Showing posts with label live-in-relationship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label live-in-relationship. Show all posts

Thursday, 17 March 2022

Whether a registered gift deed executed in favour of live in partner is void as it is for immoral consideration?

In our view, the whole approach of the trial Court and

First Appellate Court in this third round is completely

fallacious. If one may say the reasoning is based only on a

social belief that the man staying with a woman, who is not his

wife and giving his property to her is something immoral and

improper and she should not be the beneficiary of gift deed

even if the donor stands by the gift deed.

If one may say, even the belief of the original

plaintiffs and now the appellants before us is predicated on

this prejudice that they have an inherent right to get the

benefit of the properties as being the brothers of the

deceased and the lady who stayed with him, wife or not, is not

entitled for the same. It is in these circumstances that one

of the issues framed originally was also whether Pritam Kaur

enjoyed the status of a wife or not. In our view, if the donor

is making a gift out of his own free will and volition and is

the exclusive owner of the properties, it is nobody’s concern

as to whom he gives the properties to.

What is most material is that all the Courts have found

(i.e. three concurrent findings) that they are not ancestral

properties. This plea was really raised as an alternative in

the second round having failed to establish the reversionary

rights in the first round. That should have been the end of

the matter. The gift deed is a registered gift deed. The

common written statement filed by Gian Singh and Pritam Kaur

affirmed to the execution of the gift deed. The fact that they

did not step into the witness box is an incidence of Gian

Singh passing away and much later Pritam Kaur also having

passed away. That does not take the validity of the gift deed.

We are really not concerned with the moralistic issue whether

Pritam Kaur was actually married to Gian Singh as the second

wife or was she just living with him. There was undoubtedly

companionship and Gian Singh in his wisdom deemed it

appropriate to handover the properties through registered gift

deed to Pritam Kaur. In the written statement he did say that

she is his wife of 35 years’ standing.

We would in the end say that it is time that the Courts

get out of this mindset, or possibly may have got out of this

mindset by now on passing value judgments on relationships

between parties in determining either a testamentary or nontestamentary disposition so long as the document executed is

found to be validly executed. Some kind of a male chauvinistic

approach appears to have coloured judgments passed by the

trial Court and the First Appellate Court which is of course a

reflection of the mindset of the appellants before us.

We, thus, dismiss the appeal with costs and bring this

half decade of litigation to an end.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No.1731/2009

MOHINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. Vs MAL SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.

Dated: 09th MARCH, 2022

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Friday, 18 June 2021

Whether the concubine of a government servant can get a family pension if she continues to reside with him after the death of his wife?

 When there is a specific enactment of the Domestic Violence

Act, 2005, Rule 49 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 will take a

backseat, as Domestic Violence Act, 2005, will come to the driver’s seat and

the woman will have to be given protection and the Rule cannot supersede

the Statute mentioned supra. In the light of the Domestic Violence Act,

2005, if the live-in-relationship is established, then the woman attains the

status of a wife. The march of law happens only while considering the cohabitation

that, continues after the death of the first wife.{Para 13}

14. In a similar circumstance, a learned Single Judge of this Court in

the case of C.Sarojini Devi vs. The Director of Local Fund Audits,

Chennai, has held that, the second wife is entitled to payment of family

pension after the death of the first wife. For better appreciation, relevant

portion of the said judgment is extracted below:

“12. Even in the above judgment, the petitioner

therein had married the Government Employee during

the subsistence of the first marriage. The only difference

is that in that case, the first marriage got dissolved in the

year 2003 and the first wife died in the year 2005. This

Court took into consideration the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhannulal's case. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court, in the said case has held that Law

presumes in favour of marriageand against concubinage,

when a man and woman have co-habitated continuously

for a long time. By relying upon this judgment, this

Court held that after the dissolution of marriage with the

first wife and after her death, the petitioner therein was

living with the deceased Government servant till his

death. This was taken into consideration by this Court

and this Court held that the petitioner therein must be

considered to be the wife of the deceased Government

servant atleast after the dissolution of the first marriage

and the subsequent death of the first wife.

