Supreme Court: Party Estopped From Challenging Award On The Ground Of Mandate Expiry After Accepting Extension Of Arbitrator's Mandate

 In the facts of the present case, Section 29A of the Act does not apply. At the relevant time, there was no statutory provision prescribing that an extension of the mandate of the Arbitrator must be in a particular form or be reduced to writing. The ground of challenge to the Award is not based on breach of any statutory provision. The Arbitrator had unilaterally extended the mandate on three occasions and even after expiry of the mandate had fixed a date of hearing. The Board did not raise any objection in its email dated 14.10.2015 that the mandate of the Arbitrator has expired. The Board thus had tacitly agreed to extension of the mandate of the Arbitrator. The Award was delivered on 27.10.2015. Thereafter, the Board on 28.10.2015 sent an email that it had not extended the mandate of the Arbitrator, and it shall proceed Under Section 14 of the Act. The grievance of the Board about the expiry of the mandate of the Arbitrator is a matter governed by the contract and not by the statute. The Board participated in the proceeding before the Arbitrator and had acquiesced with the alleged invalidity and cannot be allowed to turn around after the Award was passed and is estopped from challenging the Award on the ground that the mandate of the Arbitrator had expired. In so far as reliance placed by the Board on the decision of this Court4 is concerned, suffice to say that in the said decision, the Arbitrator did not have mandate in the absence of a valid arbitration agreement. This Court in the aforesaid decision held that question of waiver or estoppel did not arise as there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. The said decision has no application to the facts of the instant case. For the aforementioned reasons, we answer the first issue in the affirmative. {Para 21}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 769-770 of 2026

Decided On: 26.05.2026

Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Saryu Plastics Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ.

Author:  Alok Aradhe, J.

Citation: 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲 𝗜𝗡𝗦𝗖 𝟱𝟱𝟮,MANU/SC/0554/2026

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Important provisions of Civil minor Acts(Part 1)

 

1) Important provisions of motor vehicle Act

https://www.lawweb.in/2019/09/important-provisions-of-motor-vehicle.html

2) Important provisions of The family courts Act 1984

https://www.lawweb.in/2023/09/important-provisions-of-family-courts.html

3) Important provisions of Maharashtra Regional and town planning Act 1966

https://www.lawweb.in/2022/08/important-provisions-of-maharashtra.html

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Supreme Court: Applications And Appeals Under Arbitration Act, Except International Arbitration Shall Be Heard By Designated Commercial Courts

Sections 3 & 10 of the Act, 2015 shall prevail and all

applications or appeals arising out of arbitration under the

provisions of Act, 1996, other than international

commercial arbitration, shall be filed in and heard and

disposed of by the Commercial Courts, exercising the

territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such

commercial courts have been constituted. If the

submission on behalf of the appellants that all

applications/appeals arising out of arbitration under the

provisions of Act, 1996, other than the international

commercial arbitration, shall lie before the principal civil

Court of a district, in that case, not only the Objects and

Reasons of enactment of Act, 2015 and establishment of

commercial courts shall be frustrated, even Sections 3, 10

& 15 shall become otiose and nugatory. If the submission

on behalf of the appellants is accepted, in that case,

though with respect to other commercial disputes, the

applications or appeals shall lie before the commercial

courts established and constituted under Section 3 of Act,

2015, with respect to arbitration proceedings, the

applications or appeals shall lie before the principal civil

Court of a district. There cannot be two fora with respect

to different commercial disputes.

