Whether married daughters of landlord are his dependents for the purpose of claiming eviction of tenant?

 The court is of the view that the status of financial well-being of a landlord or his family members-wife and children, who were dependent upon him, is not the test of bonafide requirement. All that was to be seen was whether there was a suitable alternate accommodation available with the landlord, for him to use or for providing the same to his daughters. No such suitable alternate accommodation has been shown. The impugned judgment has misdirected itself in an inquiry about the landlord's, his wife's and of the business of the husband's of the dependent daughters' or their economic well-being or in concluding that simply because the daughters of the petitioner were married, "happy with their matrimonial life" and alternate accommodation was available with their respective husbands, therefore, there was no need for them to start their business or to ask their father to provide them an accommodation for business. {Para 20} 

Ordinarily, for a daughter, irrespective of her matrimonial status, her paternal/maternal home is always a psychological, physical and emotional sanctuary, a place to which she can relate and return to freely, irrespective of how far she is geographically located from her parents. The law provides for eviction of a tenant on the need of dependants. Married daughters are included among dependents of their parents, for commercial/residential space.5 The test in law is about the dependency of the children upon the landlord/landlady when the property of the parent is in question.

22. In the present case, the married daughters are dependent upon their father for space to start their business in Delhi. The dependency was not pleaded on the husbands. The petition is maintainable. The daughters' need continues, so does the need of the petitioner. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Should the court refuse an eviction decree to the landlord if the husbands of his married daughters have accommodation?

 The landlord wanted his property not only for his daughters but for himself also. Assuming that accommodation was available with the respective husbands of the two daughters, surely it was not expected of the father-in-law to take assistance of his daughters and request them to make available such space through their respective husbands, for him to start a business enterprise. And why should he? The law does not require him to do so. Would it not compromise his self-respect and affect delicate family relations? Furthermore, the nature of the proposed business could be discussed/re-assessed/altered at any stage when the accommodation was made available, the landlord was not required to indicate the nature of business he intended to initiate. {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Should a landlord have all information about the income and assets of his wife and disclose it before the court to seek eviction of a tenant?

 

 The impugned judgment then delves into the examination of nature of business being carried out by the landlord i.e. whether the hotel business was being run from 19 rooms to 13 rooms and how it was being run. It also doubted the credibility of the landlord on the ground that, since his family comprised only his wife and two daughters, he should have known the received income of his wife from her business of running a hotel. It further records that the hotel business was being run from the first and second floor of a building which was rented by the same Wakf-ul-aulad, to a partnership firm in which his brothers, sisters and sister-in-law were partners. The learned ARC inferred dishonesty and concealment on the part of the petitioner because he did not disclose these aspects and of his wife's business. {Para 11}

12. The court is of the view that the aforesaid inquiry was neither relevant nor necessary because for the purposes of a petition under section 141(1)(e) read with section 25B of the DRC Act, only the availability of suitable alternate accommodation is to be seen. It also presupposes that a husband has a right to know all details of his wife's business and financial affairs, as if the wife had no right to financial and business confidentiality or personal independence or privacy. There cannot be an assumption that the wife is subservient to her husband and is obliged to disclose to or share with her husband details of all her financials. In the present case, it was only to be seen: Whether a suitable alternate accommodation was available on the ground floor for the petitioner and/or his daughters for starting the business.

21. A wife is neither an appendage of nor an adjunct to her husband. Her identity does not merge with or get subsumed in her husband's identity. In law, she retains her individual entity. She retains her natural right to pursue her dreams, aspirations and the desire and need to be financially independent or otherwise do some meaningful social work. Idle luxuriation may not be the life-goal of many a woman or to be simply known as a rich man's wife. There is a certain self-worth which a person acquires by running her or his own business/commercial enterprise, vocation and professional activity. This aspiration cannot be questioned in proceedings for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Should a landlord disclose his entire financial transactions and file details of his income tax returns to prove his bona fide need for eviction of a tenant?