13. This Court is in complete agreement with the

proposition of law that has been enunciated in the above

judgment. It is very easy to brand the petitioner as a

concubine and deprive her of her livelihood. However,

the fact remains that the petitioner lived with the

deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy from the year 1975 up to his

death in the year 2009. This means that she lived with

him for nearly 34 years. The petitioner also gave birth to

three children. If the petitioner had made this claim

when the first wife is alive, then obviously the petitioner

will not be entitled for Family Pension, since her

relationship is not recognized by law.

14. The march of law happens only while

considering the co-habitation that continues after the

death of the first wife. That is the most crucial factor that

was taken into consideration by this Court while

granting the Family Pension to the petitioner in the case

cited supra. Even in the present case, the first wife died

on 02.04.1997. Thereafter, the petitioner lived with the

deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy till his death on 20.01.2009.

During this period, it can always be construed that the

petitioner and the deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy were

living as husband and wife and their long co-habitation

itself raises that presumption of marriage. Added to that

the deceased Dr.A.Chinnasamy had also nominated the

petitioner on 11.05.1999 to receive the Family Pension

after his death.


15. In the considered view of this Court, this

Court has to necessarily lean towards the presumption of

marriage rather than branding the petitioner as a

concubine. This will be the most appropriate way to deal

with the facts of the present case, if justice has to be

done to the petitioner.

16. In view of the above discussion, this Court

has no hesitation to quash the impugned order passed by

the first respondent on 01.02.2016 and accordingly, the

same is quashed. The first respondent is directed to pass

necessary orders and sanction Family Pension to the

petitioner with effect from the date of death of

Dr.A.Chinnasamy i.e., from 20.01.2009 and disburse the

arrears of pension to the petitioner, within a period of

twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of

this order. The petitioner shall be continued to be paid

with the Family Pension till her life time.”


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS


CORAM :

 MR.JUSTICE S.VAIDYANATHAN

W.P.No.5706 of 2021

Malarkodi @ Malar Vs. The Chief Internal Audit Officer,

Board Office Audit Branch,

DATED : 09.03.2021

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Thursday, 13 May 2021

When should the Court consider a Child Born In Live-in Relationship as Child Born To a Married Couple?

  It is for the woman to recognize and decide

on recognition of fatherhood of child. If she chooses

the preference to acknowledge the biological father

at the time of conceiving, the father has every right

to be recognized as a biological father. Woman alone

has the right of choice on her body and motherhood. It

is the time when she exercises the option on

conception that reckons - a child is born to a married

couple or unmarried couple. If at the time of

conception, she has not recognized the right of

fatherhood, in the context of JJ Act, a man has no

right to recognize himself as the biological father,

except with her consent and; she continues to be

recognized as an unwed mother for the purpose of JJ

Act. Decisional autonomy is the key in privacy

rights.Once a woman acknowledges the biological father

that cannot be questioned to deny the right of

biological father on the ground of want of legal

marriage. Any such denial would amounts to encroaching

up on her decisional autonomy and freedom to choose. JJ

Act intends to exclude only such biological father, who

became father without the consent of the woman. Thus in

the light of scheme of law as above there is no

difficulty in holding that a child born in a live-in

relationship also has to be construed as a child born

to a married couple. {Para 27}

KERALA HIGH COURT

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & DR.KAUSER EDAPPAGATH, JJ.


Dated this the 9th day of April, 2021


Author: A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.

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Tuesday, 20 April 2021

Whether Child Born In Live-in Relationship is To Be treated As Child Born To Married Couple for the adoption of a child under Juvenile Justice Act?

 Now, we turn to the facts of the case. The

child was born in a Government Hospital, Aluva.

Father’s name is disclosed to the hospital authority

and also to the local authority. Name of the child was

also given in the birth certificate. Birth certificate

shows the name of the father, mother and child.

Surname of the child reflects the name of the father.

Birth certificate is a crucial document for public

authority to verify that the child is born to a married

couple or not. It is not the duty of the Committee to

inquire about the legal status of the marriage as they

are not the competent authority to decide on such

status. Once it is found that the child is born to a

couple, for all practical purposes of JJ Act, inquiry

must be initiated as though the child belonged to a

married couple. {Para 28 }

29. Under Regulation 7(5) of the Adoption

Regulations, if a child born to a married couple is

surrendered, both parents have to sign a deed of

surrender. If surrender is by one parent and the

whereabouts of the other parent are not known, the

child shall be treated as an abandoned child

[Regulation 7(6)]. In the matter of abandoned child,

Regulation 6 will have to be followed. In this case,

no such procedure was adopted. Admittedly, the

procedure applicable to an unwed mother alone was

followed. That is legally unsustainable as the child

has to be treated as born to a married couple. The

declaration and issuance of certificate under Section

38 of JJ Act that the child is legally free for

adoption is possible only after conducting due enquiry

as contemplated under the Adoption Regulations. Due

enquiry procedure postulates an institutional decision

of the Committee treating the child as abandoned or

surrendered. The enquiry in this case must have been

an enquiry as contemplated for an abandoned child as

only one parent alone had executed the surrender deed.