Under the circumstances, notification issued by the

State of Odisha issued in consultation with the High Court

of Orissa to confer jurisdiction upon the court of learned

Civil Judge (Senior Division) designated as Commercial

Court to decide the applications or appeals arising out of

arbitration under the provisions of Act, 1996 cannot be

said to be illegal and bad in law. On the contrary, the

same can be said to be absolutely in consonance with

Sections 3 & 10 of Act, 2015. We are in complete

agreement with the view taken by the High Court holding

so.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6876 OF 2022

Jaycee Housing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors Vs Registrar (General), Orissa High Court, 

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Dated: OCTOBER 19, 2022

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Bombay HC: S 12-A Commercial Courts Act on Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Is A Mandatory Provision

 Thus, we hold that section 12A of the Act of 2015 is mandatory, and a commercial suit of specified value which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief under the Act of 2015, cannot not be instituted unless the plaintiff exhausts the remedy of pre-institution mediation in accordance with such manner and procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the Central Government. Considering the object and purpose of Section 12A of being rooted in the public interest, there is no question of it being waived by a party. The findings in the impugned order to the contrary are set aside. {Para 34}

Bombay High Court

JUSTICE C. V. BHADANG JUSTICE NITIN JAMDAR

Deepak Raheja Vs. Ganga Taro Vazirani

COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO. 11950 OF 2021

1st October 2021

Author: Nitin Jamdar, J.

Citation: 2021 NearLaw (BombayHC) Online 1747

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Whether Bar U/s 9(3) Arbitration Act is Applicable If Application Was Taken Up By Court Before Constitution Of Arbitration Tribunal?

The short question of law raised in this appeal is, whether the Court has the power to entertain an application under Section 9(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hereinafter referred to as “the Arbitration Act”, once an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted and if so, what is the true meaning and purport of the expression “entertain” in Section 9(3) of the Arbitration Act. The next question is, whether the Court is obliged to examine the efficacy of the remedy under Section 17, before passing an order under Section 9(1) of the Arbitration Act, once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted.

107. It is reiterated that Section 9(1) enables the parties to an arbitration agreement to approach the appropriate Court for interim measures before the commencement of arbitral proceedings, during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of an arbitral award but before it is enforced and in accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. The bar of Section 9(3) operates where the application under Section 9(1) had not been entertained till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. Of course it hardly need be mentioned that even if an application under Section 9 had been entertained before the constitution of the Tribunal, the Court always has the discretion to direct the parties to approach the Arbitral Tribunal, if necessary by passing a limited order of interim protection, particularly when there has been a long time gap between hearings and the application has for all practical purposes, to be heard afresh, or the hearing has just commenced and is likely to consume a lot of time. In this case, the High Court has rightly directed the Commercial Court to proceed to complete the adjudication.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.)

Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. Vs Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd

Civil Appeal No. 5700 of 2021 

Decided on September 14, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 718

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Whether a party can seek production of additional documents at a later stage in the commercial suit if he has not produced those documents along with plaint as documents were voluminous?

 Now, so far as the other documents sought to be relied

on/produced as additional documents other than the invoices

are concerned the same stands on different footing. It is not

disputed and in fact it was specifically admitted and so stated

in the application that those additional documents other than

the invoices were in their possession but not produced being

voluminous and that the suit was filed urgently. However, it is

to be noted that when the second suit was filed, it cannot be

said to be urgent filing of the suit for injunction, as the first suit

was filed in the month of October, 2018 and there was an exparte

ad interim injunction vide order dated 29.10.2018 and

thereafter plaintiff withdrew the said first suit on 27.07.2019

with liberty to file a fresh suit as per the Commercial Courts Act

and the second suit came to be filed on 31.08.2019 after period

of one month of the withdrawal of first suit. Therefore the case

on behalf of the plaintiff that when the second suit was filed, it

was urgently filed therefore, the additional documents sought to

be relied upon other than the invoices were not filed as the

same were voluminous cannot be accepted. And therefore as

such Order XI Rule 1 (4) shall not be applicable, though the

application was filed within thirty days of filing of the second

suit. While seeking leave of the court to rely on documents,

which were in his power, possession, control or custody and not

disclosed along with plaint or within the extended period set

out in Order XI Rule 1 (4), the plaintiff has to establish the

reasonable cause for non disclosure along with plaint.

