Whether the court should grant bail in the case of offences under NDPS Act on the ground of delay?

 As regard to the twin conditions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, learned counsel for the respondent – State has been duly heard. Thus, the 1st condition stands complied with. So far as the 2nd condition re: formation of opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not guilty, the same may not be formed at this stage when he has already spent more than three and a half years in custody. The prolonged incarceration, generally militates against the most precious fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in such a situation, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. {Para 4}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

Coram: SURYA KANT; J., DIPANKAR DATTA; J.

 Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).4169/2023; 

 RABI PRAKASH Vs THE STATE OF ODISHA

Dated: 13-07-2023.

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Under which circumstances the court can refuse to implead purchaser of immovable property to continue suit for specific performance of contract?

 The High Court was not right in holding that mere alleged transfer/assignment of the agreement would be sufficient to grant leave to Respondent 3 to continue the suit. From the filing of the suit in 1986, over the years, valuable right of defence accrued to the appellant; such valuable right of defence cannot be defeated by granting leave to the third respondent to continue the suit in the application filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC after 27 years of filing of the suit. The learned Single Judge was not right in saying that impleading Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 would cause no prejudice to the appellant and that the issues can be raised at the time of trial.

{Para 12}

13. In a suit for specific performance, application for impleadment must be filed within a reasonable time. Considering the question of impleadment of party in a suit for specific performance after referring to various judgments, in Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd. [Vidur Impex and Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] the Court summarised the principles as under : (SCC p. 413, para 41)

“41. Though there is apparent conflict in the observations made in some of the aforementioned judgments, the broad principles which should govern disposal of an application for impleadment are:

41.1. The court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.

41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the court.

41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.

41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff.

41.5. In a suit for specific performance, the court can order impleadment of a purchaser whose conduct is above board, and who files application for being joined as party within reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about the pending litigation.

41.6. However, if the applicant is guilty of contumacious conduct or is beneficiary of a clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint order passed by the court or the application is unduly delayed then the court will be fully justified in declining the prayer for impleadment.”

In light of the above principles, considering the case in hand, in our view, the application filed for impleading Respondent 3 as Plaintiff 3 was not filed within reasonable time. No explanation is offered for such an inordinate delay of 27 years, which was not kept in view by the High Court.

14. Be it noted that an application under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC seeking leave of the court to continue the suit by the assignee/third respondent was not actually filed. Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 was straightaway filed praying to amend the suit which would have been the consequential amendment, had the leave to continue the suit been granted by the court.

15. As pointed out earlier, the application was filed after 27 years of filing of the suit. Of course, the power to allow the amendment of suit is wide and the court should not adopt hypertechnical approach. In considering amendment applications, court should adopt liberal approach and amendments are to be allowed to avoid multiplicity of litigations. We are conscious that mere delay is not a ground for rejecting the amendment. But in the case in hand, the parties are not rustic litigants; all the respondents are companies and the dispute between the parties is a commercial litigation. In such facts and circumstances, the amendment prayed in the chamber summons filed under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC ought not to have been allowed, as the same would cause serious prejudice to the appellant. In our view, the impugned order, allowing Chamber Summons No. 187 of 2014 filed after 27 years of the suit would take away the substantial rights of defence accrued to the appellant and the same cannot be sustained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5909 OF 2022 

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA Vs SANJEEV BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

Coram: ANIRUDDHA BOSE; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J.

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

Dated: September 1, 2022

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Can an arbitrator grant compensation if there is a delay by one party even in the absence of an escalation clause?

Reliance is placed on National Building Construction Corporation v. Decor India Pvt. Ltd.(2004) SCC OnLine Del 243., wherein this Court held that “It is a settled law that where there is no escalation clause in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction to award an increased rate”. Thus, there is an apparent error in Arbitrator’s finding in this regard.