30. Once the declaration under Section 38 is found

invalid, all consequential proceedings would also fall.

We paused for a moment to issue notice to the adopted

parents. We refrained from issuing notice as they

shall not come into contact with the biological

parents. That would be against the law laid down by

the Apex Court in Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union Of India

[AIR 1984 SC 469]. Further, we find no notice is

required to be sent to the adoptive parents as they

have no accrued or vested right prior to the

declaration under Section 38. If the entire

proceedings leading to Section 38 fall, consequently,

the adoption becomes illegal.

KERALA HIGH COURT

 A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & DR.KAUSER EDAPPAGATH, JJ.


Dated this the 9th day of April, 2021


A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.

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Sunday, 6 December 2020

Whether the court should give police protection to a couple if the married person is living with a spouse of someone else?


Counsel for the petitioners states that petitioner No.1 is a

lady, who shown to be wife of petitioner No.2 – Umardeen Khan.

However, it is informed that petitioner No.1 – Vakeela was married

to respondent No.5 - Talim and petitioner No.2 - Umardeen Khan

is also a married person. Now, wife of respondent No.5 – Talim,

Vakeela wants to live with petitioner No.2 - Umardeen Khan, who

is already married under the Muslim Law. A married muslim

woman cannot get married again unless she has been divorced.

Petitioner No.2 - Umardeen Khan is also married and the

documents, which have been placed on record, do not show that a

valid Nikah has taken place between the couple and only a

Nikahnama has been executed on the stamp paper of Rs.500/-

without being before any Mutwali nor there is a Nutfah read by

any Maulvi. There is Maulvi (Priest) to the Nikahnama, who has

signed the said Nikahnama. In the contents of the Nikahnama, it

is mentioned that the petitioners were living in live in relationship.

In the opinion of this Court, the married persons living with

somebody else spouse would be amount into committing an

immoral act and a seal of approval cannot be given by this Court

by directing the police to give them protection.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 4271/2020

 Vakeela Vs  State Of Rajasthan, 


HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

Order: 06/11/2020

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Sunday, 30 August 2020

Orissa HC: Live-in relationship by Same-sex couple is permissible under Domestic violence Act and woman in the said relationship is entitled to get the protection of the said Act


Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is hardly any scope to take a view other than holding that the petitioner has the right of self-determination of sex/gender and also he has the right to have a live-in relationship with a person of
his choice even though such person may belong to the same gender as the  petitioner.
Therefore, we allow the writ application (criminal) and direct that the petitioner and the daughter of the Opposite Party No.5 have the right to decide their sexual preferences including the right to stay as live-in partners.  The lady shall have all the rights of a woman as enshrined under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 57 of 2020


Chinmayee Jena @ Sonu Krishna Jena Vs State of Odisha 

P R E S E N T
 MR. JUSTICE S.K.MISHRA
AND
 MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO

Date of Judgment – 24.08.2020
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Saturday, 13 July 2019

Supreme Court guidelines for testing when live in relationship is in nature of marriage

We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression "relationship in the nature of marriage" Under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationships.

(1) Duration of period of relationship

Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression "at any point of time", which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.

(2) Shared household

The expression has been defined Under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, need no further elaboration.

(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements

Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long standing relationship, may be a guiding factor.

(4) Domestic Arrangements

Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or up keeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.

(5) Sexual Relationship

Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc.

(6) Children

Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties, therefore, intend to have a long standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication.

(7) Socialization in Public

Holding out to the public and socializing with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.

(8) Intention and conduct of the parties

Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2009 of 2013 

Decided On: 26.11.2013

 Indra Sarma  Vs.  V.K.V. Sarma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, JJ.

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Thursday, 8 November 2018

Whether persons of same gender are entitled to lead Live-in Relationship?