8.5 In view of the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove

and in view of the filing of the first suit in the month of October,

2018; the exparte ad interim injunction order in favour of the

plaintiff dated 29.10.2018; withdrawal of the first suit on

27.07.2019 and subsequently the filing of the second suit on

31.08.2019, non filing of the additional documents other than

the invoices on the ground of they being voluminous cannot be

said to be a reasonable cause for non disclosure/filing along

with plaint. There was sufficient time gap between the filing of

the first suit and filing of the second suit i.e. approximately 10

months and therefore when the second suit was filed the

plaintiff was having sufficient time after filing of the first suit, to

file the additional documents other than the invoices at the

time when the second suit was filed. Therefore as such, both

the courts below have rightly not permitted the plaintiff to rely

upon the documents, other than the invoices as additional

documents in exercise of the powers under Order XI Rule 1 (4)

read with Order XI Rule 1 (5).

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5620 OF 2021

SUDHIR KUMAR @ S. BALIYAN  Vs VINAY KUMAR G.B.

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Whether court can refuse to permit a party to produce a document on the ground that said document is suspicious?

 Even the reason given by the learned Commercial Court that

the invoices being suspicious and therefore not granting leave

to produce the said invoices cannot be accepted. At the stage of

granting leave to place on record additional documents the

court is not required to consider the genuineness of the

documents/additional documents, the stage at which

genuineness of the documents to be considered during the trial

and/or even at the stage of deciding the application under

Order XXXIX Rule 1 that too while considering prima facie case.

Therefore, the learned Commercial Court ought to have granted

leave to the plaintiff to rely on/produce the invoices as

mentioned in the application as additional documents.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5620 OF 2021

SUDHIR KUMAR @ S. BALIYAN  Vs VINAY KUMAR G.B.

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Should the plaintiff give reasonable cause for the production of additional documents in the commercial suit if the plaintiff has found those documents subsequently?

Therefore a further thirty days time is provided to the plaintiff

to place on record or file such additional documents in court

and a declaration on oath is required to be filed by the plaintiff

as was required as per Order XI Rule 1 (3) if for any reasonable

cause for non disclosure along with the plaint, the documents,

which were in the plaintiff’s power, possession, control or

custody and not disclosed along with plaint. Therefore plaintiff

has to satisfy and establish a reasonable cause for non

disclosure along with plaint. However, at the same time, the

requirement of establishing the reasonable cause for non

disclosure of the documents along with the plaint shall not be

applicable if it is averred and it is the case of the plaintiff that

those documents have been found subsequently and in fact

were not in the plaintiff’s power, possession, control or custody

at the time when the plaint was filed. Therefore Order XI Rule 1

(4) and Order XI Rule 1 (5) applicable to the commercial suit

shall be applicable only with respect to the documents which

were in plaintiff’s power, possession, control or custody and not

disclosed along with plaint. Therefore, the rigour of

establishing the reasonable cause in non disclosure along with

plaint may not arise in the case where the additional

documents sought to be produced/relied upon are discovered

subsequent to the filing of the plaint.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5620 OF 2021

SUDHIR KUMAR @ S. BALIYAN  Vs VINAY KUMAR G.B.

Dated: September 15, 2021

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Whether the party can file a review application on the ground that the court has not taken into consideration his written submission if his counsel has not relied on it?

 But before they filed this Review Petition, the Agarwals filed

an appeal. By the time of the Appeals, the Agarwals had changed

lawyers. They had now engaged M/s Pan India Legal Services LLP. Counsel instructed by Pan India Legal Services LLP in the appeal court sought to contend that I had failed to consider the Agarwals’ written submissions (filed at a much earlier date, on 15th December 2020) in my order of 12th March 2021. The Appeal Court disposed of the appeal by granting the Agarwals liberty to file a review.

9. It is actually correct that in my order of 12th March 2021 I did

not consider the Agarwals’ written submissions. I do not do so

because nobody asked me to. Nobody even told me they had been

filed. Nobody briefed for the Agarwals made any arguments on the written submissions. 