28. Once it was found that there was delay in execution of the Agreement due to the conduct of UOI. As a repercussion, they became liable for consequences of delay, on account of increase in prices even in the absence of any escalation clause. Food Corporation of India vs. A.M. Ahmed and Co. and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 82, K.N. Sathyapalan (dead) by LRs v. State of Kerala and Anr., (2007) 13 SCC 43., etc.

29. For extended period, the Arbitrator has relied upon Clause 10CC of GCC which provides the formula for calculation of price escalation. The challenge to Claim No. 5 is principally premised only on the Arbitrator’s interpretation of applicability of Clause 10CC. Even if Clause 10CC had a limited application and was only to apply for price variation only during the terms of the Agreement, mechanism therein could be adopted to calculate price escalation. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Arbitrator appears to have acted within his jurisdiction in allowing some of the claims on account of escalation. Further, the Arbitrator has excluded the component of overhead and profit and reduced the claim amount for a period of 12 months for which delay was apportioned against UOI. Therefore, the findings rendered to that effect are sustainable and cannot be disturbed in the present proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 O.M.P. (COMM) 44/2021

UNION OF INDIA  Vs C AND C CONSTRUCTION LTD. 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

Author: SANJEEV NARULA, J. 

Dated:28th October, 2021

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Whether Departmental enquiry is vitiated if there is a delay in conducting it?

The Tribunal purportedly did so on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by the denial of an opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings. The line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have been justified in directing the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in its entirety. This, in our view, was clearly impermissible. Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, in our view, has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by simply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of the Tribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matter and which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud JUSTICE Vikram Nath JUSTICE Hima Kohli

State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Akhilesh Jha & Anr.

Civil Appeal No. 5153 of 2021

6th September 2021

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation:  2021 ALL SCR 2092

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What is distinction between acquiescence and Laches?

 Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Refer Footnote 18 Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.

2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 654
Supreme Court

JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

THE CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA AND ANOTHER Vs. M.J. JAMES

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8223 OF 2009

16th November 2021

Author: SANJIV KHANNA, J.

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Whether delay in conduct of test identification parade is fatal to prosecution case?

  It may be mentioned that in the case of Pramod Mandal v/s.

State of Bihar (2204) 13 SCC 150, the Apex Court has held that “ It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down any invariable rule as to the  period within which a test identification parade must be held, or the number of witnesses who must correctly identify the accused, to sustain his conviction. These matters must be left to the courts of fact to decide in the facts and circumstances of each case. If a rule is laid down prescribing a period within which the test identification parade must be held, it would only benefit the professional criminals in whose cases the arrests are delayed as the police have no clear clue about their identity, they being persons unknown to the victims. They, therefore, have only to avoid their arrest for the prescribed period to avoid conviction. Similarly, there may be offences which by their very

nature may be witnessed by a single witness, such as rape. The

offender may be unknown to the victim and the case depends solely on the identification by the victim, who is otherwise found to be truthful and reliable. What justification can be pleaded to contend that such cases must necessarily result in acquittal because of there being only one identifying witness ? Prudence therefore demands that these matters must be left to the wisdom of the courts of fact which must consider all aspects of the matter in the light of the evidence on record before pronouncing upon the acceptability or rejection of such identification. ”

14. These principles have been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Raja v/s. State by the Inspector of Police with Govindaraj and Ors. v/s. State by the Inspector of Police, AIR 2020 SC 254. The Apex court has held that there is no hard and fast rule about the period within which the Test Identification Parade must be held from the date of arrest of the accused. In the instant case, though there is delay of about one month in conducting the Test Identification Prade, the records reveal that the Investigating Officer (PW22) was not at all cross examined on this aspect and no motive was imputed to the prosecution

for the delay in holding the TI parade. Hence, the delay in holding the TI parade is not per se fatal to the case of the prosecution.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 938 OF 2015

Harqbahaddur Logbahaddur Bhandari @ Raju Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM: SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.

DATED : 06th SEPTEMBER, 2021.

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How Maxim 'Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto' is applicable to departmental enquiry?

