Supreme Court: Sessions Court Must Order Victim Compensation In Cases Of Bodily Injury To Women And Children

On a reading of the order and judgment of the Trial

Court, which has convicted the appellant herein for the

offence, inter alia, under Section 376-D of the IPC except

imposing the fine of Rs.12,500/- (Rs.10,000/- + Rs.2,500/-),

we find that no direction for payment of victim compensation

to the second respondent/victim has been ordered. Such a lapse

on the part of Sessions Court would only delay payment of any

compensation under Section 357-A of the CrPC.

In the circumstances, we direct that a Sessions Court,

which adjudicates a case concerning the bodily injuries such

as sexual assault etc. particularly on minor children and

women shall order for victim compensation to be paid having

regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and based

on the evidence on record, while passing the judgment either

convicting or acquitting the accused. Secondly, the said

direction must be implemented by the District Legal Services

Authority or State Legal Services Authority, as the case may

be, in letter and spirit and in the quickest manner and to

ensure that the victim is paid the compensation at the

earliest.

There can also be a direction for payment of interim

compensation which could be made by the Sessions Court

depending upon the facts of each case.

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 13890/2024)

SAIBAJ NOORMOHAMMAD SHAIKH Vs  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

Dated: NOVEMBER 04, 2024.

Print Page

What are constitutional principles for safeguarding the interest of children?

 

Article 39 in Constitution of India

39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State

(e)that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength;

[In article 39 of the Constitution, for clause (f), the following clause shall be substituted through Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976]

(f )that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.

Print Page

Whether muslim mother can claim maintenance from her children U/S 125 of CRPC?

 Section 4(1) of the Act contains the provision for maintenance to the divorced woman from her children but this does in fact not debar the divorced Muslim woman from invoking the provision of Section 125 of Cr. PC against her children. Even under the Act the application of the provisions of Section 125 of Cr. PC has been contemplated and the Act has not specifically made any ouster of the application of Section 125 Cr.PC Section 5 of the Act has imposed one condition for the application of sections 125 to 128 of Cr. P C against former husband of the divorced Muslim woman but it is conspicuously silent as regards their application against others. The framework of the Act itself and the ratio decided in the case of Danial Latifi (supra) which we have discussed above will show that the Act itself is not a substituted measure of Section 125 of Cr. P C but in addition thereto. This suggests that the proceeding under Section 125 of Cr.PC against children of the respondent mother is quite maintainable despite the pendency of the proceeding under sections 3, 4 of the Act against her husband.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

C.R.R. No. 516 of 2001

Decided On: 10.12.2001

Makiur Rahaman Kha and Ors. Vs.  Mahila Bibi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.C. Sil, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/0390/2001.

Print Page

Whether Muslim children are entitled to claim maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC?

Clause (b) of Section 3(1) (supra) provides for grant of additional maintenance to her for the fosterage period of two years from the date of birth of the child of marriage for maintaining that child during the fosterage. Maintenance for the prescribed period referred to in Clause (b) of Section 3(1) is granted on the claim of the divorced mother on her own behalf for maintaining the infant/infants for a period of two years from the date of the birth of the child concerned who is/are living with her and presumably is aimed at providing some extra amount to the mother for her nourishment for nursing or taking care of the infant/infants upto a period of two years. It has nothing to do with the right of the child/children to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. So long as the conditions for the grant of maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. are satisfied, the rights of the minor children, unable to maintain themselves, are not affected by Section 3(I Mb) of the 1986 Act. Under Section 125, Cr. P.C. the maintenance of the children is obligatory on the father (irrespective of his religion) and as long as he is in a position to do so and the children have no independent means of their own. it remains his absolute obligation to provide for them. Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are concerned there is nothing in Section 125. Cr. P.C. which exempts a Muslim father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not affected by Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of Section 125, Cr. P.C. to the children only on the ground that they are born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125, Cr. P.C., cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. We do not find manifestation of any such intention in the 1986 Act to take away the independent rights of the children to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr. P.C. where they are minor and are unable to maintain themselves. Muslim father's obligation, like that of a Hindu father, to maintain his minor children as contained in Section 125, Cr.P.C. is absolute and is not at all affected by Section 3(1)(b) of the 1986 Act. Indeed a Muslim father can claim custody of the children born through the divorced wife to fulfil his obligation to maintain them and if he succeeds, he need not suffer an order or direction under Section 125, Cr.P.C. but where such custody has not been claimed by him, he cannot refuse and neglect to maintain his minor children on the ground that he has divorced their mother. The right of the children to claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. is separate, distinct and independent of the right of their divorcee mother to claim maintenance for herself for maintaining the infant children upto the age of 2 years from the date of birth of the concerned child under Section 3(1) of the Act. There is nothing in the 1986 Act which in any manner affects the application of the provisions of Sections 125-128 of the Cr.P.C, relating to grant of maintenance insofar as minor children of Muslim parents, unable to maintain I themselves, are concerned.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1197 of 1995

Decided On: 29.07.1997

Noor Saba Khatoon  Vs.  Mohd. Quasim

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. A.S. Anand and K. Venkataswami, JJ.

