Showing posts with label decree holder. Show all posts
Showing posts with label decree holder. Show all posts

Saturday, 9 July 2022

Is exemption provided U/S 60(1)(c) of C.P.C applicable to a decree with a statutory charge over the property?

 Coming to the crucial issue in these cases, it is relevant

to note that the decree put in execution is for realisation of the

advance sale consideration paid by the decree holder, where a

statutory charge was created under Section 55 (6) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act. When there is a charge decree, a debtor cannot claim exemption under Section 60(1)(c) of the C.P.C. This legal position was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision Ammini v. K.V.Vibeesh & Ors. (supra) and held in the affirmative. In fact, there is no reason to differentiate a charge decree and a decree, where statutory charge is created, while considering exemption provided under Section 60(1)(c) of C.P.C. Thus, without much ado, it can be held that a decree where there is a statutory charge over the property is akin to a charge decree. Therefore, it has to be held that the exemption provided under Section 60(1)(c) of the C.P.C is not applicable to a charge decree or to a decree where there is a statutory charge, over the property. In view of the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that Ext.P4 order passed by the execution court is legally unsustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. {Para 17}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP(C) NO. 2004 OF 2018

BINOY KURIAN Vs VARKEY JOSEPH

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Dated this the 19th day of May, 2022

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Tuesday, 26 April 2022

Can the court give possession of suit property to the decree-holder if Plaintiff has not claimed relief of possession in the suit for specific performance of the contract?

 There was no provision in the Specific Relief Act, 1877 corresponding to Section 22 of the Act. Section 22 came to be part of the Act, in pursuance of the recommendation of Law Commission in its 9th Report submitted on 19th July, 1958.The Law Commission was chaired by Mr. M.C.Setalvad and had members including Mr. S.M.Sikri, Mr. G.S.Pathak and Mr. N.A.Palkhivala. The Law Commission had recommended as under:-

“35. It will be useful, we think to introduce a rule which has been now settled by judicial decisions, that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance even though, strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when specific performance is decreed (Krishnaji v. Sangappa, A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 181, Velayuda v. Kumaraswami, 52 I.C. 700 (Mad.). No doubt, it has been laid down that possession can be asked for in execution of a decree for specific performance even though possession was not claimed in the plaint, on the ground that the relief of possession is merely incidental to that of execution of a deed of conveyance (Kartik v. Dibakar, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 362; Arjun Sing v. Sahu, A.I.R. 1950 All. 415). At the same time it has been held that the plaintiff decree-holder does not acquire title or the right to recover possession unless a saledeed is executed in execution of the decree for specific performance (Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah, A.I.R. 1938 All. 432.). We think it would be simpler to make a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the Court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession (Cf. Abdul v. Abdul, 46 Mad. 148.)” {Para 12}

The argument that the plaintiff must claim possession in a suit for specific performance of a contract in all cases was also negated as Section 22 talks about the relief of possession in appropriate case. This Court addressed the history of the provision so enacted and held as under: -

“11. Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The legislature thought it will be useful to introduce a rule that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance, even though strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when suit for specific performance is decreed. The legislature has now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2726 OF 2022 

MANICKAM @ THANDAPANI & ANR. Vs VASANTHA

Coram:  HEMANT GUPTA; V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.

Author: HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated:  APRIL 05, 2022 

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Friday, 11 February 2022

Whether plaintiff should adduce evidence to prove breach of injunction?

   It is for the Decree-holder to prove the wilful disobedience of the decree by the Judgment-debtor. “Wilful disobedience” is a question of fact, existence of which has to be inferred from direct or circumstantial evidence. In a particular case, the Decree-holder may establish, the factum of wilful disobedience on the part of the Judgment-debtor, by the circumstances of the case including the nature of the plea taken by the Judgment-debtor in answer to the execution case. If the conduct of the Judgment-debtor as revealed from his plea read with the circumstances of the case leads to a conclusion that, the said conduct was deliberate one, and the Judgment-debtor was consciously attempting to ignore the decree, the Executing Court may be justified in drawing the inference that there has been a wilful disobedience. The nature and quantum of the evidence or material to draw such an inference, and to discharge the onus cast on the decree-holder cannot be formulated in abstract terms. Each case would depend upon the facts and circumstances involved therein. {Para 27}


29. Having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of a case, “wilful disobedience” may also be inferred, by the Executing Court after giving an opportunity to the Judgment-debtor to undo the wrong by him earlier, in violation of the terms of the decree, as happened in Gundila's case2. Wilfullness connotes a “deliberate action”, conduct moulded by an obstinacy to act, conciously disregarding an injunction against such ??? conduct. For example, in the case of a right of way, the Judgment-debtor may plead that on a particular day, he had to put up a fence across it to avert a major disaster and not with a view to obstruct the decree-holder. He may agree to the removal of the obstruction or agree to provide a convenient alternate pathway to the decree-holder, when called upon to do so under Order 21 Rule 32(1) C.P.C.; in such a situation, disobedience cannot be termed as wilful. But the intitial onus to place the relevant material for an action against the Judgment-debtor will be always on the decree-holder.

In the High Court of Karnataka

(Before Shivashankar Bhat, J.)

