Showing posts with label party. Show all posts
Showing posts with label party. Show all posts

Saturday, 25 September 2021

Whether a party can directly produce documents at the stage of cross-examination of a witness without leave of court?

 As to question No. 2:

 35. In fact having answered question No. 1, in the negative, that a party cannot be equated with a ‘witness’, the answer to question No. 2, naturally follows that a plain reading of the language of Order VII, Rule 14 sub-rule 4 and Order VIII, Rule 1-A sub-rule (4) of Civil Procedure Code and specifically the use of the words ‘defendants witness’ and the ‘plaintiffs witness’, would mean not the defendant(s) or the plaintiff(s) but only the witnesses who enter the witnesses box, in support of the case set up by either party to the suit and not otherwise. Therefore no leave of the Court would be required to confront the witness with a document during his cross-examination, as the element of surprise, would be lost, if any such permission was required to be obtained.

Civil Procedure Code, O. 7, R. 14(4), O. 8, R. 1-A and O. 13, R. 1(3) — Under provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(4), Order 8, Rule 1-A(4) and Order 13, Rule 3 of Code documents can be directly produced at stage of cross-examination of a witness who is not a party to suit, to confront witness for refreshing his memory without seeking prior leave of Court. (2012) 6 Mah LJ 648, (2018) 2 Mah LJ 348 held laying down good law. (1994) 1 SCC 1, Rel., 1984 Madras 14, (2003) 3 Mah LJ 327, (2004) 4 Mah LJ 992, (1996) 1 Mah LJ 961 and (2011) 3 Mah LJ 564, Ref.

(Paras 35 to 40)

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Nagpur)


(Before Sunil B. Shukre and Avinash G. Gharote, JJ.)


Mohammed Abdul Wahid  Vs Nilofer Wd/O Dr. Mohammad Abdul Salim 

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Whether A party to a suit (plaintiff/defendant) can be equated with a witness?

The Civil Procedure Code uses the expressions ‘parties’ and ‘witness’, in contradistinction to each other. In an adversarial litigation, the conduct of which is governed by the rules of procedure as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code a party to a suit, is clearly a separate and distinct person from a witness. The role of a party, be it the plaintiff or defendant, is solely for himself as a party to the suit, in which either relief is sought or the grant of it is opposed, for the party. The role of a ‘witness’, for a ‘party’, is always in the nature of supporting or proving a plea, which is being set up by the party, be it for giving evidence of any incidence, proving a document, giving expert opinion or otherwise. It is always in aid of a plea set up by a party, in the plaint or the written statement. The ‘witness’, can never claim anything from the Court for himself, as it is impermissible for a ‘witness’, to travel beyond the role of supporting or proving the pleas as raised by the plaintiff(s) or the defendant(s) who have called or caused the ‘witness’, to be summoned, through the process of the Court. A party to a suit (plaintiff/defendant) cannot be equated with a witness. The provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(4), Order 8, Rule 1-A(4) which includes Rule 1-A(4)(a) and Order 13, Rule 1(3) which includes Rule 1(3)(a) of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to a party, who enters the witness box to tender evidence in his own cause. The provisions are applicable to a witness alone. Since a party cannot be equated with a witness in the matter of applying the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(4); Order 8, Rule 1-A(4) and Order 13, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code.

Civil Procedure Code, O. 7, R. 14(4), O. 8, R. 1-A and O. 13, R. 1(3) — Party to a suit cannot be equated with a witness — Provisions of Order 7, Rule 14(4), Order 8, Rule 1-A and Order 13, Rule 1(3) are applicable only to a witness and not to a party to suit who enters witness box to tender evidence in his own cause.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Nagpur)


(Before Sunil B. Shukre and Avinash G. Gharote, JJ.)


Mohammed Abdul Wahid  Vs Nilofer Wd/O Dr. Mohammad Abdul Salim 

W.P. Nos. 7717 and 6931 of 2019

Decided on February 9, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 170 : (2021) 3 Mah LJ 626 : (2021) 4 AIR Bom R 689

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Saturday, 28 September 2019

Whether party can seek permission to examine himself after examination of his witness?