But, apart from the question whether two adult persons of the same gender can be permitted to be in relationship and can they be permitted to live together, a larger question arises as to whether the liberty of a person who had attained majority can be curtailed. In the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Sony Gerry V. Gerry Douglas (MANU/SC/0180/2018 : AIR 2018 SC 346) it was observed that;

"it needs no special emphasis to state that attaining the age of majority in an individual's life has its own significance. She/he is entitled to make her/his choice. The Courts cannot, as long as the choice remains, assume the role of parens patriae. The daughter is entitled to enjoy her freedom as the law permits and the Courts should not assume the role of a super guardian being moved by any kind of sentiment of the mother or the egotism of the father. We say so without any reservation."
7. With respect to permitting of 'live-in relationship' the hon'ble Supreme Court in Nandakumar and another V. State of Kerala and others (MANU/SC/0505/2018: AIR 2018 SC 2254) observed that, even if the parties are not competent to enter into the wedlock, they have the right to live together even outside the wedlock. It would not be out of place to mention that 'live-in relationship' is now recognized by the Legislature itself which has found its place under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Based on principles enumerated as above, this court cannot find that the 'live-in relationship' between the petitioner and the alleged detenue will in any manner offend any provisions of law or it will become a crime in any manner. On the other hand, if the jurisdiction vested on this court is not exercised, it will amount to permitting a violation of the Constitutional right to perpetrate.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP (Crl.) No. 372 of 2018

Decided On: 24.09.2018

 Sreeja S.  Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Thiruvananthapuram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.K. Abdul Rehim and R. Narayana Pisharadi, JJ.


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Sunday, 21 October 2018

Whether woman in live in relationship can claim maintenance under Domestic violence Act even if she was previously married?

Applying the said parameters to the present case, it is apparent that the witnesses have categorically stated that the applicant and respondent have already held themselves out to the world as being husband and wife and that too, significantly, for a long period of time. The evidence of the witnesses is not shattered to the said effect, except stating that the exact relationship between the applicant and husband was not known. It was never the case of the applicant that she was married to the respondent.

The learned Sessions Judge has placed heavy reliance on the judgment in case of Indra Sarma. However, on perusal of the peculiar facts in Indra Sarma (supra) where the Hon'ble Apex Court arrived at a conclusion that the wife who was aware that the husband is already married, cannot be said to be in relationship in the nature of marriage, but she was only referred to as a concubine or a mistress. The Court arrived at such a conclusion on the basis of the peculiar facts involved in the case and specifically in the backdrop of its observation that in the said relationship before the court, there was no projection of relationship in public. Further, there is no evidence of mutual support and companionship and also no evidence is brought on record about the sharing of resources and rather the woman in the said proceedings was not even allowed to have access to his bank account nor there were any joint bank accounts though the claim was that they were living under the same roof. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Indra Sarma can thus be distinguished and cannot cover the case in hand in the peculiar facts and circumstances involved. In the facts of this case, it can be seen that the applicant and respondent have held themselves to the world as husband and wife and not only that there was economic exchange between them and they were carrying out the said business of trading. The applicant categorically had stated in her evidence that her children were residing in the same house and they referred to the respondent as 'father' and rather accepted him as their father. It is her categorical statement that he had in fact helper her in raising the children and sharing the household expenses. It is the specific case of the applicant that whatever money she had received from her father for the marriage of her daughter, she had shared with the respondent since they were sharing a common household and thus, in this background, she is left with no money and left to a stage of vagrancy. In this background, she approaches the Court and claims maintenance for herself, since her children are on their own and they are no more supporting her. The attempt made on the part of the respondent to bring on record that prior to her first marriage, the applicant was living in relationship with some other person and had in fact claimed maintenance from the said person to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000/-, is of no assistance to the respondent since merely throwing a doubt on the character of a woman like the applicant would not make escape the liability, specifically when he has shared the same household with her and treated her like his wife for a period of approximately 15 years, which fact goes undisputed and has been corroborated by the witnesses.

8. In such circumstances, the parameters laid down in Indra Sarma cannot be made applicable to the present case in hand. Ultimately, the nature of relationship between the applicant and the respondent is a question of fact and degree and would have to be looked out from the said angle.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Revision Application No. 129 of 2017

Decided On: 05.04.2018

Jayashri Samshuddin Talapdar Vs. Samshuddin Karim Talapdar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Bharati H. Dangre, J.