 

 The court is of the view that disclosure of his entire financial affairs by a tenant is neither essential in an eviction petition nor is it mandatory for the landlord to disclose all properties owned by her/him. Receipt of rentals from leased properties is a legitimate exercise. A plea of bonafide requirement has to be pivoted on the fact that the landlord had no other suitable alternative accommodation and there was a need for the same, not a mere wish. The landlord was not required to file details of his income tax returns and not filing the same along with the eviction petition would neither whittle away nor cast a doubt on the bonafide need, which is otherwise made out in the eviction petition.1 The "sufficiency" of income of a landlord or that he was well-off cannot be an issue for examination in eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act.2 For who can sit in judgment as to what is sufficient finance for a person or his/her family. There can be no check, hindrance or curtailment to aspirations of an individual.{Para 10}.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

Read full Judgment here :Click here

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Whether the rent control Court has jurisdiction to decide eviction of tenant proceeding instituted before amendment Act 2013 of S 83 of wakf Act?

 At the outset, the respondent has questioned the maintainability of the eviction petition before the learned ARC on the ground that under section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 only the Wakf Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to eviction of a tenant of a Wakf property, section 85 of the said Act bars jurisdiction of other courts in respect of the matters which the Wakf Tribunal is empowered to decide, therefore, the eviction petition could not have been decided or entertained by the learned ARC. Reliance is placed by the respondent upon the following judgments: Rashid Wali Beg vs Farid Pindari MANU/SC/1001/2021 : (2022) 4 SCC 414; Syed Amir Ali vs Anjuman-e-Maidan [CM(M) 521/2021 decided on 02.12.2021 by High Court of Delhi; and Mehnish Adil vs Delhi Wakf Board 2002 (286) DLT 654.

6. Refuting the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Gobindram vs Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf MANU/SC/0659/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 726, which while dealing with an eviction petition prior to the amendment of section 83 of the Wakf Act in November, 2013 held that an eviction petition against a Wakf property would also be maintainable before a Civil Court. In Rashid Wali (supra) the Supreme Court held as under:

"....45. Interestingly, the basis of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram was removed through an amendment under Act 27 of 2013. As we have stated elsewhere, Ramesh Gobindram sought to address the question whether a Waqf Tribunal was competent to entertain and adjudicate upon disputes regarding eviction of persons in occupation of what are admittedly waqf properties. Since this Court answered the question in the negative, Section 83(1) was amended by Act 27 of 2013 to include the words, "eviction of tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee of such property"."

7. However, the 2013 Amendment does not make section 83 of the Wakf Act applicable retrospectively. The eviction petition relates to 24.12.2009, i.e. more than over four years before the amendment came into effect. No notification was issued regarding transfer to the Wakf Tribunal of all cases relating to wakfs pending before the ARC under the DRC Act. Interestingly, this issue was never raised before by the tenant. On 11.02.2015, this court had remanded the matter to the learned ARC for decision on the issue of leave to defend. The said remand and direction received affirmation of the Supreme Court on 07.05.2015.

8. In view of the above, the eviction petition was maintainable before the learned ARC. The tenant's contentions to the contrary are untenable and are rejected. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023

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Whether landlady can seek eviction of a tenant for the bonafide need of her married daughter?

While the ARC has clearly erred in holding that the requirement of a married daughter can never be considered while deciding the bona-fide requirement of a landlord under section 14(1)(e) since a married daughter does not remain a member of the family, another question arises in the present case, and that is: whether in assessing the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation for the use of a married daughter, it is necessary to first assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the husband; or is it permissible to assess the availability of such accommodation in the hands of the maternal family of the married daughter. In the opinion of this court, this question must be answered from the perspective of the eviction petitioner who seeks recovery of possession for the bona fide requirement of a dependent family member. Accordingly, the availability of suitable, alternate accommodation is to be seen in the hands of the person filing the eviction petition, in this case the mother/landlady; and it is not relevant whether other relatives of the dependant family member have any alternate accommodation available. In this case, it is therefore not relevant whether the petitioner's sons-in-law have alternate accommodation or not.