Author: Dr. A.S. Anand, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0827/1997.

Print Page

Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act 1956 (maintenance provisions only)

 Chapter III

MAINTENANCE

18. Maintenance of wife.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime.

(2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance,—

(a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her;

(b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband;

(c) 13[* * *]

(d) if he has any other wife living;

(e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere;

(f) if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion;

(g) if there is any other cause justifying her living separately.

(3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.

Print Page

Whether the court can direct DNA test in Criminal case U/S 498A of IPC?

 iii. In Inayath Ali v. State of Telangana, MANU/SC/1538/2022, the question before this Court was whether a DNA test of two minor children could be ordered by a Court, with a view to facilitate proof of allegations Under Sections 498A, 323, 354, 506 and 509 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. This Court speaking through Aniruddha Bose, J. at the outset took note of the fact that the dispute was essentially one relating to dowry related offences, and that paternity of the children of the complainant was not directly related to the allegations. The complainant therein sought for a direction to conduct DNA test of her two minor children, in order to establish that they were born as a result of her forced relationship with her brother-in-law. Rejecting the complainant's plea, this Court held as under as to the power of Courts to subject children to DNA testing, in proceedings in which their status is not required to be examined:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1308 of 2023 

Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Authored By : B.V. Nagarathna, V. Ramasubramanian

B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Decided On: 20.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0148/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

What is the test of eminent need?

 ii. In Bhabani Prasad Jena, this Court emphasised that a direction to use DNA profiling technology to determine the paternity of a child, is an extremely delicate and sensitive aspect. Therefore, such tests must be directed to be conducted only when the same are eminently needed. That DNA profiling in a matter relating to paternity of a child should not be directed by the court as a matter of course or in a routine manner, whenever such a request is made. The court has to consider diverse aspects including presumption Under Section 112 of the Evidence Act; pros and cons of such order and the test of 'eminent need' whether it is not possible for the court to reach the truth without use of such test. It was further declared that a Court may direct that a DNA test be conducted, to conclusively determine paternity, only when there is a strong prima-facie case in favour of the person seeking such a direction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1308 of 2023 

Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Authored By : B.V. Nagarathna, V. Ramasubramanian

B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Decided On: 20.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0148/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether the court can order DNA test of child to prove adultery of wife?

 Use of DNA profiling technology as a means to prove adultery:

11. With the advancement of science, DNA profiling technology which is a tool of forensic science can, in case of disputed paternity of a child by mere comparison of DNA obtained from the body fluid or body tissues of the child with his parents, offer infallible evidence of biological parentage. But, it is not always necessary to conduct a DNA test to ascertain whether a particular child was born to a particular person, however, the burden of proof is on the husband who alleges illegitimacy. He has to establish the fact that he has not fathered the child born to his wife which is a negative plea by positive proof in accordance with Section 112 of the Evidence Act.

11.1. A Family Court, no doubt, has the power to direct a person to undergo medical tests, including a DNA test and such an order would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty Under Article 21 of the Constitution, vide Sharda. However, the Court should exercise such power only when it is expedient in the interest of justice to do so, and when the fact situation in a given case warrants such an exercise. Thus, an order directing that a minor child be subjected to DNA test should not be passed mechanically in each and every case.

11.2. This Court has, while considering questions connected with Section 112 of the Evidence Act, consistently expressed the stand against DNA tests being ordered on a mere asking. Further, the law does not contemplate use of DNA tests as exploratory or investigatory experiments for determining paternity. The following decisions of this Court are highly instructive in determining the circumstances under which a DNA test may be ordered by a Court in matters involving disputed questions of paternity:

26. From the above discussion it emerges:

(1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course;

(2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained.

(3) there must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising Under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.

(4) the court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman.