It is seen that the marriage between the respondent/petitioner and one Chinnasamy, who is also employed in the Revenue Department as an Assistant, was solemnised on 11.06.1985 without prior permission from the appellant/respondent, which resulted in issuance of charge memo. against the petitioner after a period of 22 years. Learned Single Judge, after considering the settled proposition of law and various aspects involved in the matter, decided to quash the charge memo. on the sole ground of delay. The only question to be decided in the case on hand is as to whether issuance of charge memo. after a lapse of 22 years is permissible in absence of any specific assertion or denial by the appellant as to the application made by respondent/petitioner, seeking permission for marriage under the Conduct Rules. The answer is in negative, as there is no justification pleaded in keeping the application pending for so many years without taking any decision either way and therefore, it goes without saying that Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto (No one must be punished for the wrong of another).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

W.A. No. 419 of 2013

Decided On: 21.02.2014

The District Collector, Dharmapuri  Vs.  Tmt. T.V. Kasturi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Dhanapalan and M. Duraiswamy, JJ.

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Whether the court can dismiss a suit for specific performance of contract filed within limitation on the ground of delay?

 In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was also incorrect in putting a short delay in filing the Suit against the Plaintiff to state that he was not ready and willing. In India, it is well settled that the Rule of equity that exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a Suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the Plaintiff - See Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao and Ors. MANU/SC/0310/1964 : AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1405 (paragraph 7) which reads as under:

(7) Mr. Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a Court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems-English and Indian-qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay - the time lag depending upon circumstances - may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2420 of 2018

Decided On: 10.07.2019

 R. Lakshmikantham  Vs.  Devaraji

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Surya Kant, JJ.

Citation: (2019) 8 SCC 62.

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Whether it is mandatory for court to hear accused before directing further investigation?

The question raised by the accused regarding summoning of the investigating officer by the trial court under section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. in terms with session's court directions, is no more res-integra as is well- settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Bhagwan Samrdha Sreepada vs. State of Andhra Pradesh: (1999) 5 SCC 740, holding that the power of the court to direct further investigation cannot have any inhibition and there is nothing to suggest under section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Thus the issue raised by the accused (therein) does not fall for any further debate or discussion as sought by the accused.

Delhi High Court

Shubham Bansal vs The State ( Govt Of Nct Of Delhi) & ... on 4 December, 2019

CRL.M.C. 2024/2018

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT

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Whether readiness and willingness of plaintiff in suit for specific performance of contract can be inferred even if there is delay in filing of suit?

The High Court order is not correct in stating that readiness and willingness cannot be inferred because the letters dated 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 had not been sent to the Defendant. The High Court also erred in holding that despite having the necessary funds, the Plaintiff could not be said to be ready and willing. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was also incorrect in putting a short delay in filing the Suit against the Plaintiff to state that he was not ready and willing. In India, it is well settled that the Rule of equity that exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a Suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the Plaintiff - See Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao and Ors. MANU/SC/0310/1964 : AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1405 (paragraph 7) which reads as under:

(7) Mr. Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to define the scope of a Court's discretion. Before referring to them, it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the two systems-English and Indian-qua the relief of specific performance. In England the relief of specific performance pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay - the time lag depending upon circumstances - may itself be sufficient to refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2420 of 2018

Decided On: 10.07.2019

R. Lakshmikantham Vs.  Devaraji

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Surya Kant, JJ.

Citation:(2019) 8 SCC 62

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Supreme court deprecated delay in disposal of bail application/ Suspension of sentence

We have perused the record and we are unable to comprehend
as to why so many adjournments were granted in an application
for suspension of sentence. Delay in disposing of applications
for bail and suspension of sentence in pending criminal appeals
would be a travesty of justice.
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2287-
2288/2019

S. K. HYDER  Vs  THE STATE OF ODISHA 

Date : 03-04-2019 
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH

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Supreme Court: Right to speedy investigation is fundamental right

