Showing posts with label perjury. Show all posts
Showing posts with label perjury. Show all posts

Thursday, 5 February 2026

Delhi HC: Invoking perjury jurisdiction at the interlocutory stage, with trial already underway and issues framed, would risk interfering with and prejudicing the main civil proceedings

 In my opinion, an application under section 340 of the cr.pc ought to be normally considered at the time of final decision of the case only and not at the interim stage as the defendants/applicant have pressed in the present case. It is the settled legal position that the said provision cannot be resorted to, to satisfy a private grudge of the litigant. In fact the very genesis of this provision is to prevent complaints being filed of offences having being committed in relation to the court proceedings; it was felt that if such complaints are permitted to be filed, the same may be used to force the other party into giving up its claim/defence or to dissuade witnesses from appearing before the courts under threat of criminal prosecution. It was held as far back as in Rewashankar Moolchand v. Emperor MANU/NA/0017/1939 : AIR 1940 Nagpur 72 that proceedings under Section 340Cr.PC should not be resorted to when the criminal case is calculated to hamper fair trial of issue in the civil court before which the matter would probably go on for longer. This court also in Jindal Polyster Ltd. v. Rahul Jaura MANU/DE/2772/2005 : 124 (2005) DLT 613 and in Kuldeep Kapoor v. Susanta Sengupta MANU/DE/2870/2005 : 126 (2006) DLT 149 has held that applications under section 340 of the Cr.pc should be dealt with at the final stage only and not at the interim stage. I also find a consistency of view in this regard in the other High Courts. The law is that a prosecution for perjury should not be ordered by the court before the close of the proceedings in the case in which false evidence is given. It is highly wrong for a court to take action under the said provision against a witness or a party for giving false evidence when trial is underway. {Para 18}


21. Formation of prima facie opinion that a person charged has intentionally given false evidence is a condition precedent for directing lodging of a complaint. The existence of mens rea or criminal intention behind act complained of will have to be looked into and considered before any action under section 340 of the cr.pc is recommended. Before setting the criminal law into motion, the court should exercise great care and caution and it must be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge in respect of which prosecution is directed. No prosecution ought to be ordered unless reasonable probability of conviction is found. Considering the nature of the documents and evidence in relation whereto offences are alleged to have been committed.


"6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1)CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. 

17. The law governing the initiation of criminal proceedings under Section 379 read with Section 215 of the BNSS, for offences under Sections 227, 229, 236, 237, and 246 of the BNS, provides that for a statement to constitute 'false evidence' under Section 227 BNS, the falsity must be clear, deliberate, and established through unimpeachable evidence. Mere inconsistencies in versions or bare denials do not meet this threshold. The Written Statement reflects Defendant No. 2's explanation that he had purchased the alleged pirated version of ISP under a bona fide belief of its genuineness, a contention the veracity of which can only be determined upon leading of evidence.

23. Before filing of the complaint under Section 379 read with Section 215 of the BNSS, the Court along with a clear and deliberate falsehood supported by an unimpeachable evidence has to record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (COMM) 914/2023

Decided On: 24.11.2025

Koninklijke Philips N.V. and Ors. Vs. Karma Mindtech and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejas Karia, J.

Citation: 2025 DHC 10345, MANU/DE/9185/2025.

Print Page

Saturday, 22 October 2022

Whether government servant turning hostile in Session trial amounts to misconduct?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we first examine Petitioner's contention that the act of turning hostile does not amount to misconduct. Perjury is an offence punishable under Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "I. P. Code"). If the petitioner had committed offence of perjury, the Sessions Judge ought to have issued notice to him and tried him for that offence. Whether he had committed offence of perjury or not can be established by the Sessions Judge alone. The same cannot be established in a disciplinary enquiry. The law provides for a complete mechanism to punish a person committing office of perjury. Turning hostile, by itself, is not an offence. The only Court competent to record a finding of commission of perjury was the Sessions Judge. The appointing authority, not being an expert, would otherwise not be in a position to gauge the factors leading to hostility of the witness. After considering the testimony of the petitioner, the Sessions Judge has thought it appropriate not to issue notice to him for trial for the offence punishable U/Sec. 191 of the I.P. Code. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that the act of giving testimony before Sessions Judge as misconduct and to punish the petitioner for the same. {Para 7}

8. One may morally expect a witness to stand by his previous statement during trial. For a government servant, a higher degree of responsibility could be expected by assisting the prosecution to bring home guilt of the accused by sticking to the statement previously recorded. However, whether this 'expectation' could be extended to an extent that the act becomes a misconduct capable of being punished is the issue. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2352 of 2018

Abdul Rauf Mohammed Khaja  Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mangesh S. Patil and Sandeep V. Marne, JJ.