19. If an eviction petitioner has multiple premises available with him and, as per settled law, the tenant cannot dictate to him which of the premises he may seek to get vacated, then the question of the tenant dictating that the landlord should first utilise premises owned by the landlord's relatives, in this case the petitioner's sons-in-law, simply does not arise. In the present case, if the petitioner/landlady, being the mother, asserts that she requires the subject premises for the bona fide requirement of her married daughters, then it is not for the tenant to say that such requirement must first be satisfied using the properties of their husbands, if any.

21. Moreover, bona fide requirement under the DRC Act does not imply a situation of 'dire' or 'distressed' necessity. Reference in this regard may made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by LRs. vs. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co. MANU/SC/0657/1999 : (1999) 8 SCC 1: paras 6, 11 Consider a scenario where a landlord's dependant is not in dire straits and may even be in a position to purchase or rent premises, whether for residential or commercial purposes, from her own resources. However, a landlord may have suitable premises available for residential or commercial purposes; and may wish to give that premises to the dependant, so as to obviate the need for the dependant to spend her resources to purchase or rent other premises. The landlord may not want the dependant to needlessly deploy her own resources to buy or rent premises from a third-party, while leaving the landlord's premises in the use of an incumbent tenant. In the opinion of this court, even this kind of requirement would fall within the concept of bona fide requirement of the landlord or a family member dependant on the landlord; and a tenant cannot contend that while the tenant should continue to enjoy the landlord's premises, the landlord's dependant should acquire her own premises through other resources. Any other view would mean that while deciding bona fide requirement of a landlord for a dependant, the independent resources of the dependant would also have to be considered in detail before accepting the plea of bona fide requirement.

22. What the law contemplates is a requirement and not some dire or absolute or compelling or distressed need. The law further contemplates that such requirement be an honest requirement and not a mere ruse or stratagem or falsehood to seek eviction. That is all, nothing more and nothing less.

23. In the present case, even if it is assumed that the married daughters are capable of acquiring, by purchase or tenancy, other premises for use for their proposed businesses through their own resources or the resources of their husbands, why should the premises available with their mother, which the mother is willing to make available for their bona fide commercial requirement, not be available first to them instead of being available with the tenant, even more so when the tenant has already been in use and occupation of the premises since 1975.

24. In the opinion of this court, the two grounds on which leave-to-defend has been granted to the respondents are untenable for the following reasons:

(i) The premise that a married daughter ceases to be a member of her maternal family-is flawed. Since 'family' has not been defined in the DRC Act, there is no warrant for reading into the DRC Act any absolute restrictions in relation to who all may be included in that word. As held by a Division Bench of this court in Gobind Dass (supra), an extended meaning is given to the word 'family'. In the opinion of this court, the change in the 'marital status' of a daughter does not change her 'birth status'. While marital status may change and re-change, birth status does not. Getting married does not make her any the less a daughter of the family into which she was born; and therefore, a married daughter most certainly remains a 'member' of her maternal family. Accordingly, under the DRC Act the test would be whether the married daughter, who remains a member of the family, is dependent on the landlord for the particular requirement cited in the eviction petition. We should be clear that it is not that the married daughter must be wholly and completely dependent on the landlord for her day-to-day existence. Dependence is to be assessed with respect to the particular requirement cited. Of course the bona fides of the requirement are also to be assessed;

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 349/2018 and CM Appl. No. 33344/2018

Decided On: 21.08.2020

Vidyawati Vs.  Gautam Mahajan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anup Jairam Bhambhani, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1583/2020 

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Supreme Court: While considering right of succession of married daughter over leased property provisions of rent Act are not relevant

 From the impugned orders passed by the inventory court and the High Court, it is not in dispute that both the courts below have held against the Appellants, more particularly Appellant No. 1 - married daughter, mainly relying upon and considering Section 2(o) of the Goa Rent Act, which, as observed hereinabove, ought not to have been considered and has no relevance while considering the right of succession of a married daughter in the "lease premises" under the provisions of the erstwhile Portuguese Civil Code and subsequently on enactment of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012. The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that a married daughter would have a right of succession in the "lease premises" also.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2961 of 2019 

Decided On: 13.03.2019

 Uma Mahesh Bandekar Vs.   Vivek Sadanand Marathe 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 401

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Supreme Court: While considering right of succession over lease property provisions of rent Act are not to be considered

We are of the opinion that both, the learned Inventory Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in relying upon the provisions of the Goa Rent Act, while considering the right of succession of a married daughter in the "lease premises" vis a vis and/or under the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012.