18. More disturbing is the implicit suggestion that Counsel’s

arguments are almost entirely worthless; and, by necessary extension, that Counsel are entirely redundant. If the attorney has filed something on record, Counsel must argue it, no matter how trifling or irrelevant. Further, it is then the job of the Court to engage in some sort of forensic archaeological excavation of these often mountainous records, and go through them document by document and page by page, to ferret out some sort of case in favour of a Review Petitioner, even if counsel have never argued every single line of what is pleaded.

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

REVIEW PETITION (L) NO. 5868 OF 2021

IN

COMM ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 434 OF 2021

Priyanka Communications (India) Pvt Ltd Vs Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd.

CORAM : G.S.Patel, J.

DATED : 4th August 2021

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Under which circumstances Commercial court can allow the production of documents at the subsequent stage?

 The learned Trial Court has referred to the provisions of Order XI Rule 5 CPC, as applicable to the commercial disputes. But, it has overlooked the provisions of Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) CPC, which permits the plaintiff to file documents in answer to the case set up by the defendant subsequent to the filing of the plaint. The precise case of the petitioner/plaintiff is that when the respondents/respondents denied that invoices were ever raised, the application was moved to bring the invoices on record. Under Order XI Rule 5 CPC, the court can grant leave to the plaintiff to file documents, not filed with the plaint. The learned Commercial Court erred in over-looking these provisions of the CPC. {Para 12}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CM (M) 324/2021

VALO AUTOMOTIVE PVT LTD. Vs SPRINT CARS PVT LTD & ORS.

CORAM:

 MS. JUSTICE ASHA MENON

Pronounced on: 18th August, 2021

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Whether bar U/S 8 Of Commercial Courts Act On Revision Application is Applicable To Petitions Under Article 227?

  We are of the view that once the Commercial Courts Act has expressly barred the remedy of a revision application under Section 115 of the CPC, with respect to the suits within its ambit, the purpose thereof cannot be permitted to be defeated by opening up the gates of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The scope and ambit of a petition under Article 227 is much wider than the scope and ambit of a revision application under Section 115 of the CPC; whatever can be done in exercise of powers under Section 115 of the CPC, can also be done in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. Allowing petitions under Article 227 to be preferred even against orders against which a revision application under Section 115 CPC would have been maintainable but for the bar of Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act, would nullify the legislative mandate of the Commercial Courts Act. Recently, in Deep Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (2020) 15 SCC 706, in the context of petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with respect to orders in an appeal against an order of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, it was held that if petitions under Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under the Arbitration Act were entertained, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. It was observed that though Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by an non-obstante Clause 5 of the Arbitration Act but what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing First Appeals under the Arbitration Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same taking into account the statutory policy, so that interference is restricted to orders which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction. Thus, though we are of the view that gates of Article 227

ought not to be opened with respect to orders in commercial suits at the level of the District Judge against which a revision application under CPC was maintainable but which remedy has been taken away by the Commercial Courts Act, but abiding by the judgments aforesaid, hold that it cannot be said to be the law that jurisdiction under Article 227 is completely barred. However the said jurisdiction is to be exercised very sparingly and more sparingly with respect to orders in such suits which under the CPC were revisable and which remedy has been taken away by a subsequent legislation i.e. the Commercial Courts Act, and ensuring that such exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court does not negate the legislative intent and purpose behind the Commercial Courts Act and does not come in the way of expeditious disposal of commercial suits.{Para 30}

31. We thus hold the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to be maintainable with respect to the order impugned in CM(M) No.132/2021. However the discretion, whether in the facts and circumstances such petition is to be entertained or not, having under the roster been vested in the Single Judge, we leave it to the Single Judge to exercise such discretion.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  CM(M) 132/2021 & CM No.5689/2021 (FOR STAY) 

BLACK DIAMOND TRACKPARTS PVT. LTD. & ORS.  Vs BLACK DIAMOND MOTORS PVT. LTD. 

CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

AUTHOR: RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J. 

Dated : 10th August, 2021.

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Whether S 12-A Commercial Courts Act on Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Is A Mandatory Provision?