Author: Sandeep V. Marne, J.

Decided On: 14.10.2022.
Citation: MANU/MH/3660/2022

Print Page

Sunday, 4 September 2022

Whether the person giving false answers to interrogatories is liable for perjury?

Under Order 11, Rule 22 CPC, the answer given in response to an interrogatory can be used in evidence, and therefore, its correctness and veracity will be established only at trial. Undoubtedly, it is incumbent upon a person answering the interrogatories to be truthful in the answers, and if the person is eventually found to have given false answers, they can be visited with consequences like perjury, in accordance with law, since the answer given in response to interrogatory can be used in evidence under Rule 22. All such consequences are within the domain of the Trial Court which shall eventually deal with the evidence produced by the parties before it. {Para 26}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

FAO 37/2020 and C.M. Appl. No. 3126/2020

Decided On: 29.08.2022

Rattan Mehta and Ors. Vs. Gayatri Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manoj Kumar Ohri, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/3126/2022

Print Page

Sunday, 24 March 2019

Whether court should initiate prosecution for perjury if false allegation is made in anticipatory bail application?

Thus, from the above, it is evident that the inquiry/contempt proceedings should be initiated by the court in exceptional circumstances where the court is of the opinion that perjury has been committed by a party deliberately to have some beneficial order from the court. There must be grounds of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion for initiating such proceedings. There must be distinct evidence of the commission of an offence by such a person as mere suspicion cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More so, the court has also to determine as on facts, whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed.

10. It is clear therefore from a reading of these judgments that there should be something deliberate-a statement should be made deliberately and consciously which is found to be false as a result of comparing it with unimpeachable evidence, documentary or otherwise. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the statement made in the anticipatory bail application cannot be tested against unimpeachable evidence as evidence has not yet been led. Moreover, the report dated 12.11.2011 being a report, which is in the nature of a preliminary investigation report by the investigating officer filed only two days after the F.I.R. is lodged, can in no circumstances be regarded as unimpeachable evidence contrary to the statements that have been made in the anticipatory bail application. Further, as has been correctly pointed out by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, that though the submission recorded by the High Court in para 3 of the order dated 30.11.2017 is from the aforesaid paragraph in the anticipatory bail application, yet, the High court made it clear that it was granting anticipatory bail principally because the F.I.R. annexed to the bail application does not show that there was sexual intercourse of the applicant with his wife during the course of their separation as a result of which it was not possible to assess whether the averment regarding the offence punishable Under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is or is not substantiated. The High Court also recorded that considering that the husband and wife had resided together after marriage only for a very brief period, and that the husband was granted interim anticipatory bail, decided to grant final anticipatory bail on these grounds. It is clear, therefore, that both the grounds stated by the High Court would not suffice to initiate prosecution Under Section 340 read with Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 387 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2632/2018)

Decided On: 26.02.2019

 Aarish Asgar Qureshi Vs. Fareed Ahmed Qureshi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Print Page

Friday, 22 February 2019

Whether a person can be punished for perjury if he gives contradictory statements?

The true test for determining whether statement is false or
not 'is whether two statements are contradictory or irreconcilable to
each other.' Certainly, the amount can either be paid as an illegal
gratification or it can be paid for laying of water pipeline [legitimate
purpose]. It cannot be for both the purposes. This test is certainly
satisfied.
20] When we tried to satisfy another test of 'willful/knowingly'
disclosure, we find that the case fails on this forum. It means, the
witness must tell the contrary fact knowingly or willfully. According to
evidence, it is a second statement which is false. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.699 OF 2006

 Shri Manikrao s/o Shivram Wagh, Vs The State of Maharashtra,

C ORAM : S.M. MODAK, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 16 th FEBRUARY, 2019.

