Showing posts with label streedhan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label streedhan. Show all posts

Saturday, 25 May 2024

Under which circumstances the court can grant compensation to wife in domestic violence Act proceeding in absence of specific prayer for its grant?

The submission of Mr. Deshmukh is that in absence of any prayer under section 18 of the DV Act, the award of compensation is unjustified. I have already discussed the said aspect hereinbefore. It is not necessary that the relief in respect of each and every clause of section 18 clauses (a) to (f) of the DV Act should be sought. As far as the quantum of compensation is concerned the provisions of DV Act do not lay down any strait jacket formula for computing the same and the same has to be ascertained by taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case. {Para 80}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Crim. Revision Application No. 234 of 2023

Decided On: 22.03.2024

Kaushal  Vs. Jyoti 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1955/2024.

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Tuesday, 19 December 2023

Whether wife can claim streedhan in proceeding U/S 27 of Hindu Marriage Act?

 That a wife has an independent right to recover "Stridhan " by filing a civil suit or by invoking any other independent remedy under the common law, can be no ground to oust the special jurisdiction conferred upon the matrimonial Court under Section 27 of the Act. There appears to be explicit legislative intendment behind Section 27 of the Act that all ancillary and allied disputes between a husband and wife should also be resolved along with the main controversy. Only the items with a definite life span like the clothes, shoes or other wearables, can fall within the scope of 'exclusive property' of either the husband or the wife and not the other valuable assets which can be utilized by any one of them. Traditionally, the gold ornaments are considered to be a valuable property and an addition to the joint assets of a family and, thus, can not be excluded from the purview of Section 27 of the Act even if it is a part of "Stridhan". The aforesaid conclusion stands fortified by the views taken by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Balkrishna Ramchandra Kadam's case (supra) where the wife's claim for return of jewelry was not turned down on the ground that it was an " Stridhan " or that a petition under Section 27 of the Act for recovery of those items was not maintainable, as also in Pratibha Rani's case (supra).

{Para 19}

20.A perusal of the list (Ex.PA) reveals that the "ornaments" include items like a 'gold ring' given to the appellant (Sr. No. 18 of the list). Similarly, several other items like the Television, Stablizer, Wall Clock, Alarm, Wrist Watch, Iron Press, Transistor, Table Fan and Suit case etc. are of common and joint use, though most of the jewelry items, (mentioned in the said list Ex.PA) are those which might be exclusively belonging to the respondent. However, all such items having been given by the parents of the respondent at or about the time of marriage, the same can not be segregated to compel the respondent to seek recovery thereof through multifarious legal proceedings.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

F.A.O. No. 159-M of 1995

Decided On: 11.08.2006

Subhash Chander Rohila Vs. Asha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/0657/2006.

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Saturday, 24 June 2023

How to appreciate evidence if son is claiming that his mother had no earnings and is holding immovable property as benamidar of his father?


Crucial question which is to be answered in the present appeal is whether the transaction i.e. the purchase of suit property under registered deed of sale dated 20.01.1970 by Lila is benami transaction. {Para 11}

12. Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 defines the expression, 'benami transaction' and equipped the appropriate authority with powers to acquire benami property. Provisions of three sections being Sections 35 & 8 of the 1988 Act, which was initially a 9-section legislation, came into force with effect from 5.9.1988 whereas the remaining provisions thereof came into force from the date being 19.9.1988. Section 3 being a prohibitory legislation cannot have retrospective operation but the Section 2(a) of the Act which is a piece of declaratory legislation can have its application irrespective of its date or duration. So, definition of the expression 'benami transaction' can be borrowed from Section 2(a) of the 1988 Act in respect of the transaction held prior to promulgation of the said Act. As defined in Section 2(a) of the Act 'benami transaction' means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by any other person. A transaction must, therefore, be benami irrespective of its date or duration.

13. In India, two kinds of benami transactions are generally recognized. Where a person buys a property with his own money but in the name of another person without any intention to benefit such other person, the transaction is called benami. In that case, the transferee holds the property for the benefit of the person who has contributed the purchase money, and he is the real owner. The second case which is loosely termed as a benami transaction is a case where a person who is the owner of the property executes a conveyance in favour of another without the intention of transferring the title to the property thereunder. In this case, the transferor continues to be the real owner. [See, the judgment delivered in the cases of Bhim Singh - vs- Kan Singh, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 72 and Pulin Behari Addy (supra)].

14. However, there is a presumption in law that the person who purchases the property is the owner of the same and such presumption can be displaced only by pleading and successfully proving that the person whose name appears in the document is not the real owner, but only a benami and heavy burden lies on the person who pleads that recorded owner is mere name-lender.

