Showing posts with label seat of arbitration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label seat of arbitration. Show all posts

Friday, 4 July 2025

Supreme Court Clarifies Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Arbitration: The Disortho v. Meril Landmark Ruling

 The Supreme Court of India recently delivered a significant judgment in Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited,2025 INSC 352,ARBITRATION PETITION NO.48 OF 2023,dated: MARCH 18, 2025that provides crucial clarity on determining jurisdiction in international commercial arbitration when contractual clauses conflict. This March 2025 ruling, authored by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, addresses one of the most complex issues in cross-border dispute resolution: which courts have the authority to appoint arbitrators when parties have chosen different laws and venues for their agreement.

The Contractual Dilemma

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Sunday, 13 February 2022

Whether court can direct interim relief of deposit of money while granting relief U/S 9 of arbitration Act?

 The second argument canvassed by Mr. Andhyarujina was that before any order of deposit is made, the principles underlying the provisions of Order 38 Rules 1, 2 & 5 must be complied with by the Petitioner. He submitted that in the facts of the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the Petitioner has complied with the aforesaid provisions and therefore the Petitioner is not entitled to an order of deposit. I do not think that this argument holds any substance. It is true that the broad principles of Order 38 ought to be kept in mind whilst passing an order under Section 9 for securing the amount in dispute in the proposed arbitration. As far as Section 9 of Indian Arbitration Act is concerned, whilst considering a relief thereunder, it cannot be said that the Court is strictly bound by the provisions of Order 38 Rules 1, 2 and/or 5. The scope of Section 9 of the Act is very broad and the Court has the discretion to grant thereunder a wide range of interim measures of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. Of course, the discretion to be exercised by the Court under Section 9 has to be judicious and not arbitrary. Though, for considering interim measures, the Court would be guided by the principles which the Civil Courts ordinarily employ for considering grant or refusal of interim relief, particularly Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 and Order 38 Rule 5, the Court, however, is not unduly bound by their texts. Whilst exercising its power under Section 9, the Court must have due regard to the underlying purpose of the conferment of the power in the Court which is to promote the efficacy of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. In an appropriate case, where the Court is of the view that there is practically no defense to the payability of the amount and where it is in the interest of justice to secure the amount, which forms part of the subject matter of the proposed arbitration reference, even if no case strictly within the letter of Order 38 Rules 1 or 2 is made out, though there are serious allegations concerning such a case, it is certainly within the power of the Court to order a suitable interim measure of protection. There is no requirement that for a relief of deposit, an ironclad case under Order 38 Rule 5 must be made out. The provisions of Order 38 are guides to a Section 9 Court and not fetters upon its discretion. To my mind, the position in law, is that, when there is a clear and unequivocal admission of liability or there is no real dispute with reference to the amounts payable, then in such a case an order of deposit may not only be made, but in the interest of justice, ought to be made. Where the defense raised is prima facie untenable and the Petitioner has a good chance of success, an order of deposit to secure the claim can and indeed should be made under Section 9. {Para 21}

22. In the view that I take, I am supported by several decisions of this Court. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Jagdish Ahuja v. Cupino Limited [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 849] held as under:—

“6. As far as Section 9 of the Act is concerned, it cannot be said that this court, while considering a relief thereunder, is strictly bound by the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5. As held by our Courts, the scope of Section 9 of the Act is very broad; the court has a discretion to grant thereunder a wide range of interim measures of protection “as may appear to the court to be just and convenient”, though such discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The court is, no doubt, guided by the principles which civil courts ordinarily employ for considering interim relief, particularly, Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 38 Rule 5; the court, however, is not unduly bound by their texts.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)

Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.

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Whether Indian courts should grant interim relief U/ S 9 of arbitration Act in foreign seated arbitration governed by foreign law?

 For Section 9 to be excluded, there must be a specific agreement between the parties, ousting the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 9. Simply put, there must be something more than an Arbitration Agreement being governed by foreign law and with a foreign seat. The Agreement must indicate in clear and express terms that the parties intended to exclude the operation of Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act. Merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law or the seat of the arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot be construed to mean that the parties agreed to exclude the application of Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and thereby close the gates to a party to approach this court thereunder. If I was to accept the submission of Mr. Andhyarujina, namely, that because the Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, the same would amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, it would effectively mean that in all foreign seated arbitrations, Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act would stand excluded. This would effectively mean that the proviso to Section 2(2) would be a dead letter. In fact, the interpretation of Mr. Andhyarujina would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was brought on the statute book i.e. to permit parties to an arbitration to be held outside India to approach the Courts in India inter alia under Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and seek interim relief, pending the said foreign seated arbitration. In fact, the reason why the aforesaid provision was brought on the statute book can be discerned from the discussion on this subject by the Law Commission in its 246th Report. The relevant portion of this Report reads as under:—

“While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations, the Commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic.