Kariyappa Vs Haladappa

C.R.P. No. 3285 of 1987

Decided on August 19, 1988


Citation: 1988 SCC OnLine Kar 353 : ILR 1988 Kar 3269 : (1989) 2 AP LJ (DNC 1) 23 : AIR 1989 Kar 163

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Monday, 7 February 2022

Delhi HC: Arbitral Award Is To Be Executed At A Place Where Judgment Debtor Resides, Carries Business Or Has Assets

 There is no justification for filing an execution petition before the court within whose jurisdiction the arbitral award was passed, and then seek a transfer to the Court which has jurisdiction over the Judgment Debtor or their properties. Irrespective of the place where the award was passed, it is to be executed by a Court within whose jurisdiction the Judgment Debtor resides, carries on business or his property is situated. Since the Judgment Debtor is admittedly residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts at Chennai, such courts would certainly have territorial jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral award. Thus, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. {Para 12}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 38/2021, EX.APPL.(OS) 981/2021,

EX.APPL.(OS) 1034/2021 and EX.APPL.(OS) 1367/2021

CONTINENTAL ENGINEERING CORPORATION Vs

SUGESAN TRANSPORT PVT. LTD.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

Dated:10.01.2022

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Sunday, 25 April 2021

Whether the court must decide all questions raised by obstructionist during the execution of the decree?

When a decree-holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication, the court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint.

The words all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because of the resister raised it. The questions which the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g., if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resister or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code, the execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resister or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section.

Supreme Court of India
N.S.S.Narayana Sarma & Ors vs M/S.Goldstone Exports P. Ltd. & ... on 23 November, 2001
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Wednesday, 11 November 2020

Whether executing court can give relief to decree-holder beyond the scope of decree or arbitration award?

From the facts of this case, it is clear that the Award passed by the Arbitrator could not be independently executed, as the same was only for fixation of price of land and not for enforcement of the Agreement. The Award was only declaratory of the price of the land. As per the agreement, if the Respondent agreed to the price so fixed, it could then get the sale deed executed in terms of the Agreement dated 01.02.1980 as it had the option of either accepting the price and getting the sale deed executed, or not accepting the price and thus not getting the sale deed executed. This would clearly mean that the Award was merely for the declaration of the price of the land, which would be subject to the agreement and it was not necessary for the Respondent to get the sale deed executed at the price so determined by the Arbitrator. What was thus executable was the agreement, and not the Award. The relief granted by the Court below for execution of the sale deed in terms of the Award, is thus outside the realm of law, as the Award did not contemplate the transfer of land in favour of the Respondent, but only determined the price of land.


31. It is also noteworthy that the application for execution of Award filed on 16.05.1994 before the Additional District Judge-I, Bharatpur did not provide for any provision of law under which the same was filed. Though, in paragraph 2 of the said application, it was mentioned that the Award of the Arbitrator contained a direction for execution of the Award, but in fact there was no such direction issued in the Award, in which the Arbitrator had only fixed the price of the land and nothing more.


32. In our view, once the Respondent had given up its claim of execution of sale deed in terms of the Agreement dated 01.02.1980 by withdrawing the suit for specific performance of the agreement (Civil Suit No. 60 of 1996), which was permitted to be withdrawn unconditionally on 13.02.2006, the Appellant had abandoned its claim for execution of the sale deed. Thus, in our opinion, the Respondent could not be permitted to achieve the goal of execution of sale deed by indirectly claiming for execution of Award, when the direct claim for execution of sale deed of the Agreement dated 01.02.1980 had been abandoned by the Respondent.


33. At the cost of repetition, it may be mentioned that the specific performance could only be of the Agreement dated 01.02.1980 and not of the Award dated 09.06.1985. Even the operative portion of the Award also does not give any direction for execution of the sale deed. It was after the passing of the Award that the Respondent could have fallen back on the agreement for execution of the sale deed, which Respondent did by filing the suit for specific performance, but abandoned such claim by withdrawing the suit unconditionally.


34. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that substantial justice has been done by the Court by directing execution of the sale deed, is not worthy of acceptance. In a Civil Case, the Courts have to follow the law in letter and spirit, which has not been done in the present case, as in law the sale deed could have been directed to be executed in execution of the Agreement dated 01.02.1980 and not the Award, which was only a declaration, fixing the price of land.


35. This Court, while considering the question of execution of a decree which only declared the rights of the decree holder and nothing more, has in the case of State of M.P. v. Mangilal Sharma MANU/SC/0953/1998 : (1998) 2 SCC 510 held as follows:


6. A declaratory decree merely declares the right of the decree-holder vis-à-vis the judgment-debtor and does not in terms direct the judgment-debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. Since in the present case decree does not direct reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary the executing court could not issue any process for the purpose as that would be going outside or beyond the decree. The Respondent as a decree-holder was free to seek his remedy for arrears of salary in the suit for declaration. The executing court has no jurisdiction to direct payment of salary or grant any other consequential relief which does not flow directly and necessarily from the declaratory decree...........


It is thus clear that execution of an award can be only to the extent what has been awarded/decreed and not beyond the same. In the present case, the Arbitrator in its Award had only declared the price of land and nothing more. Thus, the question of execution of a sale deed of the land at the price so declared by the Arbitrator in its Award, could not be directed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2376 of 2020 

Decided On: 24.04.2020


Firm Rajasthan Udyog and Ors. Vs.  Hindustan Engineering & Industries Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0401/2020, (2020) 6 SCC 660

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Friday, 23 October 2020

Whether the court should recognize time-barred payment made by Judgment debtor outside the court?