 It is not necessary to refer to all the decisions of this Court articulating the mandate of the Constitution that there is implicit right Under Article 21 for speedy trial which in turn encompasses speedy investigation, inquiry, appeal, revision and retrial. To determine whether undue delay has occurred, one must have regard to nature of offence, number of Accused and witnesses, workload of the court and the investigating agency, systemic delays. Inordinate delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice particularly when Accused is in custody so that prosecution does not become persecution. Court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors. Though it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any mandatory outer time limit and the court may only examine effect of delay in every individual case on the anvil of Article 21 of the Constitution, there is certainly a need for in-house mechanism to ensure that there is no undue delay in completing investigation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

M.A. No. 267 of 2017 in SLP (Crl.) No. 657 of 2017

Decided On: 01.05.2018

 Dilawar Vs. The State of Haryana and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Goel and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 16 SCC521

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Whether preliminary decree for partition can be executed after delay of thirty years?

Only question raised in the present appeal is with respect to the limitation for execution of preliminary decree for partition. In the instant case, the application for execution of the decree was filed after thirty years of the preliminary decree. That too in the shape for the appointment of an court Commissioner so as to carry out the preliminary decree which has been passed on 23.11.1959. The application for the execution of the decree was filed on 3.10.1989 i.e. after thirty years.

4. In our opinion a preliminary decree for partition crystallizes the rights of parties for seeking partition to the extent declared, the equities remain to be worked out in final decree proceedings. Till partition is carried out and final decree is passed, there is no question of any limitation running against right to claim partition as per preliminary decree. Even when application is filed seeking appointment of Commissioner, no limitation is prescribed for this purpose, as such, it would not be barred by limitation, lis continues till preliminary decree culminates in to final decree.

5. The matter is no more res integra. The Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in In Bhusan Chandra Mondal v. Chhabimoni Dasi, [MANU/WB/0079/1948: AIR 1948 CALCUTTA 363] considered the question when a preliminary decree was passed in a suit for partition in courts, the court consider the applicability of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (in short 'the old Act') the court has laid down thus:

(6) Article 181 is the residuary Article relating to applications. In a mortgage suit it has been held that the application for a final decree has to be made within 3 years by reason of Article 181, Limitation Act. But those decisions are not helpful because Order 34 Rule 4 Code of Civil Procedure expressly requires the mortgagee to make an application for a final decree, either for foreclosure or for sale. In a suit for partition and/or accounts a party need not make an application for making the decree final. After the preliminary decree is in such a suit has been passed it is the usual practice for the Plaintiff to make an application for the appointment of the Commissioner but there were no legal bar in the court appointing the commissioner suo motu and asking the Plaintiff to deposit the commissioner's fee in Court. If he does not deposit the fees any other party to the suit can do so and take upon himself the carriage of the proceedings if the Plaintiff and none of the other parties make the deposit the fact that the court would not be able to dismiss the suit is, however, another matter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4187 of 2008

Decided On: 27.04.2017

 Venu Vs.  Ponnusamy Reddiar (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 15 SCC 254

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Whether court should permit filing of written statement even after delay of twelve years?

It is true that there is inordinate and enormous delay of 12 years. The reason given therefor also may not be strictly speaking sufficient to condone the delay but then the substantive cause of justice requires that the matter should be decided on merits, especially when during all these 12 years, no progress is made in the suit. It is not that the suit is decided or is at advance stage of hearing, so that prejudice would be caused to the respondent, if the written statement is permitted to be brought on record. Therefore, if the written statement is allowed to be brought on record, the matter can be decided on merits instead of being decided on technical grounds. Hence, considering peculiar facts of this case only, the delay deserves to be condoned and the written statement needs to be brought on record.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 13339 of 2017

Decided On: 22.03.2018

Adamji Gulamhussein Tavawalla Vs  Maria Emillia Vaz and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 675

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Whether court should appoint substitute arbitrator if there is delay in passing of arbitration award?