15. Now, coming to the case at hand, it can be argued that to hold the subject transaction as benami transaction, it is to be proved by the principle of preponderance of probability that although the suit property was purchased in name of Lila but the consideration money was paid or provided by her husband and not by Lila.

16. Indisputably, subject deed of sale was executed and registered on 20.01.1970. Sekhar preferring the suit in 2011 claimed that Lila, transferee was mere name-lender and Sekhar adduced his oral testimony only and he did not produce any document whereas Lila deposed in 2016 and adduced her oral accounts which found support from the evidence of DW-2 and Lila had produced all the documents relating to suit property.

17. During course of hearing, both the appellant and the respondents advanced their arguments on the issue relating to 'burden of proof'. So, main question centred around the present appeal is whether it was Sekhar who had to discharge the burden to prove that the subject sale transaction was benami transaction or it was Lila who was to prove that she purchased the suit property from own fund or 'stridhan' properties detailing the source of such fund and disclosing every details of payment of consideration money.

18. The question relating to burden of proof has been set at rest in the judgment of Jaydayal Poddar (Deceased) thr. Lrs. -vs. Mst. Bibi Hazra reported in AIR 1974 SC 171 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled as follows:

"It is well settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact or benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question, whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations, can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the courts are usually guided by these circumstances: (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title-deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale."

19. In the given case, Sekhar claimed that his mother, Lila was a mere name-lender. He deposed that at the relevant time of sale, he was not present and he could not say the actual amount of consideration money and he admitted that he did not verify from attesting witness, identifier etc. whether his father paid the consideration money and he admitted that his father never claimed himself to be the real owner of the suit property and he admitted that he did not have any document to show that his father paid the consideration money.

20. From evidence of Lila, it appears that Lila admitted that she was a home-maker throughout her life and she had no independent income of her own and she asserted that she purchased the suit property from her 'stridhan' properties. She claimed that she herself purchased the property selling her gold ornaments. Admittedly, Lila testified that during his stay in the suit property, Sekhar used to behave well with her.

21. Mr. Poddar tried to convince us that since both the parties have led evidence, question of burden of proof has lost its significance and Court should pass judgment appreciating evidence let in by the parties and since, Lila failed to disclose the particulars of her 'stridhan' properties and since, Lila admitted that she was a home-maker throughout her life having no independent income of her own, the learned Court below should have come to the conclusion that Lila was nothing but a mere name-lender.

22. At the cost of reiteration, it may be stated that a Court is required to bear in mind the well-settled principles to the effect that the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction always lies on the person who asserts it. In the Indian society, if a husband supplies the consideration money for acquiring property in the name of his wife, such fact does not necessarily imply benami transaction. Source of money is, no doubt, an important factor but not a decisive one. The intention of the supplier of the consideration money is the vital fact to be proved by the party who asserts benami. In other words, even if it is proved that Sailendra paid the consideration money, the plaintiff must further prove that Sailendra really intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title in him alone.

23. In the case before us, Sekhar could not bring any evidence even to show what was amount of consideration money and how the consideration money was paid and how the suit property was purchased and even he could not prove who paid the consideration money. He could not produce any document relating to the suit property. Title deed and all documents relating to the suit property were all along in the custody of Lila and Lila all along paid municipal tax and got the suit property mutated in her name and Sekhar could not bring any evidence on record to lead any prudent man to infer that his father had a motive to create benami in name of his mother or Sailendra intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title in him alone. Judgments relied upon by the appellant in spite of having unquestionable value of the proposition laid down therein, shall not come in aid of the appellant in the factual matrix of the case at hand.

24. As a result, we are inclined to hold that learned Court below has correctly held that Sekhar has failed to discharge his burden to prove that subject sale transaction is benami transaction and we have not found any wrong in the approach and decision of the learned Court below and we are of the view that judgment and decree impugned cannot be annihilated. 

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Sri Sekhar Kumar Roy vs Smt. Lila Roy & Another on 7 June, 2023
Present: The Hon'ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty 
&The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee
Author: Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.
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Thursday, 4 May 2017

How to ascertain jurisdiction of court in case of misappropriation of streedhan property?