(5) no one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1308 of 2023 

Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Authored By : B.V. Nagarathna, V. Ramasubramanian

B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Decided On: 20.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0148/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Supreme Court: Children's Right Not To Have Their Legitimacy Questioned Frivolously is Part Of Their Privacy Right

 The first factor, which, in our opinion, is of significance, is that in the judgment under appeal, blood sampling of the children was directed, who were not parties to the proceeding nor were their status required to be examined in the complaint of the Respondent No. 2. This raised doubt on their legitimacy of being borne to legally wedded parents and such directions, if carried out, have the potential of exposing them to inheritance related complication. Section 112 of the Evidence Act, also gives a protective cover from allegations of this nature. {Para 7}

8. In our opinion, the Trial Court as also the Revisional Court had completely ignored the said factor and proceeded as if the children were material objects who could be sent for forensic analysis. The other factor, in our opinion, which was ignored by the said two Courts is that the paternity of the children was not in question in the subject-proceeding.

9.  Merely because something is permissible under the law cannot be directed as a matter of course to be performed particularly when a direction to that effect would be invasive to the physical autonomy of a person. The consequence thereof would not be confined to the question as to whether such an order would result in testimonial compulsion, but encompasses right to privacy as well. Such direction would violate the privacy right of the persons subjected to such tests and could be prejudicial to the future of the two children who were also sought to be brought within the ambit of the Trial Court's direction.

The right of children not to have their legitimacy questioned frivolously in Courts of Law:

17. Further, children have the right not to have their legitimacy questioned frivolously before a Court of Law. This is an essential attribute of the right to privacy. Courts are therefore required to acknowledge that children are not to be regarded like material objects, and be subjected to forensic/DNA testing, particularly when they are not parties to the divorce proceeding. It is imperative that children do not become the focal point of the battle between spouses.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1308 of 2023 

Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Authored By : B.V. Nagarathna, V. Ramasubramanian

B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Decided On: 20.02.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0148/2023

Print Page

Whether Children Born Out Of Void Marriage Are Legitimate and are entitled to get service on Compassionate ground?

 Even if the narrow classification test is adopted, the circular of the

Railway Board creates two categories between one class of legitimate

children. Though the law has regarded a child born from a second marriage

as legitimate, a child born from the first marriage of a deceased employee is

alone made entitled to the benefit of compassionate appointment. The

salutary purpose underlying the grant of compassionate appointment, which

is to prevent destitution and penury in the family of a deceased employee

requires that any stipulation or condition which is imposed must have or bear

a reasonable nexus to the object which is sought to be achieved. The

learned Additional Solicitor General has urged that it is open to the State, as

part of its policy of discouraging bigamy to restrict the benefit of

compassionate appointment, only to the spouse and children of the first

marriage and to deny it to the spouse of a subsequent marriage and the

children. We are here concerned with the exclusion of children born from a

second marriage. By excluding a class of beneficiaries who have been

deemed legitimate by the operation of law, the condition imposed is

disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved. Having regard to the

purpose and object of a scheme of compassionate appointment, once the

law has treated such children as legitimate, it would be impermissible to

exclude them from being considered for compassionate appointment.

Children do not choose their parents. To deny compassionate appointment

though the law treats a child of a void marriage as legitimate is deeply

offensive to their dignity and is offensive to the constitutional guarantee

against discrimination.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.12015 OF 2018

UNION OF INDIA  Vs  V.R. TRIPATHI 

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud

Dated: December 11, 2018

Print Page

Whether children born out of void marriage are class 1 Legal heirs as S 8 of the Hindu Succession Act?

This Court in the matter of Laxmibai

and others vrs. Limbabai, reported in 1983 Mh.L.J.103, has

recorded a finding that the children born out of the marriage

which is void cannot be termed illegitimate one and they are

covered by the expression ‘son and daughter - class-I' for

Scheduled 8 of the Hindu Succession Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATER JURISDICTION

SECOND APPEAL NO. 269 OF 1992

 Shri Vishnu Laxman Padule Vs  Laxman Rama Padule,

CORAM: N.W.SAMBRE, J .

DATE : 9 JANUARY, 2020.

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 288

Print Page

Supreme Court: Court can grant compensation for loss of consortium to parents and children also under motor accident claim petition

 Learned counsel for the appellant has

submitted that Pranay Sethi has only referred to

spousal consortium and no other consortium was

referred to in the judgment of Pranay Sethi, hence,

there is no justification for allowing the parental

consortium and filial consortium. The Constitution

Bench in Pranay Sethi has referred to amount of

Rs.40,000/- to the ‘loss of consortium’ but the

Constitution Bench had not addressed the issue as

to whether consortium of Rs.40,000/- is only

payable as spousal consortium. The judgment of

Pranay Sethi cannot be read to mean that it lays

down the proposition that the consortium is payable

only to the wife.