Under Rule 3A of Order XVIII, it is ordinarily necessary for a party to examine himself first before he examines any other witness on his behalf. A discretion has been conferred on the Court to permit such party to appear as his own witness at a later stage. The words 'at a later stage' would have to be given the ordinary meaning to mean that there is no prohibition for a party to seek such permission even after other witnesses have examined on his behalf. Restricting the application of Rule 3A to situations only where prior permission of the Court is taken by a party for examining himself before other witnesses on his behalf have been examined would amount to reading such restriction in Rule 3A of the Code which has not been provided. It is ultimately for the Court to grant such permission in the facts of the case. There could be a situation as the present case where the plaintiff was unavailable when he was required to lead evidence and after his Power of Attorney holder was examined as his witness, the plaintiff was available for leading his evidence. The Court if it finds it necessary to permit such party to be examined after his other witnesses have been examined can always permit such examination subject to the rider that such examination would not be for the purposes of filling in any lacuna that is sought to be filled in by such subsequent examination. It does not appear from a plain reading of Rule 3A of Order XVIII that only if a party seeks prior permission before any other witness on his behalf has been examined that the Court can consider such request and that the hands of the Court would be tied if such request is made later on. The fact that the power to grant such permission at a later stage by exercising discretion and permitting a party to examine himself as a witness at a later stage is conferred on the Court would imply that such permission could be sought in a given case after other witnesses on his behalf have been examined. The discretion having been conferred on the Court, it goes without saying that such discretion would have to be exercised in a judicious manner in the light of the facts of the case and obviously to prevent any mischief or filling up of any lacuna on the part of such party by examining himself at a later stage. The Court is also empowered to restrict such evidence in a given case as the facts demand. It is therefore not possible to agree with the position that if no application is made under provisions of Order XVIII Rule 3A of the Code seeking permission by the party prior to other witnesses being examined by such party, the opportunity is lost forever. On the other hand, the trial Court in exercise of its discretion can regulate the manner in which as well as the extent to which such party can be permitted to appear as his own witness at a later stage.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 447/2019

Decided On: 08.04.2019

Care Hospitals, Ganga Care Hospitals Limited  Vs. Nilesh
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Monday, 13 May 2019

Whether Arbitrator can foist unilateral addition or alteration of a contract upon an unwilling party?

However, when it comes to the public policy of India argument
based upon “most basic notions of justice”, it is clear that this ground
can be attracted only in very exceptional circumstances when the
conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction of fundamental
notions or principles of justice. It can be seen that the formula that was
applied by the agreement continued to be applied till February, 2013 –
87
in short, it is not correct to say that the formula under the agreement
could not be applied in view of the Ministry’s change in the base
indices from 1993-94 to 2004-05. Further, in order to apply a linking
factor, a Circular, unilaterally issued by one party, cannot possibly bind
the other party to the agreement without that other party’s consent.
Indeed, the Circular itself expressly stipulates that it cannot apply
unless the contractors furnish an undertaking/affidavit that the price
adjustment under the Circular is acceptable to them. We have seen
how the appellant gave such undertaking only conditionally and
without prejudice to its argument that the Circular does not and cannot
apply. This being the case, it is clear that the majority award has
created a new contract for the parties by applying the said unilateral
Circular and by substituting a workable formula under the agreement
by another formula de hors the agreement. This being the case, a
fundamental principle of justice has been breached, namely, that a
unilateral addition or alteration of a contract can never be foisted upon
an unwilling party, nor can a party to the agreement be liable to
perform a bargain not entered into with the other party. Clearly, such a
course of conduct would be contrary to fundamental principles of
justice as followed in this country, and shocks the conscience of this
Court. However, we repeat that this ground is available only in very

exceptional circumstances, such as the fact situation in the present
case. Under no circumstance can any Court interfere with an arbitral
award on the ground that justice has not been done in the opinion of
the Court. That would be an entry into the merits of the dispute which,
as we have seen, is contrary to the ethos of Section 34 of the 1996
Act, as has been noted earlier in this judgment.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4779 OF 2019

Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.Vs  National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) 

R.F. NARIMAN, J.
Dated:May 08, 2019.
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Sunday, 5 August 2018

Whether court should direct future mesne profits even if it is not claimed by a party?

