there was in fact no partition between the plaintiff's husband and his sons. Whether a partition had actually taken place between the plaintiff's husband and his sons is beside the point for the purposes of Explanation 1. That Explanation compels the assumption of a fiction that in fact "a partition of the property had taken place", the point of time of the partition being the one immediately before the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share.

12. The fiction created by Explanation 1 has to be given its due and full effect. Lord Asquith in his famous passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council. [1952] A.C. 109/132. He said if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it; and if the statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it cannot be interpreted to mean that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.

13. In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation 1 to Section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu Mita-kshara coparcener "shall be deemed to be" the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death.

What is therefore required to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages.

To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle.
All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life time of the deceased.
The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of working out some other conclusion. It has to be treated and accepted as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the notional partition.
14. The interpretation which we are placing upon the provisions of Section 6, its proviso and explanation I thereto will further the legislative intent in regard to the enlargement of the share of female heirs, qualitatively and quantitatively. The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 conferred heirship rights on the son's daughter, daughter's daughter and sister in all areas where the Mitakshara law prevailed. Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. 1937, speaking broadly, conferred upon the Hindu widow the right to a share in the joint family property as also a right to demand partition like any male member of the family. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides by Section 14(1) that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. By restricting the operation of the fiction created by Explanation I in the manner suggested by the appellant, we shall be taking a retrograde step, putting back as it were the clock of social reform which has enabled the Hindu Woman to acquire an equal status with males in matters of property. Even assuming that two Interpretations of Explanation I are reasonably possible, we must prefer that interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature and remedy the injustice from which the Hindu women have suffered over the years.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1828 of 1975

Decided On: 27.04.1978

Gurupad Khandappa Magdum  Vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., V.D. Tulzapurkar and P.N. Singhal, JJ.

Equivalent citations: 1978 AIR 1239, 1978 SCR (3) 761
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Thursday, 18 July 2019

Whether S 6 of Hindu Succession amendment Act 2005 is prospective in nature?

The text of the amendment itself clearly provides that the right conferred on a 'daughter of a coparcener' is 'on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005'. Section 6(3) talks of death after the amendment for its applicability. In view of plain language of the statute, there is no scope for a different interpretation than the one suggested by the text of the amendment. An amendment of a substantive provision is always prospective unless either expressly or by necessary intendment it is retrospective Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24, Paras 22 to 27. In the present case, there is neither any express provision for giving retrospective effect to the amended provision nor necessary intendment to that effect. Requirement of partition being registered can have no application to statutory notional partition on opening of succession as per unamended provision, having regard to nature of such partition which is by operation of law. The intent and effect of the Amendment will be considered a little later. On this finding, the view of the High Court cannot be sustained.

18. Contention of the Respondents that the Amendment should be read as retrospective being a piece of social legislation cannot be accepted. Even a social legislation cannot be given retrospective effect unless so provided for or so intended by the legislature. In the present case, the legislature has expressly made the Amendment applicable on and from its commencement and only if death of the coparcener in question is after the Amendment. Thus, no other interpretation is possible in view of express language of the statute. The proviso keeping dispositions or alienations or partitions prior to 20th December, 2004 unaffected can also not lead to the inference that the daughter could be a coparcener prior to the commencement of the Act. The proviso only means that the transactions not covered thereby will not affect the extent of coparcenary property which may be available when the main provision is applicable. Similarly, Explanation has to be read harmoniously with the substantive provision of Section 6(5) by being limited to a transaction of partition effected after 20th December, 2004. Notional partition, by its very nature, is not covered either under proviso or under Sub-section 5 or under the Explanation.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7217 of 2013, 

Decided On: 16.10.2015

 Prakash Vs.  Phulavati 
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S 6 of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 referred to bench of three judges of Supreme Court

The High Court has granted certificate of fitness to appeal
under Articles 133(1)(a) and 134A of the Constitution of India
having regard to the fact that there are conflicting decisions of
this Court in “Prakash V. Phulavati” (2016) 2 SCC 36, “Danamma @
Suman Surpur Vs. Amar” (2018) 3 SCC 343 and “Mangammal Vs. T.B.
Raju” (2018) SCC online SC 422 on the issue involved in this
petition. Since the matter is to be heard by the Larger Bench i.e.

three Judge Bench and this Bench is comprising of three Judges, we
can hear the matter finally.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL Diary No(s). 32601/2018

VINEETA SHARMA Vs RAKESH SHARMA 

Date : 27-11-2018 
This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH

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