9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the proceedings before the inventory court as well as the High Court were under the provisions of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012/Portuguese Civil Code, which shall be continued on enactment of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, as if those proceedings were/are initiated under the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012 (in view of Section 460 of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012). It is required to be noted that the proceedings before the inventory court and the High Court were not at all with respect to Goa Rent Act. The proceedings were not between the landlord and the tenant. The provisions of Goa Rent Act shall be applicable with respect to dispute between the landlord and the tenant. As per the preamble of the Goa Rent Act, it has been enacted for control of rents and evictions. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the dispute was neither under the provisions of the Goa Rent Act nor between the landlord and the tenant and therefore both, the inventory court as well as the High Court have erred in considering the provisions of the Goa Rent Act, more particularly Section 2(o) of the Goa Rent Act. The only question which was before the inventory court and the High Court was in respect of the rights of succession of a married daughter in the "lease premises" under the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code and subsequently under the provisions of the Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012. Therefore, what is required to be considered is whether under the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code and on enactment of Inventory Proceeding Act, 2012, whether the married daughter would have a right of succession in the "lease premises" or not?

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2961 of 2019 

Decided On: 13.03.2019

Uma Mahesh Bandekar  Vs.  Vivek Sadanand Marathe

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 401

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Whether grandchildren will become the tenant of rented premises after the death of tenant if her children are alive?

To state in brief, the suit premises belongs to the Parsee Central Association Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and the mother of the plaintiff, Soli Bahadurji Batiwala was tenant in the suit premises 730 Hormuzd Building, Ground Floor, J. Vimadalal Street, Parsi Colony, Dadar (East), Mumbai 400 014. She was living in the house alongwith her son and grandchildren. The defendant no.1, who is the appellant before this Court, is the daughter of the plaintiff. Mother of the plaintiff died in 1980 leaving behind the plaintiff as her legal heir. Defendant no. 1 was married in the year 1998 and she went to live with her husband. Defendant no.2, who is the respondent no.2 before this Court, is the husband of the defendant no.1. Plaintiff filed suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from causing any interference in his possession over and from entering upon or continue to stay/occupy the premises. He also took out notice of motion for interim relief of the same nature. The suit and the notice of motion were filed before the City Civil Court, Greater Bombay. Defendant No.1 contested the matter contending that she was deemed tenant alongwith the plaintiff on death  of her grandmother and, therefore, the dispute is between two tenants and as such, the City Civil Court does not have jurisdiction and that jurisdiction will lie with the Small Causes Court. 

5. Undisputedly, the mother of the plaintiff was tenant in respect of suit premises and she was paying rent. She died in the year 1980 leaving behind her son, i.e., the plaintiff, his wife and children. After her death, the plaintiff was paying rent and rent receipts were transferred in the name of the plaintiff. Thus, the landlord accepted the plaintiff as tenant in the premises. Defendant no.1 was shown to be aged 35 years in the year 2011 when the Revision Application was filed. It shows that she was just a small girl aged about four year when her grandmother died. There is no record to show that she in her own right was accepted to be tenant in respect of suit premises. She was living in the house as a daughter and family member of the plaintiff. She got married in the year 1998 and went to live with her husband. Admittedly, her marriage with the defendant no.2 is still subsisting. There is no dispute between the husband and wife. As soon as she was married and she left the house of the parents to live with her husband, she became member of the family of the husband and from that time, she was no more member of the family of her parents. After death of the parents, she may have certain rights in their property but during the life time of parents, she can not claim any right in the property of her parents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 966 of 2011 with Civil Revision Application No. 34 of 2011 With Civil Application No. 1286 of 2011

Decided On: 03.02.2012

 Kashmira Robert Lobo  Vs. Soli Bahadurji Batiwala 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2012 (2) AIR BOM R 381,2012(2)ALLMR 855,2012(3) MHLJ 396

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When married daughter is entitled to get compensation granted under motor accident claim petition?