  Now, the law says further that if money is paid or adjustment of decree of any kind is arrived at outside the Court, it should be promptly got recorded and certified as contemplated by Rule 2. This can be done either by the J. D. or by the decree-holder; but in the very nature of things, a judgment-debtor should be more concerned in having such payment or adjustment recorded and certified by the Court. Article 125 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 30 days for applying to the Court for recording; an adjustment or satisfaction of the decree, from the date of payment or adjustment. There is no provision for extending the said period. Since by virtue of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI "a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid (in accordance with Rule 2) shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree", any payment or adjustment not certified or recorded in accordance with Rule 2 of Order XXI is no payment or adjustment in law. Any such payment or adjustment cannot be recognized by the Court executing the decree -- unless of course, the decree-holder himself admits the same. Therefore, when a decree-holder takes out execution, the judgment-debtor will not be entitled to plead -- if by the date of his plea a period of thirty days has expired from the date of payment or adjustment, as the case may be -- that he has paid the money due, or has otherwise adjusted the decree, outside the Court. It is, no doubt, true that the use of the expression 'may' - in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 has given room for controversy and argument; but, in my opinion, the said expression has to be construed and understood in the light of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, and if so read, the expression 'may' is liable to be construed and understood as 'shall'. By placing this construction no inconsistency arises between Order XXI, Rule 2 and Section 47. When Section 47 declares that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree shall be enquired into and determined only by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, it does not mean that the provisions in Order XXI, Rule 2 read with Article 125 of the Limitation Act should be ignored. Indeed, one should read them together harmoniously. As stated hereinbefore, the several Rules in Order XXI supplement, illustrate and elaborate the provisions contained in Part-II of the Code. The object behind Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI is to shut out any plea of payment, or adjustment, which is not promptly got recorded and certified under the said Rule. The idea is to preclude any such pleas and leave no room for them.

20. For the above reasons, I hold, agreeing with Upendralal Waghray, J. that the payment allegedly made by the judgment-debtor on 5-1-1979 not having been recorded and certified in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2(2), C.P.C., cannot be recognized by the executing Court in E.P. No. 73/1981, because the application alleging such payment was made, even in the earlier E.P., (E.P. No. 20/1979), beyond 30 days of the payment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 2413 of 1983

Decided On: 29.04.1988

P. Narasaiah  Vs. P. Rajoo Reddy

Hon'ble Judges:

B.P. Jeevan Reddy, K. Amareswari and Upendralal Waghray, JJ.


Citation: MANU/AP/0166/1989,AIR 1989 AP 264 (FB)

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Tuesday, 1 September 2020

Whether the court can execute injunction decree against some of the Judgment debtors if one of the judgment debtors is dead?

The third contention that the first Judgment Debtor having died and his LRs having not been brought on record, the injunctive decree is not executable at all qua the other judgment debtors is too farfetched an argument since it is a judgment in personam, and can be executed as against rest of the judgment debtors, no rule of law being shown to the effect that the death of one of the judgment debtors results into the dissolution of the decree qua the other judgment debtors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Writ Petition No. 46572 of 2016 (GM-CPC)

Decided On: 28.06.2019

Hanumanthaiah  Vs.  G.S. Arun Kumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dixit Krishna Shripad, J.

Citation: MANU/KA/4382/2019
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Wednesday, 5 August 2020

Guidelines of Delhi High court for speedy disposal of application for execution of decree

Conclusion

44. The execution of decrees/awards deserves special attention considering that inordinate delay in execution proceedings frustrates the decree-holder from reaping the benefits of the decree/award.

45. In cases of execution of decrees/awards for recovery of money, the Executing Court shall direct the judgment debtor, at the first instance, to file an affidavit of assets on the date of cause of action, date of the decree/award as well as on the date of the swearing of the affidavit in Form 16A, Appendix E under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure within thirty days. The oral prayer/application of the decree-holder for issuance of this direction is sufficient compliance of Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

46. The Executing Court is empowered, at the initial stage itself, to restrain the judgment debtor from transferring, alienating or disposing of or otherwise parting with the possession of any assets to the tune of the decretal/award amount except in the ordinary course of business such as payment of salary and statutory dues. However, the judgment debtor shall not discharge any financial liability, other than the liabilities of Banks/financial institutions, without the permission of the Executing Court.

47. If the judgment debtor fails to appear before the Court upon service of notice, the Executing Court shall ensure his presence initially by issuing bailable warrants and thereafter, by issuing non-bailable warrants.

48. In the event of the default of the judgment debtor to file the aforesaid affidavit within the stipulated time, the Executing Court shall consider detention of the judgment debtor in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months under Order XXI Rule 41(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure by directing the decree-holder to deposit the subsistence allowance @ Rs. 40 per day per person with the Executing Court for detention of the judgment debtor. Upon deposit of the subsistence allowance, the Executing Court shall issue non-bailable warrants against the judgment debtor for his detention.

49. Since Form 16A, Appendix E under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive to ascertain all the assets of the decree-holder, the Executing Court shall, in exercise of power under Section 151 and Order XXI Rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 106 and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, direct the judgment debtor to file an additional affidavit of his assets and income in the format of Annexure-A along with documents mentioned therein within thirty days. If the judgment debtor is a proprietor of a proprietorship firm; partner of a partnership firm; member of an HUF and/or Director of a company, additional affidavits be filed by the judgment debtor in respect of the assets of each firm/HUF/Company, as the case may be, in the format of Annexure-B.

50. After examining Annexure-A, the Court may direct the judgment debtor to file an additional affidavit of his expenditure in the format of Annexure-C.

51. If the judgment debtor is a Firm/Company/HUF/Trust, the Court shall direct the judgment debtor to disclose its assets and income in the format of Annexure-B. This affidavit of the Firm/Company/HUF/Trust shall be sworn by all Partners/Directors (other than independent/non-executive and nominee directors)/Members/Managing Trustee, as the case may be.

52. If any ground for lifting of the corporate veil is made out, then all the Directors (other than independent/non-executive and nominee directors) of the judgment debtor Company be directed to disclose their personal assets and income in the format of Annexure-A.