When the legislature in its wisdom has given such
a right by amending Section 181 (4) of the Code in the year 1978 the
judicial authority cannot deprive a citizen of India such advantage
acquired by law on the ground that it may be misused.
Section 181(4) of the Code runs thus:
“Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of
trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is
the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be
returned or accounted for, by the accused person.” (emphasis supplied
by me)
This Court wants to emphasize on the word ‘or was required to be
returned or accounted for, by the accused person’. It is true that as per
claim of the de facto complainant the dowry was paid at Siliguri and as perFIR when the victim opposite party was driven out from her matrimonial
abode she claimed her ‘Stridhan’ articles including her certificates but
those were not given to her and as such this Court is satisfied that there is
prima facie case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is the admitted position that at present this opposite party wife is
residing at her father’s house at Lilua, Howrah. Thus, if the articles are to
be returned after the conclusion of the trial the venue of such return must
be either the court at Howrah or the residence of the de facto complainant,
the victim of this case. Thus, this Court is satisfied that interest of justice
demands that in this scenario the protection must be given to the deserted
lady by applying Section 181 (4) of the Code. The legislature in its wisdom
amended that sub-section and if such advantage has been given to the wife
or the de facto complainant why should the court will take out that
advantage from her mouth. Her entitlement as per law should not be taken
out in the disguise that such sub-section may be used just to oppress her
counterpart.
Thus, in view of the discussion so long made this court is satisfied
that there is enough of material to go for trial even against the petitioners.
This court is also satisfied that in view of Section 181 (4) of the Cr.P.C, the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah has perfect jurisdiction over the case.Thus, this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 is answered in the negative and dismissed accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
Present :  Justice Indrajit Chatterjee
C.R.R. 1529 of 2014
Ashok Kumar Marda & Ors.
V
State of West Bengal & Anr.

Judgment on : 06.10.2016.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 73

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Wednesday, 30 December 2015

Precaution to be taken by Magistrate while summoning of additional accused as per S 319 of crpc in case of misappropriation of streedhan

What should be the ambit and scope of the provisions of Section 319 of the Code came to be discussed in case Lajpat Rai v. State of Haryana, 2002 (1) RCR 280, wherein in para 2 it was stated as under ;
"12. The above provisions leave no manner of doubt that the pre-requisite for invoking the provisions of Section 319 of the Code is that evidence should disclose the commission of offence by the person who had not been arraigned as an accused for which he should be tried together with other accused. The key to the satisfaction of such a requirement is contained in the words "it appears from the evidence that any person not being an accused has committed an offence". The manifest significance of the word "appears" employed in this section by the Legislature is to cover both the stages envisaged under the provisions of Section 319 of the Code in relation to the person who had not been earlier facing trial as an accused but such person must appear to have committed the offence so that he be tried together with other accused. Though these provisions had vested a discretionary power in the Court but it being a judicial discretion has to be exercised in such a manner which would advance the cause of criminal justice. The Court is duty bound to see that these provisions are not used as a handle by a witness to bring another person in the area of trial without any acceptable basis brought forth in his statement. The Court will definitely come to the rescue of the complainant where on the basis of evidence brought on record, it is clearly made out that the other person named by him had not been sent up to face trial along with other accused unfairly by the prosecution though the other person named on record was also responsible for commission of crime. That being so, it is the paramount duty of the Court that the left over person should be made to face the trial along with other accused so that cause of justice could not be allowed to suffer at the hands of the investigating agency. Therefore, the Court has to be extra cautious while exercising the discretion vested in it and apply the test that prima facie there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of the person to be summoned to face trial along with other co-accused."
9. In para 15 of that very judgment, the factors which needed to be looked into for invoking the provision of Section 319 were highlighted and the same are as follows :
(i) the doubt about the involvement of the other accused has no place;
(ii) discretionary power so vested in Cr.P.C. under these provisions should be exercised to advance the cause of criminal justice;
(iii) there is compelling duty on the Court to proceed against other accused;
(iv) the power vested in this section is an extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly."

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dr. Sant Singh vs State Of Punjab on 27 April, 2002
Equivalent citations: II (2003) DMC 232

Bench: R Kathuria
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Sunday, 22 November 2015

When application for return of streedhan in Domestic violence proceeding is not barred by limitation?