 In the impugned judgment the High Court has correctly drawn a distinction between "right to apply for compensation" and "entitlement to compensation". The High Court has rightly held that even a married daughter is a legal representative and she is certainly entitled to claim compensation. It was further held, on the facts of the present case, that the married daughter was not dependent on her father. She was living with her husband in her husband's house. Therefore, she was not entitled to claim statutory compensation. According to the High Court, the claimant was not dependent on her father's income. Hence, she was not entitled to claim compensation based on "No Fault Liability".

17. In my opinion, "No Fault Liability", envisaged in Section 140 of the said Act, is distinguishable from the rule of "Strict Liability". In the former, the compensation amount is fixed. It is Rs. 50,000/- in cases of death [Section 140(2)]. It is a statutory liability. It is an amount which can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Since, the amount is a fixed amount/crystallized amount, the same has to be considered as part of the estate of the deceased. In the present case, the deceased was an earning member. The statutory compensation could constitute part of his estate. His legal representative, namely, his daughter has inherited his estate. She was entitled to inherit his estate. In the circumstances, she was entitled to receive compensation under "No fault Liability" in terms of Section 140 of the said Act. My opinion is confined only to the "No Fault Liability" under Section 140 of the said Act. That section is a Code by itself within the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Supreme Court of India

Manjuri Bera vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ... on 30 March, 2007

Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, S. H. Kapadia

JUDGMENT 2007 AIR 1474 = 2007(4) SCR 590 =2007(10 ) SCC 643 = 2007(5) JT 78 =2007(5 )SCALE 193 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14943 of 2004) 

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Whether Married Daughter who Has Legal Right Of Residence In Building Can Seek Tenant’s Eviction?

 Coming to the second question first, in our
opinion, its answer depends upon the proper

interpretation of the definition of the word "family" as
defined in Section 3(g) of the Act. It reads as under:
“3(g) “Family”, in relation to a landlord or
tenant of a building, means, his or her-
(i) spouse;
(ii) male lineal descendants;
(iii) such parents, grandparents and any
unmarried or widowed or divorced or
judicially separated daughter or
daughter of a male lineal descendant, as
may have been normally residing with
him or her,
and includes, in relation to a landlord, any
female having a legal right of residence in
that building;”
25) Perusal of the afore-quoted definition would go to
show that family in relation to landlord or tenant of a
building would include (1) spouse (2) male lineal
descendants (3) such parents, grandparents,
unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially
separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal
descendant as may have been residing with the
landlord. The definition further says, "Family”
includes in relation to landlord, any female having a

legal right of residence in that building.
26) The inclusive part of the definition, which is
enacted only for the benefit of “female” in relation to
the landlord, adds one more category of person in
addition to those specified in clauses (i) to (iii), namely,
“any female having a legal right of residence in that
building”.
27) A fortiori, any female, if she is having a legal right
of residence in the building, is also included in the
definition of “family” in relation to landlord regardless
of the fact whether she is married or not. In other
words, in order to claim the benefit of expression
"family", a female must have a "legal right of residence"
in the building. Such female would then be entitled to
seek eviction of the tenant from such building for her
need.
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No. 9727 OF 2016
 
Gulshera Khanam  Vs Aftab Ahmad 
Dated:September 27, 2016
Citation: 2016 SCCONLINESC1001,(2016) 9 SCC414

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Whether Denial of employment to married daughter of affected family is violative of constitutional principles?