39. The Three-Judge Bench in United India

Insurance Company Ltd. (Supra) has categorically

laid down that apart from spousal consortium,

parental and filial consortium is payable. We feel

ourselves bound by the above judgment of Three

Judge Bench. We, thus, cannot accept the submission

of the learned counsel for the appellant that the

amount of consortium awarded to each of the

claimants is not sustainable.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3093 OF 2020

THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Vs

SMT. SOMWATI 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

Dated:SEPTEMBER 07, 2020.

Print Page

Whether parties can dissolve marriage registered under Special Marriage Act by executing divorce deed on stamp paper?

It is the requirement of the statute that once having chosen to be spouses under the Special marriage Act, it is necessary for the parties to take recourse to the very law to even permanently severe the ties. In the instant case, although the marriage took place as mentioned hereinabove under the Special Marriage Act for the reasons best known to respondent No. 4, who claims to have got the purported document executed on the Rs. 100/- stamp paper before the Notary. That itself is raising question mark in relation to this very document. However, we are not presently to adjudicate upon the said issue and any claim made on the strength of the said document or any refusal that comes from the Respondent no. 4 claiming through this document, shall need to be presently denied. For the purpose of writ of habeas corpus, we have chosen not to permit reliance on the said document noticing the very question of validity of this document coupled with serious allegations of against mother of the applicant as all these can be sorted out by the respective parties in the appropriate proceedings.

In the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

(Before Sonia Gokani and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.)

Chavda Twinkle Vs  State of Gujarat

R/Special Criminal Application No. 2800 of 2020

Decided on July 17, 2020

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 1167

Print Page

Supreme Court: Court should grant maintenance to children alongwith aggrieved person in Domestic violence proceeding

Section 12(1) provides that an aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Act. Under the provisions of Section 20(1), the Magistrate while dealing with an application Under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 is empowered to direct the Respondent(s) to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. This may include but is not limited to an order for maintenance of the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order for maintenance Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 617 of 2019 

Decided On: 08.04.2019

 Ajay Kumar  Vs.  Lata and Ors.

Print Page

Important provisions of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

1. Short title, extent and commencement.
2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—
(d) “child” means any person below the age of eighteen years;

[(da) “child pornography” means any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child which include photograph, video, digital or computer generated image indistinguishable from an actual child, and image created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict a child;]

 Ins. by Act 25 of 2019, S. 2(a) (w.e.f. 16-8-2019).

(e) “domestic relationship” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005);

(k) “shared household” means a household where the person charged with the offence lives or has lived at any time in a domestic relationship with the child;

Print Page

ORDINARY TICKET PURCHASED WOMEN AND CHILDREN TRAVELLING ALONE CANNOT BE INSISTED TO LEAVE RESERVATION COMPARTMENT AFTER DAY TIME

Central Government Act

Section 139 in The Railways Act, 1989

139. Power to remove persons.—Any person failing or refusing to pay the fare and the excess charge referred to in section 138 may be removed by any railway servant authorised in this behalf who may call to his aid any other person to effect such removal: Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude a person removed from a carriage of a higher class from continuing his journey in a carriage of a class for which he holds a pass or ticket: Provided further that a woman or a child if unaccompanied by a male passenger, shall not be so removed except either at the station from where she or he commences her or his journey or at a junction or terminal station or station at the headquarters of a civil district and such removal shall be made only during the day.

Print Page

Whether children born to adoptee father prior to his adoption can inherit his property in Adoptive family?

 Since the succession has opened after the death of Laxman on 10th

January, 1987, therefore, succession has to be in accordance with

the Act and not as per Hindu law as all text, rule or interpretation

of Hindu law prior to commencement of the Act have ceased to

have any effect unless expressly provided for in the said Act. This

Court in a Judgment reported as Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo v.

Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo(1981) 4 SCC 613 held that a bare perusal of

Section 4 would indicate that any custom or usage as part of Hindu

law in force will cease to have effect after the enforcement of

Hindu Succession Act with respect to any matter for which

provision is made in the Act.

14. The principle that the Act will be applicable on the date succession

opens is well settled. Reference may be made to a judgment reported

as Bhanwar Singh v. Puran & Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 87, wherein this Court

held that the Act brought about a sea of change in the matter of

inheritance and succession amongst Hindus. Section 4 of the Act

contains a non- obstante provision in terms whereof any text, rule

or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of

that law in force immediately before the commencement of the

Act, ceased to have effect with respect to any matter for which

provision is made therein save as otherwise expressly provided.