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Wednesday, 1 August 2018

When woman in live in relationship can not claim relief under domestic violence Act?

Perusal of these decisions makes it abundantly clear that not
all the live in relationships are covered by the provision of Section 2 [f] of
the D.V. Act. It is only those which qualify to be the relationship in the
nature of marriage which are governed by that provision. In order to
constitute such relationship, a legal marriage between the two must be
possible.

11. There is one more aspect which needs such an interpretation
to be put to words 'relationship in the nature of marriage' contained in
Section 2 [f] of the D.V. Act. It is well recognized principle of
interpretation of statute that a statute should be interpreted in a manner
which would not promote illegality. It has made a provision to enable a
woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage to seek various remedies
under the D.V. Act. One cannot put an interpretation to Section 2 [f] of the
D.V. Act which would promote an adulterous relationship which is an
offence punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore,
these words will have to be interpreted in a conducive and harmonious
manner so as not to offend a penal provision contained in the Code.
Therefore looked at from this angle, one cannot interpret this provision
which would offend any law. The legislature in its wisdom has enacted the
Law so as to cover and protect not only a legally wedded wife but has gone
a step further to bring in its ambit a woman who has been in a relationship
in the nature of marriage. Use of word 'marriage' to qualify the relationship
is conspicuous and the only interpretation that can be put is that the
marriage between the couple must be legally possible. Any other
interpretation which would offend any other law would not be permissible.
12. Once it is clear that in order to enable the applicant to claim

any relief under the D.V. Act the relation between her and the respondent
No.2 was not in the nature of marriage, she is clearly not entitled to claim
any relief under that Act. Admittedly, on her own admission, her first
marriage was still in subsistence, and if that be so, she could not have
married legally with the respondent No.2 albeit he is a Muslim and his
personal law permits him to solemnize the second marriage. In view of
such state of factual matrix and the evidence, the observation and the
conclusion drawn by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge that the relationship
between these two did not fall into the 'domestic relationship' as defined
under Section 2 [f] of the D.V. Act is unassailable. The Revision is
dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 82 OF 2017
Reshma Begum W/o Gajanfar Kazi, 
V E R S U S
[1] The State of Maharashtra RESPONDENTS
[2] Gajanfar Kazi @ Jawed S/o Kazi

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.

Pronounced On : 25 July 2018
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Tuesday, 8 May 2018

Supreme court: live-in relationship is permissible in India

For our
purposes, it is sufficient to note that both appellant No. 1
and Thushara are major. Even if they were not competent to

enter into wedlock (which position itself is disputed), they
have right to live together even outside wedlock. It would
not be out of place to mention that ‘live-in relationship’
is now recognized by the Legislature itself which has found
its place under the provisions of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

‘REPORTABLE’
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 597 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4488 of 2017)

NANDAKUMAR & ANR. THE STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 
A. K. SIKRI, J.
Dated:April 20, 2018.
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Wednesday, 1 November 2017

When woman is not entitled to get residence order in domestic violence Act?

 A reading of the aforesaid provisions show that it creates an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under the "shared household" irrespective of her having any legal interests in the same. The direction, inter alia, can include an order restraining dispossession or a direction to remove himself on being satisfied that domestic violence had taken place.
 The facts of the present case are that the Respondent has never stayed with the Appellant in the premises in which she has been directed to be inducted. This is an admitted position even in answer to a court query by the Respondent during the course of hearing. The "domestic relationship" as defined Under Section 2 (f) of the D.V. Act refers to two persons who have lived together in a "shared household". A "shared household" has been defined Under Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. In order for the Respondent to succeed, it was necessary that the two parties had lived in a domestic relationship in the household. However, the parties have never lived together in the property in question. It is not as if the Respondent has been subsequently excluded from the enjoyment of the property or thrown out by the Appellant in an alleged relationship which goes back 20 years. They fell apart even as per the Respondent more than 7 years ago. We may also note that till 22.2.2010 even the wife of the Appellant was alive. We may note for the purpose of record that as per the Appellant, he is a Christian and thus there could be no question of visiting any temple and marrying the Respondent by applying "kumkum", and that too when the wife of the Appellant was alive.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2500 and 2502 of 2017

Decided On: 14.07.2017

 Manmohan Attavar Vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.
Citation: (2017) 8 SCC 550
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Sunday, 2 April 2017

Whether woman having live-in-relationship with married man is entitled to get interim maintenance?