Print Page

Sunday, 27 January 2019

Leading Supreme Court judgment on prosecution for offence of perjury U/S 340 of CRPC

In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice.

It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.
The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded.
19. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub- section (1) of Section 340 Cr.P.C. contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 2005
Decided On: 11.03.2005

Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.C. Lahoti, C.J., B.N. Agrawal, H.K. Sema, G.P. Mathur and P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.

Print Page

Basic principles to be followed by court prior to initiating prosecution for perjury U/S 340 of CRPC

 The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Iqbal
Singh Marwah (supra) interpreted section 340. Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the
said decision reads thus :“
23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court
is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of
an offence referred to in Section 195 (1)(b), as the section
is conditioned by the words “court is of opinion that it is
expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a
course will be adopted only if the interest of justice
requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint,
the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding
to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that
enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in
Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged
by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury
suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged
document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such
commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It
is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause
a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense
that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or
status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of
evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where
voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect
of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of

administration of justice may be minimal. In such
circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in
the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view
of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the
appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged
document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a
situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has
to be discarded.
24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind.
Subsection
(1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of a
preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a
complaint is not made during the pendency of the
proceeding before the court and this is done at the stage
when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is
rendered. 

As held
by the Constitution Bench in the case of Iqbal Singh, while deciding
expediency of taking action, the Court cannot weigh magnitude of injury
suffered by the person affected, but the Court is more concerned with the
effect or impact of such commission of offence on the administration of
justice. In view of the facts which are stated above, we are of the view that
at this stage it cannot be stated that the alleged false or misleading
allegations made by the first respondent have any serious impact upon
administration of justice and therefore, at this stage, the prayer made by the
applicant cannot be entertained. We are of the view that as the allegations
and counter allegations will have to be gone into at the time of final hearing
of the Family Court Appeal, at this stage, it is not expedient in the interests
of justice to take action. When we say so, the conduct of the Applicant as
reflected from the record is also taken into consideration. The Applicant has
to come clean by making disclosure of his true income, sources of income,
his assets, etc during the relevant period supported by documents. If a case
is made out, at appropriate stage, this Court can direct recording of
evidence by the Family Court on the case made out by the parties regarding
the income of the husband and the case made out by the wife. We make it
clear that when the appeal is heard on merits, the issues raised by the

applicant in this application as well as prayers will have to be considered by
the Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.72 OF 2017
IN
FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.113 OF 2014

Dr. Santosh Chandrashekar Shetty Vs Mrs. Ameeta Santosh Shetty

CORAM : A.S. OKA &
ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, JJ.

DATED : 25.01.2019
JUDGMENT (PER A.S. OKA, J.):
Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 189
Print Page

Sunday, 30 September 2018

Whether prosecution for perjury should be initiated if inaccurate statement is made?

The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. In the present case we do not think the material brought to our notice was sufficiently adequate to justify the conclusion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint. The approach of the High Court seems somewhat mechanical and superficial: it does not reflect the requisite judicial deliberation....



12. Having given our anxious consideration to the entirety of the matter, in our view, the guiding principle is the one as laid down in Chajoo Ram (supra). The law is clear, "prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent.... and there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on the matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge". The assessment made by the High Court, as extracted in the paragraph hereinabove, in our considered view, does not satisfy the parameters and requirements as laid down by this Court.

13. Recently, this Court in Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and Ors. MANU/SC/1516/2016 : (2017) 1 SCC 113 summed up the legal position as under:

6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution Under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"); but it must be shown that the Defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1) Code of Criminal Procedure., having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India). The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.

14. We are of the considered view that initiation of proceedings in the present case was not consistent with the parameters laid down by this Court. The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings Under Section 340 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Code of Criminal Procedure We, therefore, accept the appeal and close the proceedings.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 545 of 2016)

Decided On: 27.04.2018

 Chintamani Malviya Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Mishra and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 6 SCC 151
Print Page

Saturday, 31 December 2016

Whether outcome of civil proceeding has relevance in deciding issue of perjury?