Though, the word 'shall' in Section 12-A of the Act, sounds Prelitigation mediation is mandatory on the part of the plaintiff to explore Settlement before filing suit under Commercial Court Act, the Rule framed use the word 'Shall' and makes it an optional. Also even if one party go for pre-litigation mediation the other party may conveniently abstain from participating in the mediation and make it a non-starter. Even otherwise, mediator can proceed only if the both the parties appear and give consent to participate in the mediation process. Thus, it is very clear that on combined reading of the Commercial Courts

Act and the Rules framed thereunder, pre-litigation mediation is subject to urgency for any interim relief and the consent of the sparing parties.

25. In such circumstances, the Harmonious Interpretation takes us to the irresistible conclusion that Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, is not a mandatory provision. The right to access justice which is a Constitutional Right cannot be denied or deprived for not resorting to mediation. The Court is not

substitute to Alternative Dispute Redressal, it is otherwise. The litigant cannot be denied the doors of justice for directly approaching the Court without exploring the possibility of mediation. There can be no prejudice to the defendant, if the defendant is ready for mediation, even after Institution of the suit. Also there is no impediment either for the party or for the Court to refer the pending matter to be resolved through mediation or any other Alternative Dispute Redressal mechanism. This provision is meant for the parties to work out an amicably settlement without involving in the adversary system of litigation. The intention of this Section is not to prevent access to justice or to aid anyone who refuse to subject himself to the judicial process. The intention is to avoid the procedural rigor and to arrive an amicable win-win settlement. Any other interpretation to Section 12-A of the Act contrary to the intention will amount to miscarriage of Justice. Therefore, this Court holds that there is no ground to entertain this Application seeking rejection of plaint. Hence, Application is dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/-.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

 A.No.35 of 2021 in C.S.No.669 of 2019

Shahi Exports Pvt Ltd. Vs  Gold Star Line Limited,

Coram:

 DR. JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN

Pronounced on : 17.08.2021

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Supreme Court has Suo motto extended limitation of all proceedings from 14-3-2021 till further orders.

 We also take judicial notice of the fact that the steep

rise in COVID-19 Virus cases is not limited to Delhi alone but

it has engulfed the entire nation. The extraordinary situation

caused by the sudden and second outburst of COVID-19 Virus,

thus, requires extraordinary measures to minimize the hardship

of litigant–public in all the states. We, therefore, restore

the order dated 23rd March, 2020 and in continuation of the

order dated 8th March, 2021 direct that the period(s) of

limitation, as prescribed under any general or special laws

in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,

whether condonable or not, shall stand extended till further

orders.

It is further clarified that the period from 14th March,

2021 till further orders shall also stand excluded in

computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any

other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for

instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court

or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

We have passed this order in exercise of our powers under

Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of

India. Hence it shall be a binding order within the meaning of

Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and Authorities.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Miscellaneous Application No. 665/2021 in SMW(C) No. 3/2020

IN RE COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION 

Date : 27-04-2021 This Application was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA

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Supreme Court: Commercial courts Act does not excludes application of S 5 of limitation Act

 The vexed question which faces us is whether, first and foremost,

the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, as has been argued by Dr. George. The first important thing to note is that section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain any provision akin to section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act only provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order appealed against, without further going into whether delay beyond this period can or cannot be condoned.{Para 33}

34. It may also be pointed out that though the object of expeditious disposal of appeals is laid down in section 14 of the Commercial Courts Act, the language of section 14 makes it clear that the period of six months spoken of is directory and not mandatory. By way of contrast, section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act read with the Schedule thereof and the amendment made to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, would make it clear that the defendant in a suit is given 30 days to file a written statement, which period cannot be extended beyond 120 days from the date of service of the summons; and on expiry of the said period, the defendant forfeits the right to file the written statement and the court cannot allow the written statement to be taken on record. 

 Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, by way of

contrast, applies an intermediate period of 60 days for filing an appeal, that is, a period that is halfway between 30 days and 90 days provided by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act.