(i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a “judgment” or “decree” for the purposes of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it. That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realize that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company.

(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. It is for this very reason that I have opined that merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)

Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.

Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 22272 of 2021

Decided on December 13, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 5481

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Sunday, 30 August 2020

Whether court can treat exclusive jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction upon the court of a particular place as the seat of arbitration?

 Now, coming to the primary bone of contention between the parties, i.e., whether this Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. The parties are ad idem that although the cause of action arose at Aurangabad, Maharashtra, this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the present petition if it is found that Delhi was designated as the seat of arbitration by the parties. On this aspect, the petitioner contends that the Delhi was indeed designated as the seat of arbitration as the parties had specifically agreed to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the courts at Delhi in all arbitration proceedings. On the other hand, it is the respondent's stand that the parties never agreed upon a seat of arbitration in the Work Order and that, therefore, only the Court, within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose, would be a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) read with Sections 16-20 of the Act, thereby rendering it competent to decide the present petition.

11. Having carefully examined the arbitration clause, I find that the sentence 'The courts of law at Delhi alone shall have the jurisdiction.' ensconced therein contains the key to the riddle, insofar as it is a clear expression of the parties' intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction in all arbitrations arising out of the Work Order, upon the courts at Delhi. The respondent's interpretation of the arbitration clause and opposition to vesting of jurisdiction in Delhi courts arises from its contention that the arbitration clause never provided for a seat of arbitration. In my view, the absence of the term 'seat' while referring to the courts at Delhi, does not alter the significant fact that the courts of law at Delhi alone have been vested with the jurisdiction upon arbitration proceedings arising out of the subject Work Order. In fact, on this ground alone, if the respondent's plea were to be accepted and this Court were to disregard the entire phrase "The courts of law at Delhi alone shall have the jurisdiction" within the arbitration clause, it would render a vital portion of the clause meaningless and futile.

12. Ultimately, the law does not prohibit parties from agreeing to confer exclusive jurisdiction in respect of arbitration proceedings, on mutually preferred, neutral seats. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, the clear expression of intent within the arbitration clause to confer jurisdiction on the courts at Delhi helps cull out the fact that the parties chose Delhi as a neutral seat of arbitration. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

ARB. P. 218/2020

Decided On: 21.07.2020

Hamdard Laboratories (India)  Vs.  Sterling Electro Enterprises

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rekha Palli, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1403/2020
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Sunday, 5 January 2020

Supreme Court: Venue of Arbitration will be seat of Arbitration in absence of contrary intention of parties

 It will thus be seen that wherever there is an express designation of a
“venue”, and no designation of any alternative place as the “seat”,
combined with a supranational body of rules governing the arbitration,
and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable conclusion is
that the stated venue is actually the juridical seat of the arbitral proceeding.{Para 63}

On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it may be concluded that
whenever there is the designation of a place of arbitration in an arbitration
clause as being the “venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the
expression “arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the
“venue” is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, as the aforesaid
expression does not include just one or more individual or particular
hearing, but the arbitration proceedings as a whole, including the
making of an award at that place. This language has to be contrasted
with language such as “tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts
or the parties” where only hearings are to take place in the
“venue”, which may lead to the conclusion, other things being equal,
that the venue so stated is not the “seat” of arbitral proceedings, but
only a convenient place of meeting. Further, the fact that the arbitral  proceedings “shall be held” at a particular venue would also indicate
that the parties intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a particular
place, signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the arbitral proceedings.
This, coupled with there being no other significant contrary
indicia that the stated venue is merely a “venue” and not the “seat” of
the arbitral proceedings, would then conclusively show that such a
clause designates a “seat” of the arbitral proceedings. In an International
context, if a supranational body of rules is to govern the arbitration,
this would further be an indicia that “the venue”, so stated, would
be the seat of the arbitral proceedings. In a national context, this
would be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996 as applying to the
“stated venue”, which then becomes the “seat” for the purposes of arbitration.{Para 84}

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9307 OF 2019

BGS SGS SOMA JV  Vs  NHPC LTD.

Dated:December 10, 2019
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Saturday, 24 November 2018

Whether rate of interest in international commercial Arbitration will be governed by law of seat of arbitration?

 'Interest' is defined as "the return or compensation for the use or retention by one person for a sum of money belonging to or owned by any reason to another"1. In essence, an award of Interest compensates a party for its forgone return on investment, or for money withheld without a justifiable cause.

The current practice of awarding Interest in international commercial arbitrations is riddled with inconsistencies, and is criticized for lack of uniformity In international contracts, there is no consensus on the method or rate of awarding Interest.

4. In an international commercial arbitration, in the absence of an agreement between the parties on Interest, the rate of Interest awarded would be governed by the law of the Seat of arbitration.