 It is true that there was some delay in passing the award.
However, between 2011 and 2013, the respondent has not filed any
application to expedite the proceedings and for passing of the
award. The respondent has neither filed the Request Case for
passing of the award at an early date nor filed the petition under
Section 14 of the Act for termination of the mandate of the arbitrator
that the arbitrator has ‘failed to act without undue delay’.
31. Mere neglect of an arbitrator to act or delay in passing the
award by itself cannot be the ground to appoint another arbitrator in
deviation from the terms agreed to by the parties. We may usefully
refer to RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, 20th Edition which reads as
under:-
“Mere neglect of an arbitrator to act, as distinct from refusal or
incapacity, does not of itself give the court power to appoint another
arbitrator in his place. It does, however, give the court power to
remove him, whereupon there is a power to replace him.”*
*[RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, 20th Edition, Pg. 136 quoted in Law relating to
Arbitration and Conciliation, 9th Edition, by Dr. P.C. Markanda at Pg. 620]
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1039 OF 2019

RAJASTHAN SMALL INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION LIMITED  Vs  M/S GANESH CONTAINERS MOVERS SYNDICATE 

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:January 23, 2019.

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Whether clerical error can be corrected after delay of twenty five years?

 We are also not satisfied with the delay by the Respondents in making a claim Under Section 87 of the Act. The contention of the Respondents is that since there is no time limit specified for filing a claim petition, they could have made a claim at any point of time, particularly for correcting a clerical error.

59. It is now well settled that where no time-limit is specified, whatever is required to be done should be within a reasonable period. In Collector v. P. Mangamma MANU/SC/0170/2003 : (2003) 4 SCC 488 at page 491 it was held in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows:

A reasonable period would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question.

In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha MANU/SC/0406/1969 : (1969) 2 SCC 187 it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied.........". Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 4632-4638 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 21856-21862 of 2010)

Decided On: 01.05.2018

Telangana Housing Board  Vs. Azamunnisa Begum (died) thru. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 7 SCC 346.

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Whether claimant can be granted escalation charges proportionate to delay caused by other side?

This will require the Court to consider the additional plea urged on behalf of the Plaintiff, namely, that the High Court was not justified in reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court so far as 50% of the escalation charges is concerned.

12. The High Court in coming to the aforesaid conclusion took the view that the specific clause in the agreement which obliges the Plaintiff to continue to offer his rates for the entire duration of the contract prohibits grant of the said claim. We have also noticed that it is the Defendant's own case that it was responsible for the delay to the extent of nineteen and half (19 1/2) months that had occurred in the execution of the contract whereas the Plaintiff was responsible for the delay of the remaining fifteen and half (15 1/2) months. The said specific admission on the part of the Defendant and the finding arrived at by the High Court on the aforesaid basis could not have permitted the High Court to reverse the decree passed by the learned trial Court on the aforesaid count which coincidentally entitled the Plaintiff to only 50% of the escalation charges, as claimed. The aforesaid percentage (50%) roughly corresponds to the percentage of the delay attributable to the Plaintiff out of the total delay of 35 months. The clause in the contract which obliged the Plaintiff to continue to offer the rates initially offered by him would, naturally, be for the duration of the contract and cannot work to his peril for the period of delay for which the Department was admittedly responsible. Such a construction of the clause in the contract would not be reasonable. We, therefore, reverse the aforesaid finding of the High Court and hold that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the 50% of the escalation charges as decreed by the learned trial Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 1034/2008

Decided On: 21.03.2017

 Aries & Aries Vs.  Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

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Whether court can permit third party to be added as party in the suit?

Much water has been flown under the bridge after the decision is rendered. After this judgment, in 1977, amendment was brought to the Code of Civil Procedure and added a provision Order 1, Rule 8-A which reads as under :

"8-A. Power of Court to permit a person or body of persons to present opinion or to take part in the proceedings.---While trying a suit, the Court may, if satisfied that a person or body of persons is interested in any question of law which is directly and substantially in issue in the suit and that it is necessary in the public interest to allow that person or body of persons to present his or its opinion on that question of law, permit that person or body of persons to present such opinion and to take such part in the proceedings of the suit as the Court may specify."