The question that needs to be determined herein is: whether the respondent No. 1 would be entitled to maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. on account of live in relationship, not being a wife. There is no valid marriage between the parties as on the date the petition was preferred. There can be no dispute about the fact that the children being born out of this relationship would be entitled to receive maintenance. This Court, therefore, is not inclined to interfere regarding the quantum of interim maintenance that has been awarded by the Family Court to the children.
16. As regards maintenance that has been awarded to respondent No. 1, the Family Court has to determine whether or not the relationship was akin to a marriage or not. It has been argued before this Court that respondent No. 1 herein was aware of the fact that the petitioner was a married man and hence was legally not competent to enter into a matrimony, as has been alleged by the respondent herein. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that twins were born out of this relationship which would be of some indication that the couple had gone for this relationship to give it some permanence and that can entitle respondent No. 1 to claim interim maintenance, based on the evidence added. However, since all these matters are matter of evidence and the Family Court is seized of it, it would be in the interest of justice to allow the final orders to be passed, while reducing the amount of maintenance that has been awarded to respondent No. 1 to sum of Rs. 10,000, so that she is in a position to maintain herself.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Criminal Revision No. (F) 166 of 2015 (O&M)
Decided On: 23.11.2016
 Ajay Bhardwaj

Vs.
Jyotsna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jaishree Thakur, J.

Citation: 2017 ALLMR(CRI)Journal 43
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Saturday, 11 February 2017

Whether live in partner is entitled to get protection if one of partner has subsisting marriage?

Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P.2 it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations.”
6. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court the appellant (lady) had entered into the relationship knowing fully well that the man is married and therefore the Court declined to grant her any relief holding that the relationship would not be a relationship in the nature of marriage.
7. The ratio of Indra Sharma squarely applies on the facts of the present case for the reason it is admitted and pleaded in the writ petition that the second petitioner entered into a relationship with the first petitioner who is married and her marriage has not been dissolved by any competent court as on date, therefore, such a relationship cannot be granted any protection.
In the High Court of Allahabad
(Before Suneet Kumar, J.)
Kusum and Another 
v.
State of U.P. and 3 Others 
Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine All 988
Writ - C No. - 53503 of 2016
Decided on November 9, 2016
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Sunday, 19 June 2016

Whether Rape conviction is sustainable in case of Live-in Relationships?

 From the above testimony of the Prosecutrix, it can be seen that she
had been changing her version at every stage. The appellant Chaman was
well known to her. In her cross examination, she had admitted having
received ₹11,000/- from Chaman on 31.01.2010 but tried to explain it by
saying that he had given that money to change her statement in presence of
her counsel but on the way, he had taken back the said money. She has
admitted her thumb impression and signature on Ex.PW7/DA to DD.
Ex.PW7/DA is a writing dated 31.10.2010 acknowledging the receipt of
₹11,000/- from Chaman and agreeing to repay the same within one year.
This acknowledgement is bearing her signature as well thumb impression.
There is a friendship deed Ex.PW7/DD bearing photograph of the appellant
as well of the Prosecutrix attested by the Notary. In the said friendship deed
she mentioned that both of them are major and her male friend is about 18
years and she is aged about 25 years and in live-in relationship. Thereafter,
there is another document Ex.PW7/DB addressed to one Usha Kashyap
addressing her as Aunty wherein she has informed her that due to some petty
quarrel she made a complaint against Chaman though he did not rape her.
There is another communication Ex.PW7/DC addressed to the
Commissioner of Police requesting for withdrawal of her complaint
pertaining to FIR No.14/2011 under Sections 376/506/509 IPC PS Ashok
Vihar informing that no rape was committed and that she and appellant was
in live-in relationship.
24. From the above documents, which have not been considered in right
perspective by learned Trial Court, it is clear that the Prosecutrix who had
been living alone away from her husband in Delhi, was in live-in 
relationship with the appellant. She admitted having received ₹11,000/- on
31.10.2010 i.e. much prior to the alleged rape incident on the night
intervening 13/14.01.2011. Thus, her statement that this amount was paid to
her for changing her statement is falsified from the record.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Judgment Delivered on: May 26, 2016
 CRL.A. No.1466/2013
 CHAMAN Vs STATE .

