For Section 9 to be excluded, there must be a specific agreement between the parties, ousting the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 9. Simply put, there must be something more than an Arbitration Agreement being governed by foreign law and with a foreign seat. The Agreement must indicate in clear and express terms that the parties intended to exclude the operation of Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act. Merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law or the seat of the arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot be construed to mean that the parties agreed to exclude the application of Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and thereby close the gates to a party to approach this court thereunder. If I was to accept the submission of Mr. Andhyarujina, namely, that because the Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, the same would amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, it would effectively mean that in all foreign seated arbitrations, Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act would stand excluded. This would effectively mean that the proviso to Section 2(2) would be a dead letter. In fact, the interpretation of Mr. Andhyarujina would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was brought on the statute book i.e. to permit parties to an arbitration to be held outside India to approach the Courts in India inter alia under Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and seek interim relief, pending the said foreign seated arbitration. In fact, the reason why the aforesaid provision was brought on the statute book can be discerned from the discussion on this subject by the Law Commission in its 246th Report. The relevant portion of this Report reads as under:—
“While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations, the Commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic.
(i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a “judgment” or “decree” for the purposes of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it. That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realize that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company.
(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. It is for this very reason that I have opined that merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act.
In the High Court of Bombay
(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)
Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.
Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 22272 of 2021
Decided on December 13, 2021
Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 5481
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