5. By the above amendment, the Parliament has widened the scope of locus in tune with changing times. Courts were also relaxing the rigid rule of locus in the interest of justice.

6. Impleadment of a third party in a suit is an attribute of principle of natural justice. 

 Without much difficulty one can see that concept of locus standi and principle of natural justice are closely intertwined that one cannot be separated from another as the opportunity of being heard is the main attribute of locus standi. When a third party approaches Court with contention that he is interested in the subject matter of the suit or in the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant, the Court shall ordinarily give an opportunity to such a party to put his case. It may be remembered that a third party is coming to the Court on his own risk, whereas a party sought to be impleaded at the instance of the defendant is dragged on to the litigation without his will. These two incidents are therefore entirely different and require different treatment at the hands of the Court. Therefore, observation made by the Single Judge that for all impleadment the plaintiff is dominus litus cannot be applied in all cases. Of course, it can be applied where the defendant insisted in the written statement or in his reply that the particular person is necessary party and the plaintiff can resist the impleadment because he is dominus litus and he can decide who is to be the necessary party. In such an event, he is taking the risk of suit being thrown out in the absence of the necessary party. But in the case of impleadment of third party who approaches the Court and says that he is vitally interested in the dispute that is going on between the plaintiff and defendant, and therefore, he may be given an opportunity of being heard, naturally consistent with the principle of natural justice and fair play, the Court will not refuse his impleadment, unless the Court feels that he is totally a stranger and unless the Court feels that it is employing a delaying tactics.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 1306 of 1999

Decided On: 09.08.2000

 Gulab Babusaheb Bargiri Vs.  Executive Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Board and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.K. Chandra Shekhara Das, J.

Citation: 2001(1) MHLJ 63

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Whether inordinate delay in providing information under right to information Act amounts to harassment?

 Further, Commission is convinced with the averment of the Appellant for having suffered gross detriment due to the delay of over 2 years in providing the information to him. Appellant deserves to be compensated on this account. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers vested in the CIC under section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act, Commission directs the public authority through its Chief Executive Officer to compensate the Appellant by an amount of Rs. 5000/- for the inconvenience and detriment caused to him. The CPIO should ensure that this amount is remitted to the Appellant by demand draft/pay order within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.

Central Information Commission

(Before Divya Prakash Sinha, IC)

Relevant facts emerging from the Appeal:

Aabid Hussain Vs  CPIO, O/o CEO, Cantonment Board, Jabalpur (MP) … 

File No. CIC/DCABO/A/2016/271739/IARMY/SD

Decided on October 16, 2017, [Hearing on: 16/10/2017]

RTI application filed on	:	31/08/2015
PIO replied on	:	No reply
First appeal filed on	:	05/10/2015
First Appellate Authority order	:	No order
Second Appeal dated	:	24/11/2015

Citation:2017SCC ONLINE CIC  1506

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How to appreciate evidence if there is delay in taking of test identification parade?

The value to be attached to a test identification parade depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast Rule can be laid down. The court has to examine the facts of the case to find out whether there was sufficient opportunity for the witnesses to identify the accused. The court has also to Rule out the possibility of their having been shown to the witnesses before holding a test identification parade. Where there is an inordinate delay in holding a test identification parade, the court must adopt a cautious approach so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. In cases of inordinate delay, it may be that the witnesses may forget the features of the accused put up for identification in the test identification parade. This, however, is not an absolute Rule because it depends upon the facts of each case and the opportunity which the witnesses had to notice the features of the accused and the circumstances in which they had seen the accused committing the offence. Where the witness had only a fleeting glimpse of the accused at the time of occurrence, delay in holding a test identification parade has to be viewed seriously. Where, however, the court is satisfied that the witnesses had ample opportunity of seeing the accused at the time of the commission of the offence and there is no chance of mistaken identity, delay in holding the test identification parade may not be held to be fatal. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1953 of 2010

Decided On: 06.01.2017

Md. Sajjad Vs.State of West Bengal

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