The Supreme Court in R.S. Madanappa Vs. Chandramma MANU/SC/0356/1965 : AIR 1965 SC 1812 & Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Shri Chandramaul MANU/SC/0335/1965 : AIR 1966 SC 735 has held that where in a suit for recovery of possession a claim for recovery of mesne profits for the period till the date of institution of the suit is made, even if no claim/prayer for recovery of future mesne profits from the date of institution of the suit till the date of delivery of possession is made, Order 20 Rule 12 mandates the Court to direct such an enquiry into future mesne profits.

F. The reason for the aforesaid is not hard to fathom; the intent is to avoid multiplicity of suits for mesne profits for successive period after the date of the institution of the suit; each of such suits would have to be filed for recovery of mesne profits for a maximum period of three years, to avoid the defence of the claim for mesne profits having become barred by time.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

FAO(OS) 579/2013 & CM No. 20049/2013 (for stay)

Decided On: 13.05.2014

 Santosh Arora and Ors.Vs. M.L. Arora
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Saturday, 24 March 2018

Whether party can take inconsistent plea in addition written statement?

But this does not and cannot the mean that the Court should allow liberty to the defendant to deal with the matter in an arbitrary manner and ignore the stand he had disclosed to the Court on the earlier occasion and plead something contrary to what he had done before.

8. If any support for the view which I have mentioned above is needed, recourse can had to be the case of Dittu Ram v. Amar Chand MANU/HP/0018/1961. In this judgment it has been laid down in a clear and categorical manner by the judicial Commissioner that a party does not have a right to amend a previous pleading without the permission of the Court and it would be a violating of the principles of pleadings and in general of provision of O.6,R.7 of the Civil Procedure Code in particular if on the amendment of the plant a defendant is allowed to put forward pleas which are not in answer to the fresh matter introduction by the amendment of the plaint are inconsistent with the pleas previously put forward.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Second Appeal No. 465 of 1971

Decided On: 29.03.1976

Thakkar Babulal Dayashanker Vs. Mehta Natwarlal Kaluram and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.H. Bhatt, J.
Citation: AIR 1978 Gujarat 94
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Thursday, 19 October 2017

Whether a party can be permitted to amend grounds of appeal or writ petition after its disposal?

No doubt, when there existed no ground of challenge on merits in the writ petition, High Court could not have adverted to it. We are also conscious of the fact that if a party is allowed to seek amendment in the grounds of appeal or writ petition after its disposal, it can lead to abuse of process of law, and the parties would not let the proceedings come to an end. As such, we are not inclined to allow the Appellants to add grounds in writ petition by way of amendment, after its disposal. However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that to do complete justice between the parties, the matter needs to be remitted to the appellate court, as the reasons given by said court reversing the findings of the trial court, are not sufficient, and do not answer properly the issues raised in the appeals.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 9190-9191 of 2015 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 21952-53 of 2014)

Decided On: 16.11.2015

Vishwanath Dadu Gurav and Ors. Vs. Dattatray Ganapati Gurav

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.
Citation: (2016) 15 SCC 671.
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Monday, 16 October 2017

Whether service of summons on advocate of party is proper service?