In the matter of National Legal Services Authority v. Union
of India Manu/SC/0309/2014 : (2014) 5 SCC 438, the Supreme Court recognized that gender identity,
is an integral part of sex within the meaning of Articles 15 and
16 of the Constitution of India and no citizen can be
discriminated on the ground of gender. The Supreme Court
observed as follows:

“We, therefore, conclude that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
includes any discrimination, exclusion, restriction
or preference, which has the effect of nullifying
or transposing equality by the law or the equal
protection of laws guaranteed under our
Constitution, and hence we are inclined to give
various directions to safeguard the constitutional
rights of the members of the TG community.”
34. Thus, from the aforesaid cases it is quite vivid that marriage is
a social circumstance and basic civil right of man and woman,
and marriage by itself is not a disqualification. A daughter
remains a daughter after her marriage and does not cease to
be a daughter of her father or mother. Thus, denial of
employment, included in the rehabilitation, to married daughter
of an affected family (land oustee) is gender-biased and
unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 & 15 of the
Constitution of India as well as Article 21, as rehabilitation of a
land oustee is logical corollary of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Writ Petition (S) No.1762 of 2014
Smt. Sadhna Bai, V State of Chhattisgarh, 
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Citation; AIR 2016(NOC)286 CHHAT

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When married daughter is entitled to get compensation on account of accidental death of her father?

 In the impugned judgment the High Court has correctly drawn a distinction between "right to apply for compensation" and "entitlement to compensation". The High Court has rightly held that even a married daughter is a legal representative and she is certainly entitled to claim compensation. It was further held, on the facts of the present case, that the married daughter was not dependent on her father. She was living with her husband in her husband's house. Therefore, she was not entitled to claim statutory compensation. According to the High Court, the claimant was not dependent on her father's income. Hence, she was not entitled to claim compensation based on "No Fault Liability".

 In my opinion, "No Fault Liability", envisaged in Section 140 of the said Act, is distinguishable from the rule of "Strict Liability". In the former, the compensation amount is fixed. It is Rs. 50,000/- in cases of death [Section 140(2)]. It is a statutory liability. It is an amount which can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Since, the amount is a fixed amount/crystallized amount, the same has to be considered as part of the estate of the deceased. In the present case, the deceased was an earning member. The statutory compensation could constitute part of his estate. His legal representative, namely, his daughter has inherited his estate. She was entitled to inherit his estate. In the circumstances, she was entitled to receive compensation under "No fault Liability" in terms of Section 140 of the said Act. My opinion is confined only to the "No Fault Liability" under Section 140 of the said Act. That section is a Code by itself within the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Supreme Court of India

Manjuri Bera vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ... on 30 March, 2007

Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, S. H. Kapadia

CASE NO.:Appeal (civil) 1702 of 2007

Citation; AIR2007SC1474, (2007)10SCC643, 

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When married working daughter is liable to pay maintenance to parents?

 It is on the basis of  the said  recommendation of the  Joint
Committee,  submission is  being advanced  that  option  is left with the

parents  to choose the son or daughter   against whom claim u/s.  125
Cr.P.C. Could be made  as    also held by the learned single Judge of the
Gowahati High Court.
     With  due respect, I am unable to agree with the view taken
by the learned single Judge of the Gowahati High Court that there is
option  available to the parents. The first reason is that though the Joint
Committee in paragraph 5 recommended that if there are two more
children the parents may  seek remedy against  any one or more of them,
the same   appear to have not been accepted by the Parliament in its
infinite wisdom,     and that is why   the same is not inserted in the
provision of Section 125 Cr.P.C.  It thus remained only a recommendation
and   did   not   crystallize     into   law.   Insofar     as   the   present     case   is
concerned, what is  seen is that the applicant has prima facie shown that
Rajani, the married daughter and Chandan,   the younger son of the
respondents have been earning   lordly sums by way of income     and
because of the dispute with the eldest son applicant­Vasant  and his wife,
the parents have sought  maintenance from him  only, without  joining
the   married   daughter­Rajani   and   younger   son­Chandan   to   the
proceeding. In my opinion, allowing  an option for the parents to choose
any of them would be unjust   and onerous  only on  one of the children