41. For all these reasons we reject the argument made by Shri George that the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded given the scheme of Commercial Courts Act.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 995 OF 2021

GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA Vs M/S BORSE BROTHERS ENGINEERS & CONTRACTORS PVT. LTD

Author: R.F. Nariman, J.

Dated: March 19, 2021.

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Questions and answers on law part 16

Q. 1:-Whether Tender contract comes under commercial dispute under Commercial Courts Act?

Ans:  Commercial Courts Act

2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—(c) “commercial dispute” means a dispute arising out of—

(vi) construction and infrastructure contracts, including tenders;

Q. 2 :- Whether civil revision is tenable if court fails to award costs while deciding suit?

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Whether Order Of Commercial Court U/Sec 9 Of Arbitration & Conciliation Act is Appealable?

Is an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Arbitration

Act') by a Commercial Court appealable under Section 13(1) of

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the

Commercial Courts Act')? This question essentially falls for

consideration in the instant case.

In

the instant case, the impugned order is an order of injunction. It

is appealable under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908. It is an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration

Act. It is also appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act states that an appeal shall

lie from an order granting or refusing to grant any measure

under Section 9 of the said Act. Right of appeal is the creature of

a statute. It is well settled that right of appeal is a substantive

right. Nothing contained in Section 13(1) or Section 13(2) of the

Commercial Courts Act curtails this right of appeal.

21. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the heading of

the unamended Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act also

read as “Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and

Commercial Divisions”. There was a proviso to unamended

Section 13(1) of the Act which now stands as the proviso to

Section 13(1A) of the Act. This proviso restricts the right of

appeal from orders that are specifically enumerated under Order

XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 37 of the

Arbitration Act. If the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioners is accepted, the proviso to Section 13(1A) of the

Commercial Courts Act would be meaningless.

22. The scope of the proviso to the unamended Section

13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, which now stands as the

proviso to Section 13(1A) of the Act, was considered by the

Supreme Court in Kandla Export Corporation v. M/s OCI

Corporation : (2018) 14 SCC 715 and it was held as follows:

“Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act,

with which we are immediately concerned in

these appeals, is in two parts. The main provision

is, as has been correctly submitted by Shri Giri, a

provision which provides for appeals from

judgments, orders and decrees of the

Commercial Division of the High Court. To this

main provision, an exception is carved out by the

proviso. ..... The proviso goes on to state that an

appeal shall lie from such orders passed by the

Commercial Division of the High Court that are

specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the

Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and Section

37 of the Arbitration Act. It will at once be

noticed that orders that are not specifically

enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC would,

therefore, not be appealable, and appeals that

are mentioned in Section 37 of the Arbitration

Act alone are appeals that can be made to the

Commercial Appellate Division of a High Court”.

23. Moreover, in order to find out whether an appeal

against an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act is

maintainable or not, the provisions of the said Act have to be

looked into. There is no independent right of appeal provided

under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act. It merely

provides the forum of filing appeals. Section 37(1) (b) of the

Arbitration Act creates the right to file an appeal against an order granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9 of the said Act. It is the parameters of Section 37(1) of the Arbitration Act alone which have to be looked at in order to determine whether an appeal against an order under Section 9 of the said Act is maintainable or not (See BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC  Limited : (2020) 4 SCC 234).

24. The question whether the proviso in Section 13 of the

Commercial Courts Act applies only to Section 13(1A) or whether

it applies to Section 13(1) also, does not arise for consideration

in the instant case. The reason is that, the order impugned in this

original petition, is an order passed under Section 9 of the

Arbitration Act and therefore, appealable under Section 37 of the

said Act, which is specifically mentioned in the proviso.

25. The discussion above leads to the conclusion that an

order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 passed by a Commercial Court below the level of a District

Judge is appealable under Section 13(1) of the Commercial

Courts Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 OP(C).No.1467 OF 2020

 PRANATHMAKA AYURVEDICS PVT LTD. Vs COCOSATH HEALTH PRODUCTS

Coram: MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

Dated this the 24th day of November, 2020

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Bombay HC: Commercial court should not set aside no written statement order by condoning the delay of 103 days in suit transferred from regular court to commercial court

 The issue raised in this petition is, as to "whether a suit transferred from the regular Court to the Commercial Court, in view of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), would enable the Commercial Court to set aside the "No WS" Order by condoning delay of 103 days."