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

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Thursday, 12 May 2016

Whether children are liable to provide 'welfare measure' to live-in-partner of their mother?

  The above argument though appears to be meritorious,


going by the nature of provisions in the Senior Citizens Act regarding


maintenance, these arguments would have a relevance if there is an


order to pay maintenance.        Further, the order passed by the


Maintenance Tribunal would show that it has passed the order in


terms of Section 2(k) of the Senior Citizens Act for providing "welfare


measures" rather than invoking provision for maintenance under


Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act. The welfare measures can be


imposed against any person, based on the accepted relationship


between the parties involving mutual obligations for a considerable


time though such persons may not have legal obligation to pay the


maintenance.    The maintenance, of course, can be ordered only


against the persons mentioned as 'children' or 'relative' as defined



under the Senior Citizens Act. Though, there is no special provision


for providing "welfare" to the senior citizen, the scheme of Senior


Citizens Act itself gives a room for the Tribunal to protect the


"welfare" of a senior citizen. It is open for the Tribunal to impose a


liability for providing "welfare measures" on whom the Tribunal


deems fit that it can be imposed, based on the accepted relationship


between the parties. Otherwise, the very purpose of the Act would


be defeated.    Thus, it has to be concluded that the direction as


ordered in the impugned order is only a direction to provide "welfare


measures" and not as maintenance and such measures can be


imposed against any persons, whom the Tribunal deems fit in


circumstances and for sufficient reasons, though, such persons would


not come within the ambit of 'children' or 'relative' as defined under


the Senior Citizens Act.    In this case, the facts disclosed clearly


establish that the mother of the petitioners and the petitioners had



an accepted relationship involving mutual obligations with the senior



citizen. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the writ petition must



fail and accordingly, the same is dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                            PRESENT:

                   MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

                FRIDAY,THE 18TH DAY OF MARCH 2016

                                   WP(C).No. 4981 of 2015 (W)
                                      -

         REJU, AGED 38, S/O.SEKHARAN,
      Vs      

        1. THE MAINTENANCE TRIBUNAL, 

        2. THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, 

        3. SASIDHARAN, AGED 50, 


      
                
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Sunday, 27 December 2015

Whether children of woman maintaining relation with married man are entitled to get maintenance under domestic violence Act?

Over all view of the evidence of all the witnesses and silence on the part of respondent no.2 on vital facts of the case, clearly indicate that respondent no.2 knew that the applicant was a married person and he had children from his wife. Respondent no.2 also knew that the applicant had been staying with his wife. Despite that, she had maintained relationship with the applicant. In my opinion, the said relationship cannot be relationship in the nature of marriage. Therefore, it cannot be said that respondent no.2 was "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the Act. She was obviously therefore, not entitled for any relief under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Learned Magistrate should have rejected her prayer. The appeal should have been dismissed by the appellate court. If respondent no.2 was not entitled for any relief under the Act, it follows that her children are also not entitled for the relief under the said Act. It is another thing that the children may be entitled for relief under section 125 of Code 
of Criminal Procedure.

Bombay High Court

Deepak @ Gajanan Ramrao ... vs The State Of maharashtra And Anr on 1 July, 2015

Bench: M.L. Tahaliyani
Citation; 2015 CRLJ4833 Bom
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Wednesday, 7 October 2015

Whether live in partner of husband will have more right over property than legally wedded wife after death of husband?

New Delhi: A woman doesn't have a claim to her partner's home over that of his wife, the Delhi high court has said in an important ruling on legal rights in a live-in relationship.
Justice Najmi Waziri on Tuesday came to the rescue of a 78-year-old widow, a US citizen, by restoring to her possession of a Greater Kailash property owned by her husband. The senior citizen, who now lives in the US, married an Indian businessman in 1963 and was forced to move court when she was ousted from her matrimonial home following her husband's death last year.
"A live-in or mistress or survivor in a bigamous relationship does not enjoy the status of marriage, hence she does not get the protection of law for maintenance," Justice Waziri said referring to Supreme Court rulings. The court made it clear that the US citizen, being the legally wedded wife of the businessman, had a better claim to his property over that of the live in partner.

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