 On going through the relevant pages of the roznama of the
Criminal Miscellaneous Application, copies of which have been
filed on record and also copy of examination in chief of the
complainant/i.e. the petitioner which is forming a part of the
paper book, I find that, there is substance in the submissions of
the petitioner that the learned Magistrate has passed the
impugned order completely in ignorance of facts on record.
Copy of the written statement filed by the respondent nos. 3 and
4 in Regular Civil Suit No. 103/2010 as well as the copy of the
reply filed in Revenue Proceedings by the same respondents
have already been acknowledged to be produced on record by
the petitioner. That apart, Regular Civil Suit No. 103/2010, as
seen from the roznama, itself was transferred to the Court of the
same learned Magistrate and it was pending before him on the
date on which the impugned order was passed. It has been
brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner that even
today this Civil Suit is pending on the file of the same learned
Magistrate. The learned Magistrate, therefore, could have
done well to benefit himself by adverting to the facts contained
in the record of the said suit pending before him if at all he had
some doubts about filing of the relevant documents by the
petitioner. He could also have assured himself in this regard by
going through the record of the Regular Civil Suit regarding
outcome of the proceedings in that suit. The learned
Magistrate, however, did not embark upon such an exercise and
the result was dismissal of the complaint on completely
untenable and unsustainable grounds. Even otherwise, out
come of the proceedings of the suit or the revenue case could
not said to be have any relevance for deciding the issue of
prima facie making out of any offence of perjury as alleged by
the petitioner and what could have been material for arriving at
a decision in this regard was the bundle of facts alleged to be
contrary, as revealed from the statements made by the
respondent nos. 3 and 4 in their written statement filed by
them in Regular Civil Suit and their reply in the Revenue Case.
Such an order, therefore, is perverse and arbitrary and cannot
sustain the scrutiny of law. It deserves to be quashed and set
aside and the matter is required to be heard afresh by the
learned Magistrate.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 154 OF 2015.
 Cedric Bosco Savio Lobo,

V
 State of Goa represented
by its Chief Secretary

Coram:-S. B. SHUKRE, J.
Date:-7th January, 2016.
Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)4737
Print Page

Thursday, 24 November 2016

What are necessary conditions for initiation of proceeding U/S 340 of CRPC?

There are two pre conditions for initiating proceedings
under Section 340 CrPC – (i) materials produced before the
court must make out a prima facie case for a complaint for the
purpose of inquiry into an offence referred to in clause (b)(i) of
sub-Section (1) of Section 195 of the CrPC and (ii) it is
expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be
made into the alleged offence.
7. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory
statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always
sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as
“the IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has
intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial
proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of
using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even
after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to
form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to
initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and
offences against public justice and more specifically referred in
Section 340(1) of the CrPC, having regard to the overall factual
matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a

prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. and Another v. Union of
India(1992) 3 SCC 178). 
The court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is
required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts
of the case.
8. In the process of formation of opinion by the court that
it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should
be made into, the requirement should only be to have a prima
facie satisfaction of the offence which appears to have been
committed. It is open to the court to hold a preliminary inquiry
though it is not mandatory. In case, the court is otherwise in a
position to form such an opinion, that it appears to the court
that an offence as referred to under Section 340 of the CrPC
has been committed, the court may dispense with the
preliminary inquiry. Even after forming an opinion as to the
offence which appears to have been committed also, it is not
mandatory that a complaint should be filed as a matter of
course. (See Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2002) 1 SCC 253).
9. In Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another v. Meenakshi
Marwah and another (2005) 4 SCC 370
, a Constitution Bench of this Court has
gone into the scope of Section 340 of the CrPC. Paragraph-23
deals with the relevant consideration:
“23. In view of the language used in Section 340
CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint
regarding commission of an offence referred to in
Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned
by the words “court is of opinion that it is
expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows
that such a course will be adopted only if the
interest of justice requires and not in every case.
Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold
a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the
effect that it is expedient in the interests of
justice that enquiry should be made into any of
the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This
expediency will normally be judged by the court
by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered
by the person affected by such forgery or forged
document, but having regard to the effect or
impact, such commission of offence has upon
administration of justice. It is possible that such
forged document or forgery may cause a very
serious or substantial injury to a person in the
sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable
property or status or the like, but such document
may be just a piece of evidence produced or
given in evidence in court, where voluminous
evidence may have been adduced and the effect
of such piece of evidence on the broad concept
of administration of justice may be minimal. In
such circumstances, the court may not consider
it expedient in the interest of justice to make a
complaint. …”
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11120 OF 2016
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 13749 of 2016)
AMARSANG NATHAJI 
V
HARDIK HARSHADBHAI PATEL 
Dated:November 23, 2016.
Citation:(2017) 1 SCC113,2017 CRLJ758