53. Upon filing of affidavits in Form 16A, Appendix E under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the additional affidavits namely Annexure-A, B and C, the Executing Court shall give liberty to the decree-holder to verify the disclosures made in the affidavits, either himself or through an Investigator.

54. While formulating the affidavits Annexure-A, B and C, many more questions and documents were considered by this Court which would have complicated the affidavits and caused inconvenience to the litigants. In order to keep the affidavits concise and precise, this Court incorporated only important questions and documents. However, the Courts are at liberty to direct the parties to disclose further relevant facts and documents to determine the true assets and income of the judgment debtor. The Courts are also at liberty to consider the rules and formats of affidavits mentioned in para 37 to develop and further improve the format of the affidavits formulated by this Court.

55. The Courts shall ensure that the filing of the affidavits by the judgment debtor is not reduced to a mere ritual or formality. If the affidavit of the judgment debtor is not in the prescribed format or is not accompanied with the relevant documents, the Court may grant reasonable time to the judgment debtor to remove the defects/deficiencies.

56. The Courts/Arbitral Tribunals are empowered to direct a party to file the aforesaid affidavits in proceedings under Order XXXVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and proceedings under Sections 9, 17 and 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

57. The decree-holder is at liberty to serve the interrogatories and seek production of relevant documents from the judgment debtor.

58. The Executing Court shall, thereafter, consider whether the oral examination of the judgment debtor is necessary under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. If so, the Executing Court shall proceed to examine the judgment debtor.

59. Sections 51(b), 60 to 64 and Order XXI Rules 41 to 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure contain the provisions for attachment of properties in execution of decrees. Before attaching a property, the Executing Court shall ensure that the property does not fall in the list of properties which are exempt from attachment/sale under the Proviso to Section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Executing Court shall ensure the compliance of Sections 60 to 64 and Order XXI Rules 41 to 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to the attachment of properties in execution of decrees.

60. When the Executing Court finds that the judgment debtor is not satisfying the decree/award despite having means/capacity to pay, the decree-holder is at liberty to file an application for detention of the judgment debtor whereupon the Executing Court shall issue a show cause notice to the judgment debtor to show cause as to why he should not be committed to civil prison. The Court shall, upon being satisfied that the judgment debtor has means to pay the decretal amount or substantial part thereof and has refused or neglected to pay the same, pass an order for detention of the judgment debtor in civil prison for a period not exceeding three months in terms of Section 58(1)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even after release from detention, the judgment debtor shall remain liable to satisfy the decree/award in terms of Section 58(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the judgment debtor who has no means to satisfy the decree/award, cannot be detained in civil prison. The Court shall follow the procedure laid down in Sections 51(c), 55 to 59 and Order XXI Rules 37 to 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure for detention of the judgment debtor.

61. In appropriate cases, the Executing Court may (i) issue notice and direct the Garnishee(s) to deposit in Court the amount due to the judgment debtor as per law; (ii) permit the decree-holder to inspect all the assets and the records of the judgment debtor in the presence of the Local Commissioner to be appointed by the Court; (iii) direct the auditor of the judgment debtor company to submit a report with respect to the affairs of the judgment debtor; (iv) permit the decree-holder to serve interrogatories on the auditors of the judgment debtor; (v) permit the decree-holder to inspect the records of the judgment debtor with the Income Tax and the other authorities to verify the disclosures made by the judgment debtor; (vi) in extreme cases, appoint a Chartered Accountant as a Local Commissioner to inspect all the records of the judgment debtor and submit a report to the Court with respect to the affairs of the judgment debtor; (vii) restrain the judgment debtor from leaving the country without the permission of the Court; and (viii) impound the passport of the judgment debtor.

62. If the judgment debtor has made any misrepresentation, concealment or false statement in the affidavits, the decree-holder is at liberty to invoke Section 340, Cr.P.C. Reference be made to the principles laid down in Sanjeev Kumar Mittal v. State, MANU/DE/3134/2010 : 174 (2010) DLT 214 and H.S. Bedi v. National Highway Authority of India, MANU/DE/0154/2016 : 227 (2016) DLT 129.

Directions to the District Courts

63. The District Courts shall implement these guidelines with immediate effect by directing the judgment debtor to file the affidavit of assets and income on the date of the cause of action, date of decree/award and on the date of the swearing of the affidavit in Form 16A, Appendix E under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as additional affidavits in the format of Annexure-A or Annexure-B, as the case may be, within thirty days.

64. Delhi High Court Rules for execution of decrees [Volume I of High Court Rules and Orders, Part C, Chapter 12 - Part A - 'General'] provides for expeditious disposal of the execution cases by District Courts. Rule 2 provides at least one day every week to be reserved for execution work to ensure expeditious disposal. Rules 4 and 5 provide for close supervision and control of the execution cases by the District Judge and report to the High Court in the event of any delay in the disposal of execution cases.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Ex. P. 275/2012, Ex. Appl. (OS) 221/2018 and Ex. P. 276/2012

Decided On: 05.12.2019

 Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Maharia Raj Joint Venture and Ors.
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Sunday, 24 November 2019

Whether judgment debtor can deduct income tax out of mesne profits paid under decree of court?