Any process served on the pleader who has been duly appointed to act in the Court for any party or left at the office or ordinary residence of such pleader, and whether the same is for the personal appearance of the party or not, shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents, and, unless the Court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person.
Admittedly the contesting Respondents were duly served and recorded also in the roznama accordingly. The parties represented through their Advocates. The vakalatnama, therefore, once filed by the Advocate and/or if the Advocate appears on behalf of the respective parties, the vakalatnama cannot be dissected and/or treated for filing only for Notice of Motion and not for any other proceedings. Considering the provisions so recorded above once the party appears through his Advocate and due vakalatnama is filed, it is for all the proceedings. Therefore, to say that a separate summons required to be served to the Respondents/Defendants is unacceptable. No fresh service of writ of summons is contemplated in such circumstances. The Advocate's appearance, not permitted for want of specific provision and/or instruction for a part of the proceeding arising out of the suit. The vakalatnama cannot be conditional and restricted to any part of the proceedings. The learned Judge, therefore, in my view, wrong in dismissing the Suit for want of service of writ of summons.
The filing of vakalatnama and/or appearance of the parties through Advocate, in my view, amounts to service of summons for all the purposes. The time to file written statement within 30 days, from the date of appearance/service of summons, in given facts and circumstances, requires to be considered by the Court basically when the Suit was not registered for want of delay and/or for other such circumstances. The submission that the fresh writ of summons should be served even after service of summons and though parties appeared through Advocate in Notice of Motion and/or interim application, is unacceptable as that would cause great injustice and hardship to the Plaintiff and/or the parties one who has already served the Defendants/other parties though at the interim stage and/or Notice of Motion stage. There is no question of issuing fresh notice and/or multiple notices and/or services of warrant of summons at every stage of the pending legal proceedings. There is no provisions for engaging an Advocate in respect of each and every stage of the proceeding separately. Neither it is contemplated in any of the provisions so quoted above.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 807 of 2011 in Notice of Motion No. 1334 of 2009 in L.C. Suit No. 2802 of 2009 and CAA/1067/2011

Decided On: 23.10.2013

 Mr. Suresh Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anoop V. Mohta, J.
Citation; 2013 (6) MH L J 845
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Friday, 8 September 2017

Whether dead person can be party to suit?

It is necessary to lay stress on the words "any right.... is alleged to exist" in both the rules. Both Rr. 1 and 3, in my opinion, contemplate living plaintiffs and defendants. When a person dies, the right to sue survives if it is capable of survival to his legal representatives and exists in them and not in the dead man. Rules 1 and 3 of O. 1, Civil P.C. no doubt apply to a case where the right has come into existence by way of survival, but the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be, must then be dead person's legal representatives at the time of the presentation of the plaint and not the dead person. The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has exceptions, the procedure in respect of which is provided by O. 22, Civil P.C., which says that where a right to sue survives in favour or against a dead person, that right can be enforced by or against the legal representatives of the dead person. If a person dies before the suit is instituted against him, the right to sue or be sued is not an existing right but a right which has survived, and persons competent to sue or be sued are the legal representatives in whom or against whom alone the right to sue exists under the provisions of R. 1 or R. 3 of O. 1, Civil P.C. When, therefore, a suit is filed against a dead man, it is a nullity. Neither Order 1, nor O. 22, Civil P.C. applies to enable a person to sue a dead man. Order 1, Civil P.C., deals with parties to a suit; it does not and cannot contemplate a dead person as a party to a suit. If O. 1 does not permit the filing of a suit against a dead person, as I hold it does not, it follows that o. 1, R. 10, Civil P. 0., cannot apply. Order 1, Rule 10, Civil P.C., begins with the words "Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff......." "When a suit is filed against a dead man, it cannot be said that it has been filed against a wrong person. I am aware of the fact that some High Courts in India have treated a dead person as a wrong person, but with respect to the learned Judges who have so treated a dead person, I am unable to adopt that view. There is a clear distinction between a right which exists and a right which survives. I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that where a suit has been filed against a dead man, the Court is powerless to act under any of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, in order to dispose of it according to law, because no rights exist against a dead person, but if they survive, they come to exist in the legal representatives who alone can sue or be sued.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIND
Municipal Corporation of Karachi V. Baradio Jumoo Mughal

Date: 21.12.1944

Citation:AIR(33) 1946 Sind 23

Thadani, J.
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Tuesday, 27 December 2016

Whether employee of a party can be appointed as arbitrator?