Print Page

Sunday, 20 November 2016

Bombay HC: Procedure to be followed by civil court in complaint U/S 340 of CRPC relating to perjury in civil suit

The section thus says that the court should be of opinion
that an enquiry should be held. Even for forming an opinion, there
should be some evidence and not mere surmises. If there is a prima

facie evidence, the court must enter into an enquiry and record a
finding as to whether an offence referred to in Section 195 of Code of
Criminal Procedure is committed. It was, therefore, not proper on
part of Judges of the lower courts to have rejected the application.
The learned Civil Judge should have, in fact, upon consideration of
the application, decided whether it was necessary to hold the enquiry
and if found necessary should have held an enquiry. Merely because
civil suit was pending, that did not prevent and could not prevent the
Civil Judge from entering into an enquiry. I would, therefore, set
aside both the orders and direct the civil judge to register Exh.52 as
Miscellaneous Judicial Case and then proceed to decide the
application according to the provisions contained in Section 340 of
Code of Criminal Procedure. Pendency of this application shall not be
and cannot be a constraint on the Civil Judge in deciding the Civil suit
on merits. The civil judge may proceed to decide the suit and may
also proceed to decide the application under Section 340 of Code of
Criminal Procedure separately. The application under Section 482 of
Code of Criminal procedure is thus disposed of in the above terms.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPLICATION No.1115/07.

Kenneth Desa s/o Late John Desa,  Gopal s/o Leeladhar Narang,

CORAM: C.L.PANGARKAR,J.
DATE : 11th July, 2007.
Citation: 2007 ALLMR (CRI)2281
Print Page

Wednesday, 25 May 2016

When prosecution should not initiated against expert witness for Perjury?


In National Justice Compania Naviera SA v.
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The "Ikarian Reefer")[1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 455
, the Queen’s Bench (Commercial Division) even went to
 the extent of
holding that the expert has the freedom in such a situation to
change his views. It was stated that “if an expert's opinion is not
properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is
available, then this must be stated with an indication that the
opinion is no more than a provisional one. In cases where an
expert witness who has prepared a report could not assert that
the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth without some qualification, that qualification should be
stated in the report”.
Hence, merely because an expert has tendered an opinion
while also furnishing the basis of the opinion and that too without
being conclusive and definite, it cannot be said that he has
committed perjury so as to help somebody. And, mere rejection of
the expert evidence by itself may not also warrant initiation of
proceedings under Section 340 of CrPC.
 It is significant to note that the appellant’s opinion that
the cartridges appeared to have been fired from different firearms
was based on the court’s insistence to give the opinion without

examining the firearm. In other words, it was not even his
voluntary, let alone deliberate deposition, before the court.
Therefore, it is unjust, if not unfair, to attribute any motive to the
appellant that there was a somersault from his original stand in
the written opinion. As a matter of fact, even in the written
opinion, appellant has clearly stated that a definite opinion in
such a situation could be formed only with the examination of the
suspected firearm, which we have already extracted in the
beginning. Thus and therefore, there is no somersault or shift in
the stand taken by the appellant in the oral examination before
court.
The impugned proceedings initiated against the appellant
under Section 340 of CrPC are hence quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 9-10 OF 2016
(Arising from S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 7153-7154/2013)
PREM SAGAR MANOCHA 
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) 
Dated;January 6, 2016.
KURIAN, J.:
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 290
Print Page

Thursday, 19 June 2014

Whether a person giving evidence contrary to his FIR is liable for offence of perjury?



“It is crystal clear that the FIR not being a piece of evidence on oath in a judicial proceeding, the concept of giving false evidence in terms of Section 344 of the Code is not attracted.”