The above definition of rent makes it abundantly clear that rent is a payment by whatever name you call it for use of any land or building. Thus, merely because the rent awarded by the Court was called by the Court as damages mesne profits does not mean that it ceases to be income of the Decree Holder. Similarly, I consider that interest over the unpaid amount would qualify as income since the unpaid amount is treated as something lying deposited with the Judgment Debtor. As, a person has to pay income tax on his deposits in the bank or in FDs, he is liable to pay income tax on the interest received by him under Court orders for unpaid amounts. The judgments cited by the Decree Holder are of no help since the judgments deal with different facts and circumstances. In Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal MANU/SC/0817/2004 : (2005) 9 SCC 524 the Supreme Court observed that TDS could not be deducted on the payments towards compensation/damages for mental agony and harassment. The Supreme Court was not dealing with mesne profits in lieu of occupation and use of the premises. The view taken by the Calcutta High Court in my opinion is not the correct view. Delhi High Court in case of Mrs. Kanti Singh and Ors. v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. 2001 III AD (Delhi) 686 had given no opinion about TDS and only stated that the Court cannot go behind the decree.

7. I, find no force in the plea taken by Decree Holder that Judgment Debtor could not have deducted tax at source and deposited it with the government when Judgment had to pay rent mesne profits under orders of the Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Ex. Appl. No. 405/2009 in Ex. P. No. 351/2008

Decided On: 23.12.2009

Five Star Engg. and Agents Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  P.B. State Industrial Development Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.N. Dhingra, J.

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Tuesday, 8 October 2019

Whether tenant inducted by decree holder landlord is bound to deliver possession in restitution?

We are unable to share the view expressed by the High Court as in our considered opinion, the status of a bona fide purchaser in an auction sale in execution of a decree to which he was not a party stands on a distinct and different footing from that of a person who is inducted as a tenant by a decree holder-landlord. A stranger auction-purchaser does not derive his title from either the decree holder or the judgment-debtor and therefore restitution may not be granted against him but a tenant who obtains possession from the decree holder-landlord cannot avail of the same right as his possession as a tenant is derived from the landlord. 
4. In our view the above principle will apply in the case in hand as it is the decree holder who has put Respondent 2 in possession and, therefore, when the decree has been set aside he is bound to restore to the judgment-debtor what he gained under the decree and subsequently transferred to Respondent 2.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3307 of 1983

Decided On: 09.02.1994

 Gurjoginder Singh  Vs. Jaswant Kaur and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Mohan and M.K. Mukherjee, JJ.

Citation : 1994 MhLJ1 510

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Sunday, 5 May 2019

Whether execution application will abate if legal heirs of judgment debtor or decree holder are not brought on record within limitation?

If during, the pendency of a regular execution proceeding filed on the basis of a decree or order of a Civil Court, the decree holder or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record within ninety days, can the Civil Court dismiss the execution petition as abated?

12. Order 22 Rule 12 of the CPC reads as follows:

"Order 22 Rule 12: Application of order to execution proceedings'. Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order."
13. In other words the normal principle arising in a suit - before the decree is passed - that the legal representatives are to be brought on record within a particular period and if not, the suit could abate, - is not applicable to cases of death of the decree holder or the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.

14. In Venkatachalam v. Ramaswami, ILR (1932) Mad. 352 : AIR (1932) Mad. 73, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that this rule enacts that the penalty of abatement shall not attach to execution proceedings. Mulla's Commentary on CPC (Vol.3) p. 2085 (15th Ed., 1997) refers to a large number of judgments of the High Courts and says:

"Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which provides that where a party to an execution proceedings dies during its pendency, provisions as to abatement do not apply. The rule is, therefore, for the benefit of the decree holder, for his heirs need not take steps for substitution under Rule 2 but may apply immediately or at any time while the proceeding is pending, to carry on the proceeding or they may file a fresh execution application."
15. In our opinion, the above statement of law in Mulla's Commentary on the CPC, correctly represents the legal position relating to the procedure to be adopted by the parties in execution proceedings and as to the powers of the Civil Court.

16. It is clear, therefore, that if after the filing of an execution petition in time, the decree holder dies and his legal representatives do not come on record - or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, then there is no abatement of the execution petition. If there is no abatement, the position in the eye of law is that the execution petition remains pending on the file of the execution Court. If it remains pending and if no time limit is prescribed to bring the legal representatives on record in execution proceedings, it is open in case of death of the decree holder, for his legal representative to come on record at any time. The execution application cannot even be dismissed for default behind the back of the decree holder's legal representatives. In case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder could file an application to bring the legal representatives of the judgment debtor on record, at any time. Of course, in case of death of judgment-debtor, the Court can fix a reasonable time for the said purpose and if the decree holder does not file an application for the aforesaid purpose, the Court can dismiss the execution petition for default. But in any event the execution petition cannot be dismissed as abated. Alternatively, it is also open to the decree holder's legal representatives, to file a fresh execution petition in case of death of the decree holder; OR, in case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder can file a fresh execution petition impleading the legal representatives of the judgment debtor; such a fresh execution petition, if filed, is, in law, only a continuation of the pending execution petition - the one which was filed in time by the decree holder initially. This is the position under the CPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

S.L.P. (C) No..../1998 (CC 1802)

Decided On: 18.02.1998

V. Uthirapathi Vs. Ashrab Ali and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1998 SC 1168.
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Saturday, 26 January 2019

Whether chamber summons is maintainable for seeking particulars of assets of Judgment debtor?