15. I find that, section 15(3) reproduced above would clearly indicate that the Commercial Court takes over the commercial suit after transfer and proceeds thereafter under the scheme of the Act. The very purpose and object of establishing the Commercial Courts, was to ensure that, the delay is eliminated and a speedy trial is achieved. There is no provision permitting the Commercial Court to move backwards and revert to an earlier stage for overcoming a legal impediment and then again leap forward. If the Commercial Court is to go backwards to set aside the "No WS" Order and then move forward by taking such a WS on record, it would defeat the very purpose for which the Act was introduced.

 In Mira Gehani, in paragraph No. 89, this Court has concluded that the Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that, considerations of equity cannot be ground/reason/justification not to follow the law, as is laid down by the legislature. In paragraph 91, this Court then concluded that, the aforesaid judgments merely indicate that, no matter, how harsh the result, if a statute stipulates that, an act must be performed within a certain period of time, and provides for no exceptions, then the Courts must not allow such an act to be performed after the expiry of the time mandated by the statute directly or indirectly.

31. In the backdrop of the law, as is settled, if the contentions of the petitioners is accepted, that even if the suit has been transferred, after the "no WS" order is passed and when no application is pending, would not preclude the Commercial Court to set aside the "no WS" order and permit filing of the written statement, this would completely nullify the intent and object of the legislature in introducing the commercial Courts Act. The Commercial Court would then be bestowed with the status of a "non-commercial Court", which is impermissible in law.

32. In view of the above, this Petition, being devoid of merit, is therefore, dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

W.P. No. 7520 of 2019

Decided On: 01.08.2019

Raj Process Equipments and Systems Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs.

Honest Derivatives Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3846/2019,2020(2) MHLJ 78.

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Important provisions of Commercial courts Act 2015

1. Short title, extent and commencement.

2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—(c) “commercial dispute” means a dispute arising out of—

(i) ordinary transactions of merchants, bankers, financiers and traders such as those relating to mercantile documents, including enforcement and interpretation of such documents;

(ii) export or import of merchandise or services;

(iii) issues relating to admiralty and maritime law;

(iv) transactions relating to aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft equipment and helicopters, including sales, leasing and financing of the same;

(v) carriage of goods;

(vi) construction and infrastructure contracts, including tenders;

(vii) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce;

(viii) franchising agreements;

(ix) distribution and licensing agreements;

(x) management and consultancy agreements;

(xi) joint venture agreements;

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Commercial courts Act(Maharashtra govt gazette notification)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lOGG6Nax1i6o2smvMZPPtTSL6pjz0uXf/view?usp=sharing
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YPh4Je-xl01hyChm1hQAF_GBMB7z7P5e/view?usp=sharing

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When agreement relating to immovable property can be termed as commercial dispute?

In view of the above, it becomes clear that the dispute raised by respondent no. 1 in the suit for specific performance against the petitioners is covered under the definition of commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) read with Explanation (a) of the Act of 2015. This is particularly so, when the said agreement is read with the Memorandum of Understanding, also of the same date, executed between the parties showing beyond any doubt that the agreement relates to immovable property, which is to be used exclusively in trade or commerce. The respondent no. 1 has not denied and, in fact, it has accepted before this Court about the existence of the said Memorandum of Understanding executed between the parties. It is evident that the parties entered into the agreement to develop the property in question by undertaking construction activity or to further sell the same for commercial gains, in terms of the very objects of the two parties i.e. petitioner no. 1 and respondent no. 1. There is no dispute about the fact that the "commercial dispute" between the parties is beyond the amount of Rs. 1 Crore.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4080 of 2018

Decided On: 08.02.2019

Kanchanganga Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Monarch Infrastructure Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 953

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