10) In the case on hand, the petitioner as P.W-1 in C.C. No.39 of 2007 did not subscribe to the contents of Ex.P-1 report given by him to the police while giving evidence on oath in Court. It is no offence of perjury as defined in Section 191 I.P.C and punishable under Section 193 I.P.C as the statement in F.I.R was not given by the petitioner on oath. Even though it does not amount to offence of perjury under Section 191/193 I.P.C, it may amount to some other offence with which this Court is not concerned in this Criminal Petition. If it amounts to any other offence than perjury, it is for the concerned to take appropriate action as per law by following the procedure prescribed by law. When the procedure prescribed under Section 344(1) Cr.P.C was not followed by the lower Court and when the allegations against the petitioner do not attract the offence under Section 191/193 I.P.C, it follows that registration of C.C. No.17 of 2012 in the lower Court is nothing but abuse of process of law and the petitioner cannot be asked to undergo rigmarole of trial for the offence under Section 191/193 I.P.C in that case.

Malayanauru Anantha Anandacharyulu @ Narayanacharyulu Vs. The State of A.P, P.P. High Court of A.P.


Court : Andhra Pradesh
Judge : SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU
Decided On : Jul-10-2012
Case Number : Criminal Petition No.4936 of 2012
Citation; 2014(2) crimes  486 AP,2012(2)ALD(Cri)232, 2013(2)ALT(Cri)113
Print Page

Tuesday, 14 January 2014

Whether the court can permit Decree holder to cross examine judgment debtor as to his properties in execution of decree?

In my view, merely because     affidavit in rejoinder is not filed by the 
Judgment Creditor  to the affidavits  filed by the Judgment Debtor, this court 

cannot come to the conclusion   that what is stated in the affidavit filed in 
response   to   the   order   passed   by   this   court,       under   Order   21   Rule   41,   is 
deemed to have been proved and no further enquiry about the correctness 
thereof would be necessary.  Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of M/s. 
Baru Ram Banarsi Dass (supra) has considered similar situation and has held 
that the   purpose of order 21 rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to 
ascertain property if any owned by the Judgment Debtor so that the same may 
be   sold for recovery of the decretal amount.   It is held that   no prejudice 
would be caused to the Judgment Debtor  if he is cross examined  provided he 
has nothing to   conceal from the court and if the Judgment debtor actually 
does not have any property, he should   have nothing to fear from his cross 
examination.   Punjab & Haryana High Court has   held that the examination 
within   the   purview   of   Order   21   Rule   41   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure, 
includes cross examination because  the  purpose is to ascertain whether the Judgment   Debtor       has   any   property     so   that   the   money   decree   can   be 
satisfied.  It is held that      if cross examination is not permitted the Judgment 
Debtor may   falsely state   that he does not own   any property and   if the 
Judgment Debtor is cross examined, there would be nothing illegal therein.  
am in agreement with the  views expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High 
Court. In my view,  the principle laid down by the   Punjab & Haryana High 

Court in  the case of  M/s. Baru Ram Banarsi Dass (supra) are applicable to 
extended to   this case.

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
CHAMBER SUMMONS NO. 1170 OF 2009
IN
EXECUTION APPLICATION (L) NO. 463 OF 2009
IN

AWARD NO. 8 OF 2004

M/s. LA'Builde Associates  Vs Bipinchandra Narandas Dalal 

CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 6TH SEPTEMBER,  2013
Citation;2013(6)ABR406, 2013(6)ALLMR497
Print Page

Wednesday, 24 July 2013

Whether civil court can entertain application U/S 340 of CRPC?



Bombay HC-NAGPUR BENCH- Even though any Civil Suit is pending Court cannot deny case u/s 340 CrPC. Perjury Application to be register as Miscellaneous Judicial Case as per Civil Manual Chapter XIX para 337 in Civil case.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.

CRIMINAL APPLICATION No.1115/07.

 Kenneth Desa s/o Late John Desa,
v
Gopal s/o Leeladhar Narang,

Citation;2007 ALL M R(CRI)2281

CORAM:

C.L.PANGARKAR,J.
11th July, 2007.

Print Page