 In my opinion, application under Order XXI, Rule 41 is not an
application in an execution. It is an application in aid of
execution or a step towards the execution. Under Clause (j) of
Rule 11(2) of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
execution petition must specify the mode in which assistance
of the Court is required for the execution of a decree. Clause
(j) reads as follows :

(j) the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required
whether -
(i) by the delivery of any property specifically decreed.
(ii) by the attachment, or by the attachment and sale, or by the
sale without attachment, of any property.
(iii) by the arrest and retention in prison of any person;
(iv) by the appointment of a receiver;
(v) otherwise, as the nature of the relief granted may require.
Examination of a judgment debtor under Sub-rule (1) of Rule
41 of Order XXI or direction to the judgment debtor to file an
affidavit to be issued under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 41 or Order
XXI is not one of the mode of execution of a decree provided in
Clause (j) of Rule 11(2) of Order XXI, Rule 30 . Disclosure of
the assets is a preliminary step towards the execution of a
decree. Rule Nos. 3 to 9 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure contemplate transfer of a decree by the Court
which passed the decree to another Court for execution. The
decree holder, who is not aware of the assets of the judgment
debtor, is often unable to decide in which Court he should file
the execution petition or in which Court he should get the
decree transferred unless he knows the particulars of the
assets of the judgment debtor. Rule 41 of Order XXI enables
the decree holder to get from the judgment debtor the
information of the assets, which is within the special
knowledge of the judgment debtor. Therefore, an application
under Order XXI, Rule 41 is not an application for execution
of the decree but, merely an aid to the decree holder to enable
him to execute the decree by obtaining information which is
within the special knowledge of the judgment debtor. If this be
so, the application under Order XXI, Rule 41 would ordinary
precede the filing of an execution petition, though it can also
be filed in the pending execution petition itself.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
CHAMBER SUMMONS NO. 1098 OF 2017
IN
SUIT NO. 12 OF 2014

Bhupesh Sevantilal Shah vs M/s Bhoomi Tractors Sales & Services


CORAM : B.P.COLABAWALLA, J.
JANUARY 14, 2019.

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Sunday, 15 July 2018

Whether execution proceeding will abate if there is death of decree holder or judgment debtor?

If during, the pendency of a regular execution proceeding filed on the basis of a decree or order of a Civil Court, the decree holder or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record within ninety days, can the Civil Court dismiss the execution petition as abated?

12. Order 22 Rule 12 of the CPC reads as follows:

"Order 22 Rule 12: Application of order to execution proceedings'. Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order."
13. In other words the normal principle arising in a suit - before the decree is passed - that the legal representatives are to be brought on record within a particular period and if not, the suit could abate, - is not applicable to cases of death of the decree holder or the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.

14. In Venkatachalam v. Ramaswami, ILR (1932) Mad. 352 : AIR (1932) Mad. 73, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that this rule enacts that the penalty of abatement shall not attach to execution proceedings. Mulla's Commentary on CPC (Vol.3) p. 2085 (15th Ed., 1997) refers to a large number of judgments of the High Courts and says:

"Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which provides that where a party to an execution proceedings dies during its pendency, provisions as to abatement do not apply. The rule is, therefore, for the benefit of the decree holder, for his heirs need not take steps for substitution under Rule 2 but may apply immediately or at any time while the proceeding is pending, to carry on the proceeding or they may file a fresh execution application."
15. In our opinion, the above statement of law in Mulla's Commentary on the CPC, correctly represents the legal position relating to the procedure to be adopted by the parties in execution proceedings and as to the powers of the Civil Court.

16. It is clear, therefore, that if after the filing of an execution petition in time, the decree holder dies and his legal representatives do not come on record - or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, then there is no abatement of the execution petition. If there is no abatement, the position in the eye of law is that the execution petition remains pending on the file of the execution Court. If it remains pending and if no time limit is prescribed to bring the legal representatives on record in execution proceedings, it is open in case of death of the decree holder, for his legal representative to come on record at any time. The execution application cannot even be dismissed for default behind the back of the decree holder's legal representatives. In case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder could file an application to bring the legal representatives of the judgment debtor on record, at any time. Of course, in case of death of judgment-debtor, the Court can fix a reasonable time for the said purpose and if the decree holder does not file an application for the aforesaid purpose, the Court can dismiss the execution petition for default. But in any event the execution petition cannot be dismissed as abated. Alternatively, it is also open to the decree holder's legal representatives, to file a fresh execution petition in case of death of the decree holder; OR, in case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder can file a fresh execution petition impleading the legal representatives of the judgment debtor; such a fresh execution petition, if filed, is, in law, only a continuation of the pending execution petition - the one which was filed in time by the decree holder initially. This is the position under the CPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

S.L.P. (C) No..../1998 (CC 1802)

Decided On: 18.02.1998

 V. Uthirapathi Vs. Ashrab Ali and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.
Citation: AIR 1998 SC 1168
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Wednesday, 6 September 2017

Whether decree holder of foreign arbitral award enforceable in India can file application for winding up?

This court is in full consonance with the above views. A decree holder would not cease to be a creditor. The liability is only crystallized in the form of a decree or award. A creditor has a right to invoke the provisions of the Companies Act. This court is of the view that a decree holder can only be in a better position. He will have a right to either execute a decree or file an application for winding up.
13. The learned senior counsel for the respondent has contended that the respondent has filed an appeal against the order in O.P.No.56/2014. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgement of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in 2011 (8) SCC 333 cited supra to contend that the appeal under the Letters Patent Act is not maintainable.
14. Upon perusal of the records, it can be seen that the Respondent has raised all the defences available to them under Section 48 before this Court in O.P.No.56/2014 and the same was negatived. The Respondent has not challenged the award before the jurisdictional court. The appeal said to have been filed by the Respondent in 2014 is not even numbered. Obviously, there is no stay. This court feels that it is unnecessary to go into the maintainability of the appeal. In the said circumstances, it can only be construed as no appeal is pending against the order in O.P.No.56/2014 and therefore, the award has become final and enforceable. As per Section 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, once the court finds that the foreign award is enforceable, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that court. Therefore, the Petitioner is deemed to have obtained a decree from this court. As this court has already held that the decree holder would still continue to be creditor, this petition for winding up is maintainable. This court is also of the view that any leave or permission need not to be obtained when the right is conferred by law. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the rtthat the decree in O.P.No.56/2014 only permits the Petitioner to file an execution petition is also rejected.
Madras High Court
Sims Metal Management Limited vs Sabari Exim Private Limited on 31 March, 2015
CORAM: MR.JUSTICE R.MAHADEVAN

CP.No.350/2014

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Monday, 29 May 2017

Whether two simultaneous execution application filed by decree holder against two Judgment Debtors is tenable?