particularly when others are also earning that too handsomely.    I hasten
to   clarify   that I have neither  recorded any  finding nor any  inference
or conclusion which would affect  any of the parties on merits of  the
dispute since I have  already said  that this is my prima facie   opinion
that  Rajani  and Chandan are  having sufficient means to maintain their
parents and they should also have been   asked to participate in the
proceedings in question   to     place their side before the Family Court,
with pleadings  and evidences from all  angles. But  to say   that they
were   not   necessary   parties   because   of   the     available   option   to   the
parents,  would be   doing severe injustice  to only one son­Vasant, the
revision­applicant.       It will have to be further clarified that the only
question decided by me  is that they were the necessary parties to the
Application along with applicant­Vasant and all of them are free  to plead
and prove before the Family Court   as to the merits of the Application
and claim against them for maintenance, about they   having   or not
having sufficient means or neglect  or refusal. I therefore, hold that the
married daughter­Rajani  and the younger son Chandan  are necessary
parties to the Application and answer the question accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 172/2014
Vasant s/o Govindrao Naik
v 
 Govindrao Upasrao  Naik

 CORAM :     A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED :     2nd  February, 2016
Citation;2016 ALLMR(CRI)1728

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Whether married daughter is liable to pay maintenance to his parents even if she is not having independent source of income?

  

       Thus, in view of the decision in Vijaya Manohar Arbat's

case (supra), the position regarding the moral and legal obligation of a

son or a daughter to maintain his/her parents when the father or

mother is unable to maintain himself or herself is fairly settled.    The

parents are also entitled to claim maintenance from their

daughter/daughters whether married or not, provided the father or

mother is unable to maintain himself or herself. However, in respect

of such a claim it is incumbent on the court to satisfy that the married

daughter/daughters concerned got sufficient means of her/their own

independently of the means or income of her husband/ their husbands.



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                          PRESENT:

                    THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR

           MONDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF AUGUST 2014

                                  RPFC.No. 79 of 2012 ()
                                    -----------------------
  

       CHAKKINGAL ACHUTHANKUTTY NAIR
       Vs

         CHAKKINGAL SEETHAKUTTY AMMA, 
Citation; 2015 CRLJ 17

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Can the court refuse to give an eviction decree to the landlord on the ground of bonafide need if his daughters are married?

A tenancy need not be suffered or protected which deprives a landlord's visiting married daughters from staying with him because of constraints of residential accommodation. A tenant cannot be permitted to become the cause for denial of familial pleasures of the landlord and his family. The Supreme Court in Ram Nath v Rajendra Pershad (2003) 12 SCC 127 held:

 "4. Having regard to the material placed on

record and looking to the findings recorded by the trial court, it cannot be said that the requirement of the appellant of the premises in question was not bona fide. The trial court was right in passing the decree of eviction against the respondent. The first appellate court was wrong in holding that the requirement was not bona fide taking the view that the available accommodation with the appellant was sufficient as the three daughters were married. We are of the view that the approach of the first appellate court was not realistic. Merely because three daughters were married, it could not be said that they do not come and stay with the appellant even occasionally. The size of the family has

grown and the married daughters and sons-in-law of the appellant also could visit the house of the appellant occasionally."

The tenant cannot dictate how the property belonging to the landlord should be put to use. Once the landlord shows that there is bona fide requirement for the tenanted premises, the Court is bound to allow the eviction petition. The Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998)8 SCC 119 held: "14. the crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the

presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a

presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the

question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an

endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."

Delhi High Court

Bishambhar Dayal Gupta vs Naresh Kumar Sharma on 21 July, 2014

Author: Najmi Waziri

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Whether parents of victim daughter are her legal heirs if she was married?

 Reading the provision as it is, any legal heir is

entitled to claim compensation awardable under the Act. Prima

facie, it cannot be said that the parents of the victim daughter,

though she was married, were not her legal heirs, particularly

when her husband was no more living. The question needs full

consideration on the basis of evidence led by the parties in the

claim application. The Motor Vehicle Act is a special statute

with social welfare objectives. The jurisdiction of the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal having regard to the terminologies

used in the Act must be held to be wider than the civil court. A

claimant has a wide option. Residence of the claimant also

determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

APPELLATE SIDE

FIRST APPEAL NO. 132 OF 2013

 MANOHAR MARUTI GHULE  Vs DANG SANJEEV 

CORAM:-A. P. BHANGALE, J.

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED

ON: : __/10/2013.

Citation;2014(3) ALLMR 233

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