In terms of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 read with Schedule VII to the Act, any employee of a party to the arbitration proceeding is ineligible for being appointed as an arbitrator.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Judgment delivered on: 19.12.2016
ARB.P. 159/2016
MADHAVA HYTECH-RANI (JV) 
V
IRCON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 

CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

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Tuesday, 25 October 2016

Whether proceeding under DV Act is tenable against relative of husband if husband is not party to proceeding?

In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that a

proceeding against the relative of the husband is perfectly



maintainable without the husband being in the party array and

without any relief being sought against him, if it falls within

proviso of Section 2(q). Reference is answered accordingly.


    IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                PRESENT:

        MR.JUSTICE THOTTATHIL  B.RADHAKRISHNAN

                MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS

        5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2015

                    Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 328 of 2013 ()
                    

       KUNJATHIRI,
Vs


          STATE OF KERALA,

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Saturday, 10 September 2016

Whether court can dismiss appeal filed by party on ground that appeal filed by non party is already dismissed?

The High Court has while dismissing the application for
condonation of delay made by the State dismissed even the
appeal preferred by the appellants in RFA No.806 of 2000
after obtaining the leave of the Court. While doing so the
High Court has not gone into the merits of the controversy
and has simply declined to interfere with the impugned
judgment and decree with the following observations:
“In view of the State Government having filed an
appeal in respect of the very judgment and decree,
the appeal in RFA 806/2000 would not merit
consideration and accordingly rejected.”

10. We are, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct
in dismissing RFA No.806 of 2000 summarily as it has done.
Whether or not an appeal was maintainable at the instance
of someone who was not a party to the suit was itself a
matter which ought to have engaged the attention of the
High Court. The High Court has not, however, adverted to
that aspect and dismissed the appeal simply because the
appeal preferred by the State had been dismissed. That
apart, since an appeal against the very same judgment and
decree as was challenged in RFA No.296 of 2011 was
already pending before the High Court, the High Court ought
to have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter and
condoned the delay in filing of the said appeal on such terms
as it may it consider it proper. It is no doubt true that the
delay in filing of the State appeal was considerable but given
the circumstances in which the delay had occurred, we are
inclined to condone the same. 
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10418 OF 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 19634 of 2012)
The Principal Govt. Pre-University
College & Anr. 
Vs.
Mr. Jambu Kumar Mutha 
Dated:November 20, 2014
Citation:AIR 2015 SC (SUPP)306
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Saturday, 27 August 2016

Landmark Judgment on expunging of adverse remark

Their Lordships have also laid- down the test in
considering the expunction of disparaging remarks made
against persons or authorities whose conduct comes for

consideration before the Court of law to be decided by them
by summing up as under:-
“(a) whether the party whose conduct is in
question is before the court or has an opportunity
of explaining or defending himself.
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing
on that conduct justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the
case as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on
that conduct. It has also been recognized that
judicial pronouncements must be judicial in
nature, and should not normally depart from
sobriety, moderation and reserve.”
7.2 Similarly, in the matter of Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State
 of Bihar and another AIR 1964 SC 1
 , the Supreme Court has held that
the High Court has inherent power to expunge
objectionable remarks in judgment and order of the
subordinate court against stranger, after it has become final
and culled out the principles as under:-
“7-8. From the aforesaid discussion the following
principles emerge:
(1) A judgment of a criminal Court is final; it can
be set aside or modified only in the manner
prescribed by law.
(2) Every Judge, whatever may be his rank in the
hierarchy, must have an unrestricted right to