 Order 21 Rule 11 CPC does not bar simultaneous executions.-A decree holder would be entitled to file two execution petitions for realizing or recovering the decretal amount due from two judgment debtors, when judgment and decree passed against them is joint and several. [20] and [21]

(a) However, in case of two execution petitions being filed namely, one for arrest of judgment debtor and other execution petition is filed to proceed against the property of same judgment debtor, then in such a situation, executing Court may refuse execution against the person and property of said judgment debtor at the same time as indicated in Order 21 Rule 30 CPC. [20]

(b) The reasoning adopted by the Executing Court either in holding that two simultaneous execution petitions filed by the decree holder against the principal debtor and the guarantor is not maintainable or directing the decree holder to amend the execution petitions so as to conform the claim made in two simultaneous execution petitions would not exceed the decretal amount put together cannot be sustained. [21]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
W.P. Nos. 32399, 32400, 32402, 32403, 32404, 32401 and 32405/2015 (GM-CPC)
Decided On: 29.04.2016
 PAFCO 2916 INC. and Ors.

Vs.

Kingfisher Airlines Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aravind Kumar, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 karnat 10
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Saturday, 27 May 2017

Whether decree holder can execute decree as well as initiate contempt proceeding against Judgment debtor?

 Our court in MANU/MH/0195/2004 : 2004 (6) Bom. C.R. 356 European Investment Limited vs. Triumph International Finance India Limited and others has also held that availability of the remedy of the execution proceeding does not bar the contempt proceedings since it is an additional remedy. Such proceedings are between the court and deemed Contemnor and the complainant therein may not receive any relief to his benefit. The discretion given to the court in its contempt jurisdiction is for the maintenance of the court's dignity and majesty of law. Paragraph 39 of the said judgment reads as under:-
"39. Merely because the order is an executable order, it cannot be said that no contempt proceedings would lie against the defaulter in such cases nor it can be said that in case of monetary claim under a order or undertaking, the defaulter cannot be made to face contempt proceedings. The law laid down by the Apex Court and the decisions referred to above clearly reveal that the contempt proceedings are independent of the execution proceedings and are primarily made to ensure the compliance of the Court's order rather than giving a relief to the parties and, therefore, mere availability of the execution proceedings cannot be construed as bar for contempt proceedings as the remedies are not alternative remedies and they can be invoked simultaneously. The purpose behind the execution proceedings is solely to enable the decree holder to enjoy the fruits of the decree in his favour while the contempt proceedings are primarily to ensure the compliance of the Court's order and in case of failure thereof to punish the contemner."
67. In every case like our present case, the party may simply not take any step to comply with the order and will simply keep quite. It is for the party to take all possible steps to ensure prompt compliance of the courts order and in that regards to disclose what steps have been taken to comply with the order with facts and figures duly supported by materials on record. Failure in that regard would warrant conclusion about the willful default in compliance with the order. When the judgment of the single Judge in the European Investment Limited case (supra) was impugned before the Appeal Court, the Appeal Court modified the said order. That was taken to the Apex Court. The Apex Court held that the Appeal Court should not have interfered with the order passed by the single Judge and set aside the order of the Appeal Court. In the matter of MANU/MH/0139/2004 : 2004 (5) Bom. C.R. 341 Santosh Dattaram Nadkarni and others vs. New India Industries Limited and others a single Judge of this court again held that contempt proceedings and execution proceedings, are two separate remedies available and can be invoked simultaneously and that contempt is a matter between the court and the person against contempt of court whereas the purpose behind execution proceedings is to enjoy the fruits of the decree in his favour.
68. The division bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of IILLN, High Court, Madras 845 India Forge and Drop Stampings Ltd., Madras vs. India Forge and Drop Stampings Employee's Union, Madras has held that a perusal of section 22 of the 1971 Act would show that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, "shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law." The court has held that the object of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is to punish a party guilty of the disobedience as contemplated by section 2(b) of the said act. The purpose is not to "execute" any order, for which purpose the aggrieved party shall have to take recourse to other proceedings known to law. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment reads as under:-
"13. The submission on behalf of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that since the order, disobedience of which is complained of, is capable of being enforced in some other manner known to law, an application for contempt of Court for non-compliance of that order is not maintainable, has no merit. There is no warrant for saying that where an order, the disobedience of which is complied of, can be executed, the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and to punish the offender, if proved guilty, under S. 12 of the said Act, is in any way affected. As a matter of fact, a perusal of S. 22 of the 1971, "shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law." The section, unmistakably declares that its provisions are to be taken in addition to and not in derogation of the other laws. In view of this express inhibition in absolute terms against the provisions of the 1971 Act being considered in derogation of any other law, the argument that since the order, disobedience of which is complained of, could have been got executed through a procedure otherwise known to law, recourse to contempt proceedings could not be had falls flat. The object of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is to punish a party guilty of the disobedience as contemplated by S. 2(b) of the said Act. The purpose is not to "execute" any order, for which purpose the aggrieved party shall have to take recourse to other proceedings known to law."
69. It should be remembered that when a party in whose favour an order has been made approaches the court to punish the disobedience of its order, he does not use those proceedings to get the order executed but merely brings to the notice of the court the objectionable conduct of the party disobeying the order and seeks action against that party for committing contempt of court. There is a clear distinction taken - having order executed and bringing to notice of the court willful disobedience on the part of the guilty party and seek to have him punished for contempt of court.
70. This has also been reiterated by the Apex Court in the matter of MANU/SC/1031/2003 : (2004) 1 SCC 360 Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya and another. Contempt is a matter between the court and the alleged Contemnor and is not affected in any manner by the rights and obligations of the parties to the litigation inter se. Rama Narang (supra) and MANU/SC/4065/2007 : (2007) 13 SCC 220 Maruti Udyog Limited vs. Mahinder C. Mehta and others, have confirmed this view. Though the Apex Court in the Food Corporation India (supra) has held that one cannot use contempt jurisdiction for enforcement of money decrees, it should be noted that the application in that matter as mentioned in paragraph 13 of the said judgment was for enforcement of the order by attachment of the property by seizing and auctioning the movable and immovable properties of FCI. No such relief in the nature of execution is being sought in the present matter.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Contempt Petition No. 2 of 2015 in Company Application (L) No. 70 of 2013 in Company Appeal No. 15 of 2013 in CLB/Company Petition No. 13 of 2012
Decided On: 09.02.2016