15. Since there is no provision of denying the rights of succession to

the natural born son of an adoptee father, therefore, the succession

will be in terms of the provisions of the Act alone.

In my opinion, the fictional severance of ties with the

natural family would not mean that her children would

cease to be her children or can be considered to be not

her children by means of a legal fiction. If by virtue of

the definition in Section 3(j) even the illegitimate

children of a Hindu female have been given a right to

inherit her property, then it would not be permissible to

say that her legitimate children should be excluded

because they were born to her prior to the date of her

husband’s adoption. If, however, the Legislature had

specifically provided for this, then effect must be given

to such a provision and the wishes of the Legislature

respected. Where, however, there is no such clear

provision, such exclusion would appear to be against

the plain language of the enactment and it would not

be proper to come to any such conclusion.”

21. In view of the provisions of the Act which do not make any

distinction between the son born to a father prior or after adoption

of his father and that there is no provision which bars the natural

born son to inherit the property of his natural father, therefore, the

High Court has rightly upheld the rights of the sons of Laxman. In

fact, in the Full Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in Martand

Jiwajee Patil, it has been held that the natural father retains the

right to give in adoption his son born before his own adoption.

Therefore, if he has a right to give his son in adoption, such son has

a right to inherit property by virtue of being an agnate. There was

a full blood relationship between the three sons and the daughter

who was born after adoption. All the children of Laxman are

entitled to inherit the property of their natural father and mother in

accordance with the provisions of the Act as succession has opened

after the death of Laxman in 1987 and subsequently the mother in

the year 1992.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6642-6643 OF 2010

KALINDI DAMODAR GARDE  Vs MANOHAR LAXMAN KULKARNI 

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated:FEBRUARY 07, 2020.
Citation: (2020) 4 SCC 335

Print Page

Whether Court should permit DNA test against wish of grown up children?

If the major children are not co-operating with the DNA test on the ground of privacy, reputation and dignity, what will be the consequence in the appreciation of evidence of the case has to be kept in mind while any order is passed. No adverse inference can be drawn in the given case as the contesting parties are the husband and wife and not the children. When the children are major, surely they cannot be compelled to give blood sample in a civil proceeding where they were not parties. The case projected by the petitioner seems to be that if DNA test proves the petitioner is not the biological father of the said three children, the corollary is that the wife committed infidelity and there is adultery.

6. Thus the second aspect to be considered in this matter is whether for a just decision, DNA test is eminently needed. Here, it can be said that a DNA test is not a direct evidence but a fact from which an inference can be drawn. This is not a case where the test is the only safe route to reach the truth. If the paternity of the children is the issue in the proceeding, DNA test may be the only safe method. It is not so in this case. In the case of the three major children, after the passage of a long time, the DNA test cannot be used as a short cut to establish infidelity that might have occurred decades ago. Even an order to undergo DNA test itself may its own effect on the reputation of the children in the society and it is also to be considered that they are major children born during the existence of a valid marriage, who are not party to the original proceeding. They are also not party in this proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (FC) No. 556 of 2017

Decided On: 12.06.2018

E.C. Ramakrishnan  Vs.  Mrinalini and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Chitambaresh and K.P. Jyothindranath, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 (NOC) 255 Ker

Print Page

Important provisions of Information Technology Act 2000

The main objective of information technology Act was legal recognition of electronic commerce and to facilitate electronic filing of documents with the Government.

S 2.[(w) “intermediary”, with respect to any particular electronic records, means any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes;]

66-C. Punishment for identity theft.—Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly make use of the electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one lakh.

66-D. Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource.—Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource cheats by personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees.

Print Page

Whether children born out of void marriage can claim share in property of their parents during their life time?

 Thus, it is now made more than clear that, the children of a void marriage, though regarded as legitimate, such children would not be entitled to any share in the properties, which are ancestral coparcenary joint family properties of their parents. Their right to claim the share remains limited only to the extent of the separate property of their father, but in that property, they cannot make any claim during the lifetime of their father. Their right in the separate properties of their father will accrue only on the death of their father and, that too, by way of succession.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 737 of 2013, Civil Application No. 1729 of 2013 and Second Appeal No. 738 of 2013

Decided On: 30.07.2018

 Balkrishna Pandurang Halde Vs. Yeshodabai Balkrishna Halde

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 947

Print Page