The rate of interest awarded must correspond to the currency in which the award is given, and must be in conformity with the laws in force in the lex fori.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10394 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 25819 of 2018)

Decided On: 11.10.2018

Vedanta Ltd. Vs. Shenzen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2018 SC 4773
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Saturday, 6 October 2018

What is difference between place and seat of arbitration?

 The word 'determination' has to be contextually determined. When a 'place' is agreed upon, it gets the status of seat which means the juridical seat. We have already noted that the terms 'place' and 'seat' are used interchangeably. When only the term 'place' is stated or mentioned and no other condition is postulated, it is equivalent to 'seat' and that finalises the facet of jurisdiction. But if a condition precedent is attached to the term 'place', the said condition has to be satisfied so that the place can become equivalent to seat. In the instant case, as there are two distinct and disjunct riders, either of them have to be satisfied to become a place. As is evident, there is no agreement. As far as determination is concerned, there has been no determination. In Ashok Leyland Limited and State of T.N. and Anr. MANU/SC/0020/2004 : (2004) 3 SCC 1, the Court has reproduced the definition of 'determination' from Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition by Aiyar, P. Ramanatha and Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. The relevant paragraphs read thus:

Determination or order--The expression 'determination' signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. The expression 'order' must have also a similar meaning, except that it need not operate to end the dispute. Determination or order must be judicial or quasi-judicial. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmi Chand MANU/SC/0277/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 677, 680 (Constitution of India, Article 136).

A 'determination' is a 'final judgment' for purposes of appeal when the trial court has completed its adjudication of the rights of the parties in the action. Thomas Van Dyken Joint Venture v. Van Dyken 90 Wis 236 : 27 NW 2d 459, 463.

The said test clearly means that the expression of determination signifies an expressive opinion. In the instant case, there has been no adjudication and expression of an opinion. Thus, the word 'place' cannot be used as seat. To elaborate, a venue can become a seat if something else is added to it as a concomitant. But a place unlike seat, at least as is seen in the contract, can become a seat if one of the conditions precedent is satisfied. It does not ipso facto assume the status of seat. Thus understood, Kuala Lumpur is not the seat or place of arbitration and the interchangeable use will not apply in stricto sensu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4628 of 2018

Decided On: 25.09.2018

Union of India (UOI)  Vs. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.M. Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

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Tuesday, 19 December 2017

Whether parties can exclude jurisdiction of any court by arbitration agreement?

Supreme Court in the case of Indus Mobile has indeed laid down as a matter of law that any agreement between the parties as to the seat of arbitration is in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. This exclusive jurisdiction cause would then oust the jurisdiction of any other court having concurrent jurisdiction. Further, such exclusive jurisdiction clause would forbid Section 42 having any play for the purpose of determination of jurisdiction of the Court. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Associated Contractors MANU/SC/0793/2014 : (2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases 32, where the agreement between the parties restricted jurisdiction to only one particular court out of courts having concurrent jurisdiction, that court alone would have jurisdiction, since neither Section 31(4) nor Section 42 contains a non obstante clause wiping out a contrary agreement between the parties. In other words, if there is a contrary agreement between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on one particular court, it is that court and that court alone which will entertain any challenge to an arbitral award. There is no difficulty thus far. The difficulty arises when we come to consider whether or not there is indeed a seat of arbitration fixed or agreed between the parties in the present case. It is important to note that a seat of arbitration, as observed by the Supreme Court in case of Indus Mobile, is a place chosen by or on behalf of the parties; it is designated either in the arbitration agreement or in the terms of the reference or reflected in the minutes of proceedings or in some other way as "place or seat of arbitration". As far as the agreement between the parties in the present case is concerned, there is indeed no place of arbitration chosen. If at all, the agreement points to a seat outside Mumbai inasmuch as the jurisdiction to arbitrate, under the agreement, is conferred on the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation for the cities of Kalyan & Dombivli, whose seat is indisputably beyond the city of Mumbai. Mr. Chinoy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, however, submits that in the face of this agreement, when this Court was approached under Section 11 of the Act, an independent arbitrator was chosen. It is submitted that this Arbitrator held the proceedings of the reference in Mumbai, with the concurrence of the parties and also declared his award in Mumbai. Learned Counsel submits that there being nothing contrary either in the agreement or in the minutes of proceedings or otherwise, the very fact that the meetings in the arbitration reference were held, and the award was made, in Mumbai, fixes the seat of arbitration in Mumbai. I am afraid that is not a correct way of ascertaining the seat of arbitration. The seat of arbitration, in the context of fixation of jurisdiction of the curial Court, is not the same as the venue where the arbitral forum held its sittings or the place where it made its award. In fact, there is a well known distinction between the venue of arbitration and seat of arbitration. Even if the parties by their contract designate any place as the seat of arbitration, the arbitral forum is free to hold sittings at any place other than the seat of arbitration. For that matter, all sittings can be held and even an award can be made, at a location outside the place of seat of arbitration. In the face of this distinction, the simple fact of conduct of arbitration reference or making of an award at a particular place, in this case, Mumbai, is neither here nor there. In the present case, the seat of arbitration having not been designated either in the contract between the parties or in the terms of the reference or in the minutes of proceedings or otherwise, the city of Mumbai cannot be termed as the seat of arbitration, going by the sheer conduct of meetings in the reference there. Even there, as a matter of fact, it is not disputed that some of the meetings in the arbitration references were actually held in Thane, within the jurisdiction of the District Court at Thane, though even that fact, on the reasoning discussed above, is hardly relevant.