 Rajinder Kumar Malhotra Vs. Paresh Biharilal Vyas and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.R. Shriram, J.

Citation:2017 (3) ALLMR 129
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Sunday, 16 April 2017

Whether decree-holder can execute the decree for a permanent injunction against legal heirs of judgment debtor?

This Court has laid down that legal representatives of decree holder can execute decree for permanent injunction relating to property or right which is heritable and partible. When such is the situation, in our opinion, it would be open to decree holder to execute decree against successor of interest of judgment-debtor also.
In our considered opinion the right which had been adjudicated in the suit in the present matter and the findings which have been recorded as basis for grant of injunction as to the disputed property which is heritable and partible would enure not only to the benefit of the legal heir of decree-holders but also would bind the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. It is apparent from section 50 CPC that when a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been satisfied, it can be executed against legal representatives. Section 50 is not confined to a particular kind of decree. Decree for injunction can also be executed against legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” is limited to certain class of cases as indicated by this Court in Girijanandini Devi v.Bijendra Narain Choudhary (supra) and when the right litigated upon is heritable, the decree would not normally abate and can be enforced by LRs. of decree-holder and against the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives. It would be against the public policy to ask the decree-holder to litigate once over again against the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor when the cause and injunction survives. No doubt, it is true that a decree for injunction normally does not run with the land. In the absence of statutory provisions it cannot be enforced. However, in view of the specific provisions contained in section 50 CPC, such a decree can be executed against legal representatives.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(Before Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ.)
Prabhakara Adiga v. Gowri & Ors.
Civil Appeal Nos. 3007-3008 of 2017

Decided on February 20, 2017
Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 153,
(2017) 4 SCC97,AIR 2017 SC 1061
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Saturday, 25 March 2017

When decree can be executed by judgment debtor?

  An interesting legal question pop up for determination:

             Can a decree in a suit for fixation of common boundary of the


properties belonging to the plaintiffs and defendants be executed at the


instance of the defendants?

  The point germane for consideration is about the executability

of the decree for demarcation of a common boundary separating the

properties of the plaintiffs and defendants at the instance of the

defendants. I am unable to agree with the view expressed by the court

below that such a decree cannot be executed by the defendants for the


following reasons.      The court below failed to consider the marked

difference in the expressions used by the CPC in Section 2(3) and Order

XXI Rule 10.      The term "decree holder" is defined in Section 2(3) CPC.

The expression used is "holder of a decree" in Order XXI Rule 10 CPC. At

first blush, it may appear to be synonymous. But, according to me, there is

a legal distinction between these two expressions. The expression "holder

of a decree" occurring in Order XXI Rule 10 CPC takes in a transferee of a


decree and a legal representative of the decree holder also. Order XXI

Rule 16 CPC deals with an application for execution by transferee of a

decree. Such a person also comes within the expression "holder of a

decree". In this context, I may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in

Dhani Ram v. Sri Ram (AIR 1980 SC 157). Answering a question as to


whether the property in a decree passes as intended in the deed of


assignment, without the recognition of transfer by the court as a pre-


condition, the Supreme Court held that the property in a decree must pass


to the transferee under a deed of assignment when the parties to the deed


intend such property to pass and it does not depend on the court's


recognition of the transfer. It goes without saying that such a transferee is


also entitled to execute the decree. Therefore, the expression "holder of a

decree" in Order XXI Rule 10 CPC takes in parties other than whose name

appear on the decree. Likewise, a legal representative of the decree

holder, though his name may not be inscribed in the decree, can execute it

as provided in the CPC. The term "decree holder" defined in Section 2(3)

CPC takes in persons whose names appear on the record as the persons

in whose favour the decree was made. It includes persons who have been

recognized by the court by order as the decree holder from the original

plaintiff or his representative (see Paupayya v. Narasannah (ILR 2


Madras 216).
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM

                                                         PRESENT:

                           MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD

                           26TH DAY OF JUNE 2015

                          CRP.No. 321 of 2013 ()
                                                    
        SOMAVALLY
            Vs
        PRASANNA KUMAR
Citation;AIR 2015 Kerala 286
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