 Regard being had to the aforesaid statement of law, we have to
see whether retention of stridhan by the husband or any other family
members is a continuing offence or not. There can be no dispute that
wife can file a suit for realization of the stridhan but it does not debar
her to lodge a criminal complaint for criminal breach of trust. We
must state that was the situation before the 2005 Act came into force.
In the 2005 Act, the definition of “aggrieved person” clearly postulates
about the status of any woman who has been subjected to domestic violence
as defined under Section 3 of the said Act. “Economic abuse”
as it has been defined in Section 3(iv) of the said Act has a large can-
vass. Section 12, relevant portion of which have been reproduced
hereinbefore, provides for procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs. It
has been held in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) that Section 498 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to the said case under the
2005 Act as envisaged under Sections 28 and 32 of the said Act read
with Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Rules, 2006. We need not advert to the same as we are of the considered
opinion that as long as the status of the aggrieved person remains
and stridhan remains in the custody of the husband, the wife can always
put forth her claim under Section 12 of the 2005 Act. We are disposed
to think so as the status between the parties is not severed because
of the decree of dissolution of marriage. The concept of “continuing
offence” gets attracted from the date of deprivation of stridhan, for
neither the husband nor any other family members can have any right
over the stridhan and they remain the custodians. For the purpose of
the 2005 Act, she can submit an application to the Protection Officer
for one or more of the reliefs under the 2005 Act. In the present case,
the wife had submitted the application on 22.05.2010 and the said authority
had forwarded the same on 01.06.2010. In the application, the
wife had mentioned that the husband had stopped payment of monthly
maintenance from January 2010 and, therefore, she had been compelled
to file the application for stridhan. Regard being had to the said
concept of “continuing offence” and the demands made, we are disposed
to think that the application was not barred by limitation and
the courts below as well as the High Court had fallen into a grave error
by dismissing the application being barred by limitation.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1545 OF 2015
(@ SLP(Crl) No. 10223 OF 2014)
Krishna Bhatacharjee .
 V
Sarathi Choudhury and Anr.
Dated;November 20, 2015
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Saturday, 22 August 2015

Whether persons not residing with husband can be charged for criminal breach of trust relating to streedhan of wife?

In paragraph 4 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the cash and gifts which the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav had received during marriage were kept at the matrimonial home by all the accused persons including the applicant No. 1, who is accused No. 7, being the mediator for the marriage between the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav; and the applicant No. 2, who is accused No. 4, being the sister in law of the complainant-Non-applicant No. 2. It is an admitted position that both these applicants were not part of matrimonial home of the accused No. 1 and Non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, no offences relating to cheating and criminal breach of trust punishable under Sections 417 and 406 would be prima facie made out against these applicants. Besides, there is also no allegation in paragraph 4 that the Non-applicant No. 2 at any point of time demanded return of the Stridhan articles to her from those accused persons who are residing in her matrimonial home.
Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014
Decided On: 14.01.2015
 Gopal and Ors.Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.
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Sunday, 16 August 2015

Whether there is limitation for filing suit for recovery of streedhan?

In the decision reported in Scariah Varghese v. Marykutty (1991 (2) KLT 71), it was held :
"Even if there was no previous demand, the plaint itself can be considered as a demand. It is not a correct statement that the dowry would only part take the nature of a trust amount. True under the Trust Act, there are certain obligations which are in the nature of trust and certainly without any other statutory provision the amount given as dowry will legitimately assume the character and nature of trust in the hands of any person other than the person entitled to the amount, viz., the wife. Of course for recovery of a trust amount no period of limitation is prescribed. By virtue of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the statute itself says that the amounts in the hands of the husband or the husband's parents for and on behalf of the wife is a trust amount and so there is no difficulty to say that the obligation is one under trust to return the amount by virtue of the statutory provision and so there is no limitation for such a suit."
Kerala High Court

Mat.Appeal.No. 184 Of 2011 ( ) vs Biju Gopalan on 27 June, 2012
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Monday, 10 August 2015

When offence of misappropriation of streedhan by IN-LAWS is not made out?

In paragraph 4 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the cash and gifts which the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav had received during marriage were kept at the matrimonial home by all the accused persons including the applicant No. 1, who is accused No. 7, being the mediator for the marriage between the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav; and the applicant No. 2, who is accused No. 4, being the sister in law of the complainant-Non-applicant No. 2. It is an admitted position that both these applicants were not part of matrimonial home of the accused No. 1 and Non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, no offences relating to cheating and criminal breach of trust punishable under Sections 417 and 406 would be prima facie made out against these applicants. Besides, there is also no allegation in paragraph 4 that the Non-applicant No. 2 at any point of time demanded return of the Stridhan articles to her from those accused persons who are residing in her matrimonial home.
Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014
Decided On: 14.01.2015

 Gopal and Ors.
Vs.
 State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.
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Saturday, 11 February 2012

Misappropriation of Stri-Dhan

Supreme Court of India
Pratibha Rani vs Suraj Kumar & Anr on 12 March, 1985
 Citations: 1985 AIR 628, 1985 SCR (3) 191

BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

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