5. In the premises, the combined effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Indus Mobile and Associated Contractors (supra), does not imply ouster of jurisdiction of the District Court at Thane. As noted above, it is not in dispute that the cause of action did arise in Thane and application/s under Part-I was/were infact made before the Court at Thane prior to the present arbitration petitions. The District Court at Thane, accordingly, has curial jurisdiction over the award within the meaning of Section 42 read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. It is the only Court to exercise jurisdiction in any challenge to the arbitral award, and not this Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Petition No. 372 of 2016, Notice of Motion (L) No. 1302 of 2016, Miscellaneous Application No. 193 of 2016 and Arbitration Petition No. 373 of 2016

Decided On: 05.07.2017

 Municipal Corporation for the city of Kalyan & Dombivli
Vs. Rudranee Infrastructure Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Gupte, J.
Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 753
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Sunday, 9 July 2017

Whether arbitration proceeding can be conducted at place where no cause of action accrued?

A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. 21. It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts.
 REPORTABLE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5370-5371 OF 2017

INDUS MOBILE DISTRIBUTION PRIVATE LIMITED … V
 DATAWIND INNOVATIONS PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS

Citation:AIR 2017 SC 2105,2018(1) MHLJ 104,(2017) 7 SCC 678
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Thursday, 25 May 2017

How to ascertain jurisdiction of court if there is change of venue of arbitration?



 A perusal of the record further indicates that the petitioner
had not controverted the contents of the letter dated 7th July, 2014
addressed by the respondent to the Indian Merchant's Chamber that
the parties had given a consent to change the venue from Pune to
Mumbai, as the same was convenient to both the parties and
accordingly the provision of paragraph 8.3 of the Selling Agency
Agreement dated 22nd January, 2010 in regard to the venue was
recorded as null and void. The said letter addressed by the
respondent in my view was in consonance with the suggestion made
by the Indian Merchant's Chamber. Both the parties had accordingly
accepted the said suggestion made by the Indian Merchant's
Chamber and had changed the venue from Pune to Mumbai. This
fact is also clear from the arbitral award made by the learned
arbitrator and more particularly in paragraph 1 recording
communication received by the Indian Merchant's Chamber from the

parties that notwithstanding a provision in the arbitration clause to the
effect that the venue of arbitration shall be Pune, the parties had
agreed to Mumbai being the venue.
32. A perusal of this arbitration petition filed by the petitioner
and more particularly paragraph 17 clearly indicates that it is the case
of the petitioner itself that the venue of the arbitral proceedings was
Mumbai. In the entire petition, the petitioner has not challenged the
award on the ground that the learned arbitrator had wrongly recorded
that the parties had communicated to the office of the Indian
Merchant's Chamber that notwithstanding a provision in the
arbitration clause to the effect that the venue of arbitration shall be
Pune, the parties had agreed to Mumbai being the venue. In my view,
the petitioner therefore, cannot be allowed to urge now that what was
agreed between the parties in the correspondence exchanged
between the parties inter-se and with the Indian Merchant's Chamber
that the suit / place of arbitration was changed from Pune to Mumbai
and not the venue of arbitration from Pune to Mumbai. In my view,
this submission of the petitioner is contrary to the agreement arrived
at between the parties by correspondence for change of venue from
Pune to Mumbai and also contrary to their own submission made in
paragraph 17 of the arbitration petition. The submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner is thus devoid of merits and is
accordingly rejected. In my view, this Court has thus no territorial
jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the present arbitration
petition. In my view, the only appropriate Court in Pune will have
jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the present petition.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.1457 OF 2015
Unitech Texmech Private Limited,  
V
 ATE Enterprises Private Limited, 

 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

 PRONOUNCED ON : 7TH APRIL, 2016
Citation; 2017(3) ALLMR 170
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Wednesday, 17 May 2017

Whether courts at Mumbai have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate arbitration proceeding if mumbai is seat of arbitration?

 A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.
21. It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. ... vs Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. ... on 19 April, 2017

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Rohinton Fali Nariman
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