express his views in any matter before him
without fear or favour.
(3) There is a correlative and self-imposed duty in
a Judge not to make irrelevant remarks or
observations without any foundation, especially in
the case of witnesses or parties not before him,
affecting their character or reputation.
(4) An appellate Court has jurisdiction to judicially
correct such remarks, but it will do so only in
exceptional cases where such remarks would
cause irrevocable harm to a witness or a party
not before it.
29. When the question arises before the High
Court in any specific case whether to resort to
such undefined power it is essential for it to
exercise great caution and circumspection. Thus
when it is moved by an aggrieved party to
expunge any passage from the order or judgment
of a subordinate Court it must be fully satisfied
that the passage complained of is wholly
irrelevant and unjustifiable, that its retention on
the records will cause serious harm to the person
to whom it refers and that its expunction will not
affect the reasons for the judgment or order.”
7.3 Likewise, in the matter of Niranjan Patnaik v.
 Sashibhusan Kar and another  (1986) 2 SCC 569
 , Their Lordships of the
Supreme Court have held that harsh or disparaging
remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities


whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of
law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case
and followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the
matter of Mohammad Naim(supra) and observed as
under:-
“24. It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or
disparaging remarks are not to be made against
persons and authorities whose conduct comes
into consideration before courts of law unless it is
really necessary for the decision of the case, as
an integral part thereof to animadvert on that
conduct. We hold that the adverse remarks made
against the appellant were neither justified nor
called for.”
The courts should not make adverse remarks agianst
party/litigant unless really necessary for just decision of the
case and opportunity of hearing should be afforded before
making such remarks.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Writ Petition (Cr.) No.276 of 2015

Lambodar Patel,  Vs State of Chhattisgarh,

Coram:
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Dated: 04/03/2016
Citation:2016 CRLJ2814
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Monday, 4 April 2016

Whether party can made incorrect statements in affidavit in order to make it in conformity with prescribed proforma?

Relying upon the aforesaid Judgment, learned counsel submits that once the
testamentary petition is converted into a suit, provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure 1908 and Indian Evidence Act 1872 would apply to civil proceedings.
The defendants thus could not consider the said affidavit of attesting witness filed
in the year 2005 as evidence. Learned counsel submits that in any event, the
affidavit of attesting witness was filed in Form-102 prescribed under Bombay High
Court (O.S.) Rules and thus the plaintiff could not have made any changes in the
said format prescribed by the Bombay High Court rules. It is submitted that in any
event, there was no material inconsistencies or incorrect statement made in the said
affidavit by Mr H. D. Pithawalla and by Ms Dolly Divecha and the same as per the
prescribed format of Form-102 and over and above the same. Mr.Shah learned
counsel for the defendants submitted that in any event even if such affidavit was
required to be filed in any format prescribed, the plaintiff could not have made any
false and incorrect statement in such affidavit. It is submitted that the said witness
was cross examined by the defendants on both the affidavits. The defendants are
thus entitled to point out the contradictions in both the affidavits with her cross
examination.
91. In my view, Mr shah learned counsel appearing for defendants is right in his
submission that even if an affidavit is required to be filed in particular format, even
if the facts of a particular case do not match with the format prescribed and
disclosure of such fact would lead to inconsistency with the format or would
amount to false statement, party is still not bound to follow such format as it
stands. In my view, a party cannot take shelter of such format and can make false
and incorrect statement so as to comply with the format prescribed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
TESTAMENTARY SUIT NO. 85 OF 2005
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 604 OF 2005
 Jivaji Framroze Tarachand

V
Mr.Minoo S. Mistry 

Judgment pronounced on : SEPTEMBER 25, 2014
Citation;2016(1) ALLMR730
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Friday, 13 November 2015

Whether relative of Husband can be made party to proceedings under Domestic Violence Act before Family Court?

As a question of law is raised before this Court, the Court has restricted its finding only to that extent and answered that the relatives of the husband being respondents under section 2(q) of the DV Act can be made party respondents before the Family Court if the proceedings specified under section 26 of the D.V. Act are preferred.
Bombay High Court
Ms Ambreen Akhoon vs Mr Aditya Aurn Paudwal And Anr on 4 August, 2015
Bench: Mridula Bhatkar.
Citation;2015(6) MHLJ 455
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Sunday, 8 November 2015

Whether son can be denied maintenance on the ground that he is not made party in proceeding U/S 125 of crpc?

Another argument advanced by learned counsel for revisionist is that master Aryan, the minor son of revisionist was not made party in the original petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the Family Court, Ghaziabad, therefore, the trial court could not have awarded the maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to his minor son. I am afraid this argument is also misconceived for the simple reason that the provision under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a beneficial provision made precisely to provide instant relief to the estranged wife and the children of feuding couple. While it is true that the respondent no. 2 should have arrayed the minor son as party or the family court should have insisted on arraying the minor children as party in the instant petition. But family court is not denuded of its power to provide adequate relief to minor child merely because his/her parents have forgotten him/her if material on record shows requirement of such action. 
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
CHETAN ANAND  PARASHER ALIAS RAHUL SHARMA V STATE OF UP
CITATION;2015 CRLJ (NOC)468 ALL,2015 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL628
DATED; 23- 12-2014

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Tuesday, 18 August 2015

Whether party who has not come to court with clean hands is entitled to get decree for specific performance of contract?

It is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable jurisdiction of a Court and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the Court with clean hands; In other words the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief. The Division Bench has pointed put in the judgment three grounds which disentitle the plaintiff to the equitable relief as he came with a positive case of incorrect and false facts as set put in para-graphs 4 to 6 thus:
Supreme Court of India
Lourdu Mari David And Ors vs Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy And ... on 9 August, 1996
Bench: K. Ramaswamy, G. B. Pattanaik
     Citation; (1996) 5 SCC 589
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Wednesday, 27 May 2015

Whether beneficiary of trust can be impleaded as party in suit for specific performance against trust?


After due consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the view that the High Court erred in interfering with the order of the trial Court impleading the appellant as a party defendant. Admittedly, the appellant is a beneficiary of the Trust and under the provisions of the Trusts Act, the Trustee has to act reasonably in exercise of his right of alienation under the terms of the trust deed. Appellant cannot thus be treated as a stranger. No doubt, it may be permissible for the appellant to file a separate suit, as suggested by Respondent No.1, but the beneficiary could certainly be held to be a proper party. There is no valid reason to decline his prayer to be impleaded as a party to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Order I Rule 10(2), CPC enables, the Court to add a necessary or proper party so as to "effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit".
Supreme Court of India

Baluram vs P.Chellathangam & Ors on 10 December, 2014
Bench: T.S. Thakur, Adarsh Kumar Goel
Citation;AIR 2015 SC 1264
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Sunday, 26 April 2015

Whether court can draw adverse inference if party fails to enter into witness box?

Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. . This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and Ors. AIR (1930) Lahore 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR (1931) Bombay 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh's case (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath and Anr. held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an inference adverse against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand and Ors. , drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act against a party who did not enter into the witness box.

Supreme Court of India

Vidhyadhar vs Manikrao & Anr. on 17 March, 1999
Equivalent citations: AIR 1999 SC 1441, 1999 (3) ALT 1 SC, JT 1999 (2) SC 183, 1999 (2) SCALE 93, (1999) 3 SCC 573, 1999 1 SCR 1168, 1999 (1) UJ 665 SC

Bench: S Ahmed, D Wadhwa

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Whether court can draw adverse inference if party fails to enter in witness box?


DW1 admitted that she had no document showing her
title to the suit plot and that the defendant had not obtained any
licence for construction of structure in the suit plot. It is not
known as to why the defendant, who was only 49 years old in the

year 2001 when the evidence was recorded, did not enter the
witness box. Adverse inference as drawn by the Trial Court and
the First Appellate Court appears to be absolutely correct. In the
case of “Vidhyadhar” (supra), the Apex Court has held that
where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and
state his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-
examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the
case set up by him is not correct. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
SECOND APPEAL NO. 100 of 2004

Shri Damaciano Fernandes, Vs  St. Anthony's Chapel,

CORAM :- U. V. BAKRE, J.

Pronounced on : 13th June